Leishman v. Office of the Govenor

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: August 29, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01363
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 ROGER LEISHMAN, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01363-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 MOTION TO DISMISS v. 10 WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF 11 THE GOVERNOR, ET AL.,

12 Defendants. 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Roger Leishman sued Defendants Washington State Office of the 15 Governor, Attorney General’s Office, and Department of Enterprise Services 16 (collectively, “the State”) in state court alleging that they violated Title II of the 17 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The State removed the case, and now its 18 motion to dismiss comes before the Court. Dkt. No. 5. After considering the 19 complaint, the briefing, and the relevant law, the Court finds that Leishman has 20 failed to state a plausible claim under Title II of the ADA and that amendment 21 would be futile. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this case with prejudice for the 22 reasons explained below. 23 1 2. JUDICIAL NOTICE 2 Preliminarily, the State moves for judicial notice, asking the Court to take

3 judicial notice of the pleadings and rulings from Plaintiff’s prior, related lawsuits 4 against the State, its agents, and its attorneys. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, 5 “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute 6 because it: (1) is generally known within the court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) 7 can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 8 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201; Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d

9 1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2012). The court “may take judicial notice of undisputed 10 matters of public record . . . including documents on file in federal or state courts.” 11 Harris, 682 F.3d at 1132. “Moreover, documents not attached to a complaint may be 12 considered if no party questions their authenticity and the complaint relies on those 13 documents.” Id. The Court finds that the state court materials submitted are 14 subject to judicial notice and thus GRANTS the State’s motion. 15 3. BACKGROUND 16 3.1 Pre-litigation facts. 17 Leishman worked for the Washington Attorney General’s Office (AGO) from 18 July 2015 to June 2016. He is a licensed attorney and represents himself in this 19 action. 20 Shortly after he began working for the AGO, Leishman was diagnosed with 21 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Leishman v. Wash. Attorney General’s 22 Office, Case No. 2:20-cv-861, Dkt. No. 195 at 2. “His symptoms affected his behavior 23 1 at work, including his interactions with his coworkers.” Id. “In late January 2016, 2 Leishman submitted a formal workplace disability accommodation request, but the

3 Attorney General’s Office denied his request.” Id. After that, Leishman filed a 4 formal sexual orientation discrimination complaint, alleging that his supervisor had 5 made homophobic allegations against him and had wrongfully withheld his raise. 6 Id. Without explanation, the AGO placed Leishman on home assignment effective 7 immediately. Id. at 3. The AGO hired Ogden Murphy Wallace to perform an 8 investigation and subsequently terminated Leishman’s employment. Id.

9 After his termination, Leishman submitted request for documents under 10 Washington’s Public Records Act and filed complaints against several individuals, 11 including ethics complaints with Executive Director of the Washington Executive 12 Ethics Board, Kathryn Reynolds. Id. Reynolds refused to accept the complaints. Id. 13 These employment disputes triggered years of related litigation against the 14 State and its attorneys. 15 3.2 Related litigation: Leishman I–IV. 16 Leishman asserted tort claims based on his sexual orientation discrimination 17 allegations. The parties settled those claims. 18 Then, in May 2017, Leishman sued Ogden Murphy Wallace and its 19 investigator, Patricia Pearce, in King County Superior Court. Leishman v. Ogden 20 Murphy Wallace, PLLC, 479 P.3d 688, 691 (Wash. 2021) (Leishman I). In 2021, the 21 Washington State Supreme Court found that Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute 22 barred the suit. Id. at 695. 23 1 In April 2020, Leishman filed another lawsuit in King County Superior 2 Court, alleging Washington Law Against Disability (“WLAD”) discrimination based

3 on sexual orientation and disability; WLAD retaliation; negligence; negligent 4 infliction of emotional distress; outrage; civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; 5 constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and disability discrimination 6 under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Defendants included the AGO, 7 various AGO agents, and Ogden Murphy Wallace. The case was removed to federal 8 court, where Leishman requested “that the Court authorize Assistant Attorney

9 General Jeffrey Grant, rather than Defendant Janay Ferguson, to speak on behalf 10 of all Defendants during [] discussions of potential motions and other case 11 management issues.” Leishman v. Wash. Attorney General’s Office et al., Case No. 12 2:20-cv-00861 (Leishman II), Dkt. No. 94 at 2. Leishman asserted that his 13 conversations with Ferguson triggered his PTSD. On September 15, 2021, Judge 14 Jones construed the request as a request for accommodations under the Local Civil 15 Rules and found good cause, given Leishman’s mental health concerns, to grant the

16 motion. Id. at 3–4. Thus, in September 2021, Grant became the State’s point of 17 contact with Leishman, pursuant to a court order issued at Leishman’s request. The 18 case was later transferred to this Court, which dismissed Leishman’s claims. 19 Leishman II, Case No. 2:20-cv-861-JNW, Dkt. Nos. 194; 195. 20 While Leishman II was pending, on June 30, 2020, Leishman filed a 21 mandamus action in state court against Executive Director Reynolds (Leishman

22 III); he asserted that Reynolds had a duty to accept his ethics complaints under the 23 Ethics in Public Service Act. Leishman sued Executive Director Reynolds, and that 1 case was transferred to Thurston County Superior Court, where Leishman added a 2 claim under the Public Records Act (PRA) against the Office of the Governor. The

3 Court dismissed Leishman’s mandamus claim, but Leishman continued to litigate 4 his PRA claims through trial. (Leishman IV). During that litigation, on July 7, 2022, 5 Leishman moved to disqualify Assistant Attorney General Grant under RPC 3.7 6 and GR 33—the General Rule governing disability accommodation requests in 7 Washington courts. He argued that Grant was a necessary witness under RPC 3.7 8 and thus could not serve as an attorney on the case. He also argued that

9 disqualifying Grant was a reasonable accommodation under GR 33 because Grant 10 manipulated and gaslit him, which triggered his PTSD. The court denied the 11 motion, and after a bench trial entered judgment for the Governor’s Office. That 12 decision is on appeal. 13 3.3 Procedural background: Leishman V. 14 Against this backdrop of extensive prior litigation, Leishman filed this 15 lawsuit in King County Superior Court on April 16, 2024. Dkt. No. 1-4 (Leishman 16 V). He named as defendants the Governor’s Office, AGO, and DES, as well as six 17 individual attorneys who represent the Defendant agencies. Leishman’s initial 18 complaint alleged WLAD disability discrimination in a place of public 19 accommodation, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, outrage, and 20 PRA violations. 21 The superior court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, dismissing 22 Leishman’s claims for outrage, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violations 23 1 of the WLAD with prejudice. Dkt. No. 1-7 at 139–43. The court transferred the PRA 2 claims on a finding that Thurston County was the proper venue for them.

3 On July 16, 2024, Leishman moved to amend complaint and to sever claims 4 under CR 42(b). Dkt. No. 1-7 at 292–98. Leishman moved to add two Title II claims 5 against the State Defendants—a disparate treatment claim and a failure-to- 6 accommodate claim. Id. at 295. On July 30, 2024, the superior court granted 7 Leishman’s motion to amend, which allowed him to file a complaint alleging his 8 Title II claims against the State Defendants. Id. at 337–41. The superior court

9 rejected the Defendants’ argument that the new claims were barred by claim or 10 issue preclusion and thus that amendment was futile. Id. at 338. However, the 11 court “d[id] not preclude Defendants from asserting claim preclusion or issue 12 preclusion in any future motion.” Id. at 338 n.1. 13 On August 19, 2024, King County Superior Court entered a partial final 14 judgment under CR 54(b) in Defendants’ favor on the WLAD, negligence, negligent 15 infliction of emotional distress, and outrage claims. Dkt. No. 1-7 at 440–42. With no

16 claims remaining against the Attorney Defendants, the superior court ordered that 17 they be terminated as parties in this case. On August 28, 2024, Defendants then 18 removed the case. 19 3.4 The State’s alleged wrongful conduct. 20 Leishman’s Title II claims in this lawsuit are based on the State’s conduct 21 during the prior litigation. He explains “[b]y the end of 2020, former Assistant 22 Attorney General Grant’s . . . handling of communications with Leishman began to 23 1 cause increasingly serious PTSD symptoms.” Dkt. No. 1-2 at 8. “Nevertheless,” he 2 claims, “Defendants refused to permit anyone other than former Assistant Attorney

3 General Grant to respond to Leishman’s attempts to communicate with State 4 agencies and officers about his concerns . . . .” Id. at 8–9. He alleges that Grant: 5 “neglected [his] communications,” “failed to follow through on commitments,” 6 “blamed [him] for Defendant’s neglect,” “gave false and conflicting explanations to 7 Leishman,” and “obstructed Leishman’s attempts to seek redress.” Id. at 9. 8 Leishman states that he complained about Grant’s behavior to Complex

9 Litigation Division Chief Jeffrey Rupert in early 2024. Id. at 20. In response, Rupert 10 reportedly said that Leishman’s allegations against Grant were “frivolous.” Id. 11 Leishman alleges that this characterization—as “frivolous”—poses a “classic 12 example of clinical gaslighting: falsely accusing his victim of engaging in the same 13 type of misconduct the abuser himself is guilty of.” Id. 14 Leishman asserts that the State has discriminated against him on the basis 15 of his disability mostly because Grant (and potentially other attorneys working for

16 the State) won’t concede that he has a disability and also because Grant failed to 17 communicate with him in a timely and honest fashion. He asserts that this conduct 18 triggers his PTSD, which prevents him from adequately representing himself in 19 court. Leishman also alleges that he “alerted Defendants to his need for 20 accommodation,” but they refused to provide reasonable accommodations. Id. at 20.1 21

22 1 The complaint contains mostly factual allegations related to claims Leishman pursued in previous litigation against the State and its privies, like his PRA claim. 23 These allegations are irrelevant to his Title II claims. 1 4. DISCUSSION 2 4.1 Legal standard. The Court will grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the complaint fails to allege 3 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 4 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 5 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 6 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 7 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts 8 factual allegations pled in the complaint as true and construes them in the light 9 most favorable to the plaintiff. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2021). 10 “When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if a district court 11 considers evidence outside the pleadings, it must normally convert the 12(b)(6) 12 motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and it must give the 13 nonmoving party an opportunity to respond.” Furnace v. Giurbino, No. 1:11-cv- 14 00012, 2012 WL 3869914, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2012) (quoting United States v. 15 Ritchie, 342 F.3 d 903, 907 (9th Cir.2003)). “A court may, however, consider certain 16 materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by 17 reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the 18 motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Ritchie, 342 19 F.3d at 908). 20 21 22 23 1 4.2 Title II of the ADA does not apply to adversarial litigation relationships. 2 As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Leishman’s Title II claim fails 3 because the adversarial litigation relationship between Leishman and the State 4 falls outside Title II’s scope. 5 Leishman argues that when state attorneys engage in litigation conduct that 6 allegedly exacerbates his disability, the State violates Title II by failing to consider 7 his needs as an opposing party. Specifically, he contends the State should have 8 assigned different counsel to avoid triggering his PTSD and should have moderated 9 its litigation tactics to protect his mental health during adversarial proceedings. 10 This theory finds no support in the law. Leishman cites no case—and the Court has 11 found none—applying Title II to require a government entity to accommodate the 12 disabilities of adverse litigants during litigation. 13 Title II of the ADA provides that no disabled individual “shall, by reason of 14 such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the 15 services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “To state a 16 prima facie case for a violation of Title II, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a qualified 17 individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or 18 denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was 19 otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial 20 of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Payan v. L.A. Comm. 21 Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 737 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). 22 23 1 Thus, to prevail on a Title II claim, “a plaintiff must prove that he or she is a 2 ‘qualified individual with a disability.’” Zimmerman v. Or. DOJ, 170 F.3d 1169,

3 1175 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). A plaintiff is not “qualified” unless 4 he “meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the 5 participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. (quoting 42 6 U.S.C. § 12131(2)). 7 Even under the broadest interpretation of Title II, litigation defense by a 8 government entity cannot constitute a “service” provided to opposing parties. While

9 the State undoubtedly provides numerous services that benefit the public in a legal 10 or law enforcement setting—including court administration, law enforcement, and 11 regulatory oversight—the zealous representation of the government’s own interests 12 in adversarial proceedings serves only the government client, not its opponents. The 13 adversarial system is premised on each party advancing its own interests through 14 independent advocacy. To characterize the State’s litigation defense as a “service” to 15 opposing parties miscasts the nature of adversarial proceedings and collapses the

16 essential distinction between a government’s role as service provider and its role as 17 litigant. 18 Recognizing opposing parties as “qualified individuals” entitled to 19 accommodations from the State would create conflicting duties that Title II does not 20 require. An attorney owes undivided loyalty to her client and must zealously 21 advocate within the bounds of the law. Requiring government attorneys to temper

22 their advocacy to accommodate opposing parties’ disabilities would compromise this 23 duty and potentially violate ethical obligations to their government clients. 1 Leishman’s interpretation would force government entities to choose between 2 effective representation and compliance with disability law, a conflict Congress

3 could not have intended when enacting Title II. 4 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Zimmerman v. Oregon Department of Justice 5 confirms this understanding about Title II’s scope. There, the court found that an 6 employee could not bring Title II claims against his government employer because 7 employment creates a fundamentally different relationship than service provision. 8 170 F.3d at 1175–76. The employee was seeking not to “receive” government

9 services but to modify his working relationship with his employer. As the Ninth 10 Circuit explained, the “action” words in the statute assume a relationship between a 11 public entity, on the one hand, and a member of the public, on the other, where the 12 former provides an output that the latter participates in or receives. Id. at 1175. 13 Leishman’s case presents a similar dynamic: he is not seeking to receive 14 litigation defense services but to constrain how the State provides those services to 15 itself during litigation against him. Like the employee in Zimmerman, Leishman

16 seeks to alter a non-service relationship—here, the State’s litigation defense rather 17 than an employment relationship. 18 The cases Leishman invoke follow this service-recipient framework. In 19 Tennessee v. Lane, disabled plaintiffs sought physical access to courthouse 20 facilities—judicial infrastructure the state provided to litigants and the public. 541 21 U.S. 509, 513–15 (2004). The plaintiffs were eligible to receive these court services

22 as civil litigants. In Duvall v. County of Kitsap, a hearing-impaired plaintiff sought 23 accommodations from court personnel conducting his proceedings—again, services 1 the court system provided to him as a litigant. 260 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001). 2 Neither case involved adverse parties seeking to control their opponents’ advocacy.

3 Leishman’s interpretation of Title II would create the very conflict 4 Zimmerman sought to avoid by forcing government entities to pursue conflicting 5 goals—zealously representing themselves in litigation while at the same time 6 moderating that advocacy to accommodate opposing parties’ disabilities. 7 The proper forum for litigation accommodations is the court system itself, 8 which has inherent authority to manage proceedings fairly. Indeed, Leishman

9 acknowledges that “multiple courts have . . . accommodated his disability,” thus 10 ensuring his access to the courts. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5. This demonstrates that the 11 existing legal framework already provides the protections Leishman seeks through 12 his novel Title II theory. 13 Because Leishman seeks to modify the State’s adversarial litigation conduct 14 rather than to participate in or receive government services, his Title II claims fail 15 as a matter of law.

16 4.3 Leishman fails to state a plausible Title II claim. 17 Even if Title II could apply to adversarial litigation relationships, Leishman’s 18 Title II claims still fail. The elements of a prima facie Title II claim are set forth the 19 above. See supra Section 4.2. There are three legal theories of liability that can 20 support a Title II claim: “disparate treatment, disparate impact, or failure to make 21 a reasonable accommodation.’” Payan, 11 F.4th at 738 (quoting Davis v. Shah, 821 22 23 1 F.3d 231, 260 (2d Cir. 2016)). Leishman alleges disparate treatment and failure to 2 accommodate. The Court addresses each in turn.

3 4.3.1 Leishman fails to state a plausible disparate treatment claim. 4 To state a plausible disparate treatment claim, Leishman must allege the 5 State treated him less favorably than similarly situated, non-disabled persons 6 because of his disability. Sailboat Bend Sober Living, LLC v. City of Fort 7 Lauderdale, Fla., 46 F.4th 1268, 1275 (11th Cir. 2022). Leishman advances several 8 theories of disparate treatment, all of which fail to state a plausible claim. 9 Leishman alleges the State discriminated against him by assigning Grant to 10 represent the State in Leishman II and Leishman IV. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2. But 11 Leishman’s own allegations defeat this theory, as Leishman requested that Grant 12 serve as the State’s communication point person in Leishman II, and Judge Jones 13 granted his request as an accommodation. Leishman cannot claim discriminatory 14 assignment of counsel when his pleadings allege that he requested the assignment. 15 Next, Leishman alleges that the State discriminated against him through its 16 litigation conduct by “neglect[ing] communications,” “fail[ing] to follow through on 17 commitments,” “blam[ing] [him] for Defendants’ neglect,” “g[iving] false and 18 conflicting explanations,” and “obstructing [his] attempts to seek redress.” Id. at 9. 19 Leishman also claims discrimination because the State refused to concede certain 20 aspects of his claims, including that he has a disability. These allegations fail to 21 state a plausible disparate treatment claim because Leishman pleads no facts 22 showing the State treats non-disabled opponents differently. Vigorous advocacy— 23 1 including challenging an opponent’s factual and legal assertions—is standard 2 practice against all adversaries. As a litigant, the State has a right to disagree with

3 and refute an opposing party’s positions. Leishman’s allegations describe ordinary 4 adversarial conduct, not disparate treatment based on disability. 5 Finally, Leishman claims that the State discriminated against him by 6 refusing to allow anybody except Grant to communicate with him. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 7 8–9. But other allegations in the complaint contradict this statement. Indeed, 8 Leishman alleges that Grant’s supervisor responded to his complaints about Grant’s

9 alleged behavior. Contradictory allegations, not to be confused with claims in the 10 alternative, cannot support a plausible discrimination claim. 11 At bottom, Leishman has failed to state a plausible claim for relief under 12 Title II of the ADA on a disparate treatment theory. He pleads no facts showing 13 that the State treated him differently than it would treat any other adverse litigant, 14 disabled or not. 15 4.3.2 Leishman fails to state a plausible failure-to-accommodate claim. 16 Even when the State does not engage in disparate treatment, it still may 17 violate Title II of the ADA if it fails to provide reasonable accommodations to a 18 person with a disability. McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1267 (9th Cir. 19 2004). Indeed, “facially neutral policies may violate the ADA when such policies 20 unduly burden disabled persons.” Id. at 1265. Thus, failure to accommodate claims 21 are “focused on an accommodation based on [the plaintiff’s] individualized request 22 23 1 or need.” Payan, at 11 F. 4th 738. The idea is to provide “meaningful access” to 2 services for all. See Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 571 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2009).

3 Leishman asserts that he has sought “two kinds of accommodation: 4 additional time to complete tasks when his Executive Function is impaired by 5 substantial stress or PTSD triggers, and protection from the impact of interactions 6 with individuals whose conduct has caused significant PTSD triggers.” Dkt. No. 1-2 7 at 5. He maintains that these accommodations are necessary to protect his 8 fundamental right of access to the courts. Leishman’s allegations fail to state a

9 claim. 10 Leishman cannot plausibly allege that he lacks meaningful access to the 11 courts. By his own admission, “multiple courts have . . . accommodated his 12 disability, including the Washington Supreme Court, the Western District of 13 Washington, the Washington Court of Appeals, King County Superior Court, and 14 Thurston County Superior Court.” Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5. The record confirms this: 15 Leishman has filed multiple lawsuits against the State and its agents, amended his

16 pleadings, litigated through trial and appeal, and regularly appeared and 17 participated in proceedings. As he acknowledges, he has sought and received 18 accommodations from various courts. This extensive litigation history demonstrates 19 meaningful access as a matter of law. 20 Leishman also fails to allege that he actually requested the accommodations 21 he now claims were wrongfully denied. He alleges he sought “additional time to

22 complete tasks when his Executive Function is impaired” and “protection from the 23 impact of interactions with individuals whose conduct has caused significant PTSD 1 triggers.” Id. at 5. But his complaint does not plausibly allege that he requested 2 these specific accommodations from the State defendants. Rather, his pleadings

3 show accommodation requests made to courts, not to his litigation adversaries. The 4 State cannot be liable for failing to provide accommodations that were never 5 requested. 6 Even if Leishman had properly requested accommodations from the State, 7 the accommodations he seeks would fundamentally alter the nature of the 8 adversarial system itself. Requiring the State to restaff a case based on an

9 opponent’s psychological reactions to counsel, or to moderate its litigation tactics to 10 avoid triggering opposing parties, would transform adversarial proceedings beyond 11 recognition. Title II requires only “reasonable modifications” that do not 12 “fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 533. 13 Leishman’s requested accommodations don’t fall into that category. 14 The court in Leishman IV already considered and rejected Leishman’s 15 accommodation request to remove Grant under GR 33, finding that continued

16 representation was appropriate. Leishman cannot circumvent that ruling by 17 recasting his failed accommodation request as a Title II violation. 18 Finally, Leishman’s argument that the State should have extended litigation 19 deadlines to accommodate his disability fails because court deadlines are not within 20 the State’s control. Courts, not opposing parties, manage case schedules and 21 procedural deadlines.

22 In sum, Leishman’s allegations do not show that he has been “excluded from 23 participation” in his court proceedings, or that the court’s “facilities are inaccessible 1 or unusable to him” because of the State’s purported failure to accommodate his 2 PTSD. See Daubert v. Lindsay Unified Sch. Dist., 760 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2014)

3 (internal quotation omitted). Thus, dismissal is appropriate.2 4 4.4 The dismissal is with prejudice. 5 Ordinarily, when a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff’s complaint for failure to 6 state a claim, it must grant leave to amend even when no request to amend is made. 7 Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017). But Leishman is a licensed 8 attorney who has pursued related discrimination claims against the State and its 9 agents and attorneys in three other cases and who has already amended his 10 complaint once in this case. District courts have “particularly broad” discretion in 11 denying amendment when leave to amend has previously been granted. Gonzalez v. 12 Planned Parenthood of L.A., 759 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he district 13 court’s discretion in denying amendment is ‘particularly broad’ when it has 14 previously given leave to amend.”). 15 Leave to amend may also be denied where amendment would be futile. 16 Flowers v. First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court has 17 found that Leishman’s legal theories are not viable, and that he has otherwise failed 18 to state a claim. Under these circumstances, leave to amend is denied. 19 20 21

22 2 The State has raised claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and sovereign immunity arguments. But because the Court dismisses Leishman’s claims with prejudice on 23 other grounds, the Court does not address these arguments. 1 5. CONCLUSION

9 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 5, 3 DISMISSES this case with prejudice. All pending motions are DENIED AS

4 || MOOT.

5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

G Dated this 29th day of August, 2025.

7 (Z - gC f (2 8 Jamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ORDER - 18