Lemu v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 26, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-2073
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALEX LEMU,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02073 (CJN)

FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Alex Lemu claims that he was constructively discharged by his former employer,

Factory Mutual Insurance Company, in violation of public policy. See generally ECF No. 1-2.

Factory Mutual moves to dismiss. See ECF No. 11. The Court grants that motion for the following

reasons.

I. Background1

Factory Mutual is a commercial property insurer that provides risk-management services

to help companies prevent property damage and loss. See Services we provide, FM,

https://www.fm.com/solutions/services-we-provide (last visited February 23, 2026).2 Lemu

worked there as a jurisdictional consultant until May 2025. ECF No. 1-2 at 3.3 In that capacity,

1 Because Lemu proceeds pro se, the Court considers the exhibits attached to his Complaint and any allegations made in his opposition to Factory Mutual’s motion to dismiss. See Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015); infra at 5–8. 2 “[A] court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to ‘reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’” Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 202 F. Supp. 3d 159, 167 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 869 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). 3 All page citations refer to the page numbers that the CM/ECF system generates. 1 he was responsible for inspecting boilers and pressure vessels at various locations throughout the

District of Columbia. See id. at 4; see generally id.

In late 2024, Lemu notified his manager and the scheduling team that 157 boilers and

pressure vessels were overdue for inspection, including a boiler at Sibley Memorial Hospital. ECF

No. 1-2 at 3, 7–10. He requested that the team start scheduling inspections in D.C. Id. at 10.

Lemu’s manager responded that Factory Mutual was prioritizing other locations but would address

D.C. within a few weeks. Id. at 7.

In March 2025, Lemu emailed his manager, a senior account engineer, and a scheduling

specialist about difficulty he was having scheduling an inspection at Sibley. Id. at 13. The senior

account engineer forwarded Lemu’s message to a Sibley employee who directed Lemu and the

senior account engineer to the appropriate Sibley personnel. Id. at 12–13. Lemu’s filings do not

indicate whether he ever contacted those individuals or scheduled an inspection there. See

generally ECF No. 1-2. He did, however, tell his manager that Factory Mutual was obligated to

report its untimely inspection of Sibley to the D.C. Department of Buildings. ECF No. 15 at 1.

On April 2, 2025, a boiler at Sibley sustained damage following a low-water failure

incident. ECF No. 1-2 at 5. After the incident, Lemu felt “a moral and professional obligation to

report what [happened] to the appropriate authority despite [the Company’s] objection,” so he

informed the D.C. Department of Buildings “via telephone.” ECF No. 15 at 1. His pleadings do

not allege that anyone at Factory Mutual knew that he contacted the Department, nor do they

specify when the call occurred.

Later that month, Factory Mutual convened a meeting regarding the incident, during which

Lemu’s manager accused him of failing to timely escalate inspection scheduling difficulties. ECF

No. 15 at 2; see ECF No. 1-2 at 5–6. A few days later, while inspecting the boiler at Sibley, the

2 manager made similar comments in front of a Sibley employee. ECF No. 15 at 2. Lemu also

alleges that in May, during a company Microsoft Teams call, he was falsely accused of

“manipulating the events on [his] calendar” and subjected to what he describes as “defamation and

psychological torture.” Id.

On May 22, 2025, Factory Mutual issued Lemu a “Final Written Warning.” ECF No. 1-2

at 5–6. That letter stated that Lemu had failed both to timely escalate the inspection scheduling

difficulties for the Sibley boiler and to report an incident with a boiler at another location. Id. at

5. The letter advised Lemu that further performance deficiencies could result in his termination.

Id. at 5–6. Lemu disputes the accuracy of the accusations and contends that others were

responsible for scheduling inspections. Id. at 4. He refused to countersign the letter and resigned

(allegedly under duress). Id. at 3–4.

A few weeks later, Lemu filed this action in D.C. Superior Court, which Factory Mutual

then removed here. See id. at 1; ECF No. 2. Factory Mutual now moves to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6). See ECF No. 11-1.

II. Legal Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. But the rule that

courts “must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions.” Id. Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

3 At this stage, the Court “accept[s] the operative complaint’s well-pleaded factual

allegations as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor. N. Am. Butterfly

Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020). It “may also consider any documents either

attached to or incorporated in the complaint.” Joyner v. Morrison & Foerster LLP, 140 F.4th 523,

529 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). A pro se complaint is “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50

(D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). And the Court

must “consider a pro se litigant’s complaint in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a

motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt.

Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).

III. Analysis

Factory Mutual presents various arguments in its motion, but the Court only addresses two:

Lemu’s failure plausibly to allege that he was constructively discharged, and Lemu’s failure to

link his discharge to a clear public policy mandate.

A. Constructive Discharge

Lemu concedes that Factory Mutual did not expressly terminate his employment, but

instead contends his resignation was a constructive discharge. See generally ECF No. 1-2. “To

allege constructive discharge,” however, Lemu “must show ‘that (1) intentional discrimination

existed, (2) [Factory Mutual] deliberately made working conditions intolerable, and (3)

aggravating factors justified [Lemu’s] conclusion that [he] had no option but to’” resign. Walden

v. Patient-Centered Outcomes Rsch. Inst., 177 F. Supp. 3d 336, 346 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting

Douglas–Slade v. LaHood, 793 F. Supp. 2d 82, 102 (D.D.C. 2011)). Allegations of a hostile work

environment are insufficient. See Valentine v. Towers Condo. Ass’n, No. 22-cv-3216, 2024 WL

4 1299462, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2024). Rather, a plaintiff like Lemu “must show that the

employer deliberately created intolerable work conditions that forced the plaintiff to quit.” Veitch

v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2006). “The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions

become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt

compelled to resign?” Id. (quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004)).

Instances “‘where courts have upheld constructive-discharge findings tend to involve extreme

mistreatment or thinly veiled (or even overt) threats of termination’ indicative of a deliberate effort

to drive the employee out.” Valentine, 2024 WL 1299462, at *3 (quoting Robinson v. Ergo Sols,

LLC, 85 F. Supp. 3d 275, 283 (D.D.C. 2015)).

Lemu’s allegations fall short of this standard. Lemu first claims that he “resigned under

duress” after refusing to sign a letter from Factory Mutual “with an explicit threat of termination.”

ECF No. 1-2 at 3. But “when a written instrument is attached to a complaint and it contradicts the

allegations in the complaint, the written instrument controls.” Regan v. Spicer HB, LLC, 134 F.

Supp. 3d 21, 26 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing 5A Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure: Civil 3d § 1327, 450–51 (3d ed. 2004)). And here, the Final Written Warning attached

to Lemu’s Complaint does not contain an explicit threat of termination. ECF No. 1-2 at 5–6.

Rather, it states: “If you are responsible for another incident occurring of this nature, it would be

grounds for immediate termination of your employment.” Id. at 6 (emphasis added). The closest

it gets to threatening termination is when it conveys that failure to comply with Factory Mutual’s

expectations for its employees “will result in termination.” Id. But requiring Lemu to sign a letter

conditioning his continued employment on compliance with company policies falls far short of

rendering his working conditions so objectively intolerable that a reasonable employee would have

felt compelled to resign. See Walden, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 346 (holding that a plaintiff who received

5 a negative performance review and was required to sign a performance improvement plan did not

establish constructive discharge).

Lemu also alleges that Factory Mutual disseminated misleading and defamatory

information about his job performance at various meetings. See ECF No. 15 at 2. According to

Lemu, management personnel falsely accused him of “manipulating the events on [his] calendar”

and not timely escalating the scheduling difficulties at Sibley. See id. Most of Lemu’s allegations

are conclusory statements that do not provide sufficient factual details to survive a motion to

dismiss. See, e.g., id. (Lemu alleges that his manager unleashed an “irrational defamation

campaign against [him] in the presence of” a Sibley employee but does not state what his manager

said). And the allegations that do contain relevant details do not amount to “aggravating factors

which would justify [Lemu’s] conclusion that [he] had to resign.” Walden, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 346.

“[A]ggravating factors can include ‘historic discrimination’ over a period of several years,

‘repeated but futile attempts’ to remedy the discrimination, and ‘humiliation and loss of prestige’

precipitated by the failure to obtain redress.” Floyd v. Lee, 85 F. Supp. 3d 482, 521 (D.D.C. 2015)

(quoting Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1175–76 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Lemu has not alleged that

kind of extreme conduct here.

B. Public Policy At-Will Exception

Even if Lemu had plausibly alleged that he was constructively discharged, he fails to allege

that Factory Mutual forced him to choose between violating the law and losing his job, and he also

fails to identify a clear mandate of public policy closely connected to his purportedly involuntary

resignation.

Employment in the District of Columbia is generally at-will, meaning “an employer may

discharge an [ ] employee at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all.” Adams v. George

6 W. Cochran & Co., Inc., 597 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C. 1991); Bilal-Edwards v. United Plan. Org., 896

F. Supp. 2d 88, 93–94 (D.D.C. 2012). But, “[i]n Adams, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

articulated a ‘very narrow exception’ to [that] rule, allowing a discharged at-will employee to sue

his former employer ‘when the sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate

the law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation.’” Davis v. Gables Residential/H.G.

Smithy, 525 F. Supp. 2d 87, 101–02 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Adams, 597 A.2d at 34). Here, Lemu’s

allegations do not fall within the “narrow exception” recognized in Adams, as he does not allege

that Factory Mutual forced him to choose between violating the law and losing his job. If anything,

the “Final Written Warning” suggests that Factory Mutual sought to ensure that he complied with

D.C. Code inspection requirements going forward. See ECF No. 1-2 at 5–6.

D.C. courts also recognize wrongful-discharge claims where an employee’s termination

violates a clear mandate of public policy “firmly anchored in either the Constitution or in a statute

or regulation.” Warren v. Coastal Int’l Secs., Inc., 96 F. App’x. 722, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting

Fingerhut v. Child.’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 738 A.2d 799, 803 n.7 (D.C. 1999)). “[T]o be cognizable,

‘there must be a close fit between the policy thus declared and the conduct at issue in the allegedly

wrongful termination.’” Id. at 722–23 (quoting Fingerhut, 738 A.2d at 803 n.7).

Even liberally construed, Lemu’s filings do not allege that Factory Mutual terminated his

employment in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Lemu states that Factory Mutual

violated D.C. Code § 2-107 and D.C. Mechanical Code § 1003.15 by failing to timely inspect

Sibley, and that he urged his manager to report the violation but ultimately did so himself. See

ECF No. 15 at 1. At most, these allegations suggest that Lemu believes he was terminated after

reporting potential code violations. But he never alleges that Factory Mutual constructively

discharged him because of that reporting. His complaint and opposition brief are silent as to

7 whether the Company even knew that he “informed DC DOB Chief Boiler Inspector, Mr. Keith

Jones, via telephone” of the violation. Id. Regardless, even if Lemu had alleged that the Company

knew of his reporting and that it led to his involuntary resignation, he does not identify any clear

mandate of public policy that the alleged termination violated. See Lurie v. Mid-Atl. Permanente

Med. Grp., P.C., 729 F. Supp. 2d 304, 326 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Even if one accepts plaintiff’s account

of himself as a whistleblower punished for his good deeds, plaintiff is unable to identify an

appropriate public policy on which to base his claim.”); Davis, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (“[I]n the

absence of any identified public policy, the Court clearly cannot conclude that the public policy

relied upon is firmly anchored in the Constitution or a statute or regulation.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Factory Mutual’s motion to dismiss. A separate

Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: February 26, 2026 ________________________ CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge