Lehane v. Wachovia Mortgage, et al.

2013 DNH 059

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 16, 2013
• Docket: CV-12-179-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

Lehane v . Wachovia Mortgage, et a l . CV-12-179-PB 4/16/13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Edward Lehane and Marilyn Lehane

v. Civil N o . 12-cv-179-PB Opinion N o . 2013 DNH 059 Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, aka Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case arises from a loan from Wells Fargo Bank1 to

Marilyn Lehane that was secured by mortgages on properties in

Westmoreland and Swanzey, New Hampshire. Marilyn Lehane and her

husband, Edward, who is a co-owner of the Westmoreland property,

claim that Wells Fargo Bank was complicit in the overstatement

of Marilyn’s income on the loan application, approved her for

the loan even though it knew she could not afford to repay i t ,

1 Wells Fargo’s full legal description i s : Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., f/k/a Wells Fargo Bank Southwest, N.A., f/k/a Wachovia Mortgage, FSB. At the time of the events that gave rise to this suit, the bank was known as Wachovia. Although the Lehanes’ mortgage broker, Bridgeview Mortgage, is named in the complaint, the plaintiffs never served Bridgeview. Accordingly, Bridgeview is not a party to this action. 1 and improperly required her to provide excessive security for

the loan. The Lehanes bring state law claims for damages. They

also seek to enjoin the foreclosure of their Westmoreland

property and ask this court to declare void a loan modification

agreement signed by Edward Lehane in 2011. Wells Fargo moves to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and

argues that the plaintiffs’ damages claims are preempted by the

federal Home Owners’ Loan Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1461-1468. I grant

the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ damages claims on 12(b)(6)

grounds and therefore do not address the preemption question. I

deny the motion to the extent that it seeks dismissal of

plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2008, Marilyn Lehane sought to refinance the mortgage on

a property she owns jointly with her son, Kevin Lehane, in

Swanzey, New Hampshire. At the time Marilyn sought to refinance

the Swanzey property, the couple’s monthly income was $1,695,

derived solely from their social security retirement benefits.

Bridgeview Mortgage, Marilyn’s mortgage broker, submitted a

credit application on her behalf to Wells Fargo Bank (then

Wachovia), which falsely stated that Marilyn had a monthly

income of $6,000. The Lehanes allege that Bridgeview 2 purposefully misstated Marilyn’s income, and that Wachovia knew

or should have known that the income figure was false. Although

the Lehanes felt that the Swanzey property was sufficient

collateral for the loan, the bank required Marilyn to secure the

loan by also agreeing to mortgage her interest in the

Westmoreland property, which she owned jointly with her husband.

Only Marilyn signed the Promissory Note. Marilyn also signed

the mortgage on the Westmoreland property as the “Borrower” and

Edward signed as the “Borrower[’s] Spouse[].” The Mortgage

states that by signing the mortgage, the Borrowers Spouse

“encumbers, subordinates, conveys, and/or waives any and all

rights, interests, or claims in the Property, including, but not

limited t o , homestead, dower, marital or joint-occupancy

rights.” Doc. N o . 12-3.

Wells Fargo approved the loan to Marilyn in January 2008. 2

In November 2011, attorneys for Bank of America3 contacted the

2 Neither party submitted the mortgage documents relating to the Swanzey property or any documents relating to the refinancing of the mortgage on that property. In the record are the 2008 Mortgage and Mortgage Note for the Westmoreland property, and a 2011 modification agreement that presumably relates to the mortgage on the Westmoreland property, though the parties do not state that it does, and the agreement is confusing. It refers to a mortgage in the original principal amount of $229,500 and indicates that the deed is recorded in Book 2488, page 587. The original principal amount of the mortgage submitted with defendant’s motion to dismiss is $183,600. The deed for the Westmoreland property is recorded at Book 2488, page 587.

3 Lehanes regarding the Westmoreland mortgage. They asked Edward

to sign a modification agreement stating that he was a

borrower and mortgagor with respect to the Westmoreland

property. Attorneys for Wachovia threatened to sue him if he

did not agree to sign the agreement. On November 1 5 , 2011,

Edward signed the agreement acknowledging himself as a borrower

and mortgagor. Plaintiffs claim that he did s o , however,

because he feared being sued. They also allege that Edward

lacked contractual capacity due to dementia at the time of

signing and that he received no consideration for signing the

loan modification.

In February 2012, the Lehanes received a notice of

foreclosure indicating that Wells Fargo would commence

foreclosure proceedings on their Westmoreland property on April

1 2 , 2012. The Lehanes filed suit in New Hampshire state court

on April 9, 2012. The defendants removed the case to this court

on May 1 0 , 2012, and moved to dismiss the Lehanes’ complaint on

September 5 , 2012.

3 The pleadings do not explain Bank of America’s relationship to Wells Fargo or the mortgage. During a phone conference, the parties represented that the attorney who contacted Edward Lehane was the attorney for the title insurer.

4 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff

must make factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v . Iqbal,

556 U.S. 6 6 2 , 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v . Twombly,

550 U.S. 5 4 4 , 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when

it pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, I employ a two-step

approach. See Ocasio–Hernández v . Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1 ,

12 (1st Cir. 2011). First, I screen the complaint for

statements that “merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact

or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.”

Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations

omitted). A claim consisting of little more than “allegations

that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action” may be

dismissed. Id. Second, I credit as true all non-conclusory

factual allegations and the reasonable inferences drawn from

those allegations, and then determine if the claim is plausible. 5 Id. The plausibility requirement “simply calls for enough fact

to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence” of illegal conduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The

“make-or-break standard” is that those allegations and

inferences, taken as true, “must state a plausible, not a merely

conceivable, case for relief.” Sepúlveda–Villarini v . Dep't of

Educ., 628 F.3d 2 5 , 29 (1st Cir.2010); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.”).

III. ANALYSIS

In Counts I – IV, the Lehanes assert state law claims

alleging fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, violation of the New

Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), N.H. Rev. Stat. §

358-A, and violation of the Unfair, Deceptive or Unreasonable

Collection Practices Act. 4 N.H. Rev. Stat. § 358-C. The Lehanes

also seek an injunction barring Wells Fargo from foreclosing on

the Westmoreland property (Count V ) , and a declaratory judgment

that the 2011 loan modification agreement is void (Count V I ) . I

address defendant’s challenge to each claim below.

4 Wells Fargo also argues that each of the Lehanes’ damage claims is preempted by the Home Owners' Loan Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1462-1468. Because I dismiss the claims on 12(b)(6) grounds, I do not consider the preemption issue.

6 A. Fraud, Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, and Consumer Protection Act (Counts I, IV, and III)

Plaintiffs claim that Wells Fargo defrauded them by

accepting Bridgeview’s misrepresentations of Marilyn’s income on

the loan application and thereby inducing her to agree to a loan

that the bank knew or should have known the Lehanes could not

afford. They also claim that Wells Fargo purposefully over-

secured the loan by requiring the Westmoreland property as

additional collateral. Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim derives

from their fraud claim. They argue that Bridgeview and Wells

Fargo conspired to provide Marilyn with a loan she could not

afford in contemplation of foreclosing on the Lehanes’ home once

Marilyn defaulted on the loan. Wells Fargo argues that

plaintiffs’ fraud, conspiracy, and CPA claims are time-barred

because they were filed more than three years after 2008.

Plaintiffs do not contest the applicability of New

Hampshire’s three-year statute of limitations to each of these

claims. They assert, however, that the discovery rule in N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4(I) tolled the statute of limitations

period until February 2012, when they received notice of Wells

Fargo’s intent to foreclose, because “the causal relationship

between the Plaintiffs’ injuries (loss of equity in their home)

and the acts complained of were not evident until the Defendant

7 initiated foreclosure proceedings.” Doc. N o . 14 ¶¶ 3-4. I

disagree and conclude that plaintiffs’ fraud claims are time-

barred.

Although “a claim does not arise until harm is suffered,”

Benson v . N.H. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 864 A.2d 359, 366 (N.H. 2004),

the discovery rule “is not intended to toll the statute of

limitations until the full extent of the plaintiff’s injury has

manifested itself.” Furbush v . McKittrick, 821 A.2d 1126, 1130

N.H. 2003). Here, the facts that led to foreclosure were

apparent at the time of the transaction in January 2008. The

Lehanes knew or should have known that their new monthly

mortgage payment was higher than their monthly payment before

they refinanced, and that they would owe $860 per month, which

was roughly half of their $1,695 in monthly income. Doc. N o . 1-

1 ¶ 6. Plaintiffs also knew or should have known that they had

been injured by obligating themselves to a loan secured by the

Westmoreland property that they could not possibly repay.

Further, plaintiffs do not allege that their credit application

was concealed from them, or that Wells Fargo deceived them as to

their loan payments or interest rates. In light of these facts,

“it was not necessary for the other shoe to drop, in the form of

foreclosure, to put [the Lehanes] on notice that [they] had been

harmed.” Monzione v . U.S. Bank, N.A., Civil N o . 12-CV-433-LM, 8 2013 WL 310013, *3-5 (D.N.H. Jan. 2 5 , 2013). Accordingly, I

dismiss plaintiffs’ fraud, conspiracy, and CPA claims as time-

barred.5

B. Count I I : Unfair, Deceptive or Unreasonable Collection Practices Act (“UDUCPA”)

Plaintiffs claim that Wells Fargo engaged in unfair debt

collection practices in violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-

C:2 by “attempting to foreclose on Plaintiffs’ property through

5 The general statute of limitations period in N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4(I) applies to the CPA claim. The defendant cites both the general statute of limitations, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4(I), and the exemption provision in the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:3(IV-a), to support its argument that this claim is time-barred. Doc. N o . 12-1 at 7 . The plaintiffs take no position on which statute applies. I apply the general three-year limitations period because § 358-A:3(IV-a) is not a statute of limitations. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:3(IV-a). Rather, § 358-A:3(IV-a) exempts from the CPA any claim involving a transaction that occurred more than three years before the date on which the plaintiff knew or should have known of its wrongful nature. See id. (stating that “[t]ransactions entered into more than 3 years prior to the time the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, of the conduct alleged to be in violation of the chapter” are exempted from the C P A ) ; Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v . Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., Civil N o . 10-CV-154-JL, 2011 WL 6300536, *8 n.10 (D.N.H. Dec. 1 6 , 2011) (concluding that § 358- A:3(IV-a) is not a statute of limitations). But see King v . Philip Morris, N o . 99-C-856, 2000 WL 34016358, *12-13 (N.H. Sup. C t . Nov. 2 , 2000) (examining the statute’s legislative history and reaching the opposite conclusion). In this case, the Lehanes were aware or should have been aware of the defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct on the same day they signed the refinancing agreement. Because no time elapsed between the date of the wrongful conduct and the date on which plaintiffs’ should have known the conduct was wrongful, § 358-A:3(IV-a) does not exempt the Lehanes’ claim from the CPA.

9 means of a loan originating in fraud, duress, and undue

influence and misrepresentation.” Doc. N o . 1-1. ¶ 2 1 . They

also claim, without any elaboration or explanation, that Wells

Fargo’s ability to foreclose on the property was “enhanced” by

requiring Edward Lehane, under threat of suit, to concede in

2011 that he was a borrower. Id.

Wells Fargo argues that the Lehanes failed to identify any

unfair or deceptive practice that violated the New Hampshire

UDUCPA.6 In order to state a viable claim for relief under the

New Hampshire UDUCPA, a plaintiff must allege, among other

things, that “the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act or

has failed to perform a requirement imposed by the [Act]”.

6 Wells Fargo also argues that foreclosure is not debt collection activity subject to the UDUCPA. In support of this argument, Wells Fargo cites Beadle v . Haughey, N o . Civ. 04-272-SM, 2005 WL 300060 (D.N.H. 2005), in which this court noted that “[n]early every court that has addressed the question has held that foreclosing on a mortgage is not debt collection activity for purposes of the” federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Id. at * 3 . Plaintiffs assert the contrary position: that foreclosure is debt collection activity. See Glazer v . Chase Home Finance LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that “mortgage foreclosure is debt collection under the FDCPA” and finding support in cases from the Third and Fourth Circuits). The New Hampshire Supreme Court, however, has not spoken on whether foreclosure constitutes debt collection under the New Hampshire UDUCPA, and this court stated just last year that it “remains agnostic as to whether a foreclosure itself constitutes debt collection.” LeDoux v . JP Morgan Chase, N.A., Civil N o . 12-CV-260-JL, 2012 WL 5874314, *8 n.9 (D.N.H. Nov. 2 0 , 2012). Because the law is unclear and the plaintiffs’ claim is properly dismissed on other grounds, I decline to decide this issue. 10 Moore v . Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 848 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 7 ,

124 (D.N.H. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted). The list

of deceptive practices provided in § 358-C:3 includes conduct

that relates to methods by which a creditor might seek to

collect a debt. For example, it prohibits debt collectors from

engaging in certain types of communications (i.e. repeated phone

calls, the use of profanity, or the use of obscene or vulgar

language), threatening to use force or violence against debtors,

threatening to reveal the existence of a debt to a third party,

or making material misrepresentations about the size of a debt.

See N.H. Rev. Stat. § 358-C:3. Here, the plaintiffs object to

the means by which they became indebted to Wells Fargo: the

allegedly fraudulent origination of the mortgage loan in 2008

and the alleged coercion of M r . Lehane into signing the

promissory note in 2011. They make no attempt to identify a

deceptive act that the UDUCPA prohibits, and I am unable to

discern which category of deceptive or unreasonable debt

collection practices in § 358-C:3 might plausibly encompass

Wells Fargo’s alleged actions. Thus, the Lehanes have failed to

establish that defendants’ conduct is a prohibited deceptive

practice for purposes of the statute. Accordingly, I dismiss

Count II for failure to state a claim.

11 C. Count V : Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs ask the court to enjoin foreclosure on their

Westmoreland property, arguing that the mortgage loan was

obtained through fraud. Wells Fargo does not provide a distinct

basis for objecting to this claim, but states in its motion that

plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that the bank knew or

should have known that their income was misstated on the credit

application. Doc. N o . 12-1 at 8 . Although fraud must be pled

with particularity, knowledge “may be averred generally.”

Hayduk v . Lanna, 775 F.2d 4 4 1 , 443 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 9(b)). Here, plaintiffs have pled defendant’s

knowledge of the income overstatement with minimal sufficiency,

and the defendant offers no other basis for dismissal. I deny

the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief

but express no views about the sufficiency of the claim

otherwise.

D. Count V I : Declaratory Relief

Plaintiffs also claim that Wells Fargo coerced Edward in

2011 into signing the loan modification agreement, although he

lacked contractual capacity at the time and received no

consideration in exchange for signing the agreement. The

defendant objects to this claim in a conclusory manner without

offering a legal basis for dismissal. I therefore deny the 12 motion to dismiss this count.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I grant the defendant’s motion

to dismiss in part and deny it in part. Doc. N o . 1 2 . Counts I-

IV are dismissed and the motion is otherwise denied.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

April 1 6 , 2013

cc: Joseph S . Hoppock, Esq. Brian I . Michaelis, Esq. David M . Bizar, Esq.