Lennon v. Reality Kats, LLC

District Court, N.D. California·Decided April 6, 2024·No. 3:20-cv-02258·Unknown

Opinion

San Francisco Division DAVID P. LENNON, et al., Case No. 20-cv-02258-LB

Plaintiffs, (Consolidated with Case No. 20-cv-02271-LB

v. FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER REALITY KATS, LLC, et al., Re: ECF No. 125 Defendants. Plaintiff, v.

MIRSYL, INC., et al.,

Defendants. The court held a pretrial conference on April 4, 2024, and issues this pretrial order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e). 1. Trial Date and Length of Trial The jury trial will begin on Monday, May 13, 2024, in Courtroom D, 15th Floor, U.S. District Court, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California. The trial will last up to five days. The witness) and will include two fifteen-minute breaks. Counsel must arrive at 8:15 a.m. to address any issues (such as objections) before the trial day begins. Once the jury begins deliberations, it usually stays past 2:00 p.m. The first day will be a full day. Each party will have up to ten hours per side for opening statements, closing arguments (including rebuttal closings), direct examination of witnesses, and cross examination of the other side’s witnesses, including all objections raised during the trial day. 2. Procedures During Trial; Exhibit and Witness Lists; Witnesses The court’s February 9, 2024, Case-Management and Pretrial Order has the court’s trial procedures for the presentation of exhibits, depositions, and witness testimony, including specific procedures for deposition excerpts.1 The parties have identified their witnesses in a joint witness list. As discussed at the pretrial conference, if the parties identify the same witnesses, the defendants will examine the witnesses when the plaintiffs call them (as opposed to recalling them). 3. Claims, Defenses, and Relief Sought The parties’ positions (claims, defenses, and relief sought) are reflected in their joint proposed pretrial order at ECF No. 102. 4. Stipulations The parties have stipulated to certain facts.2 That stipulation must be marked as an exhibit and read into evidence at trial. 5. Motions in Limine (MILs) For the reasons stated on the record and below, the court rules as follows. 1 Case-Mgmt. and Pretrial Order – ECF No. 126 at 3–14. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 5.1 Pls.’ MIL No. 1: Exclude, Based on Collateral Estoppel, Evidence that Defendants had Probable Cause or Acted with Proper Purpose — Granted In two prior cases initiated by the defendants against the plaintiffs here, the courts sanctioned the defendants for bringing the case. The plaintiffs contend that collateral estoppel now bars the defendants from arguing that those cases were initiated with probable cause and for a proper purpose. The defendants respond that the plaintiffs have argued only that the prior cases terminated in their favor, which is a distinct element of the malicious-prosecution tort (that is, distinct from the probable-cause and improper-purpose elements of the tort). “The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents parties from relitigating issues that have been resolved in an earlier action between the same parties or their privies.” Peterson v. Clark Leasing Corp., 451 F.2d 1291, 1292 (9th Cir. 1971). “Collateral estoppel applies if: (1) the issue sought to be relitigated is identical to one necessarily decided in a previous proceeding; (2) the previous proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party (or was in privity with a party) in the prior proceeding.” E. Bay Law v. Ford Motor Co., No. 15-cv-04257-TEH, 2015 WL 7571809, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015) (citing People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 692 (1974)). Regarding the Novato Action, Judge Wilken’s sanctions order addressed both the probable- cause and improper-purpose elements, not merely the favorable-termination element. The same is true of the sanctions order in the Bellinger Property Action. The court therefore grants this motion in limine. The defendants contend that if this motion is granted, then the plaintiffs should be precluded from damages on their malicious-prosecution claim because otherwise they would receive a double recovery. The court discussed this at the pretrial conference: this is an offset issue that can be addressed by the procedure that the plaintiffs propose. 5.2 Pls.’ MIL No. 2: Exclude, Based on Collateral Estoppel, Evidence Concerning Mr. Lennon’s Alleged Misrepresentations Regarding the Novato Development Transaction — Granted The defendants’ only response is that “even if the other courts found as a matter of fact that no misrepresentation occurred, this does not preclude the [defendants] from being able to offer evidence to show probable cause for having alleged that a misrepresentation occurred.” This goes to the issue in the first motion in limine, which the court has already resolved. The court grants this motion in limine. 5.3 Pls.’ MIL No. 3: Exclude, Based on Collateral Estoppel, Evidence Concerning Mr. Lennon’s Alleged Responsibility for Authorship of Magazine Subscription Sales Solicitations — Granted In a prior enforcement action by the FTC against Mr. Simpson and companies he controlled, the court held that magazine-subscription solicitations used by Mr. Simpson’s entities were deceptive. In that case, Mr. Simpson argued that Mr. Lennon was responsible for the content of the mailers. But the court held that “[Mr.] Simpson developed and made the decisions about the deceptive mailer.” The defendants contend that because Mr. Lennon was acting as attorney for Mr. Simpson and his entities at the time, Mr. Lennon was “involved” with the mailers. But the issue here is responsibility for authorship. On that issue, the court grants this motion in limine. 5.4 Pls.’ MIL No. 4: Exclude Evidence of Mr. Lennon’s Alleged Involvement in Certain Transactions Involving Jeffrey Hoyal — Granted The transactions at issue were between Mr. Simpson and his former business partner Mr. Hoyal. The plaintiffs contend that because the defendants’ claims arising from these transactions were litigated against Mr. Hoyal and “were summarily adjudicated against the [defendants] in [that] lawsuit,” collateral estoppel bars the defendants from offering evidence that Mr. Lennon “was responsible for or involved in” the transactions. The plaintiffs also contend that any evidence that Mr. Lennon was involved in the facts underlying the claims in the Hoyal lawsuit would be irrelevant and confusing under Federal Rules of Evidence 401–03. For example, the facts in the Hoyal lawsuit “were not even alleged in the Novato Action against [the plaintiffs]” (which the plaintiffs now claim was malicious). The defendants counter (in just one paragraph) that a “link and relationship” existed between Mr. Hoyal and Mr. Lennon, as shown by the fact that Mr. Hoyal paid money to Mr. Lennon. “This evidence relates to a substantive issue of joint conduct to structure financial transactions, and not to a character issue.” The defendants also argue that “evidence of [Mr.] Lennon’s involvement with [Mr.] Hoyal is also relevant to the [defendants’] counterclaims, including, but not limited to, [Mr.] Lennon’s involvement in the US Tax Court Case.” The operative answer in the lower- numbered action does not have counterclaims.3 The original answer asserted four counterclaims and included allegations of Mr. Lennon’s allegedly divided loyalty between Mr. Hoyal and the defendants.4 But the operative answer dropped the counterclaims after the plaintiffs had moved to dismiss them.5 Of course, in the consolidated Case No. 20-

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