Digitally signed by Susan P. Williams Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of Cite as 2019 Ark. 284 this document Date: SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 2022.07.20 No. CV-19-74 14:55:50 -05'00'
LEONARD NOBLE Opinion Delivered: October 17, 2019 APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE HOT V. SPRING COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT AND MOTION TO INCLUDE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE SUPPLEMENTAL ADDENDUM IN REPLY BRIEF [NO. 30CV-18-359]
HONORABLE CHRIS E WILLIAMS, JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION MOOT.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice
Leonard Noble appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus
filed pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-101 (Repl. 2016). Noble raises
two grounds for reversal—that the circuit court erred in declining to issue the writ based
on the State’s failure to afford Noble a speedy trial and by not holding an evidentiary hearing
on his petition. Because Noble did not state a ground for the writ, we affirm the circuit
court’s order and find his subsequent motion seeking leave to file a supplemental addendum
in his reply brief is moot.
In 1999, a Sebastian County Circuit Court jury found Noble guilty of residential
burglary and rape and sentenced him as a habitual offender to an aggregate sentence of 900
months’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Noble v. State, CR-00- 587 (Ark. App. Sept. 19, 2001) (unpublished) (original docket no. CACR 00-587). Noble
filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the county where he is currently incarcerated.
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its
face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Philyaw v. Kelley, 2015 Ark.
465, 477 S.W.3d 503. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the
subject matter in controversy. Baker v. Norris, 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007). When
the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the appellant and also has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the court has authority to render the judgment. Johnson v. State, 298 Ark.
479, 769 S.W.2d 3 (1989).
Under our statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his actual innocence
and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment
or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing by affidavit or other
evidence of probable cause to believe that he is being illegally detained. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016).
A circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless
it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. A decision is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing
the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. Id. The circuit court dismissed Noble’s habeas petition on its merits; that is, it held
that Noble had not been denied a speedy trial. The issue at hand, however, is whether
Noble stated a ground for issuance of the writ. As he did not do so, the habeas petition was
subject to dismissal by the circuit court, and this court will affirm the circuit court’s decision
2 when it reached the right result even if a wrong reason may have been stated. See Marshall
v. State, 2017 Ark. 208, at 5, 521 S.W.3d 456, 459.
This court has held that speedy-trial issues are not cognizable in habeas proceedings.
Williams v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 200, at 4, 521 S.W.3d 104, 107. Allegations of speedy-trial
violations are assertions of trial error that do not implicate the facial validity of the judgment
or the jurisdiction of the trial court. Id. If there were errors at trial, those issues could, and
should, have been raised at trial and on the record on direct appeal and are thus not within
the purview of the remedy because the writ of habeas corpus will not be issued to correct
errors or irregularities that occurred at trial. Stephenson v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 143, 544 S.W.3d
44.
Noble also contends that the circuit court should have held a hearing on his petition.
Our statutory scheme does not mandate a hearing on a habeas petition regardless of the
allegations contained in it. Collier v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 170, at 4. A hearing is not required
on a habeas petition when probable cause for issuance of the writ is not shown by affidavit
or other evidence. Id. Because Noble failed to establish probable cause for issuance of the
writ, he was not entitled to a hearing. Johnson v. State, 2018 Ark. 42, at 5, 538 S.W.3d 819,
822.
HART, J., dissents.
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice, dissenting. This is yet another case in which
this court has impermissibly narrowed the grounds for relief under our state habeas corpus
statute. This stance continues to perplex in light of the Supreme Court of the United States’
3 rejection of this limit on habeas corpus when it reversed Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378
S.W.3d 103 (Jackson I), in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)––the majority’s analysis is
no longer valid.
As in the case before us, this court in Jackson I disposed of Jackson’s habeas petition
stating, “Jackson has failed to allege or show that the original commitment was invalid on
its face or that the original sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to enter the sentence. We
hold that the circuit court’s dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus was not clearly
erroneous.” Jackson I, 2011 Ark. 49, at 5, 378 S.W.3d at 106. Inexplicably, this court
continues to cite and rely on the same rationale that the Supreme Court of the United States
has expressly rejected in habeas cases.
The Arkansas habeas statute states in pertinent part:
The writ of habeas corpus shall be granted forthwith by any of the officers enumerated in § 16-112-102(a) to any person who shall apply for the writ by petition showing, by affidavit or other evidence, probable cause to believe he or she is detained without lawful authority, is imprisoned when by law he or she is entitled to bail, or who has alleged actual innocence of the offense or offenses for which the person was convicted.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016). I do not dispute the proposition in the
boilerplate language found in the majority opinion that “[a] writ of habeas corpus is proper
when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction
over the case.” I only reject that those are the only two situations in which a writ of habeas
should issue. Accordingly, I must dissent from the majority’s disposition of this case based
on this rationale.
I am further troubled that the majority purports to rely on Williams v. Kelley, 2017
Ark. 200, at 4, 521 S.W.3d 104, 107, for the proposition that this court has held that 4 speedy-trial issues are not cognizable in habeas proceedings. Williams does seem to so hold.
However, Williams purports to rely on Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. 6 (per curiam), for the same
proposition. Davis contains no such holding. While it is true that Davis does cite Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), it only does so in a footnote.
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Digitally signed by Susan P. Williams Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of Cite as 2019 Ark. 284 this document Date: SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 2022.07.20 No. CV-19-74 14:55:50 -05'00'
LEONARD NOBLE Opinion Delivered: October 17, 2019 APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE HOT V. SPRING COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT AND MOTION TO INCLUDE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE SUPPLEMENTAL ADDENDUM IN REPLY BRIEF [NO. 30CV-18-359]
HONORABLE CHRIS E WILLIAMS, JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION MOOT.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice
Leonard Noble appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus
filed pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-101 (Repl. 2016). Noble raises
two grounds for reversal—that the circuit court erred in declining to issue the writ based
on the State’s failure to afford Noble a speedy trial and by not holding an evidentiary hearing
on his petition. Because Noble did not state a ground for the writ, we affirm the circuit
court’s order and find his subsequent motion seeking leave to file a supplemental addendum
in his reply brief is moot.
In 1999, a Sebastian County Circuit Court jury found Noble guilty of residential
burglary and rape and sentenced him as a habitual offender to an aggregate sentence of 900
months’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Noble v. State, CR-00- 587 (Ark. App. Sept. 19, 2001) (unpublished) (original docket no. CACR 00-587). Noble
filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the county where he is currently incarcerated.
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its
face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Philyaw v. Kelley, 2015 Ark.
465, 477 S.W.3d 503. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the
subject matter in controversy. Baker v. Norris, 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007). When
the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the appellant and also has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the court has authority to render the judgment. Johnson v. State, 298 Ark.
479, 769 S.W.2d 3 (1989).
Under our statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his actual innocence
and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment
or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing by affidavit or other
evidence of probable cause to believe that he is being illegally detained. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016).
A circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless
it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. A decision is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing
the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. Id. The circuit court dismissed Noble’s habeas petition on its merits; that is, it held
that Noble had not been denied a speedy trial. The issue at hand, however, is whether
Noble stated a ground for issuance of the writ. As he did not do so, the habeas petition was
subject to dismissal by the circuit court, and this court will affirm the circuit court’s decision
2 when it reached the right result even if a wrong reason may have been stated. See Marshall
v. State, 2017 Ark. 208, at 5, 521 S.W.3d 456, 459.
This court has held that speedy-trial issues are not cognizable in habeas proceedings.
Williams v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 200, at 4, 521 S.W.3d 104, 107. Allegations of speedy-trial
violations are assertions of trial error that do not implicate the facial validity of the judgment
or the jurisdiction of the trial court. Id. If there were errors at trial, those issues could, and
should, have been raised at trial and on the record on direct appeal and are thus not within
the purview of the remedy because the writ of habeas corpus will not be issued to correct
errors or irregularities that occurred at trial. Stephenson v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 143, 544 S.W.3d
44.
Noble also contends that the circuit court should have held a hearing on his petition.
Our statutory scheme does not mandate a hearing on a habeas petition regardless of the
allegations contained in it. Collier v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 170, at 4. A hearing is not required
on a habeas petition when probable cause for issuance of the writ is not shown by affidavit
or other evidence. Id. Because Noble failed to establish probable cause for issuance of the
writ, he was not entitled to a hearing. Johnson v. State, 2018 Ark. 42, at 5, 538 S.W.3d 819,
822.
HART, J., dissents.
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice, dissenting. This is yet another case in which
this court has impermissibly narrowed the grounds for relief under our state habeas corpus
statute. This stance continues to perplex in light of the Supreme Court of the United States’
3 rejection of this limit on habeas corpus when it reversed Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378
S.W.3d 103 (Jackson I), in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)––the majority’s analysis is
no longer valid.
As in the case before us, this court in Jackson I disposed of Jackson’s habeas petition
stating, “Jackson has failed to allege or show that the original commitment was invalid on
its face or that the original sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to enter the sentence. We
hold that the circuit court’s dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus was not clearly
erroneous.” Jackson I, 2011 Ark. 49, at 5, 378 S.W.3d at 106. Inexplicably, this court
continues to cite and rely on the same rationale that the Supreme Court of the United States
has expressly rejected in habeas cases.
The Arkansas habeas statute states in pertinent part:
The writ of habeas corpus shall be granted forthwith by any of the officers enumerated in § 16-112-102(a) to any person who shall apply for the writ by petition showing, by affidavit or other evidence, probable cause to believe he or she is detained without lawful authority, is imprisoned when by law he or she is entitled to bail, or who has alleged actual innocence of the offense or offenses for which the person was convicted.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016). I do not dispute the proposition in the
boilerplate language found in the majority opinion that “[a] writ of habeas corpus is proper
when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction
over the case.” I only reject that those are the only two situations in which a writ of habeas
should issue. Accordingly, I must dissent from the majority’s disposition of this case based
on this rationale.
I am further troubled that the majority purports to rely on Williams v. Kelley, 2017
Ark. 200, at 4, 521 S.W.3d 104, 107, for the proposition that this court has held that 4 speedy-trial issues are not cognizable in habeas proceedings. Williams does seem to so hold.
However, Williams purports to rely on Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. 6 (per curiam), for the same
proposition. Davis contains no such holding. While it is true that Davis does cite Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), it only does so in a footnote. The footnote in Davis states:
If there was a speedy trial issue to be raised, it could have been raised in the trial court. The right to a speedy trial may be waived. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); see also Eubanks v. Humphrey, 334 Ark. 21, 972 S.W.2d 234 (1998).
Davis, 2011 Ark. 6, at 4 n.1. The Wingo Court’s actual holding was not that speedy trial was
not cognizable in habeas proceedings—Wingo is a habeas case—but rather that a petitioner’s
right to a speedy trial was not grounds for habeas relief even though five years had elapsed
between arrest and trial and four of those years were attributable to the prosecution because
Wingo had waived his right. There is no waiver of Mr. Noble’s speedy-trial rights in the case
before us. In fact, he vigorously contested it in the evidentiary hearing that was conducted
in the circuit court. Like the Wingo Court, we should have addressed Mr. Noble’s argument
on the merits.
I am mindful that the common law is fluid, and the opinions of this court have the
same effect on the common law as a stiff wind has on a stalk of wheat. However, the
pronouncements of this court on habeas are constrained by the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States and by the Arkansas Constitution. The Arkansas Constitution
provides: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except by the
General Assembly, in case of rebellion, insurrection or invasion, when the public safety may
require it.” Ark. Const. art. 2, § 11. In my view, it behooves this court to follow either the
Supreme Court or the Arkansas Constitution––preferably both. 5 I respectfully dissent.
Leonard Noble, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.