[180] OPINION BY
Judge COHN.
The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University Association (Association) and The Board of Governors of The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University Association (Board of Governors),1 appeal the order of the Court óf Common Pleas of Cumberland County granting a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Lee Publications, Inc., Publisher of The Sentinel and P. J. Browning, Publisher of The Sentinel, and The Patriot-News and Cate Barron (jointly Newspapers). The trial court determined that the Board of Governors was an “agency” as that term is defined in the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716(Act).2 Accordingly, the trial court directed the Board of Governors to comply with the provisions of the Act, and, of particular importance here, allow public attendance at its upcoming meetings, thus giving the Newspapers access to what were previously private meetings of the Board of Governors. The Association and the Board of Governors ask us to determine whether the trial court’s holding, that the Board of Governors is an “agency” of the Pennsylvania State University (PSU) because it is a committee, and therefore subject to the provisions of the Act, is an error of law.
The case arises out of the merger of The Dickinson School of Law (Dickinson), an independent, private, non-profit corporation, with PSU. The merger occurred as part of a multi-step process, after which Dickinson ceased to exist as a separate entity and became a part of PSU.
As the first part of this process, Dickinson and PSU entered into an Affiliation Agreement and Agreement and Plan of Merger (Merger Agreement), which was negotiated at arms length by the parties, and approved by both schools’ Boards of Trustees on January 17, 1997. Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, PSU and Dickinson agreed, inter alia, to uphold certain continuing covenants. (Merger Agreement, § 4.06). Because the Dickinson Board of Trustees, along with Dickinson School of Law, would be merging into PSU, the entities sought a means that would enable them to enforce these covenants into perpetuity. Therefore, the Dickinson Board of Trustees agreed to form a separate corporation, the Association, which would continue to exist after the merger; therefore, the Association, through its Board of Governors, would be able to enforce these covenants into perpetuity.3 As the second part of this process, the Merger Agreement also provided for a period of “affiliation” between Dickinson and PSU beginning July 1, 1997. During this period, the law school changed its name to “The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,” and amended its articles of incorporation to form a non-stock, single-member, Pennsylvania non-profit Corporation, with PSU designated as the single-member. (Merger Agreement, § 1.01(A) and (B)). As the third part of this process, on June 28, 2000, the parties filed the Articles of [181] Merger and the merger became effective July 1, 2000 (Merger Date). At that time, pursuant to Section 1.02(A) of the Merger Agreement, Dickinson merged with and into PSU, and ceased to exist as a separate entity. In addition, pursuant to Section 1.02(E) of the Merger Agreement, the Board of Trustees of Dickinson formed the Association as follows:
1.02 The Merger. At the Effective Time of the Merger (as defined in Section 1.02(B)):
(E) The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University Association. Effective as of the Merger Date, the Board of Trustees of Dickinson shall cause to be formed a new non-stock, non-membership Pennsylvania non-profit corporation to be named “The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University Association” (the “Association”). The term of its existence shall be perpetual. In accordance with Section 4.13(C), the Association shall be governed by a self-perpetuating Board of Governors....
(Emphasis added). Section 4.13(C) of the Merger Agreement, entitled “Association Governance,” provided that the Dickinson Board of Trustees would become the Association’s Board of Governors:
Effective as of the Merger Date, Dickinson’s Board of Trustees will be irrevocably appointed as a self-perpetuating Board of Governors of a newly-created non-stock, non-membership, nonprofit corporation, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University Association (the “Association”). The Association will be governed by then-existing Class I and Class II Trustees of Dickinson as a self-perpetuating Board of Governors.4 The Board of Governors shall provide counsel and guidance to Penn State with respect to the operation and academic mission of The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University....
(Footnote added.) Section 4.13(C) describes numerous responsibilities of the Board of Governors. Specifically, the Board of Governors possesses the “authority to enforce by specific performance in accordance with Section 8.09 of [the Merger Agreement], Penn State’s continuing covenants which survive the Merger.”5 (Merger Agreement, § 4.13(C)(9)). Of primary importance here, is the covenant described in Section 4.06(B): that PSU will not change the name of the school from “The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University” nor the school’s primary location from Carlisle.6 On June [182]*1821, 2000, before the Merger Date, the Dickinson Board of Trustees filed the Articles of Incorporation for the Association. Thereafter, the newly formed Association possessed the authority to enforce the continuing covenants, including PSU’s promise that the school’s primary location would remain in Carlisle, unless otherwise agreed.
This controversy began when the Board of Governors scheduled a private meeting for November 21 and 22, 2003, during which the possibility of relocating the Law School’s main campus from Carlisle to University Park in State College, Pennsylvania was to be discussed.7 (N.T. 53-54). On November 20, 2003, Lee Publications, Inc. and P.J. Browning, as publishers of The Sentinel, filed a complaint in equity and a motion for a preliminary injunction addressed to the original jurisdiction of this Court, brought under and pursuant to the Sunshine Act, seeking either to stop the November 21st meeting from occurring, or open the Board of Governors’ meeting to the public.8
On November 21, 2003, the day the meeting was to begin, a preliminary injunction hearing was held before this opinion writer. Following testimony and argument,9 the Court held that the Newspapers had not, at that time, met the test for a preliminary injunction and, so, denied the Newspapers’ Motion and granted the Board of Governors’ oral Motion to Dismiss.10 The Board of Governors then held its scheduled private meeting on November 21 and 22, 2003. Following the meeting, the Chairman of the Board of Governors appointed members to four ad hoc committees created for the express purpose of considering and investigating different alternatives for relocation of the Law School.11 (N.T. 21, 26, 56).
The Board of Governors scheduled its next meeting for February 7, 2004. A member of the Board of Governors, G. Thomas Miller, Esquire, testified that, at the February meeting, the four ad hoc committees would present the information they had gathered. He also testified that it was his intention to call for a vote at the meeting so the Board of Governors could [183] make its decision about whether to agree that the school could be relocated out of Carlisle. (N.T. 27).
In anticipation of this meeting, on January 23, 2004, the Newspapers filed a Complaint and a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County.12 The Newspapers claimed that both the Association and the Board of Governors are “de facto committees” of PSU and, as such, are “agencies” for purposes of Section 703 of the Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 703. Accordingly, the Newspapers asserted that the Association and its Board of Governors must open their meeting to the public in accordance with the provisions of the Act.13 The trial court issued an order scheduling a preliminary injunction hearing for January 29, 2004.
Following the hearing,14 the trial court issued an opinion and order granting the injunction. The trial court determined that the Board of Governors is a committee of PSU and, therefore, an agency as defined in the Act. It ordered that the Board of Governors comply with provisions of the Act, and specifically enjoined it from conducting any future meetings except in accordance thereto.
The Association and the Board of Governors appealed the trial court's order to this Court.15 This Court granted the application for an expedited review of them appeal by order entered February 10, 2004. On March 3, 2004, the Court heard argument en banc.
In reviewing an appeal from an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Summit Towne Centre, Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 573 Pa. 637, 828 A.2d 995 (2003). “Only if it is plain that no grounds exist to support the decree or that the rule of law relied upon was palpably erroneous or misapplied will we interfere with the decision of the [trial court].” Roberts v. Board of Directors of School District of City of Scranton, 462 Pa. 464, 469, 341 A.2d 475, 478 (1975).
The Association and the Board of Governors argue that the trial court erred when it held that the Board of Governors is an agency subject to the provisions of the Sunshine Act because it is a “committee” of PSU. The Newspapers argue that the [184] Association and the Board of Governors “are effectively vested with exclusive authority to render advice and. make binding decisions affecting [PSU] and its academic unit, the Law School,” and, thus, are the equivalent of a committee of PSU. (Appel-lees’ Brief at 15).
Section 703 of the Act defines “agency”, in pertinent part, as follows:
The body, and all committees thereof authorized by the body to take official action or render advice on matters of agency business, of all the following: ... the boards of trustees of all State-related universities....
65 Pa.C.S. § 703 (emphasis added). PSU is a state-related university and, as such, the Board of Trustees of PSU is explicitly included in the definition of an “agency” in Section 703 of the Act, and is “the body” noted in the definition. (Trial Court Op. at 9).
In an issue of first impression, the trial court concluded that the Board of Governors was also subject to the terms of the Sunshine Act as a committee of PSU. The trial court came to its conclusion after determining that the Board of Governors functioned as described in common dictionary definitions of the term “committee”. The court also found the terminology included in the Act’s definition of “agency”— as “committees” being “authorized by the body to take official action or render advice” — most significant. (Trial Court Op. at 10). The court noted that the Board of Governors’ functions would have been within the exclusive realm of the PSU Board of Trustees “had those Trustees not specifically delegated them to the Board of Governors under the terms of the Merger Plan.” (Trial Court Op. at 11). It also concluded that, as a result of that delegation, the Board of Governors acts like a “committee” of the Board of Trustees of PSU and, therefore, is considered an agency under the Sunshine Act and, thus, must comply with its provisions.
We are constrained to disagree with the trial court because, after careful review, we do not believe the Board of Governors is a “committee” of PSU within the meaning of the Sunshine Act.16
As previously noted, the Sunshine Act defines' “agency” as: “The body, and all committees thereof authorized by the body to take official action or render advice on matters of agency business ...” (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the “body” in the case sub judice is the Board of Trustees of PSU. Therefore, for the Act to apply, the Board of Governors must be a “committee thereof’ — a committee of the Board of Trustees of PSU.
The legislature specifically used the word “committee” in its definition of agency. “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature as expressed by the words employed.” Elite Industries, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 574 Pa. 476, 832 A.2d 428, 431 (2003) (quoting Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 516 Pa. 142, 532 A.2d 325, 331 (1987)) (emphasis added). Therefore, if possible, we must construe a law to give effect to all provisions so that all words have meaning and none are treated as surplusage. Colodonato v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 504 Pa. 80, 470 A.2d 475 (1983) (emphasis added).
[185] There is no definition of “committee” in the Sunshine Act. However, there is a definition of committee of a non-profit corporation in Pennsylvania’s Nonprofit Corporation Law (NCL), 15 Pa.C.S. §§ 5301-5997(NCL). Appellate courts in Pennsylvania have considered PSU to be analogous to a nonprofit corporation chartered for educational purposes. See Pennsylvania State University v. County of Centre, 532 Pa. 142, 149-150, 615 A.2d 303, 307 (1992) (discussing the status of the school for the purpose of performing tax assessment and the imposition of taxes on PSU’s property). Section 5731(a) of the NCL, 15 Pa.C.S. § 5731(a), establishes that a committee of a nonprofit corporation’s governing board may only be created and may only perform functions as specified by the governing board or its bylaws.17
The governing board of PSU is the Board of Trustees.18 For the Board of Governors to be a committee of PSU’s Board of Trustees under the NCL, it would have to be created by a resolution of the PSU Board of Trustees, include one or more members of the PSU Board of Trustees in its membership, and have power delegated by a resolution of the PSU Board of Trustees or the PSU Corporate Bylaws. Because the Board of Governors has none of these features, it cannot be a committee of the Board of Trustees of PSU pursuant to the NCL.
We next look at the committee structure of PSU for guidance in determining whether the Board of Governors possesses the qualities of a “committee of PSU.” PSU’s Corporate Bylaws set out the manner in which the Board of Trustees of PSU creates committees.19 PSU has three Standing Committees20 whose members are appointed and/or removed by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of PSU. (N.T. 125-27; PSU Corporate Bylaws, Article 4, §§ 2 and 3). The Bylaws also provide for the existence of Special Committees, whose members are appointed by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of PSU in consultation with the President of the University. There are no Special Committees in existence at the present time. Two standing subcommittees, whose members are selected by the Chairman of the PSU Board of Trustees, were established pursuant to Standing Orders.21
The salient features of all committees and subcommittees of PSU are: (1) the [186] members are members of the Board of Trustees of PSU; (2) the members are appointed by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of PSU; (3) they exist- at the pleasure of PSU’s Board of Trustees, and the Board of Trustees can eliminate them at any time; (4) the PSU Board of Trustees and the President of the University collaboratively develop agendas for all meetings; and (5) pursuant to PSU Standing Order VIII, they must advertise and hold meetings open to the public, with special accommodations provided to the press. (Standing Orders, S-6 and S-7).
In the instant case, the Board of Governors does not possess the qualities of a committee of PSU formed under Article 4. First, it is not composed of members of the Board of Trustees of PSU. Rather, the Board of Governors was formed from the Board of Trustees of the former Dickinson School of Law. (Merger Agreement, § 4.16(C)). Second, its members cannot be appointed or removed by the Board of Trustees of PSU, its Chairman, or the President of the University. Rather, the membership of the Board of Governors is self-perpetuating pursuant to the Merger Agreement and the Association’s incorporation documents. (Merger Agreement, § 4.16(C); Articles of Incorporation of the Association, Article 7). Third, activities of the Board of Governors are not controlled by PSU; the university cannot eliminate the Board of Governors or the Association, has no input into the scheduling of its meetings, and does not control the content or creation of agendas for such meetings.
Nonetheless, the Newspapers argue that the Board of Governors is a “de facto” committee, or the equivalent of a committee and, therefore, comes within the definition of the Act. They assert, and the trial court agreed, that we are to look to the dictionary definition of committee for guidance as to whether the Board of Governors comes within the definition of the Act and, therefore, would be subject to its provisions.
We agree that the legislature did not intend its use of the word “committee” in the definition of “agency” in the Sunshine Act, to be so narrowly construed as to allow public agencies to frustrate the purpose of the Act. However, the legislature has specifically used the words “committees thereof authorized by the body,” and did not use broader language such as “any group of people authorized by the body” or “any entity authorized by the body.” We must give effect to the legislature’s words.
The dictionary defines “committee” as “a body of persons delegated to consider, investigate, take action on, or report on some matter.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 231 (10th ed.2001). The term “delegate” used in the definition means “to entrust to another”; “to appoint as one’s representative”; or, “to assign responsibility or authority.” Id. at 304. Thus, the qualities of a “committee” derived from these definitions indicate that it would be “of PSU,” and entrusted by PSU as its representative, to consider, investigate, take action on, or report. Pervasive in the meaning of committee, then, is the ability of PSU to select the committee members and the obligation of the committee members to act on behalf of PSU and to act in the best interests of PSU. We find no indications in the record that the Board of Governors acts on behalf of or in the best interests of PSU.
The authority that the Board of Governors has relative to PSU is contained in a contract, the Merger Agreement, which the Board of Trustees of PSU and the Board of Trustees of the former Dickinson School of Law negotiated at arms length as part of the merger of the University and the Law School. As described in its [187] Bylaws,22 the Board of Governors has responsibility and authority to provide counsel and guidance on the Law School to PSU and its leadership.23 Of particular interest in the case subjudiee is the Board of Governors’ ability to enforce the covenant regarding the location of the Law School. In the Merger Agreement, PSU formally agreed that it would not move the Law School without the agreement of the Board of Governors. According to the testimony of one of the Newspapers’ witnesses before the trial court, Attorney Miller, this covenant was part of the price that PSU had to pay to acquire the Law School. (N.T. 45).
The record fully supports the conclusion that the Board of Trustees of the former Dickinson School of Law wanted to ensure that it would have some type of separate legal existence in order to represent its ongoing interests and concerns, and PSU agreed, pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement. Joanne Judge, Esquire, who represented Dickinson School of Law in connection with the affiliation and merger, and served as incorporator for the Association, testified that the Association was formed specifically to “have both standing and funding and be in a position to actually be adverse to the Pennsylvania State University.”24 (N.T. 107, 109). During the hearing before the trial court, Attorney Judge elaborated:
[T]he Law School Trustees thought long and hard about what to do in order to make sure that those covenants were enforced in perpetuity, and negotiated with Penn State as a part of the merger agreement that they would form a separate body, one whose purposes would be to enforce the covenants even to the point of having to sue Penn State in order to enforce the covenants.
(N.T. 111).
Furthermore, PSU must still make its own decision to move the Law School, either within Carlisle or to some other location, before the Law School would actually be affected. The process of deliberations and the decision of PSU regarding movement of the Law School would be open to the public. It is true that, under the Merger Agreement, PSU cannot relocate the Law School out of Carlisle without the agreement of the Board of Governors. [188] However, in determining whether or not to agree, the Board of Governors has no obligation to act in the best interests of PSU, but rather to act in the best interests of the Association and the interests of the alumni of the former Dickinson School of Law that it represents.
There is no dispute that the Association, pursuant to Section 8.09 of the Merger Agreement, and through its Board of Governors, has the authority to enforce the covenants against PSU, and to do so through litigation in court, if necessary. It is a common principle of law that one cannot sue oneself. See Department of Transportation v. Wilkinsburg Penn Joint Water Authority, 740 A.2d 322 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), petition for allowance of appeal granted and thereafter dismissed as improvidently granted, 564 Pa. 204, 766 A.2d 334 (2001) (holding that transportation department could sue water authority for money damages because, even though both parties were instrumentality of the same commonwealth, they were not considered the same party).
The Association, as a separate and autonomous corporation, can decide to negotiate with PSU, enter into an agreement with PSU, or take legal action against PSU, based upon its own independent interests. Because the Association has a separate legal identity, and has the authority to sue PSU, it does not come within the meaning of a “committee of’ PSU.
Furthermore, because the Association is a validly incorporated nonprofit corporation under the laws of Pennsylvania, it has certain rights and obligations. There are no allegations, and the trial court did not find, that either the Association or PSU’s Board of Trustees has failed to comply with corporate formalities since its inception, has engaged in fraudulent activity, or has attempted to defeat the Sunshine Act through the1 creation of the Association.25 Therefore, this Court should not disregard the separate corporate existence of a validly incorporated nonprofit corporation.
The Sunshine Act should be read broadly in order to accomplish its important objective of allowing the public to witness deliberations and actions of public agencies. However, an interpretation and application of the definition of “agency” that encompasses private corporations in contractual relationships with PSU, is inconsistent with the language of the Act. An interpretation that produces an unreasonable result is contrary to the rules of statutory construction. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).
The General Assembly of Pennsylvania specifically used the term “committee thereof’ in the statute. There is no indication that they intended to bring all independent entities that have a contractual relationship with a public body within the Sunshine Act simply because those entities have an ability to enforce contractual obligations against the public body. Were we to decide otherwise, we would impose a tremendous burden on numerous independent nonprofit corporations just because they have contractual relationships with Sunshine Act agencies. Such a decision could also implicate the constitutional rights of free association and privacy of these corporations. As well-stated in PSU’s amicus brief:
If the ability of an independent entity to enforce an obligation imposed upon Penn State under a contract is indeed a “delegation” of some aspect of Penn [189] State’s authority to take “official action” within the meaning of § 708, then Penn State has delegated (and so too has every other entity subject to the Sunshine Act) its authority to take official action in thousands of existing contractual arrangements.
(Amicus Brief at 7). Were we to conclude that the Sunshine Act applied here, we would be vastly expanding the reach of the Sunshine Act and would potentially eliminate the privacy of any entity that has a contract or advises a Sunshine Act agency.26 There is no indication that this was the legislature’s intent.
A trial court has “reasonable grounds” for granting injunctive relief where it properly finds that the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction have been satisfied. Summit Towne Centre, Inc., 578 Pa. at 646, 828 A.2d at 1001. “For a preliminary injunction to issue, every one of these prerequisites must be established; if the petitioner fails to establish any one of them, there is no need to address the others.” County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 518 Pa. 556, 560, 544 A.2d 1305, 1307 (1988) (emphasis added). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the petitioner must show that:
(1) an injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages;
(2) greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from granting it, and, the issuance of the injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties;
(3) an injunction will properly restore the parties to their status as it existed prior to the alleged wrongful conduct;
(4) the activity the petitioner seeks to restrain is actionable, the right to relief is clear, and success on the merits is likely;
(5) the injunction is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and,
(6) an injunction will not adversely affect the public interest.
Summit Towne Centre, Inc., 578 Pa. at 646-47, 828 A.2d at 1001 (citations omitted).
Because we conclude that, as a matter of law, the Newspapers have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, in that the Board of Governors is not a “committee” of PSU, they failed to establish one of the prerequisites for obtaining a preliminary injunction, as was them burden. Accordingly, we must reverse the trial court’s order granting the injunction.27
Judge Simpson did not participate in the decision in this case.
ORDER
NOW, April 23, 2004, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County in the above-captioned case is hereby reversed.