Lee Charles Millsap v. Dexter Payne, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction
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Opinion
Cite as 2020 Ark. 401 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-20-278
LEE CHARLES MILLSAP Opinion Delivered: December 3, 2020
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE V. LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 40CV-20-37] DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE JODI RAINES DENNIS, CORRECTION JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice
Lee Charles Millsap appeals the circuit court’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus. He contends that he is being illegally held because there was a defect in the
amended felony information, he was not afforded a speedy trial, and his attorney was
ineffective for not raising this issue. Because these are not grounds for habeas relief, we
affirm the circuit court’s order.
I. Background
In 1998, Millsap entered a plea of guilty to capital murder, first-degree terroristic
threatening, and second-degree battery. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of life
imprisonment without parole. In 2020, Millsap petitioned for writ of habeas corpus. The
circuit court concluded none of the allegations were cognizable in a habeas proceeding and
denied relief. Millsap appealed. II. Grounds for Issuance of the Writ
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment and commitment order is facially
invalid or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the case. Foreman v. State, 2019 Ark.
108, 571 S.W.3d 484. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the
subject matter in controversy. Baker v. Norris, 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007). When
the trial court has both personal jurisdiction over the appellant and jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the court has authority to adjudicate the case. Johnson v. State, 298 Ark. 479,
769 S.W.2d 3 (1989).
A petitioner who does not allege his actual innocence and proceed under Act 1780
of 2001, must plead either the judgment was facially invalid or the trial court lacked
jurisdiction and show probable cause, by affidavit or other evidence, that he is being illegally
detained. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016). A circuit court’s inquiry is
limited to the facial validity of the judgment and commitment order. McArthur v. State, 2019
Ark. 220, 577 S.W.3d 385. Unless the petitioner can show that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction or that the commitment order was facially invalid, there is no basis for issuing a
writ of habeas corpus. Fields v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 416. This court will uphold a circuit court’s
decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon,
2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. A decision is clearly erroneous when the appellate court,
after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id.
2 III. Claims for Relief
First, Millsap argues that when the State amended the felony information and added
the charge of second-degree battery, it neglected to have it signed by the circuit clerk. He
argues this failure rendered the information constitutionally invalid and deprived the trial
court of jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea and enter the judgment. This court has held
that information-signature allegations are not jurisdictional. Randle v. Straughn, 2020 Ark.
117, at 3, 595 S.W.3d 361, 364. This makes an information potentially voidable, rather than
void, and a defendant must raise this at the time of trial. Id. When a defendant enters a plea
of guilty, the plea is his trial, and a habeas corpus proceeding does not allow a prisoner to
retry his case. Finney v. Kelley, 2020 Ark. 145, at 5, 598 S.W.3d 26, 29. The circuit court
did not err in denying habeas relief on this claim.
Millsap’s second claim for habeas relief is that the State failed to afford him a speedy
trial. As part of this claim, Millsap asserts that his counsel was ineffective for not making a
motion for dismissal and instead allowing him to enter a guilty plea. Although Millsap
pleaded guilty fourteen months after the first felony information was filed, his allegation is
insufficient here. A petitioner’s speedy-trial-violation claim is not within the purview of a
habeas proceeding because it is a claim of trial error that does not implicate the facial validity
of the judgment or the jurisdiction of the trial court. Williams v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 200, at
4, 521 S.W.3d 104, 107. When Millsap argues that his attorney was ineffective for not
raising the speedy-trial issue, habeas is the incorrect avenue. Defendants should raise
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in a timely filed petition under Arkansas Rule
of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2019). A habeas proceeding does not replace timely filing this
3 petition. Davis v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 1, at 3, 564 S.W.3d 512, 514. Again, the circuit court
did not err in denying habeas relief on this ground. For the above reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.
HART, J., dissents.
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice, dissenting. I dissent for the reasons stated in
Noble v. State, 2019 Ark. 284, 585 S.W.3d 671 (Hart, J., dissenting).
I dissent.
Lee Charles Millsap, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: David L. Eanes Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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