Leonardo Ernesto Gomez v. Frank Crum, Inc. and Broadspire

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Leonardo Ernesto Gomez v. Frank Crum, Inc. and Broadspire

228 So. 3d 735, 2017 WL 5076889

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 6, 2017

DocketCASE NO. 1D17-1173

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 228 So. 3d 735 (Leonardo Ernesto Gomez v. Frank Crum, Inc. and Broadspire) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Leonardo Ernesto Gomez v. Frank Crum, Inc. and Broadspire, 228 So. 3d 735, 2017 WL 5076889 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant, through his counsel, challenges the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) order rejecting a jointly agreed upon Employer/Carrier-paid attorney’s fee, awarding instead a fee based on the statutory fee schedule as set out in subsection 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2012), and requiring the excess amount be remitted to Claimant personally. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We review for competent, substantial evidence the issue of the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. See Sanchez v. Woerner Mgmt., Inc., 867 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). As we recently explained in Banegas v. ACR Environmental, Inc., No. 1D17-1251, 2017 WL 5076887 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 6, 2017), “[njeither argument of counsel nor ‘the JCC’s reductions and deletions ... based solely on the JCC’s own subjective and personal experience of what he deemed reasonable’ are sufficient to rebut a claimant’s counsel’s sworn affidavit. See Minerd v. Walgreens, 962 So.2d 955, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).” Because the record before us contains no evidence rebutting Claimant’s counsel’s sworn affidavit or the representations of the Employer/Carrier’s counsel, the JCC erred in deleting the time entries contained within the'affidavit.

As for the redirection of the monies in excess of the statutory fee schedule to Claimant, a JCC is “without authority to redirect the attorney’s fee from counsel to claimant as an exercise of plenary equitable jurisdiction.” Luces v. Red Ventures, 140 So.3d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (explaining that “chapter =440' limits- the authority of JCCs and does not authorize them to reform the agreements of the parties on their own motion”). Thus, the JCC erred in doing so.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the portion of the order rejecting the agreed upon Employer/Carrier-paid attorney’s fee as well as the portion of the order reforming the stipulation, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LEWIS, MAKAR, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.

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PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant, through his counsel, challenges the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) order rejecting a jointly agreed upon Employer/Carrier-paid attorney’s fee, awarding instead a fee based on the statutory fee schedule as set out in subsection 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2012), and requiring the excess amount be remitted to Claimant personally. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We review for competent, substantial evidence the issue of the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. See Sanchez v. Woerner Mgmt., Inc., 867 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). As we recently explained in Banegas v. ACR Environmental, Inc., No. 1D17-1251, 2017 WL 5076887 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 6, 2017), “[njeither argument of counsel nor ‘the JCC’s reductions and deletions ... based solely on the JCC’s own subjective and personal experience of what he deemed reasonable’ are sufficient to rebut a claimant’s counsel’s sworn affidavit. See Minerd v. Walgreens, 962 So.2d 955, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).” Because the record before us contains no evidence rebutting Claimant’s counsel’s sworn affidavit or the representations of the Employer/Carrier’s counsel, the JCC erred in deleting the time entries contained within the'affidavit.

As for the redirection of the monies in excess of the statutory fee schedule to Claimant, a JCC is “without authority to redirect the attorney’s fee from counsel to claimant as an exercise of plenary equitable jurisdiction.” Luces v. Red Ventures, 140 So.3d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (explaining that “chapter =440' limits- the authority of JCCs and does not authorize them to reform the agreements of the parties on their own motion”). Thus, the JCC erred in doing so.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the portion of the order rejecting the agreed upon Employer/Carrier-paid attorney’s fee as well as the portion of the order reforming the stipulation, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LEWIS, MAKAR, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.

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228 So. 3d 735, 2017 WL 5076889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leonardo-ernesto-gomez-v-frank-crum-inc-and-broadspire-fladistctapp-2017.

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