Levy v. Runnells (In Re Landbank Equity Corp.)

66 B.R. 949, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5002
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedNovember 6, 1986
Docket19-10458
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 66 B.R. 949 (Levy v. Runnells (In Re Landbank Equity Corp.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Levy v. Runnells (In Re Landbank Equity Corp.), 66 B.R. 949, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5002 (Va. 1986).

Opinion

EXHAUSTIVE OPINION AND ORDER

HAL J. BONNEY, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

Prologue

As with any word, it can be misapplied for the occasion, but the word saga seems to have salient application here. John Galsworthy spoke of The Forsythe Saga, M.R. Ridley of the Vikings, and McCarten even thought the story of the pilot who dropped the atomic bomb a saga.

The canvas upon which Landbank Equity Corporation splashed was unbelievably enormous laying upon it a once successful business, a family, a covey of investors and a flock of sheep.

Even when it is only faintly realizable, many seek fulfillment of the American dream, “my own home.” That it is not more easily attainable is the subject for our consideration in our class on Learning for Life and not here. For those who wade the depths of homeownership, often a first mortgage is inadequate and these dreamers fall into the temptation of extending themselves into a second mortgage. In the marketplace, then, taking it as we find it, there is a need for honest money changers, those who make a second loan possible.

Landbank served that function, in the finality abysmally, yet it would be unjust to characterize all borrowers as tragedy-ridden; indeed, many, perhaps a majority, rolled the dice twice and paid the piper successfully. And that’s what Landbank was — a highly successful second mortgage business. It made huge profits prior to the Gothic god of greed being enthroned at Landbank.

Something happened — an understatement — and that ‘something’ is much a part of this seership. Acting as the servicing agent for many investor firms who were into Landbank, it [Landbank] was making the second mortgage loans, was collecting the monthly dues from the borrowers, but was not always remitting the coin to the investors. Indeed, during the last month of its operation, Landbank became a dead end and did not pass on approximately $9.5 million collected. A hole in the sewer opened and a Runnells’ ransom vanished. The reply is always that it went for operating expenses. We do not here consider the good or the bad, the right or the wrong, of Landbank’s relationship with the borrowers. That course of dealing is another’s present danger.

So, something happened. Landbank was unable to keep the perpetual motion machine going and on September 17, 1985, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, but this was but a gesture and was quickly followed in seven days by a *953 conversion to a case under Chapter 7 (straight bankruptcy).

The United States Trustee, pursuant to his power and duty under 11 U.S.C. § 15701, appointed Laurence H. Levy as Interim Trustee, later, by operation of law, to become full trustee. After months of investigation, the trustee filed this action seeking to recover from relatives and entities related to Landbank funds the trustee believes went to them illegally.

Following discovery and disposition of preliminary motions a plenty, this matter went to trial, a lengthy one, n’est pas?

The Case

The trustee’s star witness was Keith L. Davis, C.P.A., of KMG Main Kurdman, a prominent international investigative accounting firm employed by the trustee to undertake a thorough and exhaustive inquiry into the affairs of Anatol. This is the foundation upon which the trustee seeks to build his case and the evidence supports the conclusion that a thorough and exhaustive inquiry was made. As many as fifteen persons were involved and 2,900 hours expended.

Obviously, the quality of the inquiry is put at issue by the defendants, but the accountants make their case and while the degree of proof does not change, the burden certainly shifted to the defendants to explain what happened.

With such an obviously large potential fee involved for such extensive work, counsel for the defendants asked Davis if he was biased, favored his employer. No, Davis replied, he was impartial and had, in fact, advised the trustee to abandon pursuit in some areas.

Let it be said now and repeated later, as it is paramount, the Court has heard and observed the witnesses and weighed their demeanor, their credibility. All factual conclusions and the weight to be given their testimony are on that fateful but not isolated scale.

Further, two cardinal premises prevailed and ran without interruption underneath and throughout the trial and, of course, bear upon the Court’s decision. Almost every piece of evidence relates to them.

I. The accountants concluded that

(a) The books and records are in a state of gross disarray;

(b) The books and records reflect a complete lack of internal control; and

(c) As a result, their accuracy is very much in question, 1

II. In chief, the trustee has built his case upon the defendants’ own records.

Further, as threads throughout the saga of each defendant and conclusions of fact, there are basic badges of fraud which relate to the elements alleged by the trustee; fraud, preferences, fraudulent conveyances, and phony corporate veils:

(1) The accountants found more than ninety (90) names of other entities (partnerships, corporations, companies and individuals) between and among which the assets of Landbank were passed. Imagine, ninety.

(2) The accountants concluded that considerable property was placed in the names of strawmen to deceive and conceal problems.

(3) Funds were transferred constantly, as for example, between Property Buyers, Inc. and Landbank.

(4) Millions of dollars of property has vanished. For instance, once Landbank had sixty automobiles, but at bankruptcy had but one.

(5) Insiders' were constantly favored, particularly through loans and no charge for “points” in transactions, while the public paid as high as forty points for a loan.

(6) Financial statements never reflected loan loss write offs; foreclosure loan losses were hidden in the Property Buyers entity.

*954 (7) Loans were constantly made to insiders in spite of a written December 3, 1980, company policy prohibiting this.

(8) Open access to the drawing of checks existed on a higher level.

(9) Appraisals were signed in blank or were not actually made at all.

Prior to considering each defendant one by one, we must stand back and ask “Do separate and individual entities arise or does it all blend into a single entity, one blended landscape without restraints?” Legally, is all the alter ego of Landbank? While the nine elements above speak to many issues, they speak clearly to this particular one as well.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cites itself frequently on the issue of piercing the corporate veil always referring back to

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Bluebook (online)
66 B.R. 949, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5002, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/levy-v-runnells-in-re-landbank-equity-corp-vaeb-1986.