PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff, a self-insured employer under the Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation Act, brought this action to recover the amount of death benefits that it was required to pay the dependents of an employee who was killed in the course of his employment, by the sole negligence of the defendant. This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant.
The facts are not in dispute. The defendant paid $33,000 to the Administratrix of the Estate of the deceased employee in settlement of a claim for the wrongful death of the employee. The Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation Act (85 Okl.St.Ann. § 22), required the plaintiff to pay $13,500 death benefits to the dependents, which was an amount in addition to the money recovered from the defendant. Plaintiff’s theory for the recovery of the compensation award is that such payment was the direct result of the defendant’s negligence, and therefore plaintiff is entitled to be indemnified. Plaintiff says that when a party is compelled to pay damages because of the negligent or tortious act of another, he has a common law right of action in indemnity. 23 Okl.St.Ann. § 3; 27 Am. Jur., Indemnity, § 18; 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 21, are cited to support this.
Title 85 Okl.St.Ann. § 44(a), provides that when a workman, entitled to compensation under the Oklahoma Act, is injured by the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, the injured workman may elect to take compensation under the Act or pursue his remedies against the negligent third party. If he elects to take compensation under the Act, the insurance carrier or the self-insured employer shall be assigned the injured workman’s claim to the extent of the compensation received. The purpose of this section is to prevent a double recovery by the injured employee. DeShazer v. National Biscuit Co., 196 Okl. 458, 165 P.2d 816; Parkhill Truck Co. v. Wilson, 190 Okl. 473, 125 P.2d 203; Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Kirby, 109 Okl. 96, 235 P. 176; Ridley v. United Sash & Door Co., 98 Okl. 80, 224 P. 351. Section [99]*9944(b),1 however, specifically provides that there shall be no subrogation to recover money paid by the employer or his insurance carrier as death benefits under the Act. It is conceded that a self-insured employer or insurance carrier is not subrogated to the rights of the dependents of a deceased employee, and therefore cannot recover upon that theory. Updike Advertising System v. State Industrial Commission, Okl., 282 P.2d 759; New State Ice Co. v. Morris, Okl., 285 P.2d 855.
The Updike case held that the obligation to pay the death benefit as required by the Act is in the nature of accidental death insurance. The court said: “ * * * the employer must insure against loss, and the insurance company who contracts to pay is in the same position as an insurance company insuring the life of an individual or insuring against accidental injury to an individual. There would be no subrogation without statutory provision.” [282 P.2d 763.] It wTas further stated: “* * * the liability is not imposed upon the employer by reason of the negligence of third parties but is imposed regardless of negligence of anybody, whether the negligence of the employer himself or a third party, when an employee is killed in an accident arising out of and in the course of an employment covered by the act, and is in the nature of insurance. * * * ”. See also New State Ice Co. v. Morris, supra. The law is well established that a life insurer cannot maintain an action against a person causing the death of the insured. Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 24 L.Ed. 580; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New York & New Haven R. Co., 1865, 25 Conn. 265; Couch on Insurance, § 2024. Cf. Anthony v. Slaid, 1846, 11 Metc., Mass., 290. See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Paton, 9 Cir., 194 F.2d 765; Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 4 Cir., 115 F.2d 277, certiorari denied 312 U.S. 702, 61 S.Ct. 807, 85 L.Ed. 1135. It is an equally well established principle that, as there was no common law right to recover damages for the death of another, a cause of action for wrongful death must arise out of statutory provisions. Restatement, Torts, § 925; E. G. Nicholas Const. Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 207 Okl. 428, 250 P.2d 221; see Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. Fuller, 206 Okl. 638, 245 P.2d 1134; Potter v. Pure Oil Co., 182 Okl. 509, 78 P.2d 694; Shawnee Gas & Electric Co. v. Motesenbocker, 41 Okl. 454, 138 P. 790; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Lenahan, 39 Okl. 283, 135 P. 383; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Choteau, 28 Okl. 664, 115 P. 879, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 206.
But plaintiff argues that it has a right to be indemnified for the money it had to pay because of the wrongful death of the employee, independent of subrogation. Indemnity is a right which enures to a person who has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other. It implies a primary liability in one person, although a second person is also liable to a third party. Some benefit must have accrued to the indemnitor, the person primarily liable. Restatement, Restitution, § 76; Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 10 Cir., 215 F.2d 368; Thomas v. Malco Refineries, Inc., 10 Cir., 214 F.2d 884; United States v. Acord, 10 Cir., 209 F.2d 709, 715 ;2 [100]*100certiorari denied 347 U.S. 975, 74 S.Ct. 786; 98 L.Ed. 1115; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Paton, supra; American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson, 8 Cir., 179 F.2d 946; Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., supra; George’s Radio, Inc., v. Capital Transit Co., 75 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 126 F.2d 219. The defendant in the instant case settled its primary obligation for negligence and there was no liability on its part, either primarily or secondarily, to pay any compensation award. Under the Oklahoma law, the self-insured employer or the insurance carrier is solely liable for such awards which are to be paid without regard to the cause of the injury.3 85 Okl. St.Ann. § 11, § 12. We think the essential elements necessary to sustain an action for indemnity are lacking.
The contention that plaintiff is entitled to recover because the defendant, by its negligence, breached a legal duty owed plaintiff, is without merit. The substance of this contention is that without defendant’s negligent acts the plaintiff would not have been required to pay the award. This, of course, is true in the insurance cases heretofore cited, where recovery is denied. The liability of a. self-insured employer in Oklahoma is fixed by statute, while an insurer assumes its liability by contract. When, in either case, a death benefit is paid, an obligation of the employer or its insurer is discharged, not that of another. Updike Advertising System v. State Industrial Commission, supra.
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PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff, a self-insured employer under the Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation Act, brought this action to recover the amount of death benefits that it was required to pay the dependents of an employee who was killed in the course of his employment, by the sole negligence of the defendant. This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant.
The facts are not in dispute. The defendant paid $33,000 to the Administratrix of the Estate of the deceased employee in settlement of a claim for the wrongful death of the employee. The Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation Act (85 Okl.St.Ann. § 22), required the plaintiff to pay $13,500 death benefits to the dependents, which was an amount in addition to the money recovered from the defendant. Plaintiff’s theory for the recovery of the compensation award is that such payment was the direct result of the defendant’s negligence, and therefore plaintiff is entitled to be indemnified. Plaintiff says that when a party is compelled to pay damages because of the negligent or tortious act of another, he has a common law right of action in indemnity. 23 Okl.St.Ann. § 3; 27 Am. Jur., Indemnity, § 18; 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 21, are cited to support this.
Title 85 Okl.St.Ann. § 44(a), provides that when a workman, entitled to compensation under the Oklahoma Act, is injured by the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, the injured workman may elect to take compensation under the Act or pursue his remedies against the negligent third party. If he elects to take compensation under the Act, the insurance carrier or the self-insured employer shall be assigned the injured workman’s claim to the extent of the compensation received. The purpose of this section is to prevent a double recovery by the injured employee. DeShazer v. National Biscuit Co., 196 Okl. 458, 165 P.2d 816; Parkhill Truck Co. v. Wilson, 190 Okl. 473, 125 P.2d 203; Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Kirby, 109 Okl. 96, 235 P. 176; Ridley v. United Sash & Door Co., 98 Okl. 80, 224 P. 351. Section [99]*9944(b),1 however, specifically provides that there shall be no subrogation to recover money paid by the employer or his insurance carrier as death benefits under the Act. It is conceded that a self-insured employer or insurance carrier is not subrogated to the rights of the dependents of a deceased employee, and therefore cannot recover upon that theory. Updike Advertising System v. State Industrial Commission, Okl., 282 P.2d 759; New State Ice Co. v. Morris, Okl., 285 P.2d 855.
The Updike case held that the obligation to pay the death benefit as required by the Act is in the nature of accidental death insurance. The court said: “ * * * the employer must insure against loss, and the insurance company who contracts to pay is in the same position as an insurance company insuring the life of an individual or insuring against accidental injury to an individual. There would be no subrogation without statutory provision.” [282 P.2d 763.] It wTas further stated: “* * * the liability is not imposed upon the employer by reason of the negligence of third parties but is imposed regardless of negligence of anybody, whether the negligence of the employer himself or a third party, when an employee is killed in an accident arising out of and in the course of an employment covered by the act, and is in the nature of insurance. * * * ”. See also New State Ice Co. v. Morris, supra. The law is well established that a life insurer cannot maintain an action against a person causing the death of the insured. Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 24 L.Ed. 580; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New York & New Haven R. Co., 1865, 25 Conn. 265; Couch on Insurance, § 2024. Cf. Anthony v. Slaid, 1846, 11 Metc., Mass., 290. See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Paton, 9 Cir., 194 F.2d 765; Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 4 Cir., 115 F.2d 277, certiorari denied 312 U.S. 702, 61 S.Ct. 807, 85 L.Ed. 1135. It is an equally well established principle that, as there was no common law right to recover damages for the death of another, a cause of action for wrongful death must arise out of statutory provisions. Restatement, Torts, § 925; E. G. Nicholas Const. Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 207 Okl. 428, 250 P.2d 221; see Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. Fuller, 206 Okl. 638, 245 P.2d 1134; Potter v. Pure Oil Co., 182 Okl. 509, 78 P.2d 694; Shawnee Gas & Electric Co. v. Motesenbocker, 41 Okl. 454, 138 P. 790; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Lenahan, 39 Okl. 283, 135 P. 383; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Choteau, 28 Okl. 664, 115 P. 879, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 206.
But plaintiff argues that it has a right to be indemnified for the money it had to pay because of the wrongful death of the employee, independent of subrogation. Indemnity is a right which enures to a person who has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other. It implies a primary liability in one person, although a second person is also liable to a third party. Some benefit must have accrued to the indemnitor, the person primarily liable. Restatement, Restitution, § 76; Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 10 Cir., 215 F.2d 368; Thomas v. Malco Refineries, Inc., 10 Cir., 214 F.2d 884; United States v. Acord, 10 Cir., 209 F.2d 709, 715 ;2 [100]*100certiorari denied 347 U.S. 975, 74 S.Ct. 786; 98 L.Ed. 1115; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Paton, supra; American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson, 8 Cir., 179 F.2d 946; Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., supra; George’s Radio, Inc., v. Capital Transit Co., 75 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 126 F.2d 219. The defendant in the instant case settled its primary obligation for negligence and there was no liability on its part, either primarily or secondarily, to pay any compensation award. Under the Oklahoma law, the self-insured employer or the insurance carrier is solely liable for such awards which are to be paid without regard to the cause of the injury.3 85 Okl. St.Ann. § 11, § 12. We think the essential elements necessary to sustain an action for indemnity are lacking.
The contention that plaintiff is entitled to recover because the defendant, by its negligence, breached a legal duty owed plaintiff, is without merit. The substance of this contention is that without defendant’s negligent acts the plaintiff would not have been required to pay the award. This, of course, is true in the insurance cases heretofore cited, where recovery is denied. The liability of a. self-insured employer in Oklahoma is fixed by statute, while an insurer assumes its liability by contract. When, in either case, a death benefit is paid, an obligation of the employer or its insurer is discharged, not that of another. Updike Advertising System v. State Industrial Commission, supra. Furthermore, it has generally been held that damages such as claimed here, in the absence of an intent to injure or damage a third party, are too remote from the negligent act to be recovered from the tortfeasor. Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., supra, and cases cited, 115 F.2d at pages 282-283;4 [101]*101Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 9 Cir., 153 F.2d 958, affirmed 332 U.S. 301, 303, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 91 L.Ed. 2067; United States v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., D.C.E.D.N.C.1946, 64 F. Supp. 289. Harper Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Northw.L.Rev. 873, and Restatement, Torts, § 280, deal with intent necessary to create a cause of action.
The decisions in Staples v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 10 Cir., 62 F.2d 650, and Stinchcomb v. Dodson, 190 Okl. 643, 126 P.2d 257, do not control. These cases were not concerned with death benefits, and involved the right to recover the amount of compensation awards made for injuries to an employee caused by the negligent third parties without statutory assignment. In the Staples case the court, in holding that the employer was entitled to be indemnified independent of the statute, used the terms “subrogation”, and “indemnity”, interchangeably throughout the opinion.5 In Stinchcomb, the Oklahoma court, while adopting Staples, did so on the basis that the cause of action resulted from subrogation, not indemnity. Referring to the Staples case it was said that it “held that independent of the provisions of 85 O.S.1941, § 44, the insurance carrier was authorized to maintain the action under the doctrine of subrogation.” [190 Okl. 643, 126 P.2d 259.] The court concluded its decision by stating: “We therefore hold that independent of any provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Law, said insurer was subrogated to the claim of the injured workman as against the defendant tortfeasor whose negligence was responsible for the injuries sustained by the employee * *
Moreover, we think that what was said in the Updike case and the cases following it, makes it quite clear that in Oklahoma, an employer or its insurance carrier cannot recover the death benefits from a negligent third person. Updike Advertising System v. State Industrial Commission, supra; New State Ice Co. v. Morris, supra; Meadow Gold Dairy Products Co. v. Conly, Okl., 288 P.2d 1115. See also: Standard Roofing & Material Co. v. Chas. M. Dunning Const. Co., 10 Cir., 224 F.2d 449.
Affirmed.