Lee M. Campbell v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: March 27, 2026
• Docket: 2024-CA-1422
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: MARCH 27, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1422-MR

LEE M. CAMPBELL APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MELISSA L. BELLOWS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 20-CR-001972

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, L. JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Lee M. Campbell (“Campbell”) appeals from the Jefferson

Circuit Court’s judgment and sentence following his conditional guilty plea,

reserving his right to appeal from the court’s denial of several pre-trial motions.

Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND

In December of 2020, Campbell was indicted by a Jefferson County

Grand Jury for first-degree aggravated trafficking in a controlled substance (28

grams or more of fentanyl), second-degree manslaughter, possession of a handgun

by a convicted felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, trafficking in marijuana,

and illegal delivery or manufacture of drug paraphernalia. As part of the

investigation that led to the indictment, Detective Preston Eisenback (“Eisenback”)

of the Shively Police Department executed a search warrant on Campbell’s

residence. In his affidavit for the search warrant, Eisenback said that a confidential

informant had identified Campbell as a heroin/fentanyl dealer and that Eisenback

had “done multiple buys in the past few weeks with Lee M. Campbell selling

heroin/fentanyl.” Eisenback also said that the purchased narcotics had been tested

and confirmed as fentanyl.

During discovery, Campbell made several requests for the

Commonwealth to produce the dates of the alleged drug buys testified to in the

affidavit, as well as the corresponding drug test results. He later moved to compel

production of the same through a pro se “Motion for a More Specific Bill of

Particulars,” which was denied and is one of the rulings on appeal.

With this discovery, Campbell sought to challenge the validity of the

search warrant (and the indictment) based upon what he believed were false or

-2- misleading statements in the affidavit. Specifically, Campbell interpreted

Eisenback’s statement that “[t]his detective has done multiple buys in the past few

weeks with Lee M. Campbell selling heroin/fentanyl” as claiming that Eisenback

had personally purchased drugs from Campbell, which Campbell denied. He also

objected to the allegation that Campbell “was convicted of

delivering/manufacturing/possessing cocaine, heroin, or another narcotic on

multiple occasions in Michigan.” Campbell filed a motion for a hearing pursuant

to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d

667 (1978), and a motion to dismiss the indictment based upon these alleged false

statements, which were both denied. Both rulings are on appeal.

Finally, Campbell filed numerous pro se motions throughout the case,

including while represented by counsel. At several points, Campbell requested to

act as hybrid counsel and for the court to hold a hearing pursuant to Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). The final issue

on appeal concerns whether the trial court erred in failing to hold a Faretta hearing

on Campbell’s request to be hybrid counsel.

Ultimately, Campbell entered a conditional guilty plea (reserving his

right to appeal the above issues) to second-degree manslaughter and was sentenced

to ten years in prison. This appeal followed.

-3- ANALYSIS

Campbell first argues the trial court erred in failing to hold a Faretta

hearing following his request to act as hybrid counsel.1 Matthews v.

Commonwealth, 168 S.W.3d 14, 23 (Ky. 2005) is instructive. In that case, the trial

court granted the defendant’s request to act as co-counsel so that he could file his

own motions without holding a Faretta hearing. On appeal, the defendant argued

that this was error. Our Supreme Court rejected this claim, noting that

Unlike the defendants in . . . Faretta, and similar cases, [the defendant] did not participate as counsel at trial in front of the jury. He did not ask questions of the witnesses nor did he make opening or closing statements. His only participation upon being made co-counsel was to file pro se motions and, like other defendants, confer with his counsel. [The defendant] never waived his right to counsel in any manner. No Faretta hearing was required in this circumstance.

Id. at 23.

Similarly, under the circumstances here, Faretta has no application.

Campbell’s only participation as “hybrid” counsel was to file motions. He never

waived his right to counsel in any manner. Perhaps most importantly, Campbell

had the full benefit of counsel when he entered his plea agreement. We find no

error by the trial court.

1 Our standard of review when a defendant alleges that, given certain undisputed facts, the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to hold a Faretta hearing is de novo. Commonwealth v. Martin, 410 S.W.3d 119, 122 n.1 (Ky. 2013).

-4- Campbell next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for discovery.2 As noted above, Campbell made several requests for the

Commonwealth to produce the dates of the drug buys testified to in the affidavit

for the search warrant, as well as the corresponding field test results. Campbell

sought to prove that Eisenback did not personally purchase drugs from him, which

he believed would invalidate the warrant and lead to dismissal of the indictment.

Campbell argues he is entitled to this evidence under RCr3 7.24(1) and (2).

“Our standard of review in matters involving a trial court’s rulings on

evidentiary issues and discovery disputes is abuse of discretion.” Manus, Inc. v.

Terry Maxedon Hauling, Inc., 191 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Ky. App. 2006) (citations

omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000)

(citation omitted).

“In Kentucky, RCr 7.24 defines the scope of discovery in criminal

proceedings.” Stieritz v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 353, 367 (Ky. 2023).

Additionally, trial courts have broad discretion in addressing discovery matters.

2 Campbell’s pro se motion was actually titled “Motion for a More Specific Bill of Particulars” but the trial court treated it as a motion to compel discovery, so we will treat it as such on appeal. 3 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

-5- See Commonwealth v. Tramble, 409 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Ky. 2013); Commonwealth

v. Nichols, 280 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Ky. 2009). Under RCr 7.24(1), upon written

request from the defendant, the Commonwealth must allow a defendant to inspect

“results or reports of . . . scientific tests or experiments made in connection with

the particular case . . . that are known by the attorney for the Commonwealth to be

in the possession, custody or control of the Commonwealth[.]” Relatedly, RCr

7.24(2) states that on motion of the defendant, the court may order the

Commonwealth to allow the defendant to inspect “papers, documents, [or] data” in

the Commonwealth’s possession “upon a showing that the items sought may be

material to the preparation of the defense and that the request is reasonable.”

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Campbell’s

discovery requests. By Campbell’s own admission,4 “none of [his discovery]

requests concerned proof that CI buys had occurred.” He only sought “evidence

that Detective Eisenback had personally carried out any of the actions attributed to

him in the search warrant affidavit.” The Commonwealth readily admits that

Eisenback did not personally perform the drug buys.5 Thus, evidence of such is

nonexistent. We cannot find that the trial court erred in failing to require the

4 Reply Brief, page 2. 5 We would note that at the May 25, 2024, pretrial conference, the Commonwealth plainly stated that a CI performed the drug buys.

-6- Commonwealth to turn over something it does not have. See Slone v.

Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000446-MR, 2014 WL 5410289, *6 (Ky. Oct. 23,

2014) (“The rules for discovery in criminal cases do not require the

Commonwealth to disclose information it does not have.”).

Further, even if the evidence exists and Campbell is entitled to it, he

has failed to show a “reasonable probability that if the evidence were disclosed the

result would have been different.” Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288,

297 (Ky. 2008) (citations omitted). With his discovery request, Campbell sought

to challenge the validity of the search warrant and, ultimately, the suppression of

the evidence found pursuant to the search warrant. If successful, this would have

led only to a dismissal of his charges for first-degree aggravated trafficking in a

controlled substance (28 grams or more of fentanyl), possession of a handgun by a

convicted felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, trafficking in marijuana, and

illegal delivery or manufacture of drug paraphernalia. These charges were, in fact,

dismissed pursuant to Campbell’s plea agreement. Campbell would have still

faced the charge of second-degree manslaughter, which was based on different

facts and evidence. It was this charge that Campbell pled guilty to. Thus, we fail

to see any prejudice.

Campbell next argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a

Franks hearing. On appeal, Campbell identifies three purported false statements in

-7- the affidavit for search warrant that he claims entitle him to a Franks hearing.

First, he points to an alleged discrepancy between Eisenback’s statement in his

affidavit that “[t]his detective has done multiple buys in the past few weeks with

Lee M. Campbell selling heroin/fentanyl” (which Campbell interprets to mean that

Eisenback personally bought the drugs) and his hearing testimony that the only

time he spoke to Campbell was on October 14, 2020, the day of his arrest.

Campbell believes these statements are at odds. If the only time Eisenback had

spoken with him was on the day of his arrest, how could he have personally

purchased drugs from him previously?

Second, Campbell challenges Eisenback’s statement that “[t]he illegal

narcotics that were purchased were tested and confirmed as fentanyl.” He claims

this is false because the Commonwealth has not produced the field test results.

Finally, he questions Eisenback’s statement that the “NCIC shows that [Campbell]

was convicted of delivering/manufacturing/possessing cocaine, heroin, or another

narcotic on multiple occasions in Michigan.” Campbell argues that Eisenback

intentionally lied about a previous heroin conviction to support the affidavit. In

support, he has tendered a screenshot of his Michigan criminal history showing

convictions for possession of cocaine, but no conviction for possession of heroin.

Our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a Franks hearing is

twofold: we review its findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de

-8- novo. United States v. Bateman, 945 F.3d 997, 1007 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations

omitted). Affidavits supporting search warrants are presumptively valid. Franks

v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).

Therefore, to qualify for an evidentiary hearing, a defendant must make a

“substantial preliminary showing” of falsity. Id. at 155, 98 S. Ct. at 2676.

Conclusory allegations are not enough. Id. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684. Neither are

“[a]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake[.]” Id. “There must be

allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those

allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171,

98 S. Ct. at 2684 (emphasis added). The allegations

should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained.

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684.

Here, Campbell’s allegations are merely conclusory. His allegation

that Eisenback lied about the drug buys is based solely on his interpretation that

Eisenback’s statement, “[t]his detective has done multiple buys in the past few

weeks with Lee M. Campbell selling heroin/fentanyl[,]” must mean that Eisenback

personally purchased the drugs. An alternative interpretation is that Eisenback

oversaw the drug buys that a CI performed. Even conceding Campbell’s

-9- interpretation, he has offered no reliable proof that the statement was made

intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. Allegations of negligence or

innocent mistake are not sufficient to warrant a Franks hearing.

As to Eisenback’s statement that “[t]he illegal narcotics that were

purchased were tested and confirmed as fentanyl[,]” Campbell has similarly

offered no reliable proof of even falsehood, much less deliberate falsehood. He

simply claims that there is no evidence confirming the field test results. Campbell

has not met the “substantial preliminary showing of falsity” to be entitled to a

Franks hearing on this accusation. 438 U.S. at 170, 98 S. Ct. at 2684.

Finally, Campbell challenges the claim that his Michigan criminal

history includes convictions for “delivering/manufacturing/possessing cocaine,

heroin, or another narcotic on multiple occasions in Michigan.” In support, he has

inserted a screenshot that purports to show a Michigan conviction for

delivering/manufacturing/possession cocaine. He contends he has no similar

conviction for heroin, and thus, Eisenback must have manufactured it to support

his affidavit for a search warrant. Again, Campbell has offered no reliable proof of

deliberate falsehood. Even assuming Eisenback’s statement was incorrect,

Campbell has not shown that the statement was not the result of negligence, as

opposed to reckless disregard for the truth. The trial court did not err in failing to

hold a Franks hearing.

-10- Campbell last argues that the trial court failed to hold a hearing to

determine whether false or misleading information was provided to the grand jury.

Eisenback testified before the grand jury consistent with the facts in his search

warrant affidavit. Lee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, reasserting that

Eisenback falsely claimed to have personally purchased drugs from him and that

the purchased drugs tested as fentanyl. The trial court denied the motion on the

basis that it had already found that Campbell had not shown that Eisenback made a

knowingly false statement in his search warrant affidavit.

“Courts are extremely reluctant to scrutinize grand jury proceedings

as there is a strong presumption of regularity that attaches to such proceedings.”

Commonwealth v. Baker, 11 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. App. 2000) (citations omitted).

“A court may utilize its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment where a

prosecutor knowingly or intentionally presents false, misleading or perjured

testimony to the grand jury that results in actual prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

(citations omitted). The defendant bears the burden of proof.

Here, Campbell has not shown that the prosecutor knowingly or

intentionally presented false, misleading, or perjured testimony to the grand jury.

As with his motion for a Franks hearing, Campbell has only offered conclusory

allegations, unsupported by reliable proof of falsity. Thus, we find no error in the

-11- trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on these allegations or its denial of his motion

to dismiss the indictment.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jennifer Wade Russell Coleman Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny L. Sanders Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

-12-