Lee v. Caveness Produce Co.

150 S.E. 303, 197 N.C. 714, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 345
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedNovember 20, 1929
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 150 S.E. 303 (Lee v. Caveness Produce Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lee v. Caveness Produce Co., 150 S.E. 303, 197 N.C. 714, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 345 (N.C. 1929).

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

The plaintiff alleges, as we understand his complaint, that the defendant’s truck was parked on the side of the road, partly on the hard surface, in the night time, without any lights burning, in violation of C. S., 2615, and that this condition continued — the lights not being turned on by the defendant’s servant in charge of the truck — • until it was too late for Williams, in the exercise of reasonable care, to pass in safety with both the lead car, which he was driving, and the car that was being towed, in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding. Thus, it is alleged, in effect, that the plaintiff’s intestate was killed by the negligence of the driver of defendant’s truck while acting in the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the defendant’s business. The complaint, therefore, is good as against a demurrer. Misenheimer v. Hayman, 195 N. C., 613, 143 S. E., 1.

•We have not overlooked the allegation set out in paragraph 2 above, and stressfully urged as fatal by the defendant, to the effect that plaintiff’s intestate could not see the light of the truck because of the Buick car, and was unable to follow directly in the path of the car driven by Williams, by reason of the fact that he did not have sufficient time to make the turn in the same manner and to the same degree as was done by the said Williams. But this allegation, taken in connection with others appearing in the complaint, we apprehend, may be interpreted in a light favorable to the plaintiff, even if it also be susceptible to a contrary interpretation. Nor have we failed to observe that in one place plaintiff alleges the truck was “stopped on a slight curve,” while in *718 another'be says that Williams was driving “on a stretch of road which was practically straight.”

When a case is presented on demurrer, we are required by the statute, C. S., 535, to construe the complaint liberally, “with a view to substantial justice between the parties,” and in enforcing this provision, we have adopted the rule “that if in any portion of it or to any extent it presents facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or if facts sufficient for that purpose can he fairly gathered from it, the pleading will stand, however inartificially it may have been drawn or however uncertain, defective and redundant may be its statements, for, contrary to the common-law rule, every reasonable intendment and presumption must be made in favor of the pleader.” Dixon v. Green, 178 N. C., 205, 100 S. E., 262.

The demurrer interposed by the defendant was properly overruled. S. v. Bank, 193 N. C., 524, 137 S. E., 593.

Affirmed.

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Related

Bryant v. Little River Ice Co. of Zebulon, Inc.
63 S.E.2d 547 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1951)
Cummings v. . Dunning
185 S.E. 653 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1936)
Ramsey v. Nash Furniture Co.
183 S.E. 536 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1936)
Smithwick v. Colonial Pine Co.
154 S.E. 917 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1930)

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Bluebook (online)
150 S.E. 303, 197 N.C. 714, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 345, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lee-v-caveness-produce-co-nc-1929.