Lester v. Boyer

2025 Ohio 4430

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 22, 2025
• Docket: 25-CA-00010
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Lester v. Boyer, 2025-Ohio-4430.]

COURT OF APPEALS PERRY COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

WENDEE LESTER Case No. 25-CA-00010

Relator Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Original Action

TINA BOYER, JUDGE AND JAMIE Judgment: Dismissed FARMER, MAGISTRATE Date of Judgment Entry: September 22, 2025 Respondents

BEFORE: WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN, P.J., ANDREW J. KING, J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J., Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: JOHN H. COUSINS IV, for Relator; TERRY RUGG, for Respondents.

OPINION

Popham, J.,

{¶1} On July 17, 2025, Relator Wendee Lester filed a Complaint for Writ of

Prohibition. Lester’s complaint arises from two competing divorce proceedings: one filed

in Perry County, Case No. 25-DV-00087 (“Perry County divorce action”), and the other

filed in Franklin County, Case No. 25 DR 001017 (“Franklin County divorce action”).

Relator seeks an order from this Court prohibiting Respondents, the Honorable Tina M.

Boyer and the Honorable Jamie Farmer, from exercising further jurisdiction in the Perry

County divorce action. She also asks this Court to stay proceedings in Perry County and

to award costs and other relief deemed just. {¶2} On August 21, 2025, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Writ of

Prohibition, or, in the Alternative to Stay Proceedings. Separately, Robert Lester,

Respondent’s husband, moved on August 25, 2025, to intervene and also requested a

dismissal or denial of the writ. On September 9, 2025, Robert Lester filed a Memorandum

in Opposition to Respondents’ Alternative Motion for Stay, and Motion Requesting Leave

to File Petition for Mandamus.1 Relator has not responded to any of the motions filed by

Respondents or Robert Lester.

{¶3} For the reasons that follow, we dismiss Relator’s Complaint for Writ of

Prohibition.

I. Background

{¶4} On April 1, 2025, Relator filed a complaint for divorce against Robert Lester

in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. She alleged

venue was proper under Civ.R. 3(C)(2), (3), (5), and (6). Relator requested service by

process server on April 3, 2025, and certified mail service on April 8, 2025. According to

Relator, service on Robert Lester was perfected at the Franklin County courthouse on

May 7, 2025, at 11:08 a.m.

{¶5} On April 7, 2025, Robert Lester filed his own divorce complaint in Perry

County, where a process server allegedly served Relator on May 6, 2025. Although

Relator argues Robert Lester was served with the Franklin County divorce action before

she was served in Perry County, Relator’s complaint alleges otherwise. Relator avers, in

her complaint, that she was served in the Perry County divorce action one day prior to

Robert Lester being served in the Franklin County divorce action. Complaint, ¶ 9, 11.

1Robert Lester’s motions are addressed in separate Judgment Entries filed simultaneously with this

opinion. {¶6} On May 8, 2025, Relator moved to dismiss the Perry County divorce action

under the jurisdictional priority rule. On May 23, 2025, Magistrate Farmer issued an order

finding venue improper in Franklin County under Civ.R. 3(C)(9) and concluding that Perry

County was the proper venue. Relator moved to set aside that order, and a hearing was

scheduled for July 16, 2025.

{¶7} Meanwhile, on June 4, 2025, Robert Lester moved to dismiss the Franklin

County divorce action. On July 11, 2025, Judge Boyer placed the Perry County divorce

action on the inactive docket pending the Franklin County Court’s ruling, and she vacated

the hearing on Relator’s motion to set aside.

{¶8} On August 12, 2025, the Franklin County Court granted Robert Lester’s

motion to dismiss, concluding Civ.R. 3(C)(9) controlled venue and rendered Franklin

County improper. That same day, Relator filed a notice of appeal to the Tenth District

Court of Appeals. Judge Boyer thereafter issued an entry keeping the Perry County

divorce action on the inactive docket until the Tenth District resolves the pending appeal.

II. Prohibition elements/Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard

{¶9} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Relator Lester must establish: (1)

Respondents are about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of power is

unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no adequate

remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. (Citation omitted.) State ex rel. Duke Energy

Ohio, Inc. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2010-Ohio-2450, ¶ 16. “‘If a lower

court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition . . .

will issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the

results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.’” Id. at ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 2002-Ohio-6323, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 78

Ohio St.3d 391, 393 (1997).

{¶10} “‘Where jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking, [a relator] need

not establish the lack of an adequate remedy at law because the availability of alternate

remedies like appeal would be immaterial.’” Id., quoting State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty.

Court of Appeals, 2008-Ohio-2637, ¶ 15 “Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of

jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own

jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court’s jurisdiction possesses an adequate

remedy by appeal.” State ex rel. Willacy v. Smith, 78 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (1997), citing State

ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of

Common Pleas, 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289 (1996). Therefore, an available appeal will

foreclose relief in prohibition, as extraordinary relief is not available to “circumvent the

appellate process.” State ex rel. Lewis v. Moser, 72 Ohio St.3d 25, 28 (1995).

{¶11} Respondents request dismissal of Relator Lester’s petition under Civ.R.

12(B)(6). The purpose of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the

complaint. State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Loc. School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 72 Ohio St.3d

94, 95 (1995), citing State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd.. of Commrs., 65 Ohio

St.3d 545, 548 (1992). In order for a case to be dismissed for failure to state a claim, it

must appear beyond doubt that, even assuming all factual allegations in the complaint

are true, the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts that would entitle that party to the

relief requested. Keith v. Bobby, 2008-Ohio-1443, ¶ 10, citing State ex rel. Turner v. Houk,

2007-Ohio-814, ¶ 5. III.

A. Relator Lester’s Complaint for Writ of Prohibition is moot.

{¶12} This Court is tasked with deciding actual controversies, and when an actual

controversy no longer exists, we must dismiss a case as moot. State ex rel. Rodriguez v.

Lorain Cty. Joint Vocational School, 2025-Ohio-127, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.), citing State ex rel.

Grendell v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2022-Ohio-2833, ¶ 9. “Mootness presents a

question of jurisdiction because a lack of an actual case or controversy between the

parties renders it necessarily impossible for a court to grant any meaningful relief.” Brown

v. Dayton, 2012-Ohio-3493, ¶ 10 (2nd Dist.), citing Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237, 238-

239 (1910).

{¶13} Further, we will not issue a writ of prohibition when doing so would be a vain

act and the circumstances no longer require it. See generally State ex rel. Cotton v. Ghee,

84 Ohio St.3d 54, 55 (1998) (recognizing that the court will not grant a writ to compel a

vain act). “An act is in vain when the underlying dispute has become moot, such that relief

in the pending lawsuit would not affect the outcome.” State ex rel. Burkons v. Beachwood,

2022-Ohio-748, ¶ 14.

{¶14} Thus, “[a] case is moot when without any fault of the defendant, an event

occurs which renders it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of the

plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever.” (Cleaned up.) State ex rel. Wood v.

Rocky River, 2021-Ohio-3313, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Eliza Jennings, Inc. v. Noble,

49 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990), quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895). “[A]

judgment dismissing a complaint as moot means the trial court has declined to exercise

jurisdiction over the matter . . . and it necessarily follows that such a dismissal does not reach the issue of whether the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Tavenner v. Pittsfield Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2022-Ohio-4444, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).

{¶15} In determining whether a case is moot, courts may consider evidence

beyond the pleadings. State ex rel. Ames v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2020-

Ohio-354, ¶ 5-6; State, ex rel. Richard v. Wells, 64 Ohio St.3d 76, 77 (1992) (concluding

that mootness can be determined based on evidence submitted by the parties). In original

actions, a court is not limited to facts as they existed when the action was commenced

but should consider facts as they exist at the time of decision. State ex rel. Newton v.

Court of Claims, 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 557 (1995).

{¶16} Here, Respondents referenced and attached two additional Judgment

Entries from the Perry County divorce action issued after Relator Lester filed this action.

The first dismissed the Franklin County divorce action. The second placed the Perry

County divorce action on the inactive docket pending a decision from the Tenth District

Court of Appeals on whether the Franklin County dismissal was proper.

{¶17} Because of these two entries, this Court cannot grant Relator Lester the

relief she requests. The Franklin County divorce action was dismissed, leaving no basis

to challenge venue or to preclude the Perry County Court from exercising jurisdiction.

Moreover, Relator Lester sought to stay the Perry County proceeding pending resolution

of this writ, but Respondent Judge Boyer has already placed that matter on the inactive

docket until the Tenth District resolves the appeal. Thus, granting prohibition relief in the

present matter would not affect the outcome because Respondents are not exercising

further jurisdiction and the case has effectively been stayed. {¶18} For these reasons, we find Relator Lester’s writ is moot, and we decline to

exercise jurisdiction over this matter.

B. Relator Lester has an adequate remedy at law.

{¶19} Even if this matter were not moot, dismissal is still required because Relator

Lester has an adequate remedy at law. “‘Extraordinary relief in mandamus or prohibition

generally does not lie to challenge a decision on a motion to change venue because

appeal following a final judgment provides an adequate legal remedy.’” State ex rel.

Yeaples v. Gall, 2014-Ohio-4724, ¶ 33, citing State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker, 86

Ohio St.3d 169, 173 (1999); State ex rel. Lyons v. Zaleski, 75 Ohio St.3d 623, 624 (1996).

{¶20} This conclusion is underscored by the fact that Relator Lester has, in fact,

appealed the dismissal of her Franklin Count divorce action. That appeal provides her

with an adequate legal remedy at law.

{¶21} Therefore, even assuming the case were not moot, dismissal is still

appropriate under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

IV. Conclusion

{¶22} For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter

because it is moot, and we therefore dismiss it. Alternatively, even if not moot, we grant

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because Relator Lester has an

adequate remedy at law by way of appeal. We also deny Relator’s request, in the

alternative, to stay the proceedings.

{¶23} The clerk of courts is hereby directed to serve upon all parties not in default

notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. See Civ.R. 58(B).

{¶24} COMPLAINT FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION IS DISMISSED. {¶25} ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS IS DENIED.

{¶26} COSTS TO RELATOR.

{¶27} IT IS SO ORDERED.

For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the Writ of Prohibition is

Dismissed.

Costs to Relator.

By: Popham J.

Hoffman, P.J. and

King, J. concur.