Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth

23 S.W.3d 83, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3484, 2000 WL 679286

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 25, 2000
• Docket: 2-99-098-CV
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.

The issues we decide in this appeal are 1) whether enforcement of restrictions on air passenger service at Love Field Airport contained in a 1968 Bond Ordinance between the City of Fort Worth and the City of Dallas are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, and 2) whether the air passenger service proposed by Legend Airlines, Inc., Continental Airlines, Inc., and Continental Express, Inc. is within the “commuter airlines” exceptions to the Wright and Shelby Amendments.¹ Because we conclude that the restrictions in the Bond Ordinance are preempted by the ADA and that the proposed service falls within the commuter airlines exceptions to the Wright and Shelby Amendments, we will reverse and render.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 1962, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) instituted the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Investigation to determine whether public convenience required the two cities to consolidate commercial air passenger service at one airport. At the time, Dallas’s commercial air traffic operated out of Love Field, while Fort Worth’s airport was Greater Southwest International Airport (GSIA). The CAB stated that the use of multiple airports produced fragmented and more expensive service.

An evidentiary hearing was held before an administrative law judge, who ruled that neither Love Field nor GSIA could meet the future aviation requirements for the Dallas-Fort Worth area. The CAB then issued an order in September 1964, in which it concluded that “service to Dallas and Fort Worth should be required through a single airport.” The CAB instructed the cities that if they did not agree on a single airport for all commercial passenger service, the CAB would designate one for them. The order provided:

[W]e are aware of the practical difficulties involved in the transition to service through a single airport, and contemplate a voluntary arrangement.... Should the parties, contrary to our expectation, be unable to agree to designation of the airport to serve the area, the Board will then proceed promptly to issue a decision.

As a direct result of the CAB’s order, the cities created the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW). In April 1968, the cities entered into an agreement (the 1968 Agreement) that created a joint venture to build DFW. Under the 1968 Agreement, the cities are co-owners of DFW, which is operated on their behalf by the DFW Airport Board. The DFW Airport Board is comprised of members appointed by the two city councils.

In November 1968, the cities also passed the 1968 Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance (the Bond Ordinance) to authorize the issuance of bonds to finance DFW. The Bond Ordinance provided that the cities would “take such steps as may be necessary, appropriate, and legally permissible ... to provide for the orderly, efficient and effective phase-out at Love Field [and other local airports] of any and all Certificated Air Carrier Services, and to transfer such activities to [DFW].”

After the 1968 Agreement was signed and the Bond Ordinance was passed, Fort Worth demolished GSIA, and Dallas required all federally certificated air carriers to transfer their operations from local airports under its control to DFW. The DFW Airport Board entered into use agreements with the major air carriers then serving the cities’ local airports. In exchange for benefits accompanying “signatory” status, each of these carriers agreed to provide certificated air carrier services serving this region exclusively at DFW “to the extent required by the terms of the ... Bond Ordinance.”

Southwest Airlines was not a signatory and refused to move its operations from Love Field to DFW. Dallas, Fort Worth, and the DFW Airport Board sued Southwest in federal court, seeking to exclude it from operating out of Love Field upon the opening of DFW. The federal court held that Dallas could not force Southwest to vacate Love Field as long as Love Field remained open, because Southwest was not a federally certificated air carrier and was flying only intra state routes.²

In 1978, Congress deregulated the airline industry by enacting the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). The ADA expressly preempts and prohibits states and their political subdivisions from enacting or enforcing “a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.”³ After the ADA was passed, Southwest applied for and obtained federal certification to begin inter state service from Love Field to New Orleans.⁴ Dallas, Fort Worth, and the DFW Airport Board opposed Southwest’s application through an administrative appeal, but the appeal was unsuccessful.⁵

Southwest’s success in obtaining federal authority to offer interstate service out of Love Field prompted former Fort Worth Congressman and Speaker of the House Jim Wright to seek legislation that, in its original form, would have barred all regularly scheduled interstate passenger flights from Love Field, except for “commuter airline operations.”⁶ The Dallas City Council passed a resolution expressing its support for this legislation. Although Congressman Wright’s bill banning all interstate service at Love Field was adopted by the House, the Senate rejected it. The conference committee, however, reached a compromise that resulted in the legislation known as the Wright Amendment. The Wright Amendment prohibited the CAB and the Department of Transportation (DOT) from certificating interstate flights at Love Field, subject to two pertinent exceptions:

• commuter airlines operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of 56 passengers or less; and

• flights between Love Field and points in Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas, provided the carrier does not offer through ticketing or service beyond Texas and the four-state perimeter, either itself or through another airline.⁷

After passage of the Wright Amendment, Southwest began interstate service within the Amendment’s parameters. In 1982, Dallas, Fort Worth, American Airlines, Inc., and the DFW Airport Board were permanently enjoined from litigating “the validity, effect, or enforceability of the [Bond Ordinance] ... insofar as it may affect the right of [Southwest] to the continued use of and access to Love Field.”⁸

In July of 1992, the DOT published a study prepared by the Interdepartmental Task Force on the Wright Amendment (the Love Field Study Task Force) on the likely effects of repealing or loosening the restrictions on Love Field service under the Wright Amendment.⁹ The study addressed five questions arising from a debate between members of Congress who sought to amend or repeal the Wright Amendment and members of the Texas congressional delegation who opposed those efforts:

• What will be the impact on competition and fares?

• How much capacity can Love Field add?

• What will be the impact of opening Love Field on the continued growth of DFW?

• Will travelers prefer Love Field over DFW?

• What are the likely environmental consequences of more air traffic at Love Field?¹⁰

In summary, the Love Field Study Task Force reported that expanding Love Field service through modification or repeal of the Wright Amendment would cause no significant harm to DFW and would greatly benefit the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area. Specifically, the report concluded:

A change to the Wright Amendment will result in more service, more competition, lower fares, and more traffic for the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex and the region. Travellers to or from the Me-troplex region will save an estimated $183 million per year in air fares. The amount of additional service that can be provided at Love Field beyond the 214,-000 annual operations today will be limited by airspace interactions caused by Love Field’s proximity to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport and the orientation of its runways in relation to those at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport. Safety will be maintained by [Federal Aviation Administration]-imposed procedures, and noise impacts on the region will continue to decline as older “Stage 2” aircraft are phased out. Aircraft delays would become a significant problem only if operations reach the unlikely level of 360,000 operations annually. Under all possible scenarios, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport will continue to grow and remain the region’s dominant airport. [Emphasis supplied.]¹¹

The DOT submitted the report to Congress, but made no recommendation on whether the Wright Amendment should be repealed or modified.

In 1996, Astraea Aviation Services, Inc. sought to enter the Dallas air passenger market by providing long distance flights from Love Field using large jet aircraft reconfigured to accommodate no more than 56 passengers. Astraea requested an opinion from the DOT that its proposed service would meet the requirements of the “commuter airlines” exception to the Wright Amendment. The DOT concluded that such service “would be contrary to the Congressional goals underlying the [Wright Amendment]” and that whether long-haul service should be allowed at Love Field “is a question that should be resolved by Congress.” Astraea appealed the DOT’s ruling to the Fifth Circuit.

Before the appeal was resolved, however, Congress adopted the Shelby Amendment, named after Senator Richard Shelby, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The Shelby Amendment authorizes a limited increase in Love Field service in two respects:

• the Wright Amendment’s “56 passengers or less” commuter airlines exception now includes most larger aircraft “reconfigured to accommodate 56 or fewer passengers”; and

• three states are added to the Love Field service area — Kansas, Alabama, and Mississippi.¹²

Soon after the enactment of the Shelby Amendment, Southwest began offering through service from Love Field to Mississippi and Alabama. In addition, Legend, a start-up airline, and Continental Express, both announced plans to begin new interstate service from Love Field.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 10, 1997, Fort Worth filed the underlying suit against Dallas, Legend, and other entities who are not parties to this appeal. Fort Worth asked the trial court to declare that Dallas is contractually obligated by the cities’ 1968 Agreement and Bond Ordinance to limit flights from Love Field to points within Texas and the four states contiguous to Texas: Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Arkansas. Dallas and Legend defended the suit by claiming that Dallas’s obligations are preempted by federal law. American later intervened as a plaintiff.

In November 1997, Dallas filed suit in federal court against Fort Worth and the DOT, seeking a declaration that the Bond Ordinance is preempted by federal law.¹³ Dallas’s federal lawsuit was consolidated with a similar lawsuit filed by Continental Airlines and Continental Express (collectively, Continental).¹⁴

After the state court declaratory judgment action was filed, Continental scheduled flights between Love Field and Cleveland, Ohio, to begin July 1, 1998. As a result, Fort Worth and American added Continental as a defendant in the declaratory judgment action. The DFW Airport Board also filed a cross-claim against Continental and a counterclaim against American, asserting that the DFW use agreements barred signatories from offering interstate service at Love Field.¹⁵ Fort Worth and the DFW Airport Board later obtained temporary injunctions prohibiting Continental’s proposed flights to Cleveland.

In August 1998, the DOT began its own proceeding after requests for help from Fort Worth, Dallas, Legend, and several members of Congress. Dallas and Legend then moved to abate the state court suit on the ground that the trial court should defer to the primary jurisdiction of the DOT. The trial court denied the motions.

On October 15, 1998, the trial court rendered a partial summary judgment declaring that the 1968 Agreement and Bond Ordinance are valid, enforceable, and not preempted by federal law; that neither the ADA nor the Wright and Shelby Amendments convey affirmative rights that allow interstate passenger service from Love Field to points beyond Texas and the four-state perimeter established by the Wright Amendment; and that Dallas is obligated under the 1968 Agreement and Bond Ordinance to prohibit scheduled interstate passenger service beyond Texas and the four-state perimeter. The trial court denied Dallas’s, Legend’s, and Continental’s controverting motions for summary judgment, and the partial summary judgment was made final on December 16, 1998.¹⁶ This state court appeal by Dallas, Legend, and Continental followed.

Meanwhile, on December 22, 1998, the DOT ruled that neither Dallas’s commitments under the Bond Ordinance nor its rights as an airport proprietor under the ADA allow it to restrict services at Love Field that are authorized by federal law; that Dallas’s ability to limit the type of airline service operated at Love Field is preempted by the Wright and Shelby Amendments; and that the commuter airlines exception allows any airline operating certain aircraft to make long-haul flights to or from Love Field.¹⁷

Fort Worth and American appealed the DOT’s order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On February 1, 2000, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the DOT’s ruling.¹⁸ Fort Worth and American petitioned for a writ of certiorari, challenging the Fifth Circuit decision in the United States Supreme Court.¹⁹

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Dallas and Continental contend the DOT has primary jurisdiction to interpret federal aviation statutes, including the ADA and the Wright and Shelby Amendments, and that the trial court erred by not deferring to the mandate of the DOT’s order. Notwithstanding this jurisdictional bar, all appellants contend the trial court judgment should be reversed and rendered in their favor because the Bond Ordinance restrictions on interstate service at Love Field are preempted by federal law under the ADA and, thus, Dallas’s proprietary powers and rights do not authorize it to enforce the restrictions.²⁰ Appellants also assert that the Bond Ordinance restrictions on interstate service at Love Field are preempted by the Wright and Shelby Amendments, and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because of the existence of material fact questions. Appellees contend the type of long-haul service proposed by Continental and Legend is not within the commuter airlines exception in the Wright and Shelby Amendments.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant met its summary judgment burden by establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.²¹ Questions of law, such as the primary jurisdiction, preemption, and statutory interpretation issues presented here, are proper matters for summary judgment.²²

PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE DOT

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is premised on the theory that “when the Legislature has delegated the power to an administrative body to regulate a particular industry or business, the courts may not or will not interfere until the board or bureau has had an opportunity to pass upon the matter and has remedied, or attempted to remedy, the situation.”²³ When an administrative agency has primary jurisdiction over the issues presented in a case, state and federal courts generally abate or'dismiss the lawsuit pending the administrative agency’s resolution of those issues.²⁴

“[T]he test for applying the principle of primary jurisdiction is not whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts but whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the agency.”²⁵ However, where the issue is inherently judicial in nature, “the courts are not ousted from jurisdiction unless the Legislature ... has explicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction to the administrative body.”²⁶

We believe the federal law issues in this case are inherently judicial in nature. While the DOT clearly is charged with administering the federal aviation laws,²⁷ we find no statutory grant of authority that gives the DOT exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply either the ADA or the Wright and Shelby Amendments. To the contrary, federal courts have routinely exercised their jurisdiction to determine preemption issues similar to those presented here.²⁸

Accordingly, we hold the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to the federal law issues in this case.²⁹ Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not eiT by not deferring to the DOT.

PREEMPTION BY THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT

In passing the ADA, Congress expressly preempted state and local regulations “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.”³⁰ The ADA does not, however, preempt regulation of air service by local governments that own or operate airports if the regulation is an exercise of the owners’ “proprietary powers and rights.”³¹

The pertinent restrictions on interstate service in the Bond Ordinance are related to routes, because they require the transfer of all interstate flights from Love Field and other local airports to DFW.³² Thus, the ADA preempts the route restrictions in the Bond Ordinance and thus prohibits Dallas from enforcing the restrictions, unless enforcement of the restrictions is an exercise of Dallas’s proprietary powers and rights as defined by the ADA.

The DOT concluded in its December 1998 order that Dallas’s proprietary powers and rights as an airport owner or operator “do not allow it to restrict services at Love Field authorized by federal law.” The Fifth Circuit agreed and held the DOT’s order to be reasonable.³³

While we do not have concurrent jurisdiction to review the validity of the DOT’s order,³⁴ we do share jurisdiction with the Fifth Circuit to decide the preemption issues and to interpret the relevant provisions of the ADA. In so doing, we are not bound by the pronouncements of the Fifth Circuit; we are obligated only to follow the federal law decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Supreme Court.³⁵

Preemption of state or local law by federal statute is disfavored in the absence of persuasive reasons — either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakably so ordained.³⁶ Preemption questions require an examination of congressional intent, whether express or implied.³⁷ “Congress explicitly may define the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law.”³⁸ In the absence of explicit statutory language, however, congressional intent to preempt may be inferred if federal law “occupies] a given field to the exclusion of state law,” or where the state law actually conflicts with federal law and thus “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”³⁹

The manifest purpose behind the ADA’s preemption provision is to “ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.”⁴⁰ Even before enactment of the ADA, courts long adhered to the principle that airport proprietors play an “extremely limited role” in the national scheme of aviation regulation.⁴¹ Congress has specified such a limited role “[t]o avoid interference with the preeminent authority of the federal government in the field of aviation” by preventing local airport proprietors from “infringing upon the federal government’s turf.”⁴² Consequently, a local government’s exercise of its proprietary rights is limited to reasonable, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory rules that advance an articulated local interest.⁴³ Applying this rule, courts have upheld route restrictions imposed by local proprietors that were designed to address operational and safety concerns such as noise,⁴⁴ pollution,⁴⁵ and airport congestion.⁴⁶ One court has also suggested that route restrictions aimed at preventing an airport from having to shut down its operations may constitute a permissible exercise of proprietary power.⁴⁷ In each of these instances, the courts found the restrictions necessary to carry out a legitimate airport goal.⁴⁸

In this case, appellees did not allege in the trial court, and they do not argue here, that enforcement of the Bond Ordinance restrictions is necessary to abate present or future noise levels, air pollution, airport congestion,⁴⁹ or any other similar problem.⁵⁰ Nor have appellees asserted that the Bond Ordinance restrictions are necessary to protect DFW from becoming financially unviable.⁵¹ Rather, appellees contend that enforcement of the Bond Ordinance restrictions is necessary to protect the competitive position of DFW as the region’s dominant airport. They argue that Dallas has the proprietary power to enforce the restrictions at Love Field, so long as DFW accommodates all air passenger traffic on an unrestricted basis. This argument is undoubtedly sincere and not without merit; nonetheless, since the deregulation of the airline industry under the ADA, neither the federal courts nor any federal agency charged with the responsibility of administering the ADA has ever allowed a local government to impose restrictions at its own airport, or a neighboring airport, for the mere purpose of limiting competition with another airport preferred by that government.⁵² To permit Dallas to restrict routes at Love Field for such a purpose — absent a showing that DFW would become financially unviable without the restrictions — would be contrary to the competition inherent in a deregulated industry, as well as the Congressional intent of the ADA that airport proprietors not “undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.”⁵³

Appellees argue that the courts in Western Air Lines and City of Houston approved route restrictions that are similar to the restrictions at issue here. Those restrictions, however, were not upheld to limit competition between airports, but because the airport proprietors had demonstrated that the restrictions were necessary to achieve legitimate airport goals— the prevention of congestion,⁵⁴ “harsh environmental effects,”⁵⁵ and to prevent the shut down of operations at a neighboring airport.⁵⁶ In contrast, there is no showing here that the Bond Ordinance restrictions are necessary to further any legitimate operational or safety goal, or to maintain the financial viability of DFW. The finding of the Love Field Study Task Force that “Dallas-Fort Worth Airport will continue to grow and remain the region’s dominant airport,” if the restrictions on interstate service out of Love Field are modified in the manner presently allowed under the Shelby Amendment,⁵⁷ stands unchallenged in the record before us.

Finally, even if we were inclined to agree with appellees’ position, we are not empowered to substitute our judgment for that of the DOT in this case. Under the clear mandate of the United States Supreme Court, we must give “controlling weight” to reasonable DOT interpretations of the ADA.⁵⁸ According to the court having exclusive jurisdiction to review the propriety of the DOT order, the DOT carefully considered all relevant factors and arrived at a reasonable conclusion in deciding that the 30-year-old Bond Ordinance restrictions on long-haul service at Love Field are unenforceable under the ADA.⁵⁹ We are, therefore, constrained to give the DOT order controlling weight even if we would decide the preemption issue differently.⁶⁰

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that enforcement by Dallas of the Bond Ordinance restrictions at Love Field is not a permissible exercise of proprietary powers under the ADA.⁶¹ Accordingly, we hold that the Bond Ordinance restrictions are preempted by the ADA.⁶²

COMMUTER AIRLINES EXCEPTION

Appellees contend that the air passenger service out of Love Field proposed by Legend and Continental⁶³ is not within the commuter airlines exception in the Shelby Amendment. They assert the commuter airlines exception in the Shelby Amendment only authorizes short-haul service from Love Field, because the Wright Amendment was intended to limit Love Field to short-haul service and only short-haul turboprop aircraft had a passenger capacity of 56 or less when the Wright Amendment was enacted. “Commuter airlines” is not defined in either of the Amendments.⁶⁴

The Wright Amendment excepts from its prohibition against interstate air passenger service at Love Field “air transportation provided by commuter airlines operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of 56 passengers or less.” When the Wright Amendment was enacted in 1979, only turboprop planes had a passenger capacity of 56 passengers or less. Such aircraft were only marketed for service on short-haul routes because they were severely limited in range. Consequently, the Wright Amendment has been interpreted to exclude larger aircraft with long-haul capabilities.⁶⁵ In recent years, however, aircraft manufacturers have developed regional jets that typically have no more than 56 seats and offer attractive service on long flights. Large aircraft can also be reconfigured to hold no more than 56 passengers.

The Shelby Amendment modifies the commuter airlines exemption by defining “passenger capacity of 56 passengers or less” to include “any aircraft, except aircraft exceeding gross aircraft weight of 300,000 pounds, reconfigured to accommodate 56 or fewer passengers if the total number of passenger seats installed on the aircraft does not exceed 56.” [Emphasis supplied.] In its order, the DOT interpreted this language to mean any airline operating “any aircraft with a capacity of no more than 56 passengers,” whether regional jets, reconfigured large aircraft, or turboprop planes, with no geographical limit on the length of flight. Based on this interpretation, the DOT concluded that “any airline operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of no more than 56 passengers and a gross aircraft weight of no more than 300,000 pounds may operate service with any type of equipment and flights of any length from or to Love Field.” In reaching this conclusion, the DOT stated:

[E]ven if the Wright Amendment were unclear on [the meaning of “commuter airlines”], the enactment of the Shelby Amendment shows that Congress no longer intends to limit the commuter aircraft exemption to short-haul service. By expressly allowing any aircraft (except aircraft with a gross aircraft weight of more than 300,000 pounds) to qualify for the exemption, subject only to the maximum 56-passenger capacity limitation, Congress no longer wishes to limit the exemption to short-haul service.⁶⁶

We agree with the DOT’S analysis, and, because the Fifth Circuit has held that the DOT’S interpretation is reasonable, we give it “controlling weight.”⁶⁷

It is true that Congress intended to restrict the commuter aircraft exemption to short-haul service in turboprop aircraft having a 56-passenger capacity or less when it enacted the Wright Amendment. A plain reading of the Shelby Amendment, however, shows that congressional intent has shifted toward allowing commuter airlines to operate many types of aircraft out of Love Field that are capable of providing long-haul service.⁶⁸ Appellees’ narrow definition of commuter airlines would frustrate this clear intent and render the express language of the Shelby Amendment meaningless.

INJUNCTION AGAINST CONTINENTAL

Continental asserts the trial court erred by enjoining Continental Express from providing interstate air carrier service between Love Field and Cleveland, Ohio, and by limiting the injunction bond to $100,000. The propriety of the injunction and bond is now moot, however, because the trial court dissolved the injunction on February 8, 2000. Furthermore, we lack jurisdiction to consider Continental’s complaints about the injunction and bond. The injunction order was severed from the underlying case and appealed separately.⁶⁹ We dismissed that appeal at Continental’s request in December 1998. Because our plenary power over the appeal has expired,⁷⁰ we have no authority to vacate our judgment of dismissal and revisit those issues in this appeal.⁷¹

CONCLUSION

In light of our holdings on the issues of primary jurisdiction, preemption by the ADA, the commuter airlines exception, and the dissolved injunction against Continental, we need not consider the parties’ remaining issues. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment denying the declaratory relief sought by ap-pellees because the restrictions on Love Field air passenger service contained in the Bond Ordinance are preempted by the ADA. We also render judgment that the commuter airlines exception to the Shelby Amendment allows any airline operating any aircraft with a capacity of no more than 56 passengers and a gross weight of no more than 300,000 pounds to offer flights on that aircraft to or from Love Field without geographical limitation. We dismiss Continental’s injunction issues.

DAUPHINOT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

APPENDIX

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Executive Summary

Overview.

Dallas-Fort Worth Internationa! Airport opened in 1974. To ensure its success and to provide assurance that the airport could meet its bond obligations, the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth agreed to move commercial passenger operations from Love Field in Dallas and Meacham Field in Fort Worth to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport. At that time, most of the major carriers serving the area signed an agreement to transfer their operations. Only Southwest Airlines-then a small, intra-state carrier-did not sign, and was subsequently found eligible by the courts to continue to provide intra-state service from Love Field. With airline deregulation in 1978, Southwest, with court approval, expanded its service to New Orleans from Love Reid. Concern arose that other carriers might seek to provide expanded service from Love Reid, a move that might dilute the service from and financial standing of Dallas-Fort Worth Airport The legislative result of that concern was the Wright Amendment-a provision contained in the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979-that expressly prohibits non-stop air service (and through-ticketing and through-service) between Dalias Love Reid and cities other than those in Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.

Since enactment of the Wright Amendment, two views of its potential impacts have developed. On one hand, many believe that the Amendment's restrictions limit the benefits of Southwest's lower-fare structure as well as the potential economic contribution of Love Reid. As a result, residents outside the five state area, as well as some residents of Dallas, have argued for changes to the Amendment in order to allow Southwest to expand its operations from Love Reid and provide low-fare service to more cities. On the other hand, others feel that removing'or changing the current restrictions would break the agreement between the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth that has served as the foundation for regional economic planning and development They also contend that expanding service at Love Reid would compromise the justification to expand Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, lessen rather than increase consumer choice and service, and reduce the margin of safety.

Results In Brief.

A change to the Wright Amendment will result in more service, more competition, lower fares, and more traffic for the Daiias-Fort Worth Metroplex and the region. Travellers to or from the Metroplex region will save an estimated $183 million per year in air fares. The amount of additional service that can be provided at Love Reid beyond the 214,000 annual operations today will be limited by airspace interactions caused by Love Reid’s proximity to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport and the orientation of its runways in relation to those at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Safety will be maintained by FAA-imposed procedures, and noise impacts on the region will continue to decline as older “Stage 2“ aircraft are phased out. Aircraft delays would become a significant problem only if operations reach the unlikely level of 360,000 operations annually. Under ail possible scenarios, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport will continue to grow and remain the region’s dominant airport.

AB 000644

Study Approach and Results.

This study evaluates five questions surrounding change to the Wright Amendment:

• What will be the impact on competition and fares?

• How much capacity can Love Field add?

• What will be the impact of opening Love Reid on the continued growth of Dallas-Fort Worth Airport?

• Will travelers prefer Love Reid over Dallas-Fort Worth Airport?

• What are the likely environmental consequences of more air traffic at Love Reid?

This study evaluates these questions by considering two alternatives to the Amendment: modification, which would allow some new service, and repeal. Repeal was evaluated according to three different possible service levels at Love Reid.

• Base Case. The Wright Amendment will be retained in its present form.

• Modified Wriaht. A change permitting non-stop flights of up to 650 miles and through-service and through-ticketing to any destination beyond.

• Repeal/Equal Access. Carriers servo Love Reid by focusing on service to their major hubs and Southwest adds service to a limited number of cities beyond the 650 miles noted above.

• Repeal/Origin and Destination. Love Reid becomes a major origin and destination base (70 flights a day) by a carrier other than Southwest.

• Repeal/Major Hub - An airline, other than Southwest, decides to establish Love Reid as a hub (230 flights a day).

Rgure ES.1. presents the existing Wright Amendment service restriction as well as the 650 mile limit of the Modified Wright scenario.

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What will be the impact on competition and fares? With a few exceptions, the Wright Amendment limits service from Love Field to that provided by Southwest Airlines. If the Wright Amendment were changed, competition and fares in the Metroplex would be affected in two ways.

First, new service by Southwest Airlines from Love Field would likely include a number of new cities (see Table ES.1). This would result in increased competition for service from Dallas-Fort Worth Airport and should result in net increases in service for the Metroplex. Other carriers are also likely to add non-stop service from Love Field to their hubs. Only if carriers choose to shift flights from Dallas-Fort Worth Airport to Love Field rather than to supplement existing service would the diversity of air service from Dallas-Fort Worth Airport be reduced.

The non-stop cities listed above represent the most likely additional entry points from Love Field given Southwest Airlines’ current operating pattern. Analysis suggests that Southwest may enter a limited number of additional cities (all smaller in population than those shown).

Second, Southwest Airlines' low-fare structure and frequent service would have an impact on demand for air travel in the southwestern region. For example, when Southwest has initiated service in a market in the past, fares for service in that market have fallen by an average of 22 percent and traffic has increased by 50 percent Furthermore, fares for those markets with non-stop service from both Love Reid (provided by Southwest) and Dallas-Fort Worth Airport (provided by various airlines) average 39 percent below the standard industry fare level-the Civil Aeronautics Board pre-deregulation fare formula adjusted for cost increases. Fares for markets for which service is only available from Dallas-Fort Worth Airport (with no service by Southwest), on the other hand, average 19 percent above the standard industry fare level (see Figure ES.2) .

If the Wright Amendment were repealed, travelers to or from the Metroplex could conservatively expect to realize an estimated annual fare savings of $183 million (in 1991 dollars, see Table ES.2). This result would be slightly lower (approximately 5 to 10 percent) if the Wright Amendment were modified rather than repealed.

Notes:

a) Market forecast based on 1990 U.S. Department of Transportation Survey of Origin and Destination Passengers for each city pair, forecast to grow at rate of the Termtnal Area Forecasts provided by the Federal Aviation Ad ministration.

b) Demand would increase by less than the 50 percent non-stop average since many of the markets would only be affected by multiple stop (through-ticketing) service.

How much capacity can Love Field add? Dallas Love Reid is located about 4 1/2 miles from the Dallas central business district and 12 miles east of Dallas-Fort Worth Airport While Love Reid is closer to downtown Dallas than is Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, access is limited to two signal-controlled roads expected to reach capacity within the next 5 to 10 years. The airfield is a fully developed 1,300-acre site with two parallel runways (each with Instrument Landing Systems) capable of handling most domestic aircraft operations and one shorter north-south runway used for light general aviation aircraft. Industrial and residential development adjacent to Love Reid make it impractical to add new capacity through land acquisition. Thus, the potential for expanded air service at Love Reid is a function of the airspace and terminal capacity.

Airspace capacity is clearly an important constraint to expanding service at Love Reid. Love Reid's two main runways are at an angle to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport’s main north-south runways, resulting in airspace limitations between traffic approaching or departing Dallas-Fort Worth Airport and Love Reid in the north. This orientation, coupled with the proximity of the two airports and the high-activity levels in the area creates airspace limitations on Love Reid operations (see figure ES.3). Further, any change in airspace rules to increase the capacity at Love field would result in a decrease in capacity for Dallas-Fort Worth Airport. Thus, the most effective airspace configuration for the region remains that of the Federal Aviation Administration’s recently completed Metroptex Plan, now being implemented.

Figure ES.3. Dallas-Fort Worth Airport and Love Field Federal Aviation Administration Arrival and Departure Paths

Changing the Wright Amendment to establish a 650-mile perimeter with through-service and through-ticketing would not result in unmanageable capacity or delay problems. This is largely true under repeal also, provided that carriers do not elect to establish hub operations at Love Field (see Figure ES.4). If Love Field were to become a major hub, capacity and delays would become much more serious concerns. Under repeal, two conditions unique to the Metroplex airspace would become increasingly important as activity at Love Field increased. First, south-flow arrivals (which occur 70 percent of the time) are limited to a single stream at Love Field due to competing airspace with Dallas-Fort Worth Airport. Second, all departures from the Dalias-Fort Worth area use common airspace for each aircraft type. Thus, for example, if two planes of the same type, one at Love Field and one at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, are set to depart for the same destination, one might have to wait. These conditions are not expected to engender significant delays under repeal, as long as carriers limit their Love Field operations to servicing existing hubs, as illustrated by the Equal Access scenario. But any operations beyond that level, such as operating Love Field as a major hub, could result in serious delay problems.

Figure ES.4. Relationship Between Operations and Deiay at Love Field (with 1996 Scenario Forecasts)

The terminal at Love Field will support an increase in airline passenger operations, but will not support a hub operation at Love Field without the construction of new terminal facilities. The terminal, located between the parallel runways, has three concourses. The west concourse is used by Southwest Airlines. The north and east concourses have not been used for scheduled commercial passenger service for a number of years and most space has been leased out for commercial enterprises. At present, 13 active passenger loading gates are in use by Southwest. An additional 15 gates could be opened with little or no reconstruction. Major reconstruction would yield 25 more gates, bringing the total to 53 gates, (see Figure ES.5).

Figure ES.5. Gates Required by Scenario at Love Field (1996}

What will be the impact of opening Love Field on the continued growth of Dallas-Fort Worth Airport? It has been suggested that growth at Dallas-Fort Worth A.rpcn could be affected by (1) a shift in operations to Love Field, and (2) operational delays and delays in constructing planned new runways.

Changing the Wright Amendment to allow a 650 mile limit and through-service ana through-ticketing or repealing the Wright Amendment with other carriers serving their hubs from Love Field will have little if any impact on Dallas-Fort Worth Airport’s growth. On:-, if the Amendment is repealed and a carrier establishes a major origin and destination base or a major hub at Love Field would Dallas-Fort Worth Airport face a shift -r operations, the possibility of additional delays, or delays to expansion plans. To achieve either scenario (major origin and destination or major hub), however, an air carrier must be willing to accept additional delays at Love Field and, as a consequence, sacrifice service.

For example, using estimated forecast average daily domestic jet departures from Love Field and Dallas-Fort Worth Airport as one measure, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport operations drop from 950 under the Equal Access scenario to 881 under the Major Hub, with a corresponding shift upward-from 251 to 463 daily jet departures-at Love Field (see Figure ES.6).

Furthermore, because Dallas-Fort Worth Airport will remain the region's primary airport under any scenario (both in terms of operations and for airspace planning purposes), traffic to Love Field will not have any detrimental impact on Dallas-Fort Worth Airport's capacity-except under the extreme scenario of the Major Hub at Love Field. For example, using SIMMOD, a Federal Aviation Administration computer airspace and airport simulation model, ATAC Corporation concluded (in March 1990) that an increase to 955 daily operations at Love Field--an increase of more than 50 percent over 1990 operations and one within the forecast levels for both the Modified Wright and Equal Access scenarios-would not result in additional delays at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport (see Figure ES.7). This will remain the case even though the development schedule for Dallas-Fort Worth Airport calls for two new runways to be completed, one in 1994 and the second in 1997. Existing air traffic procedures at Love Field will have to be modified slightly to accommodate the proposed new runways, but these modifications will not change arrival and departure capacity levels forecast for Love Reid.

Figure ES.7. Average Daily Activity at Love Field 1990 and 1996

Will travelers prefer Love Field over Dallas-Fort Worth Airport? Some carriers serving Dallas-Fort Worth Airport have expressed concern that Love Field, because of its geographic proximity to the City of Dallas, would be the “preferred” airport.

Data provided by the North Central Texas Council of Governments show, however, that the time to drive to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport is actually shorter than to Love Reid for the majority of the Metroplex population and workforce. Furthermore, access to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport will improve through 2010, while access to Love Reid will deteriorate. For example, the percentage of Metroplex households within 45 minutes' drive of Love Field is expected to fall from the 1986 level of 67 percent to 62 percent by 2010. Conversely, the percent within 45 minutes of Dallas-Fort Worth Airport is expected to grow from 86 percent in 1986 to 88 percent in 2010 (see Rgure ES.8).

Figure ES.8. Percentage of Metroplex Population Served By Travel Time Contour Interval

Further, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport is closer to the higher-income areas-the areas whose residents have a higher propensity to fly-than is Love Field, an advantage that will also grow over time (see Figure ES.9).

Figure ES.9. Median income by Travel Time Contour interval 1986 and 2010

What are the likely environmental consequences of more air traffic at Love Field? The primary environmental consequence of any change to the Wright Amendment is noise.

Aircraft noise will be reduced from current levels under any of the scenarios examined primarily due to the change to a quieter “Stage 3“ airline fleet and the phase-out of some older, noisier general aviation aircraft. In 1989, for example, 29,000 people lived within an area equal to or in excess of noise levels deemed compatible with residential development by the Federal Aviation Administration (technically termed the "65 Ldn" line) (see Figure ES.10). Even with an increase in operations, that number is expected to decline dramatically over the next 10 years.

Figure ES. 10. Population Within 65 Ldn at Love Field

[[Image here]]

1 . International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Act of Feb. 15, 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-192, § 29, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 35, 48 [the Wright Amendment]; Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Act of Oct. 27, 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-66, § 337, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (Ill Stat.) 1425, 1447 [the Shelby Amendment].

2 . See Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 103 (5 th Cir.) ("Southwest Airlines Co. has a federally declared right to the continued use of and access to Love Field, so long as Love Field remains open.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832, 98 S.Ct. 117, 54 L.Ed.2d 93 (1977); City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F.Supp. 1015, 1034-35 (N.D.Tex.1973) (same), aff’d, 494 F.2d 773 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079, 95 S.Ct. 668, 42 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).

3 . 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).

4 . See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907, 112 S.Ct. 298, 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991); see also Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 438 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 945, 115 S.Ct. 354, 130 L.Ed.2d 309 (1994).

5 . See Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1023.

6 . H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-716, at 24 (1979), reprínted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 86.

7 . International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub.L. No. 96-192, § 29, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 48-49.

8 . Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., No. CA-3-75-0340-C, slip op. at 4-5 (N.D.Tex.1982, order).

9 . See Analysis of the Impact of Changes to the Wright Amendment, Interdepartmental Task Force on the Wright Amendment (July 1992) [the Love Field Study] (attached as Appendix).

10 . Love Field Study, Executive Summary at 2.

11 . Love Field Study, Executive Summary at 1.

12 .The text of the Shelby Amendment reads, in pertinent part:

Sec. 337 (a) In General. — For purposes of the exception set forth in section 29(a)(2) of the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979 [the Wright Amendment] ..., the term “passenger capacity of 56 passengers or less" includes any aircraft, except aircraft exceeding gross aircraft weight of 300,000 pounds, reconfigured to accommodate 56 or fewer passengers if the total number of passenger seats installed on the aircraft does not exceed 56.

(b) Inclusion of Certain States in Exemption. — The first sentence of section 29(c) of the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979 [the Wright Amendment] ... is amended by inserting "Kansas, Alabama, Mississippi,” before "and Texas”.

DOT Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-66, § 337, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (Ill Stat.) 1425, 1447.

13 . City of Dallas, Tex. v. Department of Transp., No. 3:97-CV-2734-T (N.D. Tex. filed Nov. 6, 1997).

14 . Continental Airlines, Inc. v. City of Dallas, Tex., No. 3:98-CV-1187-R (N.D. Tex. filed May 19, 1998). The federal district court has stayed the consolidated action pending resolution of the appeal from the 1998 DOT proceeding referenced herein.

15 . These claims have been severed into a separate case, and the DFW Airport Board is not a party to this appeal.

16 . Astraea was dismissed as a party for lack of a justiciable controversy and certain interlocutory orders were merged into the judgment.

17 . See Love Field Serv. Interp. Proc., DOT Decl. Order No. 98-12-27, 58 (1998).

18 . See American Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 202 F.3d 788 (5 th Cir.2000), petition for cert. filed., 68 U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2000) (No. 99-1462), 68 U.S.L.W. 3698 (U.S. May 1, 2000) (Nos.99-1739, 99-1745).

19 . See id.

20 . The dissent perceives that the primary issue in the trial court was whether the Agreement and Bond Ordinance contractually obligated Dallas to prohibit flights from Love Field beyond the four-state perimeter. However, this state law issue could not be addressed by the trial court, nor can it be addressed by this court on appeal, without first deciding the federal question of whether Dallas and Legend’s defense of preemption precludes Dallas from fulfilling its contractual obligations under the Agreement and Bond Ordinance.

21 . See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Calvillo v. Gonzalez, 922 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex.1996); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979).

22 . See Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex.1999).

23 . Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411, 413 (1961).

24 . See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 267, 113 S.Ct. 1213, 1219, 122 L.Ed.2d 604 (1993); New England Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157, 171, 173 (1 Cir.1989); Foree v. Crown Cent. Petro. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex.1968); Lens Express, Inc. v. Ewald, 907 S.W.2d 64, 71 (Tex.App.— Austin 1995, no writ).

25 . Foree, 431 S.W.2d at 316; see also American Pawn & Jewelry, Inc. v. Kayal, 923 S.W.2d 670, 674 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).

26 . Gregg, 344 S.W.2d at 415.

27 . See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 366-67, 114 S.Ct. 855, 863, 127 L.Ed.2d 183 (1994).

28 . See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth., 817 F.2d 222, 226 (2 Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct. 1467, 99 L.Ed.2d 697 (1988); City of Houston v. Federal Aviation Admin., 679 F.2d 1184, 1195 (5 th Cir.1982). But cf. Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d at 171, 175 (concluding that, while both the courts and the DOT have general jurisdiction to interpret the ADA’s preemption provision, deference to the DOT’s jurisdiction is "necessary if consistent and coherent policy [is] to emerge”) (citation omitted).

29 . But cf. American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 800-01 ("[Ajviation regulation [is] an area where federal concerns are preeminent and where DOT is charged with representing those concerns.... DOT’s interpretive order is the first time that DOT ... has interpreted the Shelby Amendment. To allow the state court effectively to foreclose the administering agency from further consideration of the Shelby Amendment ... would trump the key federal interests that motivated Congress to create DOT and give it authority over these laws.”) (citations omitted).

30 . 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2036-37, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992); National Helicopter Corp. v. New York, 137 F.3d 81, 88 (2 nd Cir.1998).

31 . 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(3) (West 1997).

32 . See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth., 658 F.Supp. 952, 955 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (concluding that perimeter rule prohibiting nonstop flights to and from New York's La-Guardia airport was regulation related to routes), aff'd, 817 F.2d 222 (2 nd Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct. 1467, 99 L.Ed.2d 697 (1988).

33 . See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 810, 813.

34 . The federal appellate courts have exclusive jurisdiction over that review process. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(c) (West 1997); City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 934 (D.C.Cir.1979) (holding that federal appellate courts' exclusive review under predecessor to section 46110(c) ”preempt[s] the original jurisdiction of state courts as well as federal district courts”).

35 . See Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.1993) (holding that, in cases in which federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, we are bound only by U.S. Supreme Court and Texas Supreme Court decisions).

36 . See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1130, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981). The underlying rationale of the preemption doctrine is that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution invalidates state and local laws that interfere with or are contrary to the laws of Congress. See id.

37 . See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299, 108 S.Ct. 1145, 1150, 99 L.Ed.2d 316 (1988).

38 . Id.; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 778 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926, 111 S.Ct. 307, 112 L.Ed.2d 261 (1990).

39 . Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300, 108 S.Ct. at 1150-51.

40 . American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222, 115 S.Ct. 817, 821, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. at 2034).

41 . British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 564 F.2d 1002, 1010 (2 nd Cir.1977).

42 . City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1194.

43 . See National Helicopter Corp., 137 F.3d at 88-89; Western Air Lines, Inc., 658 F.Supp. at 958.

44 . See Santa Monica Airport Ass’n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100, 104 (9 th Cir.1981).

45 . See National Helicopter Corp., 137 F.3d at 88-89.

46 . See Western Air Lines, Inc., 817 F.2d at 223.

47 . See City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1191.

48 . See National Helicopter Corp., 137 F.3d at 89; Western Air Lines, Inc., 817 F.2d at 223; City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1191; Santa Monica Airport Ass’n, 659 F.2d at 104; see also Love Field Serv. Interp. Proc., DOT Decl. Order No. 98-12-27, 32 (concluding that any restrictions imposed on airline operations must be necessary to carry out a legitimate airport goal).

49 . At the temporary injunction hearing, one of appellees' experts opined that short-term "chaos” may result from airlines following Continental into the Love Field market. According to another expert, an increase in flights at Love Field by as many as 200 per day could result in some delays at DFW because DFW and Love Field share the same air space. Appellees do not contend, however, that it is the avoidance of possible delays that necessitates enforcement of the Bond Ordinance restrictions.

50 . In response to Continental’s motion for summary judgment, Fort Worth argued that the cities enacted the Bond Ordinance after the CAB found safety, noise, and congestion problems at Love Field more than 30 years ago. However, there is no evidence in the record before us that indicates these problems still exist, or that allowing limited interstate service under the Shelby Amendment would create the same problems encountered in the 1960s when Love Field was the region's busiest airport. To the contrary, the uncontro-verted Love Field Study indicates that limited Love Field service under the Shelby Amendment will not create operational or safety problems at either Love Field or DFW. Love Field Study, Executive Summary at 1.

51 . See, e.g., City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1191 (citing evidence that the lack of a perimeter rule could force the FAA to close an airport). While there is evidence in the summary judgment record that opening up Love Field service under the Shelby Amendment could result in loss of revenue to DFW, there is no support in the record for the proposition that DFW would become financially unviable or be forced to close its operations. Nor is there evidence that DFW would lose its regional dominance. Moreover, the evidence that does show potential revenue loss to DFW is speculative and inconclusive. For instance, although there is testimony that $1.6 billion annually in flight revenues would be "exposed” if Continental were allowed to fly from Love Field to Cleveland, Ohio, appellees' experts admitted they had no way of calculating how many passengers DFW would actually lose to Love Field. Joe Lopano, DFW’s managing director of airport development, believed the opening of Love Field would have a "significant” impact on those revenues, but he could not quantify the potential impact to support this opinion. Appellees' experts also speculated that DFW could lose its national mega-hub status and become more like Houston Intercontinental Airport. Again, however, there is no evidence that even remotely indicates that there is a potential that DFW's operations will be shut down, or that it will lose its regional dominance, if Love Field service is allowed under the Shelby Amendment.

52 .Appellees rely on a Colorado Supreme Court decision as authority for imposing route restrictions to limit competition. See Arapahoe County Pub. Airport Auth. v. Centennial Express Airlines, Inc., 956 P.2d 587, 595-96 (Colo. 1998). Arapahoe is factually distinguishable, and, to the arguable extent that it is not, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that it was wrongly decided and thus decline to follow it. See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 807 (holding Arapahoe to be factually distinguishable and "as deviating from the generally accepted rule”). We also note that the restrictions at issue in Arapahoe have subsequently been challenged by the FAA in a separate proceeding. See Centennial Express Airlines v. Arapahoe County Pub. Airport Auth.; DOT Docket Nos. 16-98-05, 13-94-25, 13-95-03.

53 . Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222, 115 S.Ct. at 821 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. at 2034).

54 . Western Air Lines, Inc., 817 F.2d at 223; City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1188.

55 . City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1193.

56 . See id. at 1191.

⁵⁷

58 . Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see also Northwest Airlines, Inc., 510 U.S. at 366-67, 114 S.Ct. at 863; Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. United States Evntl. Protection Agency, 161 F.3d 923, 937-38 (5 th Cir.1998); see also Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449, 1455 (D.C.Cir.1988) (deferring to DOT’s interpretation of Wright Amendment).

59 . See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 813; see also 49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(c) (providing that federal appellate courts have exclusive jurisdiction to review DOT orders).

60 . See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782.

61 . See National Helicopter Corp., 137 F.3d at 92; City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1194. Our opinion should not be interpreted as concluding that Dallas is prohibited from enforcing reasonable, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory route restrictions designed to advance articulated local interests, such as those identified in this opinion. We express no opinion on that issue, because the parties did not raise it in the trial court or in this appeal. For the same reason, we also express no opinion on the "due process considerations” mentioned by the dissent. See dissent, infra at 120-21. We are prohibited from addressing issues not raised by the parties in the trial court or on appeal. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex.1991) ( op. on reh’g).

62 . In light of this holding, we need not consider whether Dallas is a multi-airport proprietor, whether the Wright and Shelby Amendments preempt the Bond Ordinance independent of the ADA, or whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because of the existence of material fact questions.

63 .Continental plans to provide service to Cleveland, Ohio from Love Field, via Continental Express aircraft having 56 or fewer seats and weighing less than 300,000 pounds. Legend recently began offering flights from Love Field to Los Angeles, Washington D.C., and Las Vegas on reconfigured DC-9s.

64 . See Continental Air Lines, Inc., 843 F.2d at 1454 (“The language of the [commuter airlines exemption] is, we are persuaded, ambiguous[.]”).

65 . See id. at 1454-55; Love Field Serv. In-terp. Proc., DOT Decl. Order No. 98-12-27, 49.

66 . Love Field Serv. Interp. Proc., DOT Decl. Order No. 98-12-27, 50.

67 . Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 104 S.Ct. at 2782; see Continental Air Lines, Inc., 843 F.2d at 1449 ("Here [referring to the Wright Amendment], Congress fashioned a specific provision which the agency (once CAB, now DOT) has been called upon to interpret.”); see also American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 813 (declining to second-guess DOT’s reasonable interpretation of the commuter airlines exception because "determinations of this nature are directly within DOT's expertise, not ours”).

68 . We note that none of the parties seriously contends that the limited long-haul service authorized by the Shelby Amendment will undermine Love Field’s status as a primarily short-haul service airport.

69 . The style of the injunction appeal was Continental Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., No. 2-98-211-CV (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

70 . See Tex.R.App. P. 19.1(a).

71 . See id. 19.3. ("After its plenary power expires, the court cannot vacate or modify its judgment.”).