Levi Thomas v. Diamond M Drilling Co.

569 F.2d 926, 1978 A.M.C. 1548, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12110
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMarch 17, 1978
Docket76-3461
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 569 F.2d 926 (Levi Thomas v. Diamond M Drilling Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Levi Thomas v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 569 F.2d 926, 1978 A.M.C. 1548, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12110 (5th Cir. 1978).

Opinion

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge.

Levi Thomas was injured in March, 1974, while working as a roustabout on an offshore drilling rig owned by the Diamond M Drilling Company. Alleging that his injury resulted from Diamond M’s negligence and from the unseaworthy condition of the rig, Thomas brought suit for damages and maintenance and cure. 1 The District Court found that Thomas had sustained a back injury, but held that Diamond M was not negligent, that the rig was seaworthy, and that Thomas’s own negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury. We affirm the District Court.

On March 3,1974, Thomas, who had been employed on the drilling rig for approxi *927 mately seven months, was working with a welder, Raymond Delcambre, to repair a mud pump. As part of this job, Thomas had to unscrew and remove the covers of the pump, then replace these caps after the welder completed his portion of the task. Thomas claimed that in lifting a pump cap, which weighed between sixty and one hundred pounds, and in leaning over the pump to screw the cap back into place, he injured his back and has since been unable to work.

Plaintiff first contends that the defendant’s rig was inadequately equipped and manned for the task of repairing the mud pump and therefore unseaworthy. In ruling on this claim, the District Court made the following findings of fact: the job of removing and replacing mud pump covers is routinely performed without assistance; a pulley and hoist were available to provide mechanical assistance if desired; two other workers were available to provide assistance if asked; and a catwalk running beside the pump provided plaintiff with a platform from which he could have replaced the cap without leaning over the pump. 2 From these findings, the Judge concluded that no unseaworthy condition existed. We determine that the findings of fact are above the Plimsoll line of F.R.Civ.P. 52(a) and that the holding of seaworthiness is not erroneous as a finding of fact or as a conclusion of law.

It is true that, as a matter of legal theory, the District Court might have found Thomas contributorily negligent in failing to ask for either human or mechanical assistance, at the same time have found the vessel inadequately manned, and apportioned damages on the basis of comparative fault. As this Court has stated, “[djepend-ing upon the particular facts, a seaman may fail to observe proper care for his own safety in failing to seek the help of others aboard ship, once he realizes or should realize that an assigned task is beyond his individual physical capacity. But that does not discharge the vessel from the responsibility of supplying adequate personnel available in the first instance for performance of the task.” Moschi v. Steamship Edgar F. Luckenbach, 5 Cir., 1970, 424 F.2d 1060, 1061 (per curiam); American President Lines, Ltd. v. Welch, 9 Cir., 1967, 377 F.2d 501, 504-505; see also Manning v. M/V “Sea Road,” 5 Cir., 1969, 417 F.2d 603. Such facts are not present in this case. In Moschi, the District Court found that the lifting job assigned to the plaintiff required two men for safe performance; in American President Lines, there was ample and uncontradicted testimony in the record that the task involved was a two-man job. Here, by contrast, there was uncontradicted testimony that removing and replacing the mud pump caps was regarded as a job that could be and was routinely performed by one man. Indeed, plaintiff had performed the task alone on several previous occasions.

That a given practice employed on a vessel is customary does not ensure its status as seaworthy, e. g., Weeks v. Alonzo Coth-ron, Inc., 5 Cir., 1972, 466 F.2d 578, 581-82; Aguirre v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York, 5 Cir., 1971, 441 F.2d 141, 145, but does provide evidence of whether the vessel is reasonably fit for the tasks required of its seamen. In this case, we need not rely solely on the testimony presented as to the usual practice. Defendant urged, and the Trial Court found, that Thomas could have used the catwalk or asked for manual or mechanical assistance, which *928 were both available on request. 3 In Moschi, American President Lines, and Aguirre, supra, the Court found that no additional personnel were available to give the assistance held necessary for the safe performance of the assigned tasks. Here, by contrast, the additional manpower was there for the asking. Plaintiff’s argument is that Diamond M should have required a second man to aid Thomas or required Thomas to use the pulley or hoist. This argument has been decisive in situations in which shipowners failed to require seamen to use equipment or assistance necessary to make an operation minimally safe, leaving the safety precautions to the option of each seaman. In Weeks v. Alonzo Cothron, Inc., supra, for example, the vessel was unsea-worthy because the seamen were not required to use any safety procedures when diving to make underwater repairs; in Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 5 Cir., 1962, 302 F.2d 489, the shipowner was liable for its failure to instruct a completely inexperienced seaman that life jackets must be worn during repair operations which involved traversing narrow walkways over open water. Here, the District Court found that a mud pump cover can usually be safely lifted by one man, and that such aids as the catwalk were easily used. Given these findings, we see no error in the holding that Diamond M fulfilled its duty of providing a seaworthy vessel.

Thomas also challenges the District Court’s findings that Diamond M was not negligent and that Thomas’s own negligent action in failing to ask for aid or use the catwalk was the sole proximate cause of his injury. These are peculiarly fact findings, see Rogers v. Gracey-Hellums Corp., 5 Cir., 1975, 442 F.2d 1196, that cannot be disturbed unless we find clear error or a manifestly improper legal standard. Thomas rested his claim of negligence on the same theory offered to support the claim of unseaworthiness, and we uphold the District Judge’s finding that this evidence was insufficient to prove negligence. Without any finding of negligence on the part of the defendant, the finding that Thomas’s own negligence contributed one hundred percent to his injury becomes irrelevant.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Woodyer v. United States
334 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (W.D. Washington, 2004)
Gillikin v. United States
764 F. Supp. 261 (E.D. New York, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
569 F.2d 926, 1978 A.M.C. 1548, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/levi-thomas-v-diamond-m-drilling-co-ca5-1978.