Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11830 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00770-AT
LEONARD ROWE, ROWE ENTERTAINMENT, INC., LEE KING, LEE KING PRODUCTIONS INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
WILLIE E. GARY, WILLIAM C. CAMPBELL, SEKOU M. GARY, TRICIA P. HOFFLER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
MARIA SPERANDO,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________ (May 9, 2019) Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Before MARTIN, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maria Sperando, a lawyer proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
order granting in part and denying in part her motion for sanctions against Leonard
Rowe; Rowe Entertainment, Inc.; Lee King; and Lee King Productions Inc.
(collectively, the “plaintiffs”). After careful review, we affirm.
I.
This Court remanded an earlier appeal in this litigation so the district court
could consider Sperando’s motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs. Rowe v.
Gary, 703 F. App’x 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished). On
remand, Sperando asked the district court to impose sanctions against the plaintiffs
for filing an objectively frivolous Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (“RICO”) lawsuit against her. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Sperando
and others who represented them in a civil rights and antitrust action in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York deliberately withheld
evidence and sabotaged that case in exchange for a bribe. See id. at 778–79; see
also Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272 (RPP),
2005 WL 22833 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint), aff’d,
167 F. App’x 227 (2d Cir. 2005).
2 Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 3 of 7
Sperando’s motion asked the Georgia district court to impose sanctions
under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court’s inherent authority. She argued
sanctions were warranted because plaintiffs’ RICO allegations were “fantastical”
and unsupported by evidence. She also argued plaintiffs and their lawyers knew or
should have known their claims were fraudulent. Additionally, Sperando claimed
the plaintiffs pursued the lawsuit in bad faith and intentionally prolonged the
proceedings despite knowing or having reason to know the RICO allegations were
frivolous and fraudulent.
Sperando asked the district court to fine the plaintiffs; order them to
reimburse her at least $2,255.76 for costs she incurred defending herself; admonish
them; order them to publicly apologize to her “on every form of media on which
they and their cohorts have disparaged” her; and publicly disavow their conduct.
For the fine, Sperando suggested $562,000. She calculated this number by
multiplying her normal $500 hourly rate by the 1,124 hours she said she spent
defending herself.
The district court granted Sperando’s request for Rule 11 sanctions. The
court explained that, viewing the facts and law objectively, plaintiffs’ claims were
frivolous. However, the court declined to impose sanctions under either § 1927 or
the court’s inherent authority because Sperando had not shown plaintiffs engaged
3 Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 4 of 7
in dilatory or vexatious litigation tactics after filing suit and plaintiffs did not act in
bad faith in pursuing their claims.
Instead of imposing Sperando’s suggested sanctions, the district court
ordered the plaintiffs and their counsel to pay a fine of $2,000 to the Court and to
reimburse Sperando for travel costs she incurred to attend oral argument on her
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. The court also formally reprimanded
plaintiffs’ counsel. In imposing these sanctions, the court explained that
Sperando’s suggested fine of more than half a million dollars was “unduly harsh
and unreasonable” and that Sperando had neither filed a timely Rule 54(d) bill of
costs nor provided any details about expenses she incurred defending herself.
This is Sperando’s appeal. 1
II.
Sperando appeals the district court’s sanctions order. She argues the district
court abused its discretion by failing to address one of her arguments for Rule 11
sanctions and by declining to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the
court’s inherent authority. She also contends the court’s Rule 11 sanctions were
“anemic” and thus insufficient.
1 The plaintiffs initially sought to appeal the district court’s sanctions order. However, they failed to timely file an appeals brief, and this Court dismissed their appeal for want of prosecution. 4 Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 5 of 7
“A court’s decision to deny sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and
the court’s inherent power is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Peer v. Lewis, 606
F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010). We also review the amount of sanctions for
abuse of discretion. Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d
1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). “A district court abuses its discretion if
it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the
determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
First, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to
explore in extensive detail whether plaintiffs’ RICO allegations were fraudulent (as
opposed to merely frivolous and unsupported). In deciding whether to impose
Rule 11 sanctions, a court asks “(1) whether the party’s claims are objectively
frivolous; and (2) whether the person who signed the pleadings should have been
aware they were frivolous.” Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir.
1998). A district court is not required to assess fraud separate from its
frivolousness inquiry simply because a party seeks a finding characterized in terms
of fraud. The district court here thoroughly explained its bases for imposing Rule
11 sanctions and did not abuse its discretion in declining to discuss other matters.
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to impose
sanctions under the court’s inherent authority. See Purchasing Power, LLC v.
5 Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 6 of 7
Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting a court may
exercise its inherent power to “sanction a party who has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons” (quotation marks omitted)). The
district court found that sanctions were not warranted because the plaintiffs did not
act in bad faith.
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Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11830 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00770-AT
LEONARD ROWE, ROWE ENTERTAINMENT, INC., LEE KING, LEE KING PRODUCTIONS INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
WILLIE E. GARY, WILLIAM C. CAMPBELL, SEKOU M. GARY, TRICIA P. HOFFLER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
MARIA SPERANDO,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________ (May 9, 2019) Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Before MARTIN, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maria Sperando, a lawyer proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
order granting in part and denying in part her motion for sanctions against Leonard
Rowe; Rowe Entertainment, Inc.; Lee King; and Lee King Productions Inc.
(collectively, the “plaintiffs”). After careful review, we affirm.
I.
This Court remanded an earlier appeal in this litigation so the district court
could consider Sperando’s motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs. Rowe v.
Gary, 703 F. App’x 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished). On
remand, Sperando asked the district court to impose sanctions against the plaintiffs
for filing an objectively frivolous Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (“RICO”) lawsuit against her. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Sperando
and others who represented them in a civil rights and antitrust action in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York deliberately withheld
evidence and sabotaged that case in exchange for a bribe. See id. at 778–79; see
also Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272 (RPP),
2005 WL 22833 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint), aff’d,
167 F. App’x 227 (2d Cir. 2005).
2 Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 3 of 7
Sperando’s motion asked the Georgia district court to impose sanctions
under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court’s inherent authority. She argued
sanctions were warranted because plaintiffs’ RICO allegations were “fantastical”
and unsupported by evidence. She also argued plaintiffs and their lawyers knew or
should have known their claims were fraudulent. Additionally, Sperando claimed
the plaintiffs pursued the lawsuit in bad faith and intentionally prolonged the
proceedings despite knowing or having reason to know the RICO allegations were
frivolous and fraudulent.
Sperando asked the district court to fine the plaintiffs; order them to
reimburse her at least $2,255.76 for costs she incurred defending herself; admonish
them; order them to publicly apologize to her “on every form of media on which
they and their cohorts have disparaged” her; and publicly disavow their conduct.
For the fine, Sperando suggested $562,000. She calculated this number by
multiplying her normal $500 hourly rate by the 1,124 hours she said she spent
defending herself.
The district court granted Sperando’s request for Rule 11 sanctions. The
court explained that, viewing the facts and law objectively, plaintiffs’ claims were
frivolous. However, the court declined to impose sanctions under either § 1927 or
the court’s inherent authority because Sperando had not shown plaintiffs engaged
3 Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 4 of 7
in dilatory or vexatious litigation tactics after filing suit and plaintiffs did not act in
bad faith in pursuing their claims.
Instead of imposing Sperando’s suggested sanctions, the district court
ordered the plaintiffs and their counsel to pay a fine of $2,000 to the Court and to
reimburse Sperando for travel costs she incurred to attend oral argument on her
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. The court also formally reprimanded
plaintiffs’ counsel. In imposing these sanctions, the court explained that
Sperando’s suggested fine of more than half a million dollars was “unduly harsh
and unreasonable” and that Sperando had neither filed a timely Rule 54(d) bill of
costs nor provided any details about expenses she incurred defending herself.
This is Sperando’s appeal. 1
II.
Sperando appeals the district court’s sanctions order. She argues the district
court abused its discretion by failing to address one of her arguments for Rule 11
sanctions and by declining to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the
court’s inherent authority. She also contends the court’s Rule 11 sanctions were
“anemic” and thus insufficient.
1 The plaintiffs initially sought to appeal the district court’s sanctions order. However, they failed to timely file an appeals brief, and this Court dismissed their appeal for want of prosecution. 4 Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 5 of 7
“A court’s decision to deny sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and
the court’s inherent power is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Peer v. Lewis, 606
F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010). We also review the amount of sanctions for
abuse of discretion. Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d
1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). “A district court abuses its discretion if
it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the
determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
First, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to
explore in extensive detail whether plaintiffs’ RICO allegations were fraudulent (as
opposed to merely frivolous and unsupported). In deciding whether to impose
Rule 11 sanctions, a court asks “(1) whether the party’s claims are objectively
frivolous; and (2) whether the person who signed the pleadings should have been
aware they were frivolous.” Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir.
1998). A district court is not required to assess fraud separate from its
frivolousness inquiry simply because a party seeks a finding characterized in terms
of fraud. The district court here thoroughly explained its bases for imposing Rule
11 sanctions and did not abuse its discretion in declining to discuss other matters.
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to impose
sanctions under the court’s inherent authority. See Purchasing Power, LLC v.
5 Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 6 of 7
Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting a court may
exercise its inherent power to “sanction a party who has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons” (quotation marks omitted)). The
district court found that sanctions were not warranted because the plaintiffs did not
act in bad faith. Although Sperando takes issue with this finding, we will not
disturb the district court’s determination that plaintiffs did not act with subjective
bad faith. Sperando says the district court’s finding of no bad faith is inconsistent
with the finding that the plaintiffs’ beliefs were not reasonable. She is mistaken.
A person may hold an unreasonable belief in good faith. We see no clear error in
the district court’s finding to that effect here.
Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to impose
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. An attorney multiplies court proceedings
“unreasonably and vexatiously,” thereby justifying sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, “only when the attorney’s conduct is so egregious that it is tantamount to
bad faith.” Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). The standard is an objective one focusing
“not on the attorney’s subjective intent, but on the attorney’s objective conduct.”
Id. The district court found here that the record lacked evidence of dilatory
conduct. Sperando’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
6 Case: 18-11830 Date Filed: 05/09/2019 Page: 7 of 7
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rule 11
sanctions in the amount of $2,000. Sperando describes the $2,000 fine as
“meager,” “arbitrarily chose[n],” and an insufficient deterrent. The district court
thought differently. The court thoroughly explained why it rejected Sperando’s
suggested sanctions and why it deemed a $2,000 fine; reimbursement of travel
costs; and a reprimand the appropriate sanctions under the circumstances.
Sperando may disagree with the court’s reasoning, but she has fallen well short of
showing an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.