Leonard Sandoval v. Brad Cain

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 18, 2024
• Docket: 23-35213
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 18 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEONARD CONTRERAS SANDOVAL, No. 23-35213

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01278-SI

v. MEMORANDUM* BRAD CAIN, Superintendent, Snake River Correctional Institution,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 6, 2024** Portland, Oregon

Before: RAWLINSON, FORREST, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Leonard Contreras Sandoval (Contreras Sandoval) appeals the district

court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, after Contreras

Sandoval was convicted of murder in Oregon state court. Contreras Sandoval

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). argues that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984) for failing to obtain his military records and offer a use-of-force

and military combat training expert at trial to support his self-defense theory. We

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition and

review for clear error any factual findings made by the district court. . . .” Hart v.

Bloomfield, 97 F.4th 644, 652 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). “But we are

constrained by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which

governs habeas review of state convictions.” Iversen v. Pedro, 96 F.4th 1284,

1286 (9th Cir. 2024). “Under AEDPA, we must defer to the last state court’s

reasoned decision1 on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits unless that

decision is (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding. . . .” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1. As an initial matter and based on the post-conviction court’s statement

that it “read 90 percent” of the trial transcript, Contreras Sandoval argues that the

court’s decision is not subject to the customary AEDPA deference. Under

Strickland, “a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of

1 In this case, the last reasoned decision was that of the state post-conviction court.

2 the evidence,” 466 U.S. at 695, but a state court “need not address ‘every jot and

tittle of proof suggested to them.’” Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir.

2020) (citation omitted). The state post-conviction court acknowledged the totality

of the evidence standard, and adhered to that standard in finding no prejudice.

Accordingly, the post-conviction court’s ruling is entitled to AEDPA deference.

See Iversen, 96 F.4th at 1286.

2. The post-conviction court’s determination that Contreras Sandoval was

not prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffective performance was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Strickland. “Strickland’s ‘prejudice’ prong requires a

defendant to show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. . . .”

Lewis v. Andes, 95 F.4th 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

We agree with the district court that the experts’ testimony was “of

somewhat limited value” under Oregon law, being “necessarily . . . based on [their]

assessment of [Contreras Sandoval’s] believability.” State v. Sperou, 442 P.3d

581, 588 (Or. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted). In any event, the jury was aware

that Contreras Sandoval was a skilled shooter due to his military background. And

the State introduced ample evidence to dispel Contreras Sandoval’s self-defense

theory, including that Contreras Sandoval often communicated a desire to kill the

3 victim, and even divulged a plan to prompt the victim to brandish a firearm so that

Contreras Sandoval could shoot the victim and assert self-defense. The State also

presented evidence that the trajectory of the bullet established that Contreras

Sandoval exited his vehicle to shoot the victim, refuting the premise that Contreras

Sandoval was reacting to a threat created by the victim.

3. Finally, we are not persuaded by Contreras Sandoval’s contention that the

post-conviction court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. Based on the record evidence, the post-conviction court “could reasonably

determine that” Contreras Sandoval planned to provoke the victim. Sifuentes v.

Brazelton, 825 F.3d 506, 531 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended.

AFFIRMED.