Leroy Jackson v. State of Arkansas

2024 Ark. App. 5

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: January 10, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 5 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-23-20

Opinion Delivered January 10, 2024

LEROY JACKSON APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, THIRD DIVISION V. [NO. 60CR-20-2159]

HONORABLE CATHLEEN V. STATE OF ARKANSAS COMPTON, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Appellant LeRoy Levelle Jackson appeals his conviction in the Pulaski County Circuit

Court for rape and internet stalking of a child, to which he was sentenced to twenty-five

years’ and ten years’ imprisonment, respectively, with the two sentences to run concurrently.

Jackson argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of internet stalking of a

child because the State failed to introduce substantial evidence that he used a means of

electronic communication to arrange a meeting with a minor for the purpose of engaging in

deviant sexual activity. We affirm.

The victim was Jackson’s stepdaughter (Minor Child), who was under the age of

fourteen. The incident leading to Jackson’s arrest occurred on May 4, 2020. Jackson asked

Minor Child how much money she needed for her Roblox gaming account. He sent a text to Minor Child that stated, “I give u the money blow me.” Not understanding what Jackson

meant, Minor Child asked if she had to do chores or “be kind” in order to get the money.

Jackson quickly corrected her, stating she had to “suck his penis.” Despite Minor Child’s

protests, Jackson prevailed; Minor Child went downstairs to Jackson’s “man cave” where

Minor Child performed oral sex on Jackson.

On May 8, 2022, Investigator Ryan Jacks of the Arkansas State Police Criminal

Division was assigned a priority one CyberTip report from the National Center for Missing

and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC is a nonprofit organization that assists in

missing children, abducted children, sexual exploitation, and victimization of children, using

an algorithm which monitors social media platforms for words or phrases that might involve

talk of abduction or sexual acts toward a child or exploitation of a child. Facebook Messenger

had reported to NCMEC that they had a possible inappropriate conversation between an

adult and a child. Facebook Messenger Kids was the actual platform, but Facebook was the

main entity that reported it. A CyberTip provides the names of the account holder, the

names of the two parties that were communicating and the name of the parent account

holder. Investigators ran that information through Arkansas Crime Information Center to

learn the address of the account holder. Investigator Jacks was able to identify an address

associated with this account because the parent account and the account of Leroy Jackson

both had the same address. After Jackson was mirandized, Investigator Jacks interviewed

Jackson who admitted he sent the messages but said they were meant for his wife not his

2 stepchild. Jackson was arrested at the end of this interview for rape and internet stalking of

a child.

At trial after the State’s case-in-chief, Jackson moved for a directed verdict, stating the

following:

[T]he State failed to make a prima facia case that Mr. Jackson committed internet stalking of a child . . . [and] the person being over the age of 21 did that knowingly using a computer or some sort of chat message or board to communicate, seduce, or lure . . . someone under the age of 15 years old with the purpose of engaging in sexual intercourse against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas.

Jackson merely recited the statute with which he was charged and failed to mention that the

statute required him to arrange a meeting with Minor Child, the very argument he now raises

on appeal. Jackson also moved for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, stating he

stood on his earlier arguments in his motion for directed verdict at the close of the State’s

case, which the court again denied.

This court reviews a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence and will affirm the circuit court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict if there

is substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to support the jury’s verdict. See

Flowers v. State, 373 Ark. 127, 282 S.W.3d 767 (2008). Substantial evidence is evidence

forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture.

Id. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the State—without weighing it

against conflicting evidence that may be favorable to the appellant—and affirm the verdict if

3 it is supported by substantial evidence. We need only consider the testimony that supports

the verdict of guilty. Thomas v. State, 312 Ark. 158, 847 S.W.2d 695 (1993).

In order to preserve for appeal the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant

must first raise the issue to the circuit court as provided in Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1. Rule 33.1(a)

provides that, in a jury trial, a defendant must challenge sufficiency by a specific motion for

directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution and at the close of all

of the evidence. A defendant’s failure to raise the issue at the times and in the manner

required by the rule will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of

the evidence to support the judgment. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c).

A motion for directed verdict is inadequate if it states, “that the evidence is

insufficient [and] does not preserve for appeal issues relating to a specific deficiency such as

insufficient proof on the elements of the offense.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c); Smith v. State,

367 Ark. 274, 239 S.W.3d 494 (2006). The motion must specifically advise the circuit court

as to how the evidence was deficient. Smith, supra (citing Nelson v. State, 365 Ark. 314, 229

S.W.3d 35 (2006); Pyle v. State, 340 Ark. 53, 8 S.W.3d 491 (2000)). The reason underlying

this requirement that specific grounds be stated and that the absent proof be pinpointed is

that it allows the circuit court the option to either grant the motion or, if justice requires,

allow the State to reopen its case to supply the missing proof. Id. (citing Webb v. State, 327

Ark. 51, 938 S.W.2d 806 (1997)). We will not address the merits of an appellant’s

insufficiency argument where the directed-verdict motion is not specific. See Newman v. State,

353 Ark. 258, 106 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

4 In the present case, Jackson stated only that there was insufficient evidence and read

the statute under which he was charged without specifying either the manner in which it was

insufficient, or the element(s) of the offense now alleged not to have been proved by the

State. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that appellant’s directed-verdict motion was

nonspecific. Therefore, we will not address appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument

on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s motion for

directed verdict.

Affirmed.

HARRISON, C.J., and KLAPPENBACH, J., agree.

Mac J. Carder, Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for

appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.