League of Women Voters of New Hampshire, et al. v. Steve Kramer, et al.

2024 DNH 089

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: October 15, 2024
• Docket: 24-cv-73-SM-TSM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

League of Women Voters of New Hampshire, et al.

v. Case No. 24-cv-73-SM-TSM Opinion No. 2024 DNH 089 Steve Kramer, et al.

O R D E R

Default was entered against defendant Steve Kramer on

August 29, 2024. Doc. no. 92. The plaintiffs move for default

judgment against Kramer while their claims against the other

defendants remain pending. Doc. no. 98. For the reasons that

follow, the motion is denied.

Discussion

The plaintiffs, the League of Women Voters of New

Hampshire, the League of Women Voters of the United States, and

three New Hampshire voters bring claims under the Voting Rights

Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and New Hampshire

Election Laws, NH RSA 664:14-1 and 644:14-b, challenging the

defendants’ involvement in robocalls sent to New Hampshire

residents before the New Hampshire Primary in January of 2024.

In addition to Kramer, the defendants are Lingo Telecom, LLC,

Life Corporation, and Voice Broadcasting Corporation. The

active defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them,

and those motions are pending. Despite the pending motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs move

for entry of default judgment, final judgment, against Kramer

and seek a permanent injunction and statutory damages against

him. The plaintiffs’ motion raises two related issues that must

be considered separately: the entry of default judgment and

entry of final judgment as to only one of multiple defendants.

See Pinnacle Bank v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Case No. 24-cv-305,

2024 WL 3656179, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2024); Sullivan v.

Snider, Case No. 19-cv-129, 2023 WL 9181363, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.

Dec. 19, 2023).

A. Default Judgment

After entry of default against a defendant, the court may

enter default judgment if the well-pleaded facts alleged in the

complaint demonstrate that the moving party has stated an

actionable claim against the defaulted party. Universitas

Educ., LLC v. Granderson, 98 F.4th 457, 377 (1st Cir. 2024).

While the defaulted party is deemed to have conceded the truth

of the factual allegations in the complaint, for purposes of a

default judgment, the court determines whether it has

jurisdiction, whether the allegations state an actionable claim

for relief, and whether the defaulted party had notice and an

opportunity to respond. Id. Because default judgment “runs

contrary to the goals of resolving cases on the merits and

2 avoiding harsh or unfair results,” courts are cautioned to enter

default judgment only in extreme situations. Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to default

judgment against Kramer on all three claims because default has

been entered against him and because Kramer’s actions in

orchestrating the robocalls, as alleged in the complaint,

violated section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act, section 227 of

the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and New Hampshire

Election Laws, NH RSA 664:14-1 and 644:14-b. The plaintiffs did

not address the issue of whether they have standing to bring the

claims, which is raised in the defendants’ motions to dismiss

and is discussed in the report and recommendation to deny the

plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. If the

plaintiffs lack standing, the court lacks jurisdiction over the

claims against Kramer. For that reason alone, the plaintiffs’

motion for default judgment must be denied.

In addition, the defendants challenge the sufficiency of

the plaintiffs’ allegations to state a cognizable claim. If the

court were to conclude that the plaintiffs’ allegations were

insufficient in the context of deciding the defendants’ motions,

that outcome likely would undermine a default judgment entered

against Kramer. For that reason too, no default judgment can be

entered at this time. Even if a default judgment were

3 appropriate at this time, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated

that a separate final judgment should be entered against Kramer.

B. Separate Final Judgment

When, as here, there are multiple parties in an action,

“the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or

more, but fewer than all, . . . parties only if the court

expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Before entering a judgment under Rule

54(b), the district court “must go through two steps: [1] it

must ‘determine that it is dealing with a ”final judgment”’ that

provides an ultimate disposition on a ‘cognizable claim for

relief,’ and [2] it must ‘determine whether there is any just

reason for delay.’” 1 Boston Property Exchange Transfer Co. v.

Iantosca, 720 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Curtiss–Wright

Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1980)). In

determining whether there is no just reason for delay, the court

must consider the interrelationship of the claims and whether

early entry of judgment will result in piecemeal appeals.

Amyndas Pharms., S.A. v. Zealand Pharma A/S, 48 F.4th 18, 28

(1st Cir. 2022).

1 Ordinarily, the court must make findings to support a determination that there is no just reason for delay. Boston Property Exchange, 720 F.3d at 7.

4 The plaintiffs did not address the requirements under Rule

54(b) for a separate final judgment and, as a result, failed to

show that there is no just reason for delay. In this case, the

defendants’ pending motions to dismiss preclude entering a final

judgment against Kramer now, even if the plaintiffs could meet

the requirements for a default judgment.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for

default judgment against Steve Kramer (doc. no. 98) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

______________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

October 15, 2024

cc: Counsel of Record