Leehaug v. State Board of Tax Commissioners

583 N.E.2d 211, 1991 WL 246803
Indiana Tax Court·Decided November 18, 1991·No. 49T10-9108-SC-00044, 49T10-9109-SC-00046·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

ORDER ON RESPONDENTS MOTION TO TRANSFER TO THE PLENARY DOCKET

FISHER, Judge.

The Claimants, David J. Lechaug and Lloyd L. Shonkwiler, appeal the State Board of Tax Commissioners' (State Board) final determinations of the assessed value of their property. Both appeals are filed as small tax cases 1 as provided by IND. CODE 338-8-5-12(a)(2) and Indiana Tax Court Rule 16(A). These cases are before the court on the State Board's motions to transfer them from the small claims docket to the plenary docket. Since these cases involve the same issue, the court considers them together.

ISSUE

The question before the court is whether IC 838-8-5-12(a)(2) and Indiana Tax Court Rule 16(A) limit the small claims docket to appeals from the State Board involving a maximum assessed value $15,-000, or whether they limit the small claims docket to appeals in which the disputed amount of assessed value is less than $15,-0007

*212 DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The State Board's final determination of the assessed value of Leehaug's property is $60,990, and the State Board's final determination of the assessed value of Shonk-wiler's property is $165,640. - Lechaug claims the proper assessed value of his property should be an amount between $45,990 and $60,990, and Shonkwiler claims the proper assessed value of his property should be $154,684.80. The State Board contends the claimants' cases should not be permitted on the small claims docket since the final determinations of assessed value involved exceed $15,000. The claimants contend their cases are appropriate on the small claims docket since the disputed amounts of assessed value are less than $15,000.

The parties' differing contentions spring from the language of IC 88-8-5-12(a)(2) and Indiana Tax Court Rule 16(A). IC 83-83-5-12 provides:

(a) The tax court shall establish a small claims docket for processing:
(1) claims for refunds from the department of state revenue that do not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) for any year; and
(2) appeals of final determinations of assessed value made by the state board of tax commissioners that do not exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for any year.
(b) The tax court shall adopt rules and procedures under which cases on the small claims docket are heard and decided.

Indiana Tax Court Rule 16, provides in relevant part:

(A) The term 'small tax case' means a case which involves either a claim for refund from the Department of State Revenue that does not exceed $5,000 for any year or an appeal of a final determination of assessed value made by the State Board of Tax Commissioners that does not exceed $15,000 for any year.

"In construing a statute, it is the duty of a court to give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used." Jones v. Hendricks County Plan Comm'n (1982), Ind.App., 435 N.E.2d 82, 84 (citing State ex rel. Bynum v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 1 (1978), 259 Ind. 647, 291 N.E.2d 355). " '[Slimple disagreement between the parties does not necessarily constitute ambiguity.'" Johnson County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1991), Ind.Tax, 568 N.E.2d 578, 580 (quoting Indianapolis Pub. Transp. Corp. v. Indiana Dep't of Revenue (1987), Ind.Tax, 512 N.E.2d 906, 908, aff'd, (1990), Ind., 550 N.E.2d 1277). "[ exists when parties advance well reasoned, albeit differing, theories about a statute's meaning." Id. (citing Pub. Transp., 512 N.E.2d at 908). In the case at bar, the claimants allege ambiguity results from the placement of the relative clause "that do not exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for any year" in IC 38-3-5-12(a)(2) and the placement of the relative clause "that does not exceed $15,000 for any year" in Indiana Tax Court Rule 16(A). The claimants argue the placement of these relative clauses creates ambiguity because the reader is not sure which words they modify.

The State Board's interpretation of the statute and rule construes the relative clauses as modifying the term "final determination(s)." The State Board's interpretation may be expressed as follows: "appeals from the State Board involving final determinations of assessed value that do not exceed $15,000 for any year." The Claimants' interpretation of the statute and rule construes the relative clauses as modifying the word "appeal(s)." The claimants' interpretation may be expressed as follows: "appeals that do not exceed $15,000 for any year of final determinations of assessed value made by the State Board."

Where the meaning is in doubt, rules of grammar may be applied to interpret a statute. Faris Mailing, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1987), Ind.Tax, 512 N.E.2d 480, 485. In grammatical structures, a relative pronoun should come immediately after the antecedent it modifies. W. STRUNK JR. AND E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE at 29 (3rd Ed.1979); see also Seiler v. State *213 ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs of DeKalb County, (1903), 160 Ind. 605, 67 N.E. 448 (applying the grammatical rule that where there is a series of words, each capable of being the antecedent, the relative pronoun generally refers to the last word). If an antecedent consists of a group of words, ambiguity results from placing the relative pronoun at the end of the group if the reader cannot be sure which words from the group the relative pronoun modifies. W. STRUNK JR. AND E.B. WHITE, supra, at 30. In IC 33-3-5-12(a)(2), the relative clause follows the antecedent group of words "appeals of final determinations of assessed value." Likewise, in Indiana Tax Court Rule 16(A), the relative clause follows the antecedent group of words "appeal of a final determination of assessed value." Consequently, it is not clear which words the relative clauses modify in either IC 33-8-5-12(a)(2) or Indiana Tax Court Rule 16(A), and no plain meaning is discernable from either the statute or the rule.

"If the meaning of a statute's language is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, the court will construe the statute to determine the apparent legislative intent." Johnson County, 568 N.E.2d at 580 (citing Gary Community Mental Health Center, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of Pub. Welfare (1987), Ind.App., 507 N.E.2d 1019, 1022). "The foremost goal of statutory construction [] is to determine and give effect to the true intent of the legislature." Id. (citing Scheid v. State Bd.

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Leehaug v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 583 N.E.2d 211, 1991 WL 246803 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1991).

583 N.E.2d 211 (Leehaug v. State Board of Tax Commissioners) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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