Leroy A. Frazier v. United States

339 F.2d 745

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: January 5, 1965
• Docket: 18514_1
• Status: Published

Opinions

• J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

•' Appellant was convicted of escaping from the custody of the Attorney General¹ while serving a sentence for an earlier conviction of narcotics violations. His escape was from St. Elizabeths Hospital, to which, some five months earlier, he had been transferred from the District of Columbia Jail under 24 D.C. Code § 302 (1961).² On appeal he contends that this escape was not from the “custody of the Attorney General” and, henee, not a violation of the Federal Escape Act.³

Under 24 D.C.Code § 425 (1961), all persons convicted of crime in the District of Columbia are committed to the custody of the Attorney General for “their terms of imprisonment.” ⁴ Since the section authorizes assignment of prisoners to institutions “whether maintained by * * * the federal government, or otherwise,” it is clear that the “custody” intended is not limited to actual physical custody, but denotes a type of legal custody which remains in the Attorney General even though the prisoner is assigned to an institution over which the Department of Justice has no control.⁵ Appellant contends, however, that custody of the Attorney General ended when appellant was transferred to St. Elizabeths pursuant to 24 D.C.Code § 302. We do not agree.

24 D.C.Code § 302 outlines the responsibility of the District of Columbia prison director with respect to treatment of a prisoner who becomes mentally ill while serving his sentence in a local prison. Transfer of the physical custody of the mentally ill prisoner to a mental hospital under this statute is neither inconsistent with, nor exclusive of, the legal custody of the Attorney General under 24 D.C.Code § 425.⁶ 24 D.C.Code § 425 specifically authorizes the Attorney General to transfer prisoners committed to his custody “from one institution to another if, in his judgment, it shall be for the well-being of the prisoner * * In 24 D.C.Code § 302 Congress merely provides a safeguard to insure that a prisoner is mentally ill before he is transferred to a mental institution. And 24 D.C.Code § 303(b) (1961)⁷ assures his transfer out of a mental institution when the prisoner is “restored to mental health.” Thus the custody of the Attorney General is continuous as he discharges his responsibility to transfer a prisoner “from one institution to another * * * for the well-being of the prisoner.” ⁸ 24 D.C.Code § 425.

“When any person confined in a hospital for the mentally ill while serving sentence shall be restored to mental health within the opinion of the superintendent of the hospital, the superintendent shall certify such fact to the Director of the Department of Corrections of the District of Columbia and such certification shall be sufficient to deliver such person to such Director according to Ms request.”

Another point raised by appellant concerns the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence on the issue of mental responsibility for the crime charged.⁹ On trial the Government produced a psychiatrist from St. Elizabeths who testified as to the nature of appellant’s mental disorder. His opinion was that the escape charged was not the product of any mental disease or defect. The appellant offered no evidence of his own on the issue, but moved for acquittal at the close of the Government’s case.¹⁰ The trial court denied the motion and, sitting without a jury, found the appellant mentally responsible and guilty as charged.

Since the evidence is not such as to compel “a reasonable doubt concerning the accused’s responsibility,”¹¹ the factual finding of the trial court must stand¹²

Affirmed.

1 . The indictment charged that appellant, “having been lawfully committed, on July 2, 1959, to the custody of the Attorney General, * * * did unlawfully and feloniously fiee and escape from such custody.”

2 . 24 D.G.Code § 302 provides:

“Any person while serving sentence of any court of the District of Columbia for crime, in a District of Columbia penal institution, and who, in the opinion of the Director of the Department of Corrections of the District of Columbia, is mentally ill, shall be referred by such Director to the psychiatrist functioning under section 24-106, and if such psychiatrist certifies that the person is mentally ill, this shall be sufficient to authorize the Director to transfer such person to a hospital for the mentally ill to receive care and treatment during the continuance of his mental illness.”

3 . 18 U.S.C. § 751:

“Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, or from any institution in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or commissioner, or from the custody of an officer or employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both * *

4 . 24 D.C.Code § 425 reads:

“All prisoners convicted in the District of Columbia for any offense, * * * shall be committed, for their terms of imprisonment, and to such types of institutions as the court may direct, to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative, who shall designate the places of confinements where the sentences of all such persons shall be served. The Attorney General may designate any available, suitable, and appropriate institutions, whether maintained by the District of Columbia Government, the federal government, or otherwise, or whether within or without the District of Columbia. The Attorney General is also authorized to order the transfer of any such person from one institution to another if, in his judgment, it shall be for the well-being of the prisoner or relievo overcrowding or unhealthful conditions in the institution where such prisoner is confined, or for other reasons.”

5 . The second definition of the word “custody” given in Webster’s Third Now International Dictionary (Unabridged) (1961) is “judicial or penal safekeeping: control of a thing or person with such actual or constructive possession as fulfills the purpose of the law or duty requiring it.” (Emphasis added.) Cases under the Federal Escape Act have given the term “custody of the Attorney General” a similar definition. Tucker v. United States, 9 Cir., 251 F.2d 794 (1958) (escape from “Jail Unit” of Dos Angeles County General Hospital); United States v. Piseitello, 2 Cir., 231 F.2d 443 (1956) (escape from Public Health Service guards); Giles v. United States, 9 Cir., 157 F.2d 588 (1946).

6 . See Note 5, supra.

7 . 24 D.C.Code § 303(b) reads:

8 . Prisoners committed to the custody of the Attorney General receive credit on their sentences for the time served in mental institutions. IS U.S.O. § 4242.

9 . On trial and on appeal, appellant concedes his competency to stand trial. Shortly after his return to custody, and three months before his trial for escape, he was examined by the staff at St. Eliz-abeths and certified as restored to mental health. Pursuant to 24 D.O.Code § 303 (b), he was thereupon transferred out of St. Elizabeths to a local jail.

10 . On the basis of appellant’s record, the trial court ruled during the Government’s case that the burden of proving mental responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt was upon the Government.

11 . McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S. App.D.C. 120, 123, 312 F.2d 847, 850 (1962) (en banc).

12 . Barkley v. United States, 116 U.S.App. D.C. 334, 323 F.2d 804 (1963); Williams v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 312 F.2d 862 (1962); Hawkins v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 310 F.2d 849 (1962).