League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Benson

373 F. Supp. 3d 867
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedApril 25, 2019
DocketNo. 2:17-cv-14148
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 373 F. Supp. 3d 867 (League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Benson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Benson, 373 F. Supp. 3d 867 (E.D. Mich. 2019).

Opinion

CLAY, Circuit Judge

The League of Women Voters of Michigan ("League"), numerous League members ("League Plaintiffs"), and several Democratic voters ("Individual Plaintiffs") bring suit against Jocelyn Benson, the Michigan Secretary of State in her official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, alleging that Michigan's current legislative apportionment plan (the "Enacted Plan"), which the state legislature implemented as Michigan Public Acts 128 and 129 of 2011, violates Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights and First Amendment free speech and association rights by deliberately discriminating against Democratic voters.1 (See Compl., ECF No. 1.)

After Plaintiffs filed suit, several parties moved to intervene. Ultimately, intervention was granted to several of the Republican members of Michigan's United States congressional delegation and two Republican state house members (together "Congressional and State House Intervenors") (see ECF Nos. 103, 157) and to numerous Republican state senators and the Michigan *880Senate as a whole (together "Senate Intervenors") (see ECF No. 237 ).2

Plaintiffs initially sought to invalidate the entire Enacted Plan. (See Compl.) However, they have since narrowed their claims to 34 congressional, House, and Senate districts (the "Challenged Districts").3

The Court held a trial on Plaintiffs' claims. (See Trial Trs., ECF Nos. 248, 249, 250.) In addition to presenting witnesses at trial, the parties submitted hundreds of exhibits and deposition testimony from numerous witnesses in lieu of in-person testimony, pursuant to the Court's order, which reflected the parties' stipulation about the presentation and admissibility of evidence. (See Order Re: Parties' Partial Stipulations and Report, ECF No. 234.) The parties also filed post-trial briefs, including proposed findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law.4 (See ECF Nos. 254, 255, 256, 257, 258.) The Court has carefully considered all the evidence.

Today, this Court joins the growing chorus of federal courts that have, in recent years, held that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional. We find that the Enacted Plan violates Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it deliberately dilutes the power of their votes by placing them in districts that were intentionally drawn to ensure a particular partisan outcome in each district. See Gill v. Whitford , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1916, 1929-31, 201 L.Ed.2d 313 (2018). The Enacted Plan also injures Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to association by discriminating against them and their political party and subjecting them to "disfavored treatment by reason of their views." Vieth v. Jubelirer , 541 U.S. 267, 314, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Because we find that these constitutional violations will reoccur if future elections are held under the Enacted Plan, we HEREBY ENJOIN the use of the Challenged Districts in any future election.

*881I. INTRODUCTION

The term "partisan gerrymandering" describes "the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power." Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2658, 192 L.Ed.2d 704 (2015). "By definition, partisan gerrymandering amounts to an effort to dictate electoral outcomes by favoring candidates of one party and disfavoring candidates of another." Common Cause v. Rucho , 318 F.Supp.3d 777, 800 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (three-judge panel) (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton , 514 U.S. 779, 833-34, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995) ). Partisan gerrymandering thus violates the core purpose of legislative apportionment-providing "fair and effective representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims , 377 U.S. 533, 565, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964).

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that partisan gerrymandering is "incompatible ... with democratic principles." Ariz. State Leg. , 135 S.Ct. at 2658 (quoting Vieth , 541 U.S. at 292, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion) ). It violates "the core principle of republican government ... that the voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around." Id. at 2652 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Lower federal courts have also noted that partisan gerrymandering diminishes our democracy, aptly describing it as a "noxious" practice that "has no place in a representative democracy[,]" Shapiro v. McManus , 203 F.Supp.3d 579, 600 (D. Md. 2016) (Bredar, J. dissenting) (three-judge panel) (internal citation omitted); a "cancerous" problem that "undermin[es] the fundamental tenets of our form of democracy," Benisek v. Lamone , 266 F.Supp.3d 799, 818 (D. Md.

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Bluebook (online)
373 F. Supp. 3d 867, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/league-of-women-voters-of-mich-v-benson-mied-2019.