UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
REVEREND FATHER EMMANUEL LEMELSON,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 2415 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Reverend Father Emmanuel Lemelson was recently the subject of a Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) civil enforcement action in federal court where a
jury found him liable under antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Lemelson was
ordered to pay a civil penalty and enjoined from violating certain federal securities laws for five
years. Now the SEC has initiated an in-house administrative proceeding to suspend or bar
Lemelson from working in the securities industry. Lemelson brought this lawsuit to challenge the
SEC’s follow-on proceeding on constitutional and res judicata grounds. Lemelson seeks
preliminary injunctive relief, and the SEC has moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Court is unpersuaded by Lemelson’s arguments. It dismisses
two of his claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction and the rest under Rule 12(b)(6).
BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
“The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was the last in a series of Acts designed to eliminate
certain abuses in the securities industry, abuses which were found to have contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930[s].” SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). “Like the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Investment Advisers Act was intended to achieve a high standard of business ethics in
the securities industry.” Robare Grp., Ltd. v. SEC, 922 F.3d 468, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up). The Advisers Act accordingly “establishes federal fiduciary standards to govern the
conduct of investment advisers,” Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17
(cleaned up), “imposing on them an affirmative duty of utmost good faith, and full and fair
disclosure of all material facts,” Robare Grp., Ltd., 922 F.3d at 472 (cleaned up).
Section 203(f) of the Advisers Act “authorized the SEC to oversee the registration and
licensing of different classes of participants in the securities markets[.]” Bartko v. SEC, 845 F.3d
1217, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). It also “authorized the [SEC] to suspend or bar a
participant from specific classes if certain conditions were met.” Id. (citations omitted).
As presently codified, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(f) allows the SEC to suspend or bar someone if it finds
“on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing” that (1) such a suspension or bar is “in the
public interest,” and (2) that the person “has been convicted” of certain crimes or has been
“enjoined from any action, conduct, or practice” specified in another paragraph, id., including
being enjoined from “engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice . . . in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security,” id. § 80b-3(e)(4). These proceedings are called “follow-on
administrative proceeding[s].” Bartko, 845 F.3d at 1219. And the Advisers Act allows “[a]ny
person or party aggrieved by” an SEC order issued pursuant to such proceedings to “obtain a
review of [the] order in the United States court of appeals within any circuit wherein such person
resides or has his principal office or place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a).
2 B. Factual Background
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Wright v.
Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
The Reverend Father Emmanuel Lemelson “manages an investment fund called The
Spruce Peak Fund, LP.” First Am. Compl. (Am. Compl.) ¶ 3, ECF No. 10. About ten years ago,
in 2015, the SEC “launched an . . . investigation against him . . . after a pharmaceutical company
complained about Lemelson’s . . . public criticism of the company the year before.” Id. ¶ 8.
“In September 2018, just months after Lemelson sent an open letter to Congress accusing [the]
SEC of incompetence and financial illiteracy, the agency sued Lemelson in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts,” alleging that he “had engaged in market
manipulation and other nefarious misconduct.” Id.
The SEC “overwhelmingly lost its case before the Massachusetts federal jury and obtained
only a small fraction of the relief it demanded.” Id. ¶ 11. But the district court still “entered a final
judgment” that “summarily enjoined Lemelson ‘from violating Section 10(b) of the [Securities]
Exchange Act and [SEC] Rule 10b-5 for a period of five years’ while ordering him to pay a
$160,000 civil penalty and no disgorgement.” Id. And the SEC has now initiated a follow-on
administrative proceeding to suspend or bar Lemelson, citing the district court’s injunction as the
relevant predicate act. Id. ¶ 20. Lemelson spends much of his Amended Complaint cataloguing
various details to show that the SEC is biased against him. See id. ¶¶ 6–10, 12–20. He summarizes
the central problem as follows: The “SEC has not only an intense and obvious prejudice against
[him] but also the undeniable appearance of bias in favor of its own lawyers, who are now
appearing before [the] SEC” and one of its Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) “as lead prosecutors
3 of the administrative follow-on proceeding after having advised [the] SEC, ex parte, in connection
with the parallel Massachusetts federal court litigation against Lemelson.” Id. ¶ 21.
C. Procedural Background
Lemelson filed his Amended Complaint on December 17, 2024, bringing five claims
against the Commission. See id. ¶¶ 30–47. He alleges (1) that the SEC denied him due process,
(2) that the SEC usurped judicial power in violation of Article III, (3) that the SEC has
unconstitutionally deprived him of a jury trial, (4) that the SEC ALJ’s multiple layers of removal
protections violate Article II, and (5) that res judicata bars the follow-on administrative
proceeding. See id. Lemelson moved for a preliminary injunction on the same day. See Pl.’s Mot.
Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 11. And on January 16, 2025, the SEC moved to dismiss the case. See Mot.
Dismiss, ECF No. 13; see also Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 14. These motions are
fully briefed and are ripe for review. See Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (Pl.’s Opp’n), ECF No. 18;
Pl.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 17; Def.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss (Def.’s Reply),
ECF No. 21.
LEGAL STANDARDS
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) presents a threshold challenge to a court’s jurisdiction.”
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Int’l Dev. Fin. Corp., 585 F. Supp. 3d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2022)
(cleaned up). The plaintiff “bears the burden of providing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims.” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd.,
826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69 (D.D.C. 2011). When evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), “the court
may consider documents outside the pleadings to assure itself that it has jurisdiction.” Sandoval v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 322 F. Supp. 3d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2018).
“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether a
complaint has properly stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Kursar v. Transp. Sec.
4 Admin., 751 F. Supp. 2d 154, 163 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true” and “must grant [the]
plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). But the Court need not accept
the plaintiff’s “legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Browning v. Clinton, 292
F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). And the court “may consider only the facts alleged
in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters
of which [it] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621,
624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (cleaned up).
DISCUSSION
The Commission moves to dismiss two of Lemelson’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 9–14. And it moves to dismiss the
remaining three claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See id. at 14–37. The Court is persuaded by the Defendant’s arguments and dismisses all
five of Lemelson’s claims.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Commission argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Lemelson’s
third and fifth claims. Id. at 9–14. More specifically, it argues that Congress has “preclude[d]
district courts from exercising jurisdiction over [these] challenges to federal agency action” by
specifying in the Advisers Act “a different method to resolve” these claims. Id. at 9 (quoting Axon
Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 185 (2023)). The Court agrees and dismisses the third and fifth
claims under Rule 12(b)(1).
District courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But Congress may “preclude district
5 courts from exercising jurisdiction over challenges to federal agency action” by “substitut[ing] for
that district court authority an alternative scheme of review.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 185. Congress may
do so explicitly by “providing in so many words that district court jurisdiction will yield.” Id. But
it may also do so implicitly by “‘specifying a different method to resolve claims about agency
action,’ typically by providing for ‘review in a court of appeals following the agency’s own review
process.’” Vape Cent. Grp., LLC v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 24-cv-3354, 2025 WL 637416,
at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2025) (quoting Axon, 598 U.S. at 185). Here, Congress took the latter path
with the Advisers Act, providing that “a party aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission
under this subchapter may obtain a review of such order in the [appropriate] United States court
of appeals.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a); see also N.Y. Republican State Comm. v. SEC, 799 F.3d 1126,
1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding “the courts of appeals” have “exclusive jurisdiction” under
15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a)).
“But a statutory review scheme of that kind does not necessarily extend to every claim
concerning agency action.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 185. It extends only to claims “of the type Congress
intended to be reviewed within [the] statutory structure.” Id. at 186 (quoting Thunder Basin
Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 208 (1994)). “Three considerations, referred to as the Thunder
Basin factors, help courts determine whether a claim is subject to the presumptive ‘statutory
structure’ for direct appellate review or whether it falls outside this scheme.” Vape Cent. Grp.,
2025 WL 637416, at *4. First, courts ask whether “precluding district court jurisdiction” could
“‘foreclose all meaningful judicial review’ of the claim.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 186 (quoting Thunder
Basin, 510 U.S. at 212–13). Second, courts ask whether the claim is “wholly collateral to [the]
statute’s review provisions.” Id. (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212). And third, courts ask
whether the claim is “outside the agency’s expertise.” Id. (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at
6 212). “When the answer to all three questions is yes, ‘we presume that Congress does not intend
to limit jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
489 (2010)). “But the same conclusion might follow if the factors point in different directions.”
Id. “When that happens, courts must return to the lodestar of whether Congress intended the claim
at issue to be swept into the statutory enforcement scheme.” Vape Cent. Grp., 2025 WL 637416,
at *5. Applying these factors, the Court concludes that Lemelson’s third and fifth claims are “of
the type Congress intended to be reviewed within [the] statutory structure.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 186
(quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212).
1. Denial of Jury Trial (Claim 3)
Lemelson alleges that the “SEC seeks to deprive him of his private liberty and private
property rights to pursue his chosen profession and his chosen means of livelihood” without a jury
trial in contravention of SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), Am. Compl. ¶ 39, which held that
the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial in certain circumstances, see Jarkesy, 603 U.S.
at 140–41. But this claim is precluded by the Advisers Act under the Thunder Basin factors.
First, preclusion would not “foreclose all meaningful judicial review of the claim.”
Axon, 598 U.S. at 186 (cleaned up). The Supreme Court has explained that “adequate judicial
review does not usually demand a district court’s involvement” because “[r]eview of agency action
in a court of appeals can alone ‘meaningfully address[]’ a party’s claims.” Id. at 190
(quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215) (citing Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 21 (2012)
(holding Federal Circuit review over constitutional claims was “meaningful review”). And here,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a) provides such review by allowing a “party aggrieved by an order issued by
the Commission under this subchapter” to “obtain a review of such order in the [appropriate]
United States court of appeals.” Id. Lemelson can therefore obtain meaningful review of the
7 Commission’s decision, including any Seventh Amendment defense, in an Article III court.
If a court of appeals agrees with Lemelson’s Seventh Amendment argument, he can ask that court
to vacate the Commission’s decision. See, e.g., Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446, 465–66
(5th Cir. 2022).
Free Enterprise Fund does not foreclose this conclusion. There, the Supreme Court held
that 15 U.S.C. § 78y did not preclude district court jurisdiction. See 561 U.S. at 491. Much like
the statutory provision at issue here, that Section provided that “[a] person aggrieved by a final
order of the Commission . . . [could] obtain review of the order in the [appropriate] United States
Court of Appeals[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1). The problem in that case, however, was that the
plaintiff had challenged actions of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, “and not
every Board action [was] encapsulated in a final Commission order or rule.” Free Enter. Fund,
561 U.S. at 490. This meant that the statutory scheme—which “provide[d] only for judicial review
of Commission action”—might never have provided the plaintiff with judicial recourse.
Axon, 598 U.S. at 190 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 490). That concern does not apply
here. Lemelson challenges SEC actions, and 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a) allows for review of orders
“issued by the Commission.” Id.
Lemelson reads Free Enterprise Fund more broadly. He argues that he is similarly situated
to the plaintiff in that case because, as of now, “there is no final SEC order from which Lemelson
[may] seek review,” and “there may never be one.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. According to him, this makes
“the possibility of future judicial review of any final SEC order . . . entirely hypothetical and
speculative at this point, just as it was in Free Enterprise Fund.” Id. But this reading cannot be
squared with Axon. There, one of the plaintiffs sued the SEC in federal district court after it had
brought an enforcement action but before the ALJ hearing had begun. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 182.
8 And the Supreme Court did not think that Free Enterprise Fund controlled. See id. at 191.
It explained that because the plaintiffs were “parties in ongoing SEC and FTC proceedings, and
the statutes at issue provide[d] for judicial review of SEC and FTC action,” the plaintiffs could
“(eventually) obtain review of their constitutional claims through an appeal from an adverse
agency action to a court of appeals.” Id. at 190–91. Free Enterprise Fund thus does not support
Lemelson’s claim that judicial review is too speculative here. Cf. Vape Cent. Grp., 2025 WL
637416, at *5 (“In general, review of agency decisions must await finality; that is, in at least most
circumstances, a regulated party has no right to obtain judicial review of the relevant rules and
procedures until after the agency has rendered a decision.”).
Axon ultimately held that preclusion would foreclose meaningful judicial review, but not
in a way that bears on this case. See 598 U.S. at 196. Dealing with the same provision from Free
Enterprise Fund, the Court “recognized a narrow exception to Congress’s prescribed path for
judicial review of agency action for facial challenges to the constitutional structure of
administrative agencies’ ability to operate.” Loma Linda-Inland Consortium for Healthcare Educ.
v. NLRB, No. 23-5096, 2023 WL 7294839, at *11 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 27, 2025). The Axon plaintiffs
alleged that they were “being subjected” to a “proceeding by an unaccountable ALJ.” Axon,
598 U.S. at 191. This was a structural claim that had nothing to do with the result of the
administrative proceeding before the agency. See id. To the contrary, each plaintiff “would have
[had] the same claim had it won before the agency.” Id. The Court therefore concluded that the
plaintiffs had alleged a “here-in-now injury” about which “the court of appeals [could]
do nothing.” Id.
But Lemelson’s third claim does not fit within this “narrow exception.” Loma,
2023 WL 7294839, at *11. That is because the alleged harm caused by the denial of a jury trial
9 does not “arise merely from his appearance in [SEC] proceedings.” Blankenship v. Fin. Indus.
Regul. Auth., No. 24-cv-3003, 2024 WL 4043442, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2024). Rather, the harm
accrues only if the SEC takes “certain allegedly unconstitutional steps to injure him.” Id.; see also
Vape Cent. Grp., 2025 WL 637416, at *7 (“Thus, Vape Central’s Seventh Amendment claim is
best characterized, not as a challenge to an ‘unconstitutional proceeding,’ but as a challenge to the
ALJ’s authority—if necessary—to resolve any disputed issues of fact.”). And “[i]t is
well-established that the harm resulting from the denial of a jury trial can be remedied on appeal,
even after the case has already been tried—the reviewing court simply orders a new trial.” Ponte
v. FDIC, No. 24-cv-2379, 2024 WL 4730602, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 2024) (collecting cases).
So the Court joins the chorus of post-Jarkesy district court opinions holding that “the relevant
statutory procedures for challenging final administrative orders provide a sufficient opportunity
for ‘meaningful review’ of any Seventh Amendment defense.” Vape Cent. Grp., 2025 WL 637416,
at *6 (citing VHS Acquisition Subsidiary No. 7 v. NLRB, No. 24-cv-2577, 2024 WL 4817175, at *3
(D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2024); Blankenship, 2024 WL 4043442, at *2 n.4; Nexstar Media, Inc. Grp. v.
NLRB, No. 24-cv-1415, 2024 WL 4127090, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2024)).
Second, the claim is not “wholly collateral to [the] statute’s review provision.” Axon,
598 U.S. at 186 (cleaned up). The Court in Axon held that the structural constitutional claims were
collateral because the plaintiffs were “challenging the Commissions’ power to proceed at all, rather
than actions taken in the agency proceedings.” Id. at 192. Put another way, the plaintiffs
“object[ed] to the Commission’s power generally, not to anything particular about how that power
was wielded.” Id. at 193. But the same cannot be said for Lemelson. His third claim challenges the
lack of “any procedural option for a trial by jury,” Am. Compl. ¶ 40, not the existence of the SEC.
“[T]his is not a case in which the asserted injury exists separate and apart from the specifics of the
10 adjudicatory process[.]” Vape Cent. Grp., 2025 WL 637416, at *8. Lemelson’s claim is therefore
not wholly collateral. See, e.g., Blankenship, 2024 WL 4043442, at *2 (holding Seventh
Amendment claims were “not wholly collateral because they d[id] not challenge FINRA’s
existence” (citation omitted)).
Third, the claim is not “outside the agency’s expertise.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 186. The Court
acknowledges that this is a closer question because it may seem like the contours of the Seventh
Amendment belong “squarely within the judicial ken.” Vape Cent. Grp., 2025 WL 637416, at *8.
“But framing the application of the third Thunder Basin factor in that limited manner risks creating
a far more expansive exception to the statutory review procedures than the Supreme Court has ever
embraced; most, if not all, questions of constitutional law fall outside of the expertise of the
administrative agencies.” Id. “Instead, this factor is better understood to ask whether the challenge
raises a pure question of constitutional law, detached from considerations of agency policy, or
whether it raises a mixed question of law and fact (or policy), where agency action might shed
light on the constitutional question or obviate the need for judicial review.” Id. (cleaned up).
Lemelson’s Jarkesy claim is intertwined with the development of the factual record. This is
because “the right to a jury trial arises only if ‘there are issues of fact to be determined.’”
Vape Cent. Grp., 2025 WL 637416, at *7 (quoting In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920)).
So “[u]nlike in Axon,” “development of the factual record before the administrative agency
provides an essential component” of a Seventh Amendment claim. Id. at *9. This means that “the
agency’s expertise regarding the factual dispute, if any, may play a central role in the court of
appeals’ ultimate resolution of the constitutional argument.” Id. It should therefore come as no
surprise that the SEC and its ALJs have experience applying the Seventh Amendment in its
enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., In re Application of Kabani & Co., 116 SEC Docket 1095,
11 2017 WL 947229, at *20 (Mar. 10, 2017) (“The Supreme Court has similarly held that the Seventh
Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings.” (cleaned up)); John Thomas Cap.
Mgmt. Grp., Initial Decision Release No. 693, 2014 WL 5304908, at *6 (ALJ Oct. 17, 2014)
(holding respondents’ argument that “not having an opportunity of a hearing before a jury violates
the Seventh Amendment . . . has no merit”). The D.C. Circuit has even cited one of those agency
opinions to conclude that the SEC “has proven fully capable of considering [an individual’s]
attacks on the fairness of his proceeding.” Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
The Court accordingly finds that the SEC’s expertise may be “brought to bear” in this case.
Elgin, 567 U.S. at 23.
The Court caps this Thunder Basin analysis by returning to the “lodestar” of congressional
intent. Vape Cent. Grp., 2025 WL 637416, at *5. The Advisers Act created a statutory scheme for
follow-on proceedings that relies on decision-making by the SEC. It is hard to imagine that
Congress wanted the subjects of those proceedings to be able to short-circuit that scheme by
running straight to district court to challenge that congressional decision. Of course, there are
certain types of claims where appellate review would come too late to be of any use. See Axon,
598 U.S. at 191. And we presume that Congress meant not to foreclose such claims. Cf. id. at 191
(“Judicial review of . . . structural constitutional claims would come too late to be meaningful.”).
But those claims make up only a “narrow exception.” Vape Cent. Grp., 2025 WL 637416, at *6–8
(quoting Loma, 2023 WL 7294839, at *11). And that exception is not implicated here because any
harm caused by the denial of a jury trial “can be remedied on appeal,” Ponte, 2024 WL 4730602,
at *8 (collecting cases).
Lemelson raises one final point in opposition. He argues that even if the statutory scheme
precludes district court jurisdiction over this claim, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction
12 under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the claim arises from the same nucleus of operative facts as his
remaining claims. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. But he cites no authority for this theory. See id. at 11–12.
And the case law suggests there is no such work-around to preclusion. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 5
(holding a claims-channeling statute “provides the exclusive avenue to judicial review”);
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 318 F. Supp. 3d 370, 395 (D.D.C. 2018)
(Jackson, J.) (explaining that although Congress has provided federal district courts with “federal
question jurisdiction,” “diversity jurisdiction,” and “supplemental jurisdiction,” it “may also
choose to withhold jurisdiction[] by ‘channeling’ certain types of claims through alternative review
mechanisms” (citing Elgin, 567 U.S. at 9; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207)), rev’d on other
grounds, 929 F.3d 748 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The Court therefore declines to create such a carve-out.
2. Res Judicata (Claim 5)
Lemelson alleges that in the prior federal court proceedings, the “SEC could have requested
that the injunction include a bar or suspension to restrict [him] from participating in the securities
industry.” Am. Compl. ¶ 45. But because the SEC declined to do so, he argues that
“well-established principles of res judicata forbid [the] SEC from splitting its claims and pursuing
a second prosecution against Lemelson to obtain that relief now[.]” Id. ¶ 46. But for many of the
same reasons as described above, see supra, at 7–13, this claim is precluded by the Advisers Act
under the Thunder Basin factors.
First, preclusion would not “foreclose all meaningful judicial review of the claim.”
Axon, 598 U.S. at 186 (cleaned up). Lemelson is a “part[y] in ongoing SEC . . . proceedings, and
the statute[] at issue provide[s] for judicial review of SEC . . . action.” Id. at 190 (citation omitted);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a). “So Free Enterprise Fund’s analysis of the judicial review factor
does not control.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 191. And this res judicata claim does not fit within Axon’s
13 “narrow exception to Congress’s prescribed path for judicial review of agency action for facial
challenges to the constitutional structure of administrative agencies’ ability to operate.” Loma,
2024 WL 7294839, at *11 (citation omitted). Second, the claim is not “wholly collateral,”
Axon, 598 U.S. at 186, because Lemelson is challenging something “particular about how
[the SEC’s] power was wielded” instead of “object[ing] to the Commission’s power generally,”
id. at 193. And third, the claim is not “outside the agency’s expertise,” id. at 186, or “detached
from ‘considerations of agency policy,’” id. at 194 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 491).
Resolution of the res judicata question necessarily involves consideration of the nature of the prior
federal civil enforcement action and the follow-on administrative proceeding, both brought under
federal securities laws. See Beavers v. Watters, No. 10-cv-1343, 2010 WL 3155179, at *1
(D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2010) (“Under the principle of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits in
one action bars any further claim based on the same nucleus of facts.” (cleaned up)). It is therefore
intertwined with the question before the Commission. More generally, the Court is convinced that
Congress intended for challenges like these to proceed though the prescribed statutory scheme.
Cf. supra, at 12; see also Axon, 598 U.S. at 186 (“The ultimate question is how best to understand
what Congress has done[.]”).
B. Failure to State a Claim
The Commission argues that the remaining claims should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 14. The Court agrees and
dismisses Lemelson’s first, second, and fourth claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
1. Due Process (Claim 1)
Lemelson alleges that the SEC’s follow-on procedures violate due process by allowing
adjudicators to “decide their own cases.” Am. Compl. ¶ 33 (citing Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579
14 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2016); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136–37 (1955)). But the D.C. Circuit has
already rejected this argument. See Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1104
(D.C. Cir. 1988). And neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit has expressly or impliedly
overruled that case. So the Court dismisses this claim.
In Blinder, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action against the petitioners in federal
court alleging “violations of the antifraud provisions of both the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” 837 F.2d at 1101. After a full trial, the district court found the
petitioners had violated those antifraud provisions. See id. As that litigation “was proceeding
through the appellate process, the SEC instituted an administrative proceeding” against one of the
petitioners and its president “pursuant to [S]ection 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(4)). Much like the provision at issue here, that Section “authorize[d] the Commission to
impose sanctions on broker-dealers if, after notice and hearing, it determine[d] that sanctions
[were] in ‘the public interest.’” Id. The petitioner who was subject to these follow-on proceedings
challenged them on due process grounds: “Having prevailed on its contested lawsuit, the SEC now
is seeking to exercise quasi-judicial discretion to decide how severely [the petitioner] should be
sanctioned for the conduct that was the subject of the lawsuit.” Id. at 1104 (cleaned up). It thought
that such a procedure would allow the SEC to “become a judge of its own claim.” Id. (cleaned up).
But the D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, relying in large part on Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35 (1975), to hold that the procedure was “not founded upon a violation of the Due Process
Clause.” Blinder, 837 F.2d at 1107. Lemelson’s claim cannot be meaningfully distinguished from
the one advanced in Blinder and therefore fails as a matter of law.
Lemelson concedes that his due process claim is in “tension” with Blinder. Am. Compl.
¶ 34 n.1; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 20. But rather than resolving that tension, he argues that “Blinder
15 was not only profoundly mistaken at the time but, more importantly, would be decisively swept
aside if and when it were assessed by today’s Supreme Court.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 22. This misstates
the standard for vertical stare decisis. “[D]istrict judges . . . are obligated to follow controlling
circuit precedent until either [the Circuit], sitting en banc, or the Supreme Court, overrule it.”
United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d 1033, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Controlling
precedent may also be “effectively overruled,” but only if an intervening Supreme Court decision
“‘eviscerates’ the prior precedent such that the two cases are ‘incompatible.’” Harriott v. WMATA,
No. 19-cv-1656, 2019 WL 7066631, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2019) (quoting Perry v. MSPB,
829 F.3d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Perry v. Ross,
697 F. App’x 18 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
Lemelson points to no case that “eviscerates” Blinder’s reasoning. See Pl.’s Opp’n
at 21–24. Far from it. Most of the cases he cites deal with unrelated issues like the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, see Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 140–41, the application of a statute of
limitations to SEC proceedings, see Kokesh v. SEC, 581 U.S. 455, 457, 461 (2017); Gabelli v.
SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 447–49 (2013), the outer bounds of an agency’s statutory authority to seek
equitable remedies, see AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67, 70, 75–78 (2021); Liu v.
SEC, 591 U.S. 71, 85–87 (2020), the Appointments Clause, see Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237, 241,
244–49 (2018); United States v. Arthrex, 594 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2021), the President’s removal
powers, see Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 213 (2020); Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at
495–98, and the statutory preclusion of federal district court jurisdiction, see Axon, 598 U.S. at
180; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489–91. And the few combination-of-function due process
cases he does cite, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 23 (citing Williams, 579 U.S. at 4, 16; Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 884–86 (2009)); see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 34 n.1
16 (citing Williams, 579 U.S. at 8–9; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136–37), are compatible with
Blinder because they involved the judiciary instead of agency action, and Blinder itself noted that
the Supreme Court had “expressly distinguished the situation of administrative agencies from the
prototypical situation of a judge performing combined functions,” 837 F.2d at 1105
(citing Withrow, 421 U.S. at 53).
Lemelson seems to argue that taking each case one at a time misses the forest for the trees.
See Pl.’s Opp’n at 21–22. As he sees it, Blinder “was heavily influenced by the panel’s repeatedly
expressed . . . reluctance to upset the then-prevailing status quo in the field of administrative law.”
Id. at 21 (collecting quotations). And he cites many of the above cases to support the proposition
that today’s Supreme Court has shown no such reticence. See id. at 21–22 (collecting cases).
But this is far too attenuated to effectively overrule Blinder. See United States v. Richardson,
No. 23-cv-200, 2024 WL 402948, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2024) (saying “tension” between two cases
“is not enough for this Court to disregard a prior factually indistinguishable decision”
(cleaned up)); cf., e.g., Rai Care Ctrs. of Maryland I, LLC v. U.S. Off. of Personnel Mngmt.,
No. 18-cv-3151, 2024 WL 3694433, at *13 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2024) (holding Loper Bright
Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), did not effectively overrule a D.C. Circuit
precedent requiring deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous contracts).
Moreover, the Court reads Blinder as a straightforward application of Withrow.
See Blinder, 837 F.2d at 1105 (“The permissibility of the APA-sanctioned regime under the
Constitution has been strongly suggested (if indeed not settled) by the Supreme Court in the case
of Withrow v. Larkin[.]”); id. at 1106 (“Withrow v. Larkin thus stands as a formidable (if not
insurmountable) barrier to Mr. Blinder’s due process attack.”). And the D.C. Circuit has not
stopped applying Withrow just because the Supreme Court has shown an appetite for change in
17 other doctrinal fields. See Meta Platforms, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24-cv-5054, 2024 WL 1549732, at *1
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2024) (“But under longstanding precedent, it is settled that an agency generally
can constitutionally undertake both investigative and adjudicative functions.” (citing Withrow,
421 U.S. at 55–58) (citation omitted))). This Court will not be the first to announce such a change.
2. Article III (Claim 2)
Lemelson also alleges that the “SEC is usurping the judicial power of the United States and
purporting to relocate and vest it in an independent agency of the executive branch, thereby
violating Article III of the constitution and the constitutional separation of powers.” Am. Compl.
¶ 37. “When determining whether a proceeding involves an exercise of Article III judicial power,
[the Supreme Court’s] precedents have distinguished between ‘public rights’ and ‘private rights.’”
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 584 U.S. 325, 334 (2018)
(cleaned up). “Those precedents have given Congress significant latitude to assign adjudication of
public rights to entities other than Article III courts.” Id. (cleaned up). Lemelson challenges a
follow-on proceeding that deals with a public right, so the Court dismisses this claim.
The Supreme Court “has not definitively explained the distinction between public and
private rights.” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 131 (cleaned up). Historically, “public rights were not rights
important to the public, or rights created by the public, but rights of the public—that is, rights
pertaining to claims brought by or against the United States.” Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 68 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)
(“As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at once apparent between cases of private right
and those which arise between the government and persons subject to its authority in connection
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.”).
But over time, the Court developed a more capacious understanding of public rights, upholding
18 non-Article III adjudications even for disputes between private parties. See Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593–94 (1985); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835–36, 847–50 (1986). What never changed, however, was the idea
that “the doctrine’s heartland consist[ed] of claims belonging to the Government.” Jarkesy,
603 U.S. at 174 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of agency adjudications for statutory
claims brought by the Government in Atlas Roofing Company, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). There, a congressional investigation had
concluded that “work-related deaths and injuries had become a ‘drastic’ national problem.”
Id. at 444. “Finding the existing state statutory remedies as well as state common-law actions for
negligence and wrongful death to be inadequate to protect the employee population from death
and injury due to unsafe working conditions, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970[.]” Id. at 444–45. That statute “created a new statutory duty to avoid maintaining
unsafe or unhealthy working conditions” and empowered the Secretary of Labor to promulgate
standards. Id. at 445. It also allowed the Government to impose civil penalties upon violators by
proceeding before an administrative agency. Id. The Court upheld the structure as a case “in which
the Government sue[d] in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes[.]”
Id. at 450.
The Supreme Court revisited Atlas Roofing last term in Jarkesy. That case dealt with three
statutes that were “designed to combat securities fraud and [to] increase market transparency,”
including the Advisers Act. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 115. The antifraud provisions of those statutes
prohibited regulated individuals from engaging in fraudulent conduct. See id. at 116. And the SEC
could enforce those provisions by adjudicating the matter itself. Id. The Court distinguished Atlas
19 Roofing to hold that the public rights doctrine did not apply. See id. at 136–41. As it saw it, “Atlas
Roofing concluded that Congress could assign the OSH Act adjudications to an agency because
the claims were ‘unknown to the common law.’” Id. at 138 (quoting Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S.
at 461). Meanwhile, the respondents before the Court “were prosecuted for ‘fraudulent conduct,’
. . . and the pertinent statutory provisions derive[d] from, and [were] interpreted in light of, their
common law counterparts.” Id. (cleaned up). This mattered because “[i]f a suit is in the nature of
an action at common law, then the matter presumptively concerns private rights, and adjudication
by an Article III court is mandatory.” Id. at 128 (emphasis added) (citing Stern v. Marshall, 564
U.S. 462, 484 (2011)). Atlas Roofing therefore did not control. Id. at 136.
But Atlas Roofing applies where, as here, the agency brings claims “unknown to the
common law.” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 137 (cleaned up). In this case, an Article III court already
adjudicated the SEC’s antifraud enforcement action against Lemelson. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at
22; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 8. The only question left for the SEC ALJ to answer is whether barring
or suspending Lemelson would be “in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(f). The Commission
has argued that this question “is not a common law cause of action ‘borrow[ed]’ by Congress
for the Advisers Act, but is instead ‘self-consciously novel.’” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 23
(quoting Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 136–37). And Lemelson has not responded to this argument,
conceding the point. See Pl.’s Opp’n; Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries,
284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (“It is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff
files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the
defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”).
That is determinative for this case. And zooming out, it is hard to see how allowing an agency to
20 answer such a policy-laden question would “chip away at the authority of the Judicial Branch.”
Stern, 564 U.S. at 503.
Lemelson seems to suggest that Atlas Roofing is not good law. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 14.
He highlights language from Jarkesy stating that Atlas Roofing represents “a departure from
our legal traditions” and that it has been ignored and criticized by commentators. Id. (quoting
Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 138 n.4). But the Court in Jarkesy was careful to note that it “express[ed] no
opinion on these various criticisms.” 603 U.S. at 138 n.4. Atlas Roofing therefore still controls this
case. See Meta Platforms, Inc. v. FTC, 723 F. Supp. 3d 64, 71 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2024) (“To give
existing precedent anything less than its full due based on speculation about what the Supreme
Court might someday hold would exceed the authority of this Court, would inject grave uncertainty
in the legal landscape, and would undermine the rule of law.”).
Lemelson also argues more broadly that Jarkesy “effectively emasculated the public rights
exception without expressly overruling it.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. According to him, Jarkesy “strictly
limited” the public rights doctrine “to cases involving revenue collection, foreign commerce,
immigration, tariffs, relations with Indian tribes, and the granting of public benefits.” Id. at 14–15
(citing Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 128–30). But Jarkesy was not so ambitious. Right after listing those
“historic categories of adjudications” that “fall within the exception,” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 130,
the Court clarified that it did not claim to “definitively explain[]” the public rights doctrine,
id. at 131. The Court will take Jarkesy on its own terms.
The Court would come to the same conclusion even without Atlas Roofing. The Supreme
Court reiterated in Jarkesy that cases concerning public rights are those that “historically could
have been determined exclusively by the executive and legislative branches.” 603 U.S. at 128
(cleaned up); see also Stern, 564 U.S. at 485 (“[The plurality in Northern Pipeline] concluded that
21 this ‘public rights’ exception extended only to matters arising between individuals and the
Government in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive
or legislative departments . . . that historically could have been determined exclusively by those
branches.” (cleaned up)). While it never clarified the historical pedigree required to qualify as a
public right, we can glean some clues from the Court’s citations.
On one end of the spectrum, it cited Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856), which “took pains to justify the application of the exception
. . . by explaining that it flowed from centuries-old rules concerning revenue collection by a
sovereign.” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 131 (citing Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 281–85).
But at the other end of the spectrum, it cited Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929),
and United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011). Ex parte Bakelite Corp. was
an opinion from 1929 that “upheld a law authorizing the President to impose tariffs on goods
imported by unfair methods of competition” because “the political branches had traditionally held
exclusive power over this field and had exercised it.” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 130 (cleaned up).
The Court there supported this historical claim by citing to Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236
(1845), see Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 458 n.26, which involved an 1839 statute that
“made the head of the Treasury Department the tribunal for the examination of claims for duties
said to have been improperly paid,” Cary, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 239, 242. This suggests that the
public rights doctrine might apply to adjudications that have been entrusted to non-Article III
decisionmakers for a little under a century. And one need only look to Jicarilla to confirm this
reading—a 2011 opinion recognizing “relations with Indian tribes” as a “historic categor[y]” of
adjudication falling “within the [public rights] exception.” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 130 (cleaned up).
There, the Court used a string cite to support the proposition that Congress has plenary power over
22 “the organization and management” of the Indian trust relationship. Jicarilla, 564 U.S. at 175.
And the oldest case cited was a little more than a century old at the time. See id. (citing Cherokee
Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902)). So it appears that about a century of history is
sufficient.
Congress enacted the Advisers Act nearly a century ago. See Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-686, 54 Stat. 789, 851. And the original statute included a provision that
was materially similar to 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(f). See id. § 203(d) (“The Commission after hearing
may by order deny registration to or revoke or suspend the registration of an applicant under this
section, if the Commission finds that such denial, revocation, or suspension is in the public interest
and that such investment adviser . . . is permanently or temporarily enjoined by order, judgment,
or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction . . . from engaging in or continuing any conduct
or practice . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security[.]”). This separates 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(f) from the provision at issue in Jarkesy, which was “barely over a decade old.” 603 U.S.
at 131 n.2. The SEC’s claim against Lemelson therefore “historically could have been determined
exclusively by the executive and legislative branches,” making this a case concerning public rights,
id. at 128, even without Atlas Roofing.
3. Article II (Claim 4)
Finally, Lemelson alleges that “[t]he SEC ALJ assigned to superintend and adjudicate [the]
SEC’s follow-on prosecution against Lemelson . . . enjoys multiple layers of tenure protection” in
violation of Article II. Am. Compl ¶¶ 42–43. The SEC originally moved to dismiss this claim on
two grounds. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 24. First, it argued that the ALJ’s removal protections
were constitutional. See id. And second, it argued that even if they were not constitutional,
Lemelson did not plausibly allege “that the ALJ tenure protections caused him any harm—as the
23 Supreme Court required in Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021).” Id. The SEC has since
abandoned any argument that the removal protections are constitutional. See Def.’s Reply at 10–11
(citing Notice of Change in Position, ECF No. 16). 1 But it maintains that Lemelson has not
plausibly alleged the required harm under Collins. See id. The Court agrees with the Commission
and dismisses Lemelson’s fourth claim.
Collins held that “where plaintiffs showed no harm stemming from similar removal
protections, there was ‘no basis for concluding’ that an agency ‘lacked the authority to carry out
[its] functions’ and thus no unlawful action to remedy.” Cortes v. NLRB, No. 23-cv-2954,
2024 WL 1555877, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2024) (quoting Collins, 594 U.S. at 258); see also
K & R Contractors, LLC v. Keene, 86 F.4th 135, 149 (4th Cir. 2023) (“The courts of appeals have
followed the Supreme Court’s guidance and denied relief on removal claims when the challengers
have not shown that the constitutional violation caused them harm.” (collecting cases)).
Collins did not provide clear guidance about the requisite showing of harm. It instead
hypothesized two satisfactory situations. See 594 U.S. at 259–60. First, where “the President had
attempted to remove a Director but was prevented from doing so by a lower court decision holding
that he did not have ‘cause’ for removal.” Id. at 259. And second, where “the President had made
a public statement expressing displeasure with actions taken by a Director and had asserted that he
would remove the Director if the statute did not stand in the way.” Id. at 260. Courts of appeals
have distilled this guidance in slightly different ways. See, e.g., Comm. Fin. Servs. Assoc. of
Am., Ltd. v. CFPB, 51 F.4th 616, 632 (5th Cir. 2022) (“We distill from these hypotheticals three
1 The Commission filed a notice “to inform the Court that the Acting Solicitor General has decided that the multiple layers of removal restrictions for administrative law judges in 5 U.S.C. § 7521 do not comport with the separation of powers and Article II and that the United States will no longer defend them in litigation.” Notice of Change in Position at 1.
24 requisites for proving harm: (1) a substantiated desire by the President to remove the
unconstitutionally insulated actor, (2) a perceived inability to remove the actor due to the infirm
provision, and (3) a nexus between the desire to remove and the challenged actions taken by the
insulated actor.”); CFPB v. Law Offices of Crystal Moroney, P.C., 63 F.4th 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2023)
(holding “a party must show that the agency action would not have been taken but for the
President’s inability to remove the agency head”); CFPB v. Nat’l Collegiate Master Student Loan
Tr., 96 F.4th 599, 615 (3d Cir.) (“There is no notion in this statute that the CFPB would have taken
this action but for the President’s inability to remove the Director.”)
But no matter the standard, Lemelson has not plausibly alleged facts that would meet it.
At no point in the Amended Complaint does he mention anything suggesting that the removal
protections “would play any role” in SEC decisions. Cortes, 2025 WL 1555877, at *6;
see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 41–43. Lemelson responds by arguing that “[a]t this stage of the litigation
(before any discovery or trial), . . . [he] has no burden to prove that the ALJ’s tenure protection
has inflicted or will inflict compensable harm.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 18 (cleaned up). But that does not
free him of the obligation to allege such harm. The Court therefore dismisses this claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) without reaching the constitutional question. See, e.g., Cortes, 2025 WL 1555877,
at *6; see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011) (“[A] longstanding principle of
judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the
necessity of deciding them.” (cleaned up)).
25 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No. 13. It therefore also denies as moot Lemelson’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
ECF No. 11. See, e.g., United to Protect Democracy v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n,
288 F. Supp. 3d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2017).
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge
Date: May 27, 2025