Ledgends, Inc. v. Kerr

91 P.3d 960, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 67, 2004 WL 1191053
CourtAlaska Supreme Court
DecidedMay 28, 2004
DocketS-10840
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 91 P.3d 960 (Ledgends, Inc. v. Kerr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alaska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ledgends, Inc. v. Kerr, 91 P.3d 960, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 67, 2004 WL 1191053 (Ala. 2004).

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Mary Kerr was injured at the Alaska Rock Gym when she dropped from a climbing wall onto a padded surface. According to her complaint the padded surface had been formed by several mats whose seams were overlaid by tape. The tape where she landed was weak or split and her foot penetrated into the seam. Her movement caused her to suffer a displaced, comminuted fracture of her right knee.

*961 Kerr sued Ledgends, Inc., owner of the gym, contending that Ledgends had actual knowledge of the condition of the tape at the climbing wall and had negligently failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Ledgends answered denying knowledge and negligence and pled as an affirmative defense a release that Kerr had signed. The terms of the release are set out in Appendix B.

■ After depositions were taken both parties moved for summary judgment concerning the effect of the release. Superior Court Judge Sharon L. Gleason wrote an opinion denying both motions. Subsequently the parties agreed to a conditional settlement under which Ledgends confessed judgment in the principal amount of $150,000 subject to an appeal of the court’s order. The parties agreed that if this court

rules that the release bars Kerr!s claims based on the facts alleged in the complaint ... the case will terminate with each side to bear its own costs and fees. If the Court rules otherwise, including remand for any other purpose, payment upon the entire -confessed judgment is due and payable to [Kerr] within 30 days.

Ledgends now appeals.

Upon a careful review of the parties’ briefs and arguments, we conclude that the superi- or court properly denied Ledgends’ motion for summary judgment for the reasons expressed in the court’s opinion, attached as Appendix A.

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

EASTAUGH, Justice, not participating.

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR . THE STATE OF ALASKA

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT ANCHORAGE

MARY KERR,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEDGENDS, INC. d/b/a ALASKA ROCK GYM,

Defendant.

Case No. 3AN-01-05350 Cl

ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In January 1999 Mary Kerr signed a “Release of Liability — Waiver of Claims” in partial consideration for permission to use the facilities at, the Alaska Rock Gym (the Gym), which is the principal place of business of Defendant Ledgends, Inc. In her complaint in this case, Ms. Kerr alleges that she was bouldering at the Gym on May 1, 2000. She alleges that she dropped straight down to the mats upon completing a bouldering sequence and that her .right foot slipped into a weak taped joint between mats causing her body to fall to the mat surface. Ms. Kerr alleges that she suffered a bone fracture at her right knee in the fall. She alleges that the Gym had known of the problems with the tape where she landed, but had not repaired it. Ms. Kerr claims that her injury was caused by the Gym’s negligent failure to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition for its climbing patrons. In answer -the Gym asserts assumption of the risk as an affirmative defense, contending that Ms. Kerr assumed the risk of injury by climbing at the gym and by signing the release of liability in January 1999. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability under the release Ms. Kerr signed in January 1999.

The Alaska Supreme Court established the rules of interpreting pre-recreational exculpatory agreements in Kissick v. Schmierer, 816 P.2d 188 (Alaska 1991). Under Kissick any ambiguities in pre-recreational exculpatory clauses must be resolved against the party seeking exculpation. 816 P.2d at 191. Kissick established that “to be enforced the intent to release a party from liability for future negligence must be conspicuously and unequivocally expressed.” 816 P.2d at 191. The Kissick court stated that an agreement purporting to exculpate the drafter from liability for negligence or tortious conduct is not effective unless the agreement is “clear, *962 explicit and comprehensible in each of its essential details.” 816 P.2d at 191. Finally, Kissick requires that such an agreement, read as a whole, must “clearly notify the prospective releasor or indemnitor of the effect of signing the release.” 816 P.2d at 191 (citation omitted).

The agreement at issue in Kissick provided that flight passengers could not sue for “any loss, damage, or injury to [their] person or ... property which may occur from any cause whatsoever.” 816 P.2d at 189. When presented with the question whether that language precluded widows of passengers killed in an accident from bringing wrongful death claims, the Kissick court determined that because there was an ambiguity as to whether “injury” included death, the decedents’ agreement not to sue did not bar their widows’ wrongful death claims. 816 P.2d at 192.

Recently, in Moore v. Hartley Motors, 36 P.3d 628 (Alaska 2001), the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted a release signed by a participant in an ATV safety class, which purported to absolve the defendants from “any and all liability, loss, damage claim or cause of action, known or unknown, including but not limited to all bodily injuries and property damage arising out of the participation in the ATV Rider Course.” In reversing the entry of summary judgment against a participant injured when her vehicle hit a rock in high grass just off the course, the Moore court concluded that the release at issue purported to waive liability only for the inherent risks of ATV riding. The court determined that the release did not suggest “an intent to release [the defendants] from liability for acts of negligence unrelated to those inherent risks.” 36 P.3d at 633. Instead, the court found that “underlying the ATV course release signed by [the participant] was an implied and reasonable presumption that the course is not unreasonably dangerous.” The court then concluded that the injured rider’s allegation that the course was improperly laid out was actionable to the extent that she claimed the course was unreasonably dangerous because it posed risks beyond the ordinary risks of off-road ATV riding assumed by the release.

In the eases discussed above the exculpatory agreement was determined to be inadequate to preclude the plaintiffs’ claims. Those cases offer little guidance as to what language could effectively accomplish a waiver of liability for future language, but the cases demonstrate that under Alaska law pre-recreational exculpatory agreements have been held to a very high standard of clarity and that any ambiguity in that regal’d should be strictly construed against the party seeking exculpation.

In this case, the Gym contends that its release eliminates liability for injuries caused by negligence or by equipment defects. Ms.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
91 P.3d 960, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 67, 2004 WL 1191053, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ledgends-inc-v-kerr-alaska-2004.