Lewis v. Container Port Group

872 S.W.2d 134, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 442, 1994 WL 75770
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 15, 1994
Docket64708
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 872 S.W.2d 134 (Lewis v. Container Port Group) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewis v. Container Port Group, 872 S.W.2d 134, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 442, 1994 WL 75770 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinions

CRANE, Presiding Judge.

Employer/insurer appeals from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s order dismissing employer/insurer’s Application for Review of Temporary or Partial Award. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

On April 27, 1990 claimant, Paul Lewis, an independent tractor-trailer driver, was injured while driving a truck for employer, [135]*135Container Port Group. In June, 1990 claimant filed a claim for compensation under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act against employer and insurer, Wausau Insurance Co., for injuries to his “back, right knee, headaches, neck & nervous.”

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) heard this claim on June 8, 1992. The parties agreed that the disputed issues at the hearing were: medical causation, future medical care, nature and extent of temporary total disability, and nature and extent of permanent partial disability.

On September 2, 1992, the ALJ issued a “Temporary or Partial Award,” which recited in part:

This award is only temporary or partial, is subject to further order, and the proceedings are hereby continued and the case kept open until a final award can be made.

The ALJ found that claimant’s low back, neck and right knee injuries and his symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder were caused by the April 27, 1990 accident, but that his headaches and vision problems were not caused by the accident. She found that claimant was suffering from Obstructive Sleep Apnea and that it was aggravated or accelerated by the accident. She found that claimant was paid temporary total disability benefits from the date of the accident through August 2, 1990 and that he was no longer entitled to further benefits for the low back, neck and right knee injuries or for the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

She further found that claimant is “temporarily totally disabled as a result of his Obstructive Sleep Apnea.” She ordered the employer to pay temporary total disability benefits from December 10, 1990 to the time of the award and for an undetermined number of additional weeks. Because of the need for ongoing treatment, the ALJ found she could not determine the extent of permanent partial disability.

On September 16, 1992 employer/insurer filed an Application For Review with the Commission. In the Application for Review, employer/insurer alleged that the ALJ’s award was erroneous because: •

Although [Claimant’s obstructive sleep apnea] may have been mildly aggravated by the accident, the accident did not cause claimant’s obstructive sleep apnea, nor did the accident cause claimant’s obstructive sleep apnea to escalate to the level of disability. Claimant’s obstructive sleep apnea would have progressed to its present, disabling severity had claimant not been in the accident.

On September 13, 1993 the Commission dismissed employer’s/insurer’s Application for Review pursuant to 8 CSR 20-3.0401 because it found that “The employer/insurer are not denying any and all liability, just that portion of the award which pertains to sleep apnea.” The Commission’s order went on to state:

The Commission construes the above rule [8 CSR 20-3.040] as requiring an allegation' that the employer/insurer deny all liability, not just liability for a portion of the award. The rule also is not intended to allow review of the nature and extent of [136]*136a temporary award. The Commission having fully considered the Application for Review filed in this cause and pursuant to the above-cited rule finds it inappropriate at this time to review the temporary or partial award issued by the administrative law judge. Wherefore, the Commission finds that said Application for Review of the Temporary or Partial Award must be and is hereby dismissed. The cause is remanded to the Division of Workers’ Compensation for any further proceedings as are necessary. (Emphasis in original).

Claimant urges that we have no jurisdiction to review the Commission’s action because it has not issued a final award. We agree.

Here, the ALJ made a temporary or partial award, for temporary total disability benefits, leaving open the determination of the extent of permanent partial disability. Section 287.510, RSMo 1986, provides for temporary or partial awards which may be modified and may be kept open until a final award can be made.

The decisions appealable in workers’ compensation proceedings are only those expressly declared to be appealable by statute. Blanford v. Robinett’s Motor and Tmck Service, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Mo.App.1993). The Missouri constitution, art. 5, § 18 provides that all final decisions of administrative officers or bodies are subject to direct judicial review. Section 287.495, RSMo 1986, provides that the final awards of the Commission may be appealed to the Missouri court of appeals.

Finality is found when the agency arrives at a terminal, complete resolution of the case before it. Blanford, 865 S.W.2d at 876. An order lacks finality in this sense where it remains tentative, provisional, or contingent, subject to recall, revision or reconsideration by the issuing agency. Id. A final award is one which disposes of the entire controversy between the parties. Id.

There is no statutory authorization to appeal the Commission’s orders dismissing applications for review of temporary or partial awards. Further, the dismissal order is not a final order because it does not completely resolve the case before it. The matter is still pending before the ALJ until a final award can be made. The temporary award is by its terms subject to further order.

Employer/insurer does not dispute that the ALJ’s ruling on the temporary award remains subject to modification, either by the ALJ in the final award or by the Commission on review of such a final award. Rather, employer/insurer essentially takes the position that the Commission’s refusal to step in and review the award now puts employer/insurer in an impossible position that, as a practical matter, prevents it from obtaining meaningful judicial review of the final award. According to employer/insurer, this is because it must either refuse to pay, subjecting it to the potential doubling penalty set forth in § 287.510 RSMo 1986 if the temporary award is ultimately upheld, or pay the award as ordered, including all ongoing medical bills, without any realistic possibility of re-coupment if the temporary award is ultimately reversed. From these premises, employer/insurer reason that 8 CSR 20-3.040 must be deemed unconstitutional because it violates Article 2, § 1 of the Missouri Constitution relating to separation of powers and Article 5, § 18 of the Missouri Constitution, which provides for direct review of final administrative decisions by the courts. We decline to review this constitutional challenge in the absence of jurisdiction and a fully developed record on the issues raised.

Accordingly, we hold that we do not have jurisdiction to review the Commission’s order dismissing the Application for Review and dismiss the appeal. Claimant’s request for sanctions for frivolous appeal is denied.

KAROHL, J., concurs. CRAHAN, J., concurs and files separate concurring opinion.

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Lewis v. Container Port Group
872 S.W.2d 134 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
872 S.W.2d 134, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 442, 1994 WL 75770, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lewis-v-container-port-group-moctapp-1994.