WATT, J.:
T1 We granted certiorari to address a single issue: whether the trial court erred in granting a motion for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct.1 Resolution of this issue requires us first to answer the question of whether the juror's affidavit was properly submitted as evidence in the hearing on the request for new trial.
1 2 We hold that the juror's affidavit demonstrating the injection into the deliberative process of extraneous prejudicial information was admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 0.8.2011 § 2606 (B)2 Furthermore, counsel were entitled to rely on the foreperson's guarantee to the trial court that she would not allow her professional expertise to override the testimony presented. Because there is evidence to the contrary, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
13 Ledbetter has a long history of diabetes which grew worse over time requiring increased medical intervention. In 1997 or 1998, he developed signs of peripheral neuro-pathy of the legs, a diabetic complication affecting the nerves and which can lead to serious leg and foot complications, including amputation.
1 4 On May 31, 2005, Ledbetter went to his primary care physician, Dr. Kevin Reed, complaining of swelling, redness, and discomfort in his left foot and leg. Dr. Reed diagnosed Ledbetter with cellulitus, an infection of the soft tissues, and began treating him with a broad-spectrum oral antibiotic.
15 On Dr. Reed's orders, Ledbetter returned for a followup appointment on June 7th. There being no apparent improvement in Ledbetter's leg, Dr. Reed admitted him to the hospital and began intravenous antibiot-ies. Two days later, Dr. Reed ordered x-rays of Ledbetter's left foot because of concerns related to a potential bone infection. [1034]*1034Howard read the x-rays concluding that there were no dislocations or fractures and that the foot was radiographically normal.
16 Having improved, Ledbetter was discharged from the hospital on June lith,. Although the symptoms continued to abate during the three (8) weeks after discharge, Ledbetter continued to have swelling in his left ankle. Dr. Reed ordered a second x-ray on July 5th which showed a dramatic deterioration of the bones in Ledbetter's left foot. Dr. Reed referred Ledbetter to an orthopedic surgeon who sent Ledbetter to see Dr. Steven Lund, a podiatrist with experience treating Charcot Foot.3
T7 Dr. Lund diagnosed Ledbetter with Charcot Foot. Because of the severity of the foot's deformity, Dr. Lund recommended reconstructive surgery to attach an external fixator to Ledbetter's foot. Ledbetter wore the fixator, which was adjusted daily, for approximately seven weeks. Thereafter, Ledbetter spent several weeks in a cast and then in a specially crafted boot for six to eight months. Finally, Ledbetter was fitted with a brace intended to be worn continually with a shoe. However, because the brace was uncomfortable, Ledbetter discontinued its use.
T8 The Ledbetters sued Howard and Radiology Services for negligence. Ledbetter alleged that the doctor misread the July 9th x-ray causing delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot. Coupled with the malpractice claim was the wife's plea for loss of consortium. The action was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The Ledbetters filed two motions: one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and one for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct during deliberations. The trial court refused to grant judgment to the Ledbetters but sustained their motion for new trial finding that "juror misconduct affected materially the substantial rights of the [Ledbetters]".4 The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded ordering the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Howard and Radiology Services. The cause was assigned for consideration to this chamber on December 5, 2011.
Standard of Review
19 It has long been recognized that the granting of a new trial is within the wide discretion of the trial court.5 We will not reverse an order granting a new trial unless error is clearly established in respect to some pure, simple, and unmixed question of law.6 The judge who presides at the trial: hears the testimony; observes the witnesses; and has full knowledge of the proceedings during the trial process. -It is that adjudicator who is in the best position to know whether substantial justice has been done. Where such a judge sustains a motion for new trial, a clear showing of manifest error and an abuse of discretion must be made before this Court is justified in reversing the ruling. The threshold for upholding the grant of a new trial is much lower than where the motion is overruled.7 Furthermore, when, as here, the new trial is granted by the same judge who tried the case, a much stronger showing of error or abuse of discretion is required for this Court to reverse than if a party appeals from a refusal to grant a new trial.8
[1035]*103510 The Ledbetters allege they are entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct.9 They insist that the jury foreperson, a licensed practical nurse who regularly assists with the care and treatment of diabetic patients, improperly injected extraneous prejudicial information into the deliberative process. Howard and Radiology Services contend that the juror's affidavit utilized to impeach the verdiet is inadmissible pursuant to 12 0.8.2011 § 2606 (B).10 In the alterna tive, they argue that the foreperson's statement interjected no extraneous information improperly influencing any juror. We disagree with both of the defendants' arguments.
T 11 a) The juror's affidavit regarding the foreperson's statements during deliberations is admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 0.8.2011 $ 2606 (B).
§12 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as expressed by the statutory language.11 Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective 12 considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each.13 The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its intent and that it intended what it expressed.14 Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and end 15 championing the broad public policy purposes underlying them.16 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are rules of statutory construction employed.17 If the language is plain and clearly expresses the legislative will, further inquiry is unnecessary.18
T13 Title 12 0.8.2011 § 2606 (B)19 provides in pertinent part:
A juror may20 testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial informa[1036]*1036tion was improperly brought to the jury's attention ... An affidavit ...
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WATT, J.:
T1 We granted certiorari to address a single issue: whether the trial court erred in granting a motion for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct.1 Resolution of this issue requires us first to answer the question of whether the juror's affidavit was properly submitted as evidence in the hearing on the request for new trial.
1 2 We hold that the juror's affidavit demonstrating the injection into the deliberative process of extraneous prejudicial information was admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 0.8.2011 § 2606 (B)2 Furthermore, counsel were entitled to rely on the foreperson's guarantee to the trial court that she would not allow her professional expertise to override the testimony presented. Because there is evidence to the contrary, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
13 Ledbetter has a long history of diabetes which grew worse over time requiring increased medical intervention. In 1997 or 1998, he developed signs of peripheral neuro-pathy of the legs, a diabetic complication affecting the nerves and which can lead to serious leg and foot complications, including amputation.
1 4 On May 31, 2005, Ledbetter went to his primary care physician, Dr. Kevin Reed, complaining of swelling, redness, and discomfort in his left foot and leg. Dr. Reed diagnosed Ledbetter with cellulitus, an infection of the soft tissues, and began treating him with a broad-spectrum oral antibiotic.
15 On Dr. Reed's orders, Ledbetter returned for a followup appointment on June 7th. There being no apparent improvement in Ledbetter's leg, Dr. Reed admitted him to the hospital and began intravenous antibiot-ies. Two days later, Dr. Reed ordered x-rays of Ledbetter's left foot because of concerns related to a potential bone infection. [1034]*1034Howard read the x-rays concluding that there were no dislocations or fractures and that the foot was radiographically normal.
16 Having improved, Ledbetter was discharged from the hospital on June lith,. Although the symptoms continued to abate during the three (8) weeks after discharge, Ledbetter continued to have swelling in his left ankle. Dr. Reed ordered a second x-ray on July 5th which showed a dramatic deterioration of the bones in Ledbetter's left foot. Dr. Reed referred Ledbetter to an orthopedic surgeon who sent Ledbetter to see Dr. Steven Lund, a podiatrist with experience treating Charcot Foot.3
T7 Dr. Lund diagnosed Ledbetter with Charcot Foot. Because of the severity of the foot's deformity, Dr. Lund recommended reconstructive surgery to attach an external fixator to Ledbetter's foot. Ledbetter wore the fixator, which was adjusted daily, for approximately seven weeks. Thereafter, Ledbetter spent several weeks in a cast and then in a specially crafted boot for six to eight months. Finally, Ledbetter was fitted with a brace intended to be worn continually with a shoe. However, because the brace was uncomfortable, Ledbetter discontinued its use.
T8 The Ledbetters sued Howard and Radiology Services for negligence. Ledbetter alleged that the doctor misread the July 9th x-ray causing delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot. Coupled with the malpractice claim was the wife's plea for loss of consortium. The action was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The Ledbetters filed two motions: one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and one for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct during deliberations. The trial court refused to grant judgment to the Ledbetters but sustained their motion for new trial finding that "juror misconduct affected materially the substantial rights of the [Ledbetters]".4 The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded ordering the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Howard and Radiology Services. The cause was assigned for consideration to this chamber on December 5, 2011.
Standard of Review
19 It has long been recognized that the granting of a new trial is within the wide discretion of the trial court.5 We will not reverse an order granting a new trial unless error is clearly established in respect to some pure, simple, and unmixed question of law.6 The judge who presides at the trial: hears the testimony; observes the witnesses; and has full knowledge of the proceedings during the trial process. -It is that adjudicator who is in the best position to know whether substantial justice has been done. Where such a judge sustains a motion for new trial, a clear showing of manifest error and an abuse of discretion must be made before this Court is justified in reversing the ruling. The threshold for upholding the grant of a new trial is much lower than where the motion is overruled.7 Furthermore, when, as here, the new trial is granted by the same judge who tried the case, a much stronger showing of error or abuse of discretion is required for this Court to reverse than if a party appeals from a refusal to grant a new trial.8
[1035]*103510 The Ledbetters allege they are entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct.9 They insist that the jury foreperson, a licensed practical nurse who regularly assists with the care and treatment of diabetic patients, improperly injected extraneous prejudicial information into the deliberative process. Howard and Radiology Services contend that the juror's affidavit utilized to impeach the verdiet is inadmissible pursuant to 12 0.8.2011 § 2606 (B).10 In the alterna tive, they argue that the foreperson's statement interjected no extraneous information improperly influencing any juror. We disagree with both of the defendants' arguments.
T 11 a) The juror's affidavit regarding the foreperson's statements during deliberations is admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 0.8.2011 $ 2606 (B).
§12 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as expressed by the statutory language.11 Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective 12 considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each.13 The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its intent and that it intended what it expressed.14 Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and end 15 championing the broad public policy purposes underlying them.16 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are rules of statutory construction employed.17 If the language is plain and clearly expresses the legislative will, further inquiry is unnecessary.18
T13 Title 12 0.8.2011 § 2606 (B)19 provides in pertinent part:
A juror may20 testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial informa[1036]*1036tion was improperly brought to the jury's attention ... An affidavit ... of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying shall not be received ... [Emphasis provided.]
The statute does not preclude the admission of all juror affidavits in queries involving juror misconduct. Instead, it blocks the offering of juror affidavits on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying. Jurors are specifically allowed under the statute to testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention. Therefore, if the foreperson's statements constituted extraneous prejudicial information, admission of the juror-affidavit was not precluded.
T 14 During voir dire, the foreperson testified that she was a licensed practical nurse involved in home-health care and that she dealt daily with diabetics but never with anyone with Chareot foot. When the trial court asked whether she ever had a diabetic patient with complications she confirmed that she had. She also assured the Court that nothing about her experiences would cause her to be biased and that she would not substitute her experience for the testimony of the witnesses in the trial.21
T 15 In support of the new trial argument, the Ledbetters obtained a sworn affidavit from one of the foreperson's fellow jurors. It provides that: 1) the foreperson took charge of the deliberations "eagerly sharing her experiences and knowledge of the proper care and treatment of diabetic patients"; the foreperson and another juror stated that "they had been in similar situations as Dr. Howard" and that it was "common place" to note a patient's condition as being "normal" when it was not; the foreperson shared "her experience and knowledge of diabetes" stating that "all diabetics have podiatrists" then questioned why Ledbetter did not have a treating podiatrist; the foreperson expounded that she was "certain" Ledbetter had prior foot problems and was not following his doctor's instructions because, in her experience, "most diabetics do not follow doctor's instructions;" the foreperson hypothesized that Ledbetter wasn't following his doctor's instructions because he was taking four shots of insulin per day and that was "certainly a lot of insulin;" and, finally, the foreperson told jurors that because Ledbetter had Charcot foot, he would "likely have had the same problems and result" regardless of any delay in treatment caused by Howard's misreading of the original x-ray.22
116 These statements were clearly improper under 12 0.S8.2011 § 2606 (B). They were: made as statements of fact by the foreperson; involved purportedly extraneous information arising solely from the foreperson's professional experience; and were intended to sway the jury toward a defendant's verdict. The juror's affidavit regarding these statements was admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 0.8.2011 § 2606 (B).23
[1037]*1037{ 17 b) Counsel were entitled to rely on the foreperson's guarantee to the trial court that she would not allow her professional expertise to override the testimony presented. Because there is admissible evidence to the contrary, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations.
118 This is not a case in which we need make any sweeping statement as to when or how a professional may utilize individual training or expertise in the deliberative process or even may be allowed to communicate the same to fellow fact finders.24 Neither does this cause stand for the proposition that a single false answer to a question on voir dire requires or supports the ordering of a new trial. Here, the simple fact is that during voir dire, the foreperson clearly stated that she would not substitute her experiences as a nurse to diabetic patients to over-ride witness testimony. The affidavit indicates she did exactly what she promised not to do once deliberations began and went even further by attempting to influence her fellow jurors based on her professional knowledge and experiences, all while acting in the leadership position of foreperson on the jury.25
{19 We addressed the issue of a juror giving untruthful answers to a question during voir dire in Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn. v. Masterson, 1996 OK 99, 928 P.2d 291. There, the juror gave false information concerning his involvement in prior lawsuits. We stated:
We need not determine whether the juror was biased against [the defendant] nor whether he had some influence upon the other jurors. -It is enough that [the defendant] was deprived of an opportunity to delve deeper into [the juror's] qualifications during voir dire and under Oklahoma case law is entitled to a new trial.
Unlike the juror in Dominion, the foreperson here gave sworn testimony that she would not allow her expertise and training to override the testimony presented. Thereafter, she accepted the leadership position as foreperson of the jury, and specifically informed the other jurors that because Ledbetter had Charcot foot, he would "likely have had the same problems and result" regardless of any delay in treatment caused by Howard's misreading of the original x-ray.26 She made these statements based solely on her experience and training in treating diabetics, rot on the basis of the evidence presented.
20 Trial courts must serupulously avoid allowing a jury to have access to matters not proper for consideration or to perform their functions irregularly.27 The trial court [1038]*1038attempted to meet that duty during voir dire. Counsel were entitled to rely on the foreperson's guaranty to the trial court that she would not allow her professional expertise to override the testimony presented. There is admissible evidence to the contrary. The foreperson made improper statements, involving extraneous information, intending to sway the jury toward a defendant's verdict. Under these facts, we determine that the plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial.
CONCLUSION
121 We express no opinion on the ability of the Ledbetters to prevail in a new trial. Furthermore, this decision should not be construed to stand for the proposition that a single untrue response to a question on voir dire will necessarily require a new trial. Here, however, we are presented with a false answer which led to a person clothed with the mantel of leadership attempting to persuade fellow jurors to reach a defendants' verdict.on extraneous prejudicial information precluded by the legislative pronouncement in 12 0.8.2011 $ 2606 (B)28
122 The trial judge: conducted the initial voir dire in which the foreperson assured him that she would not allow her professional background to be substituted for the evidence presented by the witnesses; was present during the trial; observed the witnesses; and heard their testimony. After considering the motion for new trial and the juror's affidavit, the response, and the argument of counsel for all parties, he determined that the statements of the foreperson, taking on the persona of an expert witness during jury deliberations, constituted conduct materially and adversely affecting the Ledbetters' right to a fair trial. On the record presented, there has been no clear showing of manifest error and an abuse of discretion. Howard and Radiology Services simply have not met the difficult standard which must be demonstrated to show that the trial court erred in granting a new trial. Therefore, the trial court's new trial order must be upheld. The order of the trial court is affirmed and the matter is remanded for a new trial.
123 CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., WATT, REIF, COMBS, JJ., concur.
GURICH, J., concurs in result.
WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, JJ., dissent.
KAUGER, J., not participating.