1 O 2
6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8
9 LEVON AYRAPETOV, Case No.: 5:26-cv-00599-MEMF-PVC
10 ORDER GRANTING IN PART 11 PETITIONER’S EX PARTE APPLICATION Petitioner, FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 12 v. AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 2] 13 DAVID MARIN et al.,
15 Respondents. 16
19 Before the Court is the Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion 20 Preliminary Injunction filed by Petitioner Levon Ayra petov. Dkt. No. 2 (“Application”). For the 21 reason s stated herein, the Application is GRANTED IN PART : the Court grants the Temporary 22 Restraining Order, and issues an Order to Show Cause why a Preliminary Injunction should not 23 issue, but does not grant a Preliminary Injunction at this time. 24
28 1 I. Background
2 A. Factual Background1
3 Petitioner Levon Ayrapetov is a native and citizen of the USSR, who entered the United
4 States on January 8, 1992. Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”) at 2. In 1999, Ayrapetov was convicted of robbery
5 under California Penal Code Section 211. Id. In 2011, Ayrapetov was convicted cannabis cultivation
6 and possession of a firearm. Id. Due to these convictions, Ayrapetov received a final order of
7 removal on January 1, 2015. Id.
8 After eleven (11) months in ICE custody, Ayrapetov was released on supervised release
9 because ICE had failed to obtain any travel document to the USSR, Armenia, and Azerbaijian. Id.
10 Since Ayrapetov’s release, he has complied with the terms of his supervised release and has made all
11 his scheduled check-ins except one in 2024 due to his mother suffering a stroke. Id.; Reply at 4.
12 After missing the one check-in in 2024, ICE placed Ayrapetov on electronic monitoring for
13 six months. Reply at 4. Ayrapetov complied with his electronic monitoring and was scheduled to
14 have his electronic monitor removed on February 2, 2026. Petition at 2.
15 On February 2, 2026, Ayrapetov was asked to report to the ICE Field Office in Downtown
16 Los Angeles. Id. Upon his arrival, Ayrapetov was immediately arrested and redetained. Id.
17 Ayrapetov was never provided notice regarding the reasons for the revocation of his supervised
18 release. Id. at 2-3. And Ayrapetov was not given an informal interview to contest the revocation. Id.
19 After his redetention, ICE began to ask Ayrapetov to sign travel documents related to his removal.
20 Reply at 4.
21 As of the filing of this Petition, Ayrapetov remains in ICE custody. Petition at 2.
B. Procedural History 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the following factual background is derived from Ayrapetov’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 28 Corpus. Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”). This Court is not, at this time, making a final determination as to the veracity of the facts 1 On February 9, 2026, Ayrapetov filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C.
2 § 2241 in this matter. Petition. Ayrapetov also filed an Ex Parte Application for Temporary
3 Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction on February 9, 2026.2 Application.
4 On February 12, 2026, the Court ordered the Respondents to file a response to the
5 Application by February 17, 2026, at 5pm. Dkt. No. 8. The Court’s Order also ordered Ayrapetov to
6 file a Reply by February 18, 2026, at 5pm. Id. On February 17, 2026, Respondents filed an
7 Opposition. Dkt. No. 13 (“Opposition”). On February 18, 2026, Ayrapetov filed a Reply. Dkt. No.
8 14 (“Reply”).
9 II . Applicable Law 10 A. Preliminary Injunctions 11 The analysis that courts must perform for temporary restraining orders and preliminary 12 injunc tions is “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 13 832, 8 39 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 sets forth the procedure for issuance of 14 a preli minary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 15 remed y never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To 16 qualif y for injunctive relief, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) 17 a likel ihood that he will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; (3) the balance of equities tips 18 in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. This Court cannot grant the 19 prelim inary injunction “unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” 20 Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). 21 The Ninth Circuit has held that injunctive relief may is sue, even if the moving party cannot 22 show a likelihood of success on the merits, if “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance 23 of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, 24 so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the 25 26 2 The Court notes that it appears that Petitioner did not comply with Local Rule 7-19.1 in filing his Application as the 27 Application does not include the contact information for the opposing party, as well as a declaration of the movant’s efforts to contact other counsel. L.R. 7-19.1. Given that the Defendant is pro se, detained, and seeking emergency relief, 28 and in light of the fact that Respondents do not argue that the Application should be denied for failure to comply with 1 injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th
2 Cir. 2011). Under either formulation of the principles, preliminary injunctive relief should be denied
3 if the probability of success on the merits is low. See Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670,
4 675 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[E]ven if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party,
5 it must be shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits.”).
6 B. Habeas Petitions in the Immigration Detention Context
7 District Courts are “generally prohibit[ed]” from “entering injunctions that order federal
8 officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out”
9 certain provisions of the INA, found in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596
10 U.S. 543, 550 (2022). But “lower courts retain the authority to ‘enjoin or restrain the operation of’
11 the relevant statutory provisions ‘with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual
12 [noncitizen] against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.’ Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
13 1252(f)(1)).3 This Court, therefore, may grant relief in “individual cases.” Reno v. American-Arab
14 Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1999).
15 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court established that courts should
16 treat a six-month period of detention as “presumptively reasonable.” Id. at 700–01. It explained:
17 After this 6–month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the 18 Respondents must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for
detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, 19 what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. 20 This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every [noncitizen] not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, a [noncitizen] may be held 21 in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 22 Id. at 701. In other words, trial courts considering an immigration detainee’s habeas petition seeking 23 release must first ascertain if the detainee has demonstrated good reason to believe that, in the 24 reasonably foreseeable future, there is no significant likelihood of removal. Only then does the 25 burden shift to the Respondents to rebut that showing. 26 27
28 3 Where it does not change the meaning, this Court will endeavor to use the term “noncitizen” in place of alien, 1 A different framework applies, however, once an immigrant has been “released under an
2 order of supervision.” 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i)(1). To “revoke an [noncitizen]’s release under this
3 section and return the [noncitizen] to custody,” the Service must “determine[] that there is a
4 significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.
5 § 241.13(i)(2). “Upon revocation, the [noncitizen] will be notified of the reasons for revocation of
6 his or her release,” and is entitled to an initial interview after the immigrant’s return to custody to
7 allow the immigrant to respond, submit evidence, or otherwise demonstrate that “there is no
8 significant likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. § 241.13(i)(3).
9 III. Discussion
10 A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Matter.
11 Respondents argue that, “[t]o the extent Petitioner is challenging his Removal Order, this
12 Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g),” and that Sections 1252(a)(5) and
13 1252(b)(9) also bar review. Opposition at 2-5. Ayrapetov counters that this Court has jurisdiction
14 under 8 U.S.C. § 2241 because Ayrapetov is not seeking to challenge his final removal order. Reply
15 at 12-13. For the reasons below, this Court finds that Section 2241 grants this Court jurisdiction, and
16 none of Respondents’ proffered jurisdictional bars apply here.
17 As this Court has explained supra, it lacks authority to enjoin the Government or its
18 subdivisions to “take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out”
19 certain provisions of the INA. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. at 550. But it may still enjoin the
20 operation of statutory provisions as they apply to an individual noncitizen in removal proceedings.
21 Id. Put another way, the Supreme Court has recognized that this Court’s jurisdiction to enter
22 individual habeas relief, where appropriate, does not improperly bear on the Government’s ability to 23 carry out immigration policy decisions. 24 As a general matter, in arguing this Court lacks jurisdiction, Respondents appear to 25 inaccurately describe the question posed to this Court. They note, and then justify, that the Court is 26 stripped of jurisdiction over challenges to the commencement of “removal proceedings.” Opposition 27 at 4. But this case does not challenge the execution of a final removal order—the Petition merely 28 alleges that, when Respondents redetained Ayrapetov, they did not afford him the process he was 1 due. Petition at 4. That inquiry is entirely independent of whether the government may execute the
2 final removal order.
3 With this framework in mind, the three statutes that Respondents argue prevent this Court
4 from exercising jurisdiction are inapposite.
5 Section 1252(g) states that no court may hear a nonimmigrant’s case “arising from the
6 decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
7 removal orders against an [undocumented person].” Respondents suggest that this statute bars any
8 District Court claims—in habeas or otherwise—that would prevent or delay the government from
9 executing that final removal order. Opposition at 3-4. But the Supreme Court has rejected “the
10 unexamined assumption that § 1252(g) covers the universe of deportation claims,” and has instead
11 endorsed a “much narrower” read that is confined to the “three discrete actions” listed above. Reno,
12 525 U.S. at 482. With this reading in mind, Section 1252(g) does not apply here. Neither the instant
13 Application nor the Petition stem from (or challenge) the commencement of proceedings,
14 adjudication of a case, or the execution of a removal order. Instead, they seek that this Court find
15 that the manner in which Ayrapetov was redetained was in violation of his constitutional and
16 statutory protections. Petition at 4. Respondents cite no authority for their proposed broad reading of
17 Section 1252(g), particularly the idea that it would prevent any claim that had the effect of delaying
18 the government’s execution of a final removal order. And, even if they did, this Court is not inclined
19 to find that this argument would be relevant: Nothing in this Court’s ruling today (or Ayrapetov’s
20 requested relief) prevents Ayrapetov’s redetention or removal.
21 Nor do Respondents’ other two suggested jurisdictional bars operate in this case. Section
22 1252(a)(5) states that “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance 23 with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal 24 entered or issued under any provision of this chapter.” And Section 1252(b)(9) states that “[j]udicial 25 review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to 26 remove an alien from the United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order 27 under this section.” The Ninth Circuit has clarified that these two provisions only “channel judicial 28 review over final orders of removal to the courts of appeals.” J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). And, again, Ayrapetov has not requested this Court to
2 review his removal order itself. See generally Petition. Neither the Petition nor the TRO before this
3 Court contest the basis of the final removal order. Nor does this Court intend to call into question the
4 merits of the Respondents’ reasons, or the basis of the Respondents’ authority, to remove Ayrapetov.
5 In sum, this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition and consider
6 the granting of injunctive relief as a preliminary matter, if appropriate.
7 B. Ayrapetov Provides a Sufficient Legal Basis for Relief.
8 Respondents argue that Ayrapetov’s Application is facially flawed as it “assumes with no
9 evidence [] or factual support that he would be removed unlawfully to an undesignated third country
10 and without notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Opposition at 5.
11 Although the Application is brief, it does argue the factual and legal basis for the requested
12 relief because it specifically references the claims set forth in Ayrapetov’s Petition, and the Petition
13 argues why Ayrapetov is likely to succeed on the merits for Ayrapetov’s claims. See Application at
14 1-3; see generally Petition. Ayrapetov subsequently included additional exhibits and discussion in
15 the Reply. See generally Reply. Therefore, the Court holds that Ayrapetov provides a sufficient legal
16 basis for relief.
C. Applying the Winter factors, Ayrapetov Is Entitled to a Temporary Restraining 17 Order. 18 As discussed above, the standard for granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
19 injunction are substantively identical. Given the urgency of this matter, this Court has only
20 considered whether Ayrapetov is entitled to a temporary restraining order. Having determined below
21 that Ayrapetov is entitled to a temporary restraining order, the Court will issue an order to show
22 cause as to why a preliminary injunction should issue, which should permit further development of 23 the record and additional briefing. 24 Ayrapetov advances two grounds upon which a temporary restraining order should be 25 granted. First, Ayrapetov argues that ICE unequivocally failed to provide notice or an opportunity to 26 be heard prior to Ayrapetov’s redetention. Petition at 4; Reply at 6. Second, Ayrapetov asserts that 27 there is no good reason to believe that Ayrapetov’s removal to the USSR, Armenia, or Azerbaijan 28 1 will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petition at 5-6; Reply at 7-8. As such, Ayrapetov
2 alleges that Respondents violated 8 U.S.C. §§ 241.13(i)(2)-(3), 241.4(I). Petition at 4.
3 The Court addresses these grounds below.
4 i. The first Winter factor, likelihood of success on the merits, is met with respect to both grounds. 5 1. There is no significant likelihood of Ayrapetov’s removal to the USSR, 6 Armenia, or Azerbaijan in the reasonably foreseeable future.
7 On his first ground, Ayrapetov argues that Respondents have failed to establish that her
8 removal to the USSR, Armenia, or Azerbaijan is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.
9 Petition at 5-6; Reply at 7-8. Respondents counter, stating that they have applied for travel
10 documents and that Ayrapetov “has refused to participate in obtaining travel documents or otherwise
11 assist in his removal,” thereby “adding several weeks to his detention.” Opposition at 1.
12 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court established that a six-month period of detention was
13 presumptively reasonable. 533 U.S. at 701. Thus, in order to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
14 the merits, Ayrapetov has to indicate that there is good reason to believe that there is no likelihood of
15 removal in the near future. Id. However, because Ayrapetov is an immigrant released under an order
16 of supervision, Section 241.13 codifies how Zadvydas should apply:
17 This section establishes special review procedures for those [noncitizens] who are subject to a final order of removal and are detained under the custody review procedures 18 provided at § 241.4 after the expiration of the removal period, where the [noncitizen]
has provided good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal to the 19 country to which he or she was ordered removed . . . in the reasonably foreseeable 20 future.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a) (emphasis added). This therefore indicates that the subsection Ayrapetov relies 21
upon—241.13(i)(2)-(3)—only applies where the noncitizen has made the showing of “good reason 22 to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal.” And this mirrors Zadvydas: “[a]fter [the] 6- 23 month period, once the [non-citizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant 24 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Respondents must respond with 25 evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” 533 U.S. at 701. 26 Ayrapetov has provided good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of 27 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Under Section 241.13(i)(2), Respondents bear the 28 1 burden to establish that there is a significant likelihood that Ayrapetov may be removed in the
2 reasonably foreseeable future.
3 As detailed by Ayrapetov, ICE, in 2015, tried and failed to remove Ayrapetov to: (1) the
4 USSR because the USSR was dissolved in 1991; (2) Armenia because Ayrapetov is not recognized
5 as an Armenian citizen; and (3) Azerbaijan because Ayrapetov is not recognized as an Azerbaijan
6 citizen. Petition at 1 n.1, 5-6. Notably, Respondents, in their Opposition, do not detail efforts taken
7 toward Ayrapetov’s removal. See generally Opposition. They only indicate that Ayrapetov’s
8 removal has been delayed due to Ayrapetov’s refusal to assist Respondents’ removal efforts.4
9 Opposition at 1. And that they believe that they can obtain travel documents. Dkt. No. 13-1 ¶ 8.
10 Although Ayrapetov’s current length of detention is not excessive, as discussed by
11 Respondents, Petition at 2, Ayrapetov’s circumstances and background, raise genuine concerns as to
12 whether his removal is reasonably likely to occur in the future. The record demonstrates that
13 Respondents have previously failed to remove Ayrapetov to the intended countries—the USSR,
14 Armenia, and Azerbaijan—in 2015. Dkt. No. 13-1 ¶¶ 4-8; Petition at 5-6; Opposition at 1. During
15 that period, Ayrapetov remained in custody for seven and a half months. Reply at 9.
16 Further, the countries Respondents attempted to remove Ayrapetov to in 2015 have now
17 either been dissolved or explicitly declined to accept Ayrapetov in 2015. Dkt. No. 13-1 ¶¶ 6-8.
18 Respondents have not provided any timeline for when travel documents should be expected. Reply
19 at 7. As such, there is no significant likelihood of Ayrapetov’s removal to the USSR, Armenia, or
20 Azerbaijan in the reasonably foreseeable future. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. And Respondents have
21 not indicated a travel document is forthcoming in the near future. In sum, based on the record, it
22 does not appear that removal is reasonably foreseeable. Id. 23 This Court thus finds that Ayrapetov has demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits 24 of the question of whether his detention is unlawful under Zadvydas on this ground. 25 2. Ayrapetov was redetained without notice and was not provided an opportunity to be heard. 26 27 28 1 On this ground, Ayrapetov argues that Respondents failed to provide adequate notice or an
2 opportunity to be heard prior to Ayrapetov’s redetention. Petition at 4; Reply at 6. Respondents
3 claim that they are authorized to “arrest and detain noncitizens to effectuate final removal orders.”
4 Opposition at 2.
5 “‘The Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law’ in the context of
6 removal proceedings.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507
7 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). Accordingly, immigration detainees pending removal are “entitled to notice
8 and opportunity to be heard ‘appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central
9 Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
10 Respondents do not, in their Opposition, claim that Ayrapetov was: (1) provided notice of his
11 redetention; or (2) given an opportunity to be heard prior to his redetention. See generally
12 Opposition. In light of J.G.G., it appears that the applicable regulations, namely 8 U.S.C. §
13 241.13(i)(3) and 8 U.S.C. § 241.4(l)(1) are the means by which ICE has determined it will meet the
14 due process rights of putative detainees. The Respondents provide no reason that this Court should
15 find otherwise, and this Court declines to take the extraordinary position that these individuals are
16 not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard in the absence of clear direction—in binding
17 law, in the relevant statutes, or in the applicable regulations—to that effect. See generally
18 Opposition. Thus, the Court holds that Respondents’ admitted failure to provide Ayrapetov notice
19 and an opportunity to be heard constitutes an unequivocal violation of Section 241.13(i)(3).
20 This Court’s conclusion is consistent with that of other district courts. Particularly instructive
21 is the district court’s approach in McSweeney v. Warden of the Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 3:25-
22 CV-02488-RBM-DEB, 2025 WL 2998376 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025). There, the Court found that a 23 detention which did not properly notify the petitioner of the reasons for revocation of release, or 24 grant him an interview to allow him to respond to the reasons for revocation, violated the petitioner’s 25 due process rights. Id. at *5–7. In McSweeney, it appears that the petitioner had received adequate 26 notice, unlike Ayrapetov; there, the petitioner was sent a notice of the reasons for revocation of his 27 release. Id. at *6. Still, because there was no interview opportunity following that notice, the Court 28 found that the procedural deficiencies constituted violations of procedural due process. Id. In its 1 words, “Petitioner could not have meaningfully responded to the proffered reasons for revocation
2 when he had not yet even been informed of those reasons.” Id.
3 Today, the Court must determine whether Ayrapetov is likely to eventually prevail on the
4 merits. For the reasons described above, this Court finds that she is likely to succeed on the merits
5 under both of her arguments for habeas relief. In sum, the first Winter factor is met here under both
6 of Ayrapetov’s arguments for habeas relief.
7 ii. The second Winter factor, a demonstrated likelihood of irreparable harm absent an injunction, is met. 8 To establish the second Winter requirement, Ayrapetov must demonstrate a likelihood that 9 she w ill suffer irreparable harm without a temporary restraining order. This Court finds that she has 10 done s o. 11 As a threshold matter, Ayrapetov has “established a likelihood of irreparable harm by virtue 12 of the fact that [he is] likely to be unconstitutionally detained for an indeterminate period of time.” 13 Herna ndez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017). Respondents have provided no evidence 14 that A yrapetov’s detention will not be prolonged or that Ayrapetov’s removal is likely to occur in the 15 reason ably foreseeable future. See generally Opposition. Further, Respondents have failed to comply 16 with t he legal process that is due to her as a detained noncitizen. J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 673. And “it is 17 well e stablished that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable 18 injury .’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 19 347, 3 73 (1976)). Ayrapetov’s ongoing detention of indeterminate length—which may lead to a 20 deportation sometime in the future to an undetermined country—inherently risks his irreparable 21 harm, as it is not clear when he will be processed, released, or removed. Ayrapetov’s harm is 22 compounded by: (1) his separation from his wife and children; (2) his absence from the operation of 23 his business; and (3) the potential public abuse he will receive due to ICE publicizing his redetention 24 on social media platforms. Petition at 2; Reply at 3, 11-12; Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 484 25 (9th Cir.2001). 26 27 28 1 Thus, as this Court has already found that Ayrapetov has a sufficient likelihood of success on
2 the merits of both of his challenges to his current detention—one of which has a basis in
3 Ayrapetov’s constitutional rights—this Court finds the second Winter factor is met.
4 iii. The third and fourth Winter factors, balancing the equities and considering the public interest, are met. 5 When, as here, the nonmoving party is a Respondents entity, the last two Winter factors 6 “merg e.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). This Court then considers the third and fourth 7 factor s—whether the “balance of equities” is in Ayrapetov’s favor and whether an injunction is in 8 the pu blic interest—jointly. All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. 9 The balance of equities does appear to tilt strongly in Ayrapetov’s favor. The Court notes that 10 the Go vernment has a strong interest in the enforcement of federal immigration law. However, the 11 Respo ndents have failed to comply with binding authorities, resulting in the violation of Ayrapetov’s 12 consti tutional rights against unlawful detainment. Petition at 4; Reply at 12. “‘[I]t is clear that it 13 would not be equitable or in the public’s interest to allow the [Respondents] . . . to violate the 14 requir ements of federal law, especially when there are no adequate remedies available.’” Valle Del 15 Sol In c. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013). Given Ayrapetov’s unlawful detention, and 16 witho ut any reason to believe Ayrapetov’s removal or release will occur in the reasonably 17 forese eable future, the Court finds ample reason to conclude that “the balance of hardships tips 18 decide dly in plaintiffs’ favor.” Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983). And, for 19 related reasons, an injunction is in the public interest. “Public interest concerns are implicated when 20 a constitutional right has been violated, because all cit izens have a stake in upholding the 21 Const itution.” Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th C ir. 2005). 22 Accordingly, the third and fourth Winter factors are met here. 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 27 28 1 IV. Conclusion
2 For the foregoing reasons, the Application is GRANTED IN PART. Ayrapetov’s request for
3 a temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Court will rule on the request for a preliminary
4 injunction following the Order to Show Cause hearing described below.
5 1. Respondents are ORDERED to release Ayrapetov from custody (and return to him his
6 personal belongings) within forty-eight (48) hours,5 and they may not redetain him
7 without compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1), 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), and 8 U.S.C. §
8 1231;
9 2. Respondents are enjoined from relocating Ayrapetov outside of the Central District of
10 California pending final resolution of this matter;
11 3. This Court orders Respondents to show cause, in writing, as to why a preliminary
12 injunction should not issue.
13 a. Respondents’ brief is due at 5 PM on Wednesday, February 25,
14 2026. Ayrapetov may file a response brief by Friday, February
15 27, 2026.
16 b. The parties may stipulate to a different briefing schedule via
17 joint stipulation filed by 5 PM on Monday, February 23, 2026.
18 Should the parties wish to extend either briefing deadline past
19 Friday, March 6, 2026, the parties should also stipulate that this
20 temporary restraining order may remain in effect (without
21 converting to a preliminary injunction) through this Court’s
22 decision on the preliminary injunction. 23 c. The parties’ briefing on the preliminary injunction should 24 address whether the granting of this TRO renders the PI 25 request, and the habeas petition itself, moot. 26 27
28 5 This Court understands, based on Respondents’ representations from hearings in similar immigration habeas cases, that 1 4. The parties shall meet and confer and file a joint status report regarding the Respondents’ 2 compliance with this Order by March 2, 2026. 3 5. The Court waives the bond requirement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 65(c) as to Ayrapetov. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Af ——— 6 Dated: February 20, 2026 7 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 8 United States District Judge 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28