Leonard Stevenson a/k/a Leonard Stevenson, Jr. v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: May 16, 2023
• Docket: 2022-KA-00284-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-KA-00284-COA

LEONARD STEVENSON A/K/A LEONARD APPELLANT STEVENSON, JR.

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/10/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W. ASHLEY HINES COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: CASEY B. FARMER NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/16/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. After a jury trial, Leonard Stevenson was found guilty of capital murder. Miss. Code

Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 2015). He appeals his conviction and sentence on the grounds

that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding his medical records, thereby prohibiting

him from presenting his singular theory of defense. Finding no error, we affirm.1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1 This Court’s docket reveals an appeal involving the same defendant in Appeal Number 2021-KA-00411-COA. The charged offenses in this separate appellate case were not “based on the same act or transaction” or “part[] of a common scheme or plan.” MRCrP 14.2(a). ¶2. The deceased, Alonzo Dukes, lived in a two-story business and residential building

in Leland, Mississippi. The building consisted of two commercial units downstairs and an

upstairs residential area. A 25-foot garage sat in the back of the building. Once inside the

garage door, a stairwell led to the upstairs unit. Dukes owned a blue Dodge van that he had

recently purchased before he died.

¶3. Away from his home, Dukes also owned and operated a number of businesses. He

assisted a non-profit organization called Southern Health Commission. Under this

organization, Dukes advocated for and supported sexual-health awareness. Dukes also

operated the Hollywood Palace Bingo Hall, located in Greenville, Mississippi. When Dukes

was not using the Bingo Hall to host bingo games, he was renting out the Bingo Hall for

special events and for entertainers to perform.

¶4. Dukes’ business ventures seemed to be expanding. He extended cleaning contracts

through Southern Health and employed several people to perform the cleaning services.

Dukes’ long-time employee Roderick Bell had previously worked with Dukes’ mother and

continued to work with Dukes in his various business ventures. Bell and Dukes had been

friends for approximately twenty-five years. Bell worked closely with Dukes when it came

to the Bingo Hall, the cleaning contracts, and the newest venture—a skating rink called

Skate-O-Rama. Bell helped Dukes move into Dukes’ Leland home. And if individuals were

coming to Dukes’ home, Dukes would usually notify Bell.

¶5. In January 2017, Dukes commercially advertised for Skate-O-Rama, which (when it

opened) would be located inside the Bingo Hall. The day after Dukes began advertising,

2 Stevenson and Cordero Hill came to the Bingo Hall and applied to work at the Skate-O-

Rama. Bell and Dukes told Stevenson and Hill that Dukes would contact them in a month

when Dukes began looking for employees.

¶6. On February 4, 2017, Bell was running late for work. He made it in around 10:00 a.m.

The day before, Dukes had instructed Bell to report to the Bingo Hall and finish his work

duties so they could finish getting everything ready for the skating rink. Dukes also informed

Bell that he did not have to come clean at his home that morning because Stevenson and Hill

were coming to do it. Dukes told Bell he would meet him at the Bingo Hall around

lunchtime. However, when the lunch hour arrived, Dukes did not appear.

¶7. The rest of the afternoon passed. At approximately 4:00 p.m., Bell left for the evening

and reached out to Dukes. Bell testified that he began asking others if they had heard from

Dukes. No one had. Bell then called Dukes’ secretary who said she had not heard from

Dukes. After calling Dukes’ nephew, Bell picked him up and decided to search for Dukes.

¶8. Bell and Dukes’ nephew drove to Dukes’ home and noticed that his roll-up garage

was halfway opened. Alarmed, Dukes’ nephew jumped out of the car and went underneath

the garage to check on Dukes. Believing that there was a burglary in progress, Bell told

Dukes’ nephew to come back and stay outside. Bell immediately went to the Leland Police

Department and reported a burglary in progress at Dukes’ home.

¶9. Deputy PJ Lamberson spoke with Bell about his suspicions regarding a burglary in

progress at the residence. After receiving Dukes’ address from Bell, Lamberson drove to the

location to conduct an investigation. Lamberson observed that Dukes’ garage was opened

3 approximately three feet. At this time, Lamberson also noticed that Dukes’ 2004 blue Dodge

Caravan was not on the street or in the driveway. Lamberson then entered the home through

the garage.

¶10. Lamberson searched the home and did not find any suspects. Lamberson checked the

first level and then proceeded up the stairwell to the second level to check all the rooms.

Lamberson found Dukes’ dead body lying between the bed and the wall. Lamberson also

saw that some drawers were open and that a few tables had dust markings on top of them,

indicating that some items had been removed. Lamberson took pictures of the scene and then

called other officers from the police station to come to the scene to conduct a search and set

up a perimeter around the home.

¶11. Investigator Louis White arrived at the scene after receiving the call. White searched

the residence in a manner similar to Lamberson’s search. White saw that Dukes’ neck had

been stabbed on the left side. White also noticed bruising around Dukes’ mouth.

Subsequently, White found a knife at the bottom of the stairs. During his investigation,

White spoke with Bell, who mentioned a few names, including Stevenson and Hill.

¶12. The Greenville Police Department informed White that Dukes’ van had been found

in Little Rock, Arkansas, and that Stevenson was the one driving it at the time. The

Greenville Police Department notified White that some of Dukes’ personal belongings were

found in Greenville, Mississippi. Then, the Leland Police Department retrieved and

processed the van. After processing, White found some “member” cards with Dukes’ name

on them, Dukes’ driver’s license, a Visa card, and a bottle of bleach in the van.

4 ¶13. Upon arrest, Stevenson was interviewed by White in Arkansas. During this interview,

Stevenson stated that he went to Greenville to find employment. Through his friend Hill, he

was introduced to Dukes. Stevenson knew that Dukes was homosexual and knew that Dukes

may have been interested in him. Stevenson said he also made it clear to Dukes that he was

not interested in him and that he was at the Bingo Hall for business only. Stevenson and Hill

showed up at the Bingo Hall to pass out contraceptives and receive signatures on behalf of

the Southern Health Commission, the nonprofit that “the Bingo Hall operate[d] up under.”

According to Stevenson, he was paid for each signature he received.

¶14. On the morning of Dukes’ murder, Stevenson stated that he was searching for

additional employment opportunities and called Dukes for this reason. Later, he was under

the impression that Dukes picked him and Hill up to do some work. Stevenson stated that

he was not aware that he was going to Dukes’ home. Stevenson remained at Dukes’ house

for approximately one hour. Sometime after arriving at Dukes’ home, Stevenson entered

Dukes’ bedroom when Dukes began making sexual advances toward Stevenson by asking

him to perform oral sex in exchange for financial security. Stevenson stated that he rejected

the offer, but Dukes still leaned in and kissed him on the forehead in Dukes’ bedroom. In

a recorded interview with White, Stevenson said he previously told Dukes that he was not

homosexual. Stevenson said, as a result, that he felt like “[Dukes] was about to take

something.” At that point, Stevenson just “snapped.” Stevenson said he began beating

Dukes’ head into the wall on the right side of the bed. There were no words spoken between

them. Stevenson also said he beat Dukes “helpless.” After that, Stevenson went into Dukes’

5 kitchen, grabbed a kitchen knife, and stabbed Dukes once in the neck. Stevenson stated that

he knew that Dukes would die when he stabbed him in the neck. And after killing Dukes,

he immediately prayed for forgiveness. Stevenson stated that if Dukes “would have kept it

business, then [Dukes] would still be alive right now.”

¶15. Stevenson told White that after he killed Dukes, Hill cleaned the apartment, while

Stevenson loaded up some of Dukes’ electronics into Dukes’ van, including one fifty-inch

screen television. Stevenson stated that because he was a chess player, he realized that he

could sell Dukes’ electronics for a profit. Stevenson stated that throughout the rest of the

day, he and Hill sold the electronics to different individuals and hid the van somewhere in

Greenville.

¶16. On March 8, 2021, the State indicted Stevenson and Hill for the capital murder of

Alonzo Dukes. The State charged that Stevenson and Hill killed Dukes while engaging in

the commission of a robbery. The trial was continued multiple times due to COVID-19.

Stevenson pled not guilty and, through his counsel on February 4, 2022, filed a “Notice of

Intent to Offer Mental Health Records Into Evidence.” Stevenson attached his Life Help

medical records and “Consent to Release/Obtain Information” as exhibits to the notice.

Stevenson asserted in the “Notice of Intent to Offer Mental Health Records” that he “suffered

from a psychosis” and that his “mental instability” was his only defense.2

¶17. Stevenson’s trial was held on February 8, 2022. One of the State’s witnesses,

Investigator White, testified that Stevenson said he had been sexually abused as a child and

2 Stevenson’s counsel filed the notice of intent citing the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. M.R.E. 803(6), 804(b), 902(2) & 902(11).

6 that was why he snapped. After the State rested its case-in-chief, the trial court gave

Stevenson an opportunity to be heard on the admission of his medical records.

¶18. The State argued that the medical records should not be admitted if no accompanied

medical professional testified as to how his childhood abuse affected him on the night in

question. Stevenson’s counsel responded that the medical records should be made a part of

the record. The trial court ruled that medical records were only relevant in the event that (1)

“the person is so profoundly mentally affected that they are unable to assist their lawyer in

preparation of the defense and to understand and comprehend the legal proceedings,” or (2)

“the person at the time of the crime was so profoundly affected by some mental disease or

other thing that they could not comprehend the legal consequences of their actions.”

¶19. After finding that neither instance applied in the case at hand, the trial court denied

the admission of the medical records into evidence. Additionally, the trial court determined

that “just snapping” was not a defense and that Stevenson could not state that because

“something bad happened to [him] in the past regardless of how bad it was . . . [he] [could]

go out and commit heinous crimes.” Stevenson’s counsel responded that this was

Stevenson’s only defense. The trial court concluded that Stevenson could testify about his

medical records and reiterated that “just snapping” was not a defense under the law.

Stevenson’s counsel then proffered that the medical records be entered for identification

purposes only, which the trial court allowed.

¶20. Stevenson rested without testifying and without calling any witnesses to the stand.

Closing arguments were heard, and then the jury found Stevenson guilty of capital murder.

7 The trial court sentenced Stevenson to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. On

appeal, Stevenson challenges the trial court’s exclusion of his medical records.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶21. “We review the exclusion or admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.”

McCammon v. State, 299 So. 3d 873, 886 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Collins v. State,

172 So. 3d 724, 738-39 (¶14) (Miss. 2015)). “Unless a judge abuses this discretion so as to

be prejudicial to the accused, this Court will not reverse the ruling.” Ousley v. State, 984 So.

2d 996, 1002 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). “We reverse ‘only if such discretion has been

abused and a substantial right of a party has been affected.’” Thompson v. State, 157 So. 3d

844, 851 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Richardson v. State, 74 So. 3d 317, 329 (¶39)

(Miss. 2011)).

DISCUSSION

¶22. Every defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial and to present his theory of

defense. Chinn v. State, 958 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (¶13) (Miss. 2007); O’Bryant v. State, 530

So. 2d 129, 133 (Miss. 1988); see generally Ward v. State, 479 So. 2d 713, 716-17 (Miss.

1985). Our Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “[p]sychiatric and psychological

evidence is crucial to the defense of a capital murder case.” State v. Tokman, 564 So. 2d

1339, 1343 (Miss. 1990). And “it is fundamentally unfair to deny the jury the opportunity

to consider the defendant’s defense where there is testimony to support the theory.” Terry

v. State, 718 So. 2d 1115, 1121 (¶28) (Miss. 1998) (citing Keys v. State, 635 So. 2d 845, 848-

49 (Miss. 1994)).

8 ¶23. Stevenson alleged that Dukes’ sexual advances triggered the trauma of his childhood

sexual abuse and caused him to “just snap[].” Thus, Stevenson offered to enter his medical

records documenting his childhood abuse to explain why he overreacted to Dukes kissing

him. The trial court excluded the medical records as irrelevant, stating Stevenson’s “just

snapped” assertion was not, under the law, a recognized theory of defense. After a thorough

review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

¶24. To the extent that Stevenson made a heat-of-passion argument, under Mississippi law

“heat-of-passion manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder,” not a theory of

defense. Blanden v. State, 276 So. 3d 1204, 1210 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018); accord Miss.

Code Ann. § 97-3-35 (Rev. 2014). Manslaughter is “[t]he killing of a human being, without

malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous

weapon, without authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense. . . .” Byrd v. State, 158

So. 3d 1146, 1151 (¶15) (Miss. 2015). Heat of passion is “[p]assion or anger suddenly

aroused at the time by some immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one

at the time.” Curtis v. State, 298 So. 3d 446, 453 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). “A person

may form an intent to kill from a sudden passion induced by insult, provocation or injury

from another. In that moment of passion, while still enraged, if he slays the other person, the

homicide may be manslaughter . . . depending upon the insult, provocation or injury causing

the anger.” Windham v. State, 520 So. 2d 123, 127 (Miss. 1987).

¶25. Nevertheless, the passion or anger must be caused “by some immediate and reasonable

provocation, by words or acts of one at the time. The term includes an emotional state of

9 mind characterized by anger, rage, hatred, furious resentment or terror.” McClendon v. State,

748 So. 2d 814, 817 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Underwood v. State, 708 So. 2d

18, 36 (¶54) (Miss. 1998)). But “[t]his is an objective standard, and an individual

defendant’s emotional defects are irrelevant to the issue of whether he or she acted in the heat

of passion.” 3A Jeffrey Jackson et al., Encyclopedia Mississippi Law § 23:65 (3d ed.

updated Oct. 2022) (citing Dabney v. State, 772 So. 2d 1065, 1069 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)).

The question of whether the accused acted in the heat of passion, and therefore without

malice, “is an objective one, being whether a reasonable man would have been so provoked.”

Lewis v. State, 170 So. 3d 1245, 1248 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Taylor v. State,

452 So. 2d 441, 449 (Miss. 1984)). The supreme court “has held that the passion felt by the

accused should be superinduced by some insult, provocation, or injury which would naturally

and instantly produce, in the minds of ordinarily constituted men, the highest degree of

exasperation.” Dabney, 772 So. 2d at 1069 (¶11) (citing Barnett v. State, 563 So. 2d 1377,

1379 (Miss. 1990)).

¶26. In Dabney, this Court addressed the defendant’s claim that his mild retardation should

have been considered in determining whether he was reasonably provoked to shoot the

deceased. Id. at (¶13). In addressing the claim, we noted the supreme court’s prior holding

“that the question of whether the accused has acted in the heat of passion is to be resolved

by utilization of an objective standard[,]” and “[t]he standard presupposes an individual

without ‘serious mental and emotional defects.’” Id. (quoting Taylor, 452 So. 2d at 449).

We therefore concluded in Dabney that the defendant’s “mental retardation, in the absence

10 of an insanity defense, [was] irrelevant to the issue of whether he acted in the heat of

passion.” Id.

¶27. Here, Stevenson did not assert an insanity defense or claim that he lacked the ability

to differentiate between right and wrong. See Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 738 (¶46) (Miss.

2008) (citing M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843)). Had Stevenson intended to

allege an insanity defense, then the correct criminal procedure would have been for

Stevenson’s defense counsel to serve a “written notice of the intention to offer a defense of

insanity” during the time set for pretrial motions. MRCrP 17.4. Rather than file this notice,

as required, Stevenson’s defense counsel filed a “Notice of Intent to Offer Mental Health

Records into Evidence” four days before the trial began. Within this notice of intent,

Stevenson’s defense counsel asserted that the medical records were necessary to support

Stevenson’s sole defense of “mental instability at the exact time of the incident.” Therefore,

the actions of Stevenson’s counsel make clear to this Court that Stevenson did not allege an

insanity defense or the inability to distinguish right from wrong. Consequently, any evidence

of childhood trauma contained in his medical records was irrelevant—and therefore

inadmissible—at his trial to determine whether he murdered Dukes.

¶28. Moreover, to the extent that Stevenson alleged a diminished-capacity defense, the trial

court properly excluded Stevenson’s proffered evidence. “Mississippi law does not

recognize diminished capacity as a defense to a criminal charge.” Lewis, 170 So. 3d at 1248

(¶13). Evidence of diminished capacity has no bearing at the guilt phase of a trial and is only

potentially relevant at certain sentencing hearings where it is necessary to show mitigating

11 circumstances. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6)(f) (Rev. 2020) (discussing sentencing in a

death-penalty case); Stevens v. State, 806 So. 2d 1031, 1051 (¶¶84-89) (Miss. 2001). And

ultimately, the exclusion of this evidence is proper when it “does not stand up to the

M’Naghten test for legal insanity during the guilt phase” of the trial. Stevens, 806 So. 2d at

1051 (¶88).

¶29. Because Stevenson did not follow our rules of criminal procedure and failed to

provide evidence to support a theory of defense recognized under our law, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by excluding the medical records as irrelevant to the issue of

reasonable provocation.

¶30. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.