Lee v. Love

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedAugust 18, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00483
StatusUnknown

This text of Lee v. Love (Lee v. Love) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lee v. Love, (S.D. Ohio 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

ANTOINE LEE, Case No. 1:23-cv-483

Plaintiff, Hopkins, J. vs. Bowman, M.J.

RENEE LOVE, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a resident of Cincinnati brings this action against Renee Love, Cieria Lovett, and the Owner of Hometown and Studio Suites by Red Roof located in Sharonville, Ohio. By separate Order issued this date, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the

allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however,

the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he is suing two employees and the owner of Hometown Studio Suites for violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff claims that he was a resident at Hometown Studio Suites and his room was often dirty, with roaches and the doors were broken. Plaintiff also claims that he was improperly charged late fees by the hotel. Additionally, in June 2023, Plaintiff claims that

water began pouring into his room from the ceiling, flooding his room which the Defendants refused to clean up. After Plaintiff complained, he alleges that he was evicted from the hotel. For relief, Plaintiff seeks $50,000 from Defendants. Upon careful review, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim with an arguable basis in law over which this federal Court has subject matter jurisdiction To the extent plaintiff seeks to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the complaint reveals such jurisdiction is lacking. A district court has jurisdiction over a suit between citizens of different states when the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeks $50,000.00 in damages. The complaint, as alleged, fails to satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for this Court’s exercise of diversity jurisdiction. In addition, in order for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(a) to lie, the citizenship of the plaintiff must be “diverse from the citizenship of each defendant” thereby ensuring “complete diversity.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (citing State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967)); see also Napletana v. Hillsdale College, 385 F.2d 871, 872 (6th Cir. 1967); Winningham v. North American Res. Corp., 809 F. Supp.

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Related

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire
386 U.S. 523 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Papasan v. Allain
478 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Taylor
481 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis
519 U.S. 61 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Lappin
630 F.3d 468 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
Winningham v. North American Resources Corp.
809 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Ohio, 1992)
Callihan v. Schneider
178 F.3d 800 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)

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Lee v. Love, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lee-v-love-ohsd-2023.