Leslie Hoof a/k/a Leslie Manning v. Ayahuasca Foundation

CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedFebruary 11, 2026
Docket1:23-cv-02232
StatusUnknown

This text of Leslie Hoof a/k/a Leslie Manning v. Ayahuasca Foundation (Leslie Hoof a/k/a Leslie Manning v. Ayahuasca Foundation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leslie Hoof a/k/a Leslie Manning v. Ayahuasca Foundation, (D. Colo. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 23-cv-02232-PAB-MDB

LESLIE HOOF a/k/a LESLIE MANNING,

Plaintiff,

v.

AYAHUASCA FOUNDATION,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and Request for Evidentiary Hearing [Docket No. 31]. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Allegations1 Plaintiff Leslie Hoof (also known as Leslie Manning) is a Colorado citizen. Docket No. 1 at 1, ¶ 1. Defendant Ayahuasca Foundation is a foreign company that regularly conducts business throughout the United States, including but not limited to the marketing, advertisement, and sale of retreats and wellness workshops. Id., ¶ 2. Defendant’s primary address is in Peru. Id. Defendant also does business under other names, including as the Ayahuasca Association. Id.

1 Because of the Clerk of Court’s entry of default against defendant, see Docket No. 30, the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, Docket No. 1, are deemed admitted. See Olcott v. Del. Flood Co., 327 F.3d 1115, 1125 (10th Cir. 2003). On or about September 25, 2021, plaintiff was on defendant’s property located in Peru. Id. at 2, ¶ 9. She was walking down the hall from her room on the second floor when she slipped and fell on oil that had been left on the floor. Id., ¶ 10. She severely fractured her wrist and arm and suffered other injuries. Id. at 3, ¶ 11. The conditions leading to the fall were present for a sufficient time that defendant knew or should have

known of the dangerous condition, and defendant did not promptly correct the condition or warn plaintiff. Id., ¶ 13. Defendant was the landowner of the subject premises. Id., ¶ 16. Defendant was responsible for the maintenance and condition of the property. Id. at 2, ¶ 6. Plaintiff was a paying guest of defendant at a wellness retreat/workshop program. Id., ¶ 9. Plaintiff booked her spot in the program while in Colorado. Id. B. Procedural History Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 31, 2023. Docket No. 1. Plaintiff asserts a claim against defendant for premises liability. Id. at 3-4, ¶¶ 15-20. On September 5, 2023, the assigned magistrate judge issued an order to show

cause raising questions as to subject matter jurisdiction. See Docket No. 4. The magistrate judge found that complete diversity of citizenship existed because plaintiff stated that she was a Colorado citizen and alleged that defendant was a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in Peru. Id. at 2. The magistrate judge noted, however, that plaintiff failed to allege that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. Id. at 2-3. The magistrate judge ordered plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 3. Plaintiff responded by providing evidence of medical bills and lost wages and alleging various non-economic injuries. Docket No. 5. These damages exceed $75,000. See id. Based on those representations, the magistrate judge discharged the order to show cause. Docket No. 6. On December 30, 2024, the assigned magistrate judge found that plaintiff served defendant on December 17, 2024. Docket No. 28. Defendant has not made an appearance in this action. On March 24, 2025, the Clerk of the Court entered default

against defendant. Docket No. 30. On April 14, 2025, plaintiff filed the motion for default judgment. Docket No. 31. II. LEGAL STANDARD In order to obtain a judgment by default, a party must follow the two-step process described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. First, the party must seek an entry of default from the Clerk of the Court under Rule 55(a). Second, after default has been entered by the Clerk, the party must seek judgment under the strictures of Rule 55(b). See Williams v. Smithson, 57 F.3d 1081, 1995 WL 365988, at *1 (10th Cir. June 20, 1995) (unpublished table decision) (citing Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1981)). The decision to enter default judgment is “committed to the district court's sound

discretion.” Olcott, 327 F.3d at 1124 (citation omitted). In exercising that discretion, the Court considers that “[s]trong policies favor resolution of disputes on their merits.” In re Rains, 946 F.2d 731, 732 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation and citations omitted). “The default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Id. It serves to protect a plaintiff against “interminable delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights.” Id. at 733. When “ruling on a motion for default judgment, the court may rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence to determine the appropriate sum for the default judgment.” Seme v. E&H Prof'l Sec. Co., Inc., No. 08-cv-01569-RPM-KMT, 2010 WL 1553786, at *11 (D. Colo. Mar. 19, 2010). A party may not simply sit out the litigation without consequence. See Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Bielenberg Masonry Contracting, Inc., 715 F.2d 1442, 1444-45 (10th Cir. 1983) (“a workable system of justice requires that litigants not be free to appear at their

pleasure. We therefore must hold parties and their attorneys to a reasonably high standard of diligence in observing the courts’ rules of procedure. The threat of judgment by default serves as an incentive to meet this standard.”) (internal citation omitted). One such consequence is that, upon the entry of default against a defendant, the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted. See 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2688.1 (4th ed., 2023 rev.). “Even after default, however, it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit conclusions of law.” Id. A court need not accept conclusory

allegations. Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002). Although “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” in order to state a claim, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), the well-pleaded facts must “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quotations and alterations omitted). Thus, even though modern rules of pleading are somewhat forgiving, “a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted). III. ANALYSIS Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is brief and assumes that the Court will set an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of damages. See Docket No. 31 at 1-2.

However, before reaching the issue of damages, the Court must assess whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

International Shoe Co. v. Washington
326 U.S. 310 (Supreme Court, 1945)
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
444 U.S. 286 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
465 U.S. 770 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
471 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC
616 F.3d 158 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Jenkins v. City of Topeka
136 F.3d 1274 (Tenth Circuit, 1998)
Peay v. BellSouth Medical Assistance Plan
205 F.3d 1206 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
291 F.3d 1227 (Tenth Circuit, 2002)
Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co.
327 F.3d 1115 (Tenth Circuit, 2003)
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc.
514 F.3d 1063 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Bryson v. Gonzales
534 F.3d 1282 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown
131 S. Ct. 2846 (Supreme Court, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Leslie Hoof a/k/a Leslie Manning v. Ayahuasca Foundation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leslie-hoof-aka-leslie-manning-v-ayahuasca-foundation-cod-2026.