DICKSON, Justice.
The sole plaintiffs in this case, the Indiana State and Indianapolis chapters of the League of Women Voters, brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Indiana Voter ID Law violates Article 2, Section 2, and Article 1, Section 28 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the Voter ID Law did not violate either constitutional provision. The Court of Appeals reversed. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). We granted transfer, thereby automatically vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals and accepting jurisdiction over the appeal, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A). Determining that this case presents only facial challenges to the constitutionality of the Voter ID Law, we now affirm the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, but without prejudice to future as-applied challenges by any voter unlawfully prevented from exercising the right to vote.
The relief the plaintiffs seek is a declaration that it was beyond the power of the legislature to require any voters to identify themselves at the polls using a photo ID.1 [761]*761Voters have long been required to identify themselves at the polls by announcing and signing their names. Neither of the constitutional provisions the plaintiffs invoke prevents the legislature from promulgating a new way for voters to identify themselves. -It is within the power of the legislature to require voters to identify themselves at the polls using a photo ID. The plaintiffs' claim for relief cannot be granted and dismissal was appropriate. No individual voter has alleged that the Voter ID Law has prevented him or her from voting or inhibited his or her ability to vote in any way.2 Our decision today does not prevent any such voter from challenging the Law in the future.
In 2005, an enactment of the Indiana General Assembly, Public Law 109-2005, referred to by the parties as the Indiana Voter ID Law, made several modifications to Indiana's election and motor vehicle laws. This Law was challenged in federal court where the plaintiffs claimed that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1971, and Article 2, Sections 1 and 2 of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court rejected the plaintiffs' challenges and upheld the law, and its judgment was upheld on appeal. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F.Supp.2d 775 (S.D.Ind.2006), aff'd sub nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir.2007), aff'd, 553 U.S. 181, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008).
In both the federal litigation and in the present appeal, the challenges to the Voter ID Law center on its requirement, as summarized by Justice Stevens for the United States Supreme Court, that:
. citizens voting in person on election day, or casting a ballot in person at the office of the cireuit court clerk prior to election day, [must] present photo identification issued by the government.
... [T)he statute applies to in-person voting at both primary and general elections. The requirement does not apply to absentee ballots submitted by mail, and the statute contains an exception for persons living and voting in a state-licensed facility such as a nursing home. A voter who is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed may cast a provisional ballot that will be counted only if she executes an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within 10 days following the election. A voter who has photo identification but is unable to present that identification on election day may file a provisional ballot that will be counted if she brings her photo identification to the cireuit county clerk's office within 10 days. No photo identification is required in order to register to vote, and the State offers free photo identification to qualified voters able to establish their residence and identity.
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 185-86, 128 S.Ct. at 1613-14, 170 L.Ed.2d at 580-81 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
In June 2008, the plaintiffs instituted the present state court action challenging [762]*762the Voter ID Law.3 When their constitutional claims were rejected and their action dismissed by the trial court, the plaintiffs instituted this appeal, in essence claiming violations of Article 2, Section 2, and Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. The plaintiffs seek a general judicial nullification of the Indiana Voter ID Law. This case presents facial but not as-applied constitutional challenges. The amended complaint does not seek individual relief under any claim that the Voter ID Law is unconstitutional as applied to either of the plaintiffs but rather seeks only a general declaration that "the Indiana Photo ID Law violates Art. 2, § 2 and Art. 1, § 28 of the Indiana Constitution." 'Appellants' App'x at 16. Among their assertions at trial and on appeal, the plaintiffs-appellants recite a claim that the Voter ID Law is unconstitutional as applied to some persons but make no claim that the Law is unconstitutional as applied to either of the plaintiffs-appellants, nor do they seek individualized exemptions from the Law's requirements, See [League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc.] Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Appellants' Supp. App'x at 35-837; Appellants' Br. at 48-45. We therefore treat this case as alleging only claims 'of facial unconstitutionality and do not address the availability of claims alleging that the Law is unconstitutional as applied.
The plaintiffs argue that it is beyond the power of the legislature to require any voters to identify themselves at the polls using a photo ID for three reasons:
(1) The requirements of the Voter ID Law constitute a "qualification for voting" in violation of the Indiana Constitution which limits qualifications for voting to those specified in Article 2, Section 2; 4
(2) The Voter ID Law violates the prohibition on granting privileges or immunities to any citizen or class of citizens that do not equally belong to all citizens on the same terms (the "Privileges and Immunities Clause") because it does not require a class of citizens, voters casting absentee ballots by mail, to comply with its provisions;5 and
(3) The Voter ID Law violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it does not require a class of citizens, voters who both live and vote in a state licensed care facility, to comply with its provisions.6
[763]*763Part I. Entitlement to Vote-Article 2, Section 2
Emphasizing that voting is a fundamental right of all voters who meet the enumerated qualifications in Article 2, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution, the plaintiffs contend that the only permissible voting qualifications are those explicitly established in Article 2 and that the Voter ID Law is unconstitutional because (a) it imposes a new substantive qualification on the right to vote; (b) it is not a registration law authorized by Article 2, Section 14(c) of the Indiana Constitution; and (c) it is not uniformly applicable to all voters. With respect to these arguments, the following provisions of the Indiana Constitution are relevant:
Article 2
Suffrage and Election
Section 1. All elections shall be free and equal.
Section 2.
(a) A citizen of the United States, who is at least eighteen (18) years of age and who has been a resident of a precinet thirty (80) days immediately preceding an election may vote in that precinet at the election.
(b) A citizen may not be disenfranchised under subsection (a), if the citizen is entitled to vote in a precinct under subsection (c) or federal law.
(c) The General Assembly may provide that a citizen who ceases to be a resident of a precinet before an election may vote in a precinet where the citizen previously resided if, on the date of the election, the citizen's name appears on the registration rolls for the precinet.
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Section 14.
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(c) The General Assembly shall provide for the registration of all persons entitled to vote.
A
The plaintiffs acknowledge that the Indiana General Assembly has the power to regulate the administration of elections but argue that the Voter ID Law is not merely a procedural regulation but rather "adds a new substantive voting qualification not authorized by the Indiana Constitution." Appellants' Br. at 18. This contention was presented and rejected in the federal litigation. Judge Barker, whose judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Seventh Cireuit and by the United States Supreme Court in a 6-3 vote, explained:
The fact that Plaintiffs prefer alternative procedures to the photo identification does not ereate a Constitutional violation in requiring the latter. Nor is a Constitutional violation committed every time the General Assembly enacts a new voting regulation since, as we have previously noted, under Indiana law "the Legislature has power to determine what regulations shall be complied with by a qualified voter in order that his ballot may be counted, so long as what it requires is not so grossly unreasonable that compliance therewith is practically impossible." Simmons v. Byrd, 192 Ind. 274, 186 N.E. 14, 17-18 (Ind.1922). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that [the Voter ID Law] violates Indiana Constitution Article 2, section 2.
Ind. Democratic Porty, 458 F.Supp.2d at 843. A federal court's interpretation of Indiana law is not binding on Indiana state courts. See Evan v. Poe & Assocs., 873 N.E.2d 92, 103 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. not sought; Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 812 n. 1 [764]*764(Ind.Ct.App.2000), trams. not sought. In addition, while the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes parties "from raising issues in state court that have been finally determined as to the same parties in previous federal actions," Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 321 (Ind.2004), we do not have the same parties in the present litigation as in the federal litigation. Indiana Secretary of State Todd Rokita was and is a defendant in both cases, but the plaintiffs here were not parties in the federal lawsuit.
To support their claim that the Voter ID Law created prohibited voter qualifications rather than permissible election regulations, the plaintiffs argue that the legislature may not alter the voting qualifications established by the Indiana Constitution and that the Voter ID Law is not a permissible procedural regulation but instead is a statute that imposes a new property qualification and arbitrary, burdensome, and exclusionary conditions on the right to vote of constitutionally eligible voters.
The plaintiffs rely primarily upon the early case of Morris v. Powell, 125 Ind. 281, 25 N.E. 221 (1890). At the time Morris was decided, the Indiana legislature had not yet enacted a general voter registration law, although authorized in 1881 to do so by an amendment to Article 2, Section 2. A statute was enacted in 1889 that (a) required certain Indiana residents absent from Indiana for six months or more or who had not resided in one county for six months before an election to register in their home county three months before the election and to present a certified copy of such registration at the time of voting, and (b) required a voter absent from Indiana for six months or more on state or federal government business to produce when voting a certificate from the county auditor verifying that the voter's name had continuously "been upon the tax duplicate of said county for the purpose of taxation, during his absence from the State, and that he is still a taxpayer in said county." Id. at 288, 25 N.E. at 222. This latter requirement operated to prevent voting by such persons absent on government business if they did not own taxable property in the county and were more than fifty years old.7 Morris was an action brought against a county auditor to enjoin the payment for books furnished for registering votes under provisions of the 1889 statute. The Morris Court identified the question presented as whether the legislature can impose the challenged obligations "on the class of voters therein specified, and to another class add a qualification not required by the Constitution to entitle them to vote." Id. at 286, 25 N.E. at 228. The Court declared that the legislature lacked the authority to require any voter to own taxable property within the county and held that the challenged statute, in requiring a special registration of voters who may be absent from Indiana for six months, was "both unreasonable and not impartial." Id. at 294, 25 N.E. at 225. It concluded:
The authorities universally hold that registration laws must be impartial, uniform and reasonable, giving to all who [765]*765have a right to vote a fair and reasonable opportunity to exercise such right.
The Constitution not only confers upon the General Assembly the power to make illegal voting an impossibility by a proper system of registration, but it makes it the imperative duty of that body to exercise that power. The imposition of unauthorized burdens and qualifications not authorized by the Constitution upon a part of the citizens of the State is not an exercise of that power, and while we would regret to declare void any law having for its object the purity of elections, we can not so far forget our duty as to uphold a law so plainly in conflict with the fundamental law of the State as the section of the law under consideration.
Id. at 296, 25 N.E. at 226. The plaintiffs argue that the government identification card with an expiration date and a photograph, required by the Voter ID Law, is equivalent to the county auditor certificate found to be unconstitutional in Morris. Such government identification, they assert, should be considered an impermissible statutory "qualification" to vote, and thus violative of Section 2, "because it imposes an unnecessary and arbitrary burden on some voters." Appellants' Br. at 21-22.
Defending the Voter ID Law, the defendant counters that the Voter ID Law "is merely a regulation of election procedures designed to ensure fair elections, not an alteration of voter qualifications." Appel-lee's Br. at 18. He points to Article 2, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that all elections "shall be free and equal," and argues that the General Assembly has the power to protect the rights of citizens to "a fair and reliable electoral system in which their individual votes are not diluted by the fraudulently cast votes of others." Id. He contends that the requirements of the Voter ID Law are valid and reasonable means of enfore-ing the qualifications established in Article 2, Section 2. The defendant stresses that in Morris the statutory provisions were not invalidated because they required some voters to produce a document proving they complied with the valid existing constitutional qualifications of Article 2, Section 2. Rather, the provisions were invalidated in Morris "because they required documentation of some other extra-constitutional qualification to vote, i.e., 90-day residency and property ownership." Id. at 23. Citing Simmons v. Byrd, 192 Ind. 274, 136 N.E. 14 (1922), the defendant asserts that Article 2, Section 2 does not provide "an exhaustive list of possible impediments to voting." Appellee's Br. at 15.
Between 1881 and 1921, Article 2, Section 2 set forth the qualifications for voting, followed by the phrase "if he shall have been duly registered according to law." Ind. Const. art. 2, § 2 (1881). Another provision added in 1881 expressly required the Indiana General Assembly to "provide for the registration of all persons entitled to vote." Ind. Const. art. 2, § 14 (1881). In 1921, the voter qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Article 2 were altered (in part to include women), but the revision omitted the former concluding condition "if he shall have been duly registered according to law."8 Ind. Const. art. 2, § 2 (1921).
In Simmons, the plaintiff challenged various statutes that required voters to register before taking part in elections, his claim based largely on the 1921 amendment's elimination of the registration [766]*766clause from Section 2 of Article 2. The principal claim in Simmons was that, without the registration clause, Section 2 was violated by the statutory language that prohibited persons from voting unless registered and subjected such unregistered voters to be challenged and their votes excluded. In Simmons, this Court upheld the registration provisions, emphasizing that the Indiana Constitution requires that "(alll elections shall be free and equal." Ind. Const. art. 2, § 1. It quoted with express approval from an opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court, stating:
If there is a provision, that all persons, possessing certain qualifications, shall be entitled to vote, there is also a provision, that all elections shall be free and equal. It is as much the duty of the legislature to pass measures for carrying the latter as for carrying the former provision, into effect.... When the ballot-box becomes the receptacle of fraudulent votes, the freedom and equality of elections are destroyed.
Simmons, 192 Ind. at 285, 136 N.E. at 17-18 (quoting People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 616, 5 N.E. 596, 611 (1886)). Simmons also noted that, despite the omission of the registration clause from Section 2 of Article 2, a separate voter registration provision was present in the then-existing language of Section 14 of Article 2, which "authorizes and commands ... for the registration of all persons entitled to vote." 192 Ind. at 282, 136 N.E. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Simmons did not find Morris to be an impediment to the legislature's authority to regulate elections. Upholding a statutory requirement for voters to register twenty-nine days before the election, this Court forcefully concluded:
Being charged by the constitution with the duty to "provide for the registration of all persons entitled to vote," and to enact such laws governing registration and the holding of elections that "all elections shall be free and equal," the legislature has power to determine what regulations shall be complied with by a qualified voter in order that his ballot may be counted, so long as what it requires is not so grossly unreasonable that compliance therewith is practically impossible.... [Slince the legislature has power to provide by law for the registration of all voters, it has power to exclude from the privilege of voting those persons who refuse or neglect to register a reasonable number of days before the election.
Id. at 286, 136 N.E. at 18.
As declared in Morris and emphatically reasserted in Simmons, "the General Assembly has the power to enact a law providing for a uniform system of registration of all voters" and "the duty ... to enact a law providing a reasonable, uniform and impartial system for the registration of all voters." Morris, 125 Ind. at 286, 25 N.E. at 222-23, quoted with approval in Simmons, 192 Ind. at 282, 136 N.E. at 16. As to its language suggesting consideration of election regulation legislation as analogous to voter qualifications, Morris must be viewed in its historical context. The Court in Morris was confronted with the legislature's failure to enact a general voter registration law despite constitutional authorization and then its adoption of an incomplete and selective registration system, one that operated to disqualify certain voters for lack of property ownership. We find the essential holding from Morris and Simmons is that reasonableness and uniformity are required in the regulation of elections by means of a system of registration. We do not read Simmons as granting a blanket authorization for the legislature to enact any voting regulation it sees fit.
[767]*767The plaintiffs are correct that the legislature may not by statutory enactment add a substantive qualification to the right to vote assured by Article 2. In our view,. however, the Voter ID Law's requirement that an in-person voter present a government-issued photo identification card containing an expiration date is merely regulatory in nature. The voter qualifications established in Section 2 of Article 2 relate to citizenship, age, and residency. Requiring qualified voters to present a specified form of identification is not in the nature of such a personal, individual characteristic or attribute but rather functions merely as an election regulation to verify the voter's identity. When the United States Supreme Court reviewed the Indiana Voter ID Law, the lead opinion, written by Justice Stevens on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy, pointed out that Congress "believes that photo identification is one effective method of establishing a voter's qualification to vote and that the integrity of elections is enhanced through improved technology." Crawford, 558 U.S. at 198, 128 S.Ct. at 1618, 170 L.Ed.2d at 585.9 Justice Stevens quoted with approval from the report issued by the Commission on Federal Election Reform chaired by former President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, which emphasized: "The electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters. Photo [identification cards] currently are needed to board a plane, enter federal buildings, and cash a check. Voting is equally important." Id. at 194, 128 S.Ct. at 1618, 170 L.Ed.2d at 585-86 (quoting Building Confi
dence in U.S. Elections § 2.5 (Sept. 2005), App. 136-137 (Carter-Baker Report)).
We conclude that the Indiana Voter ID Law's photo identification card requirements are in the nature of an election regulation and, as such, must satisfy Indiana's requirements of uniformity and reasonableness. But the requirements of the Voter ID Law are not, as the plaintiffs urge, unconstitutional as additional substantive voter qualifications.
B.
As an additional argument claiming that the Voter ID Law violates Article 2, Section 2, the plaintiffs assert that the law is not uniformly applicable to all voters. We augment this argument to also consider both the requirements uniformity and reasonableness.
The plaintiffs contend that the Voter ID Law is not universally applicable to all voters because it does not apply to voters who mail in an absentee ballot or those who live in a state licensed care facility housing the voter's polling place. They argue that, to obtain the required Indiana photograph identification card, "a would-be voter must present the original or certified copy of her birth certificate, a certificate of naturalization, a U.S. Veteran's photo identification, a U.S. military photo identification, or a U.S. passport," many of which involve significant fees and/or hardship to obtain. Appellants' Br. at 22-28. The plaintiffs assert that these requirements make the Voter ID Law "burdensome, exclusionary and disqualifying as to some voters," particularly non-drivers and college students. Id. at 283.
As to uniformity, we acknowledge that the Voter ID Law creates exceptions to its [768]*768general requirement for government-issued photo identification as to mail-in absentee voters and for voters living in state licensed care facilities which house the voter's polling place. These exceptions, however, do not undermine the uniformity of the photo identification requirement for in-person voting. They apply only with respect to special alternative voting accommodations in which the photo identification requirement would be impracticable, unnecessary, or of doubtful utility. Such special exceptions no more create a fatal lack of uniformity in the Voter ID Law than do the statutory provisions authorizing mail-in absentee voting, early voting, and other accommodations that allow voting apart from in-person voting at regular polling places on election day invalidate Indiana's general election scheme for non-uniformity. They represent specific legislative regulations associated with additional accommodations extended by the legislature to provide alternatives for voters for whom in-person voting on election day would be difficult or impossible.
We are not persuaded that the photo identification requirements in the Voter ID Law are so unreasonable as to violate Article 2, The Law authorizes and provides guidelines to the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles for the issuance of non-driver voter identification cards. Ind.Code §§ 9-24-16-1, 9-24-16-2, 9-24-16-3.5. The Bureau must issue an identification card to an individual who applies for a card, is a resident of Indiana, and presents documentary evidence to verify the individual's name, date of birth, address, social security number, and legal presence in the United States. See Ind.Code §§ 9-24-16-1, 9-24-16-22, 9-24-16-38.5. Under regulations promulgated by the Bureau, an individual must provide documents to establish (1) identity, which includes full legal name and date of birth; (2) lawful status in the United States, which can be shown by a birth certificate, passport, or one of several other documents; (@) residency in Indiana; and (4) a social security number. 140 Ind. Admin. Code 7-1.1-8. To assist individuals in the process and to prevent the necessity for return trips to a Bureau branch, the Bureau has created an online list of the documents that can be used. The Bureau also has a customer service telephone line to assist people in retrieving the necessary documents. Furthermore, the Bureau may grant exceptions or use other verifiable documentation if an applicant is reasonably unable to gather the necessary documents. 140 LA.C. 7-1.1-3(e). Finally, the Bureau has established a system by which it can issue an interim identification card to allow an individual to vote while the Bureau conducts its verification of the application for a permanent identification card. 140 LA.C. 7-1.2-1.
We share the assessment expressed by Justice Stevens that "we cannot conclude that the [Indiana Voter ID] statute imposes 'excessively burdensome requirements' on any class of voters" and that, considering the statute's broad application to all Indiana voters, "it "imposes only a limited burden on voters' rights'" Crawford, 558 U.S. at 202-08, 128 S.Ct. at 1623, 170 L.Ed.2d at 590-91 (internal citations omitted)10 The burdens occasioned by the [769]*769Voter ID Law serve numerous substantial interests relating to the use of technology to modernize and to protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process. We find that the requirements of the Indiana Voter ID Law, while enhancing the procedural burdens associated with the voting process, are not sufficiently unreasonable.
Because it is not alleged in the present case, we need not determine whether an as-applied challenge may be maintained if a claim were presented and proven that reasonable government assistance was not actually available to adequately relieve either the cost or hardship of obtaining photo ID.
We therefore reject the plaintiffs' claims of facial unconstitutionality under Article 2 of the Indiana Constitution.
Part I. Equal Privileges and Immunitiee-Article 1, Section 23
The plaintiffs contend that the Voter ID Law violates the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution: "The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." Ind. Const. art. 1, § 23.11 The plaintiffs' complaint alleges two examples of unequal treatment claimed as violations of Section 23: (1) requiring photo identification of in-person but not mail-in absentee voters, and (2) exempting from the photo identification requirement voters residing in state licensed care facilities at which a precinet polling place is located.12
In Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994), this Court engaged in a comprehensive review of the history and purposes animating the adoption of Section 23 as part of Indiana's 1851 Constitution and of the subsequent case law, particularly our early decisions that were contemporaneous with its adoption and which were "accorded strong and superseding prece-dential value." Id. at 77. Synthesizing history, text, and subsequent case law, we adopted a superseding analytical formulation that, when statutes grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing per[770]*770sons or classes of persons, the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause imposes two requirements: "First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics [that] distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated." Id. at 80. In addition, "in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 283, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion." Id.
The plaintiffs' assertion that the Voter ID Law violates Section 28 is based on three principal contentions: (a) that the photo identification requirement is not reasonably related to the inherent characteristics that distinguish in-person and absentee voters; (b) that, among the in-person voters, variations in the photo identification requirement are not reasonably related to the differences among affected voters; and (c) that "for all these classifications, the preferential treatment is not equally available to all voters." Appellants' Br. at 30.
Employing the first Collins factor, and contrasting the in-person and absentee voters, the plaintiffs generally contend that the photo identification requirement is not reasonably related to the inherent characteristics that distinguish these two classifications of voters. The Voter ID Law requires proof of identification for in-person voters but not for persons who vote by mailing in an absentee ballot. The plaintiffs argue that these two classifications are distinguished on the basis that mail-in absentee ballots require heightened security and that this difference does not rationally support imposing additional identification requirements upon in-person voters. They also assert that the preferential treatment accorded mail-in absentee voters is not reasonably related to the distinctions between the classes.
The first factor in the Collins analysis involves considering both the nature of the characteristics that distinguish the classes and the relationship between the disparate treatment and such characteristies. Under this first factor, a statute may result in different treatment for different classifications of people without offending Section 23 if both (a) the disparately treated classifications are rationally distinguished by distinctive, inherent characteristics, and (b) such disparate treatment is reasonably related to such distinguishing characteristics. Ledbetter v. Hunter, 842 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ind.2006); Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 79.
The plaintiffs first compare the classifications of in-person voters with mail-in absentee voters. These two classifications are principally distinguished by the fact that an in-person voter, unlike a mail-in absentee voter, personally appears before election officials who can verify the identity of the person seeking to cast a vote. The plaintiffs urge that the photo identification requirement for in-person voters does not reasonably relate to the inherent differences between in-person voters and mail-in absentee voters.
The plaintiffs argue in part that, because the nature of absentee ballots requires a heightened security, the imposition of higher identification security on in-person voters is not reasonably related to the differences between the classifications. This interest in heightened security may be of particular concern in the regulation of absentee voting, but it is not determinative on the issue presented. The plaintiffs argue that the special treatment provided to mail-in absentee voters "do[es] not support the claimed purpose of the Photo ID Law." Appellants' Br. at 32. But such focus on the "purpose" of the Law is not [771]*771determinative, As we noted in Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. 2003), Collins "requires only that ... 'the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation, not the purposes of the legislation, 'be reasonably related to the inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes."" Dvorak, 796 N.E.2d at 239 (quoting Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 79).
More significantly, other critical attributes distinguish the identified disparately treated classes, especially the practicability of requiring and efficaciously utilizing photo identification for mail-in absentee voters, in contrast to in-person voters. For ballots received by mail, there is no opportunity for an election official to personally compare the voter with the voter's photo identification to verify identity. Absentee ballots "reach the hands of election officials outside of the confines of the Election Day polling place." Horseman v. Keller, 841 N.E.2d 164, 172 (Ind.2006). The plaintiffs do not propose any method by which a photo identification requirement could be effectively utilized to verify the identity of a mail-in absentee voter. Legislation is not constitutionally deficient for failing to impose an unenforceable, useless requirement. We find that not requiring photo identification for mail-in absentee voters is reasonably related to the inherent distine-tions between such voters and those voting in person. We decline to find that the Voter ID Law's failure to require photo identification of mail-in absentee voters violates the Indiana Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The plaintiffs assert multiple arguments with respect to the Voter ID Law's provision regarding certain voters living and voting in state licensed care facilities. One of the statutes comprising the Voter ID Law provides: "A voter who votes in person at a precinet polling place that is located at a state licensed care facility where the voter resides is not required to provide proof of identification before voting in an election." Ind.Code § 3-11-8-25.l1(e). This provision serves as a basis for the plaintiffs to claim a Section 23 violation under both Collins factors.
Using the first factor of the Collins methodology, the plaintiffs assert that the statute violates Section 23 by permitting residents of state licensed care facilities to vote at their residence without photo identification while requiring such identification as a prerequisite to voting by other seniors living elsewhere. They argue that "the distinctions between in-person senior citizen voters are not reasonably related to the different treatment accorded by the [Voter ID] Law." Appellants' Br. at 40. The plaintiffs also employ the second Collins factor, arguing that the statute grants preferential treatment to residents of certain state licensed care facilities but "does not grant similar relief to the elderly who are able to remain out in the community but who would have the same difficulties in procuring the requisite identification." Id. at 48. The plaintiffs thus assert that such privileged classification is not "open to any and all persons who share the inherent characteristics [that] distinguish and justify the classification" nor is the "particular classification ... extended equally to all such persons." Id. at 42-43 (internal citation omitted).
The relief sought by the plaintiffs is that the entire Voter ID Law be declared unconstitutional, not the overturning of the special exception for voters living in state licensed care facilities that serve as pre-cinet polling places on election day. In light of the relatively extremely small number of voters excluded from the photo identification requirement under this exception, even if arguably violative of Section 23, we find that it represents a minor [772]*772and insubstantial disparity permissible under Section 23. See Dvorak, 796 N.E.2d at 240. We explained in Dvorak that, in applying Section 23, "[elxact exclusion and inclusion is impractical," and noted the following observation from Collins:
It is almost impossible to provide for every exceptional and imaginary case, and a legislature ought not to be required to do so at the risk of having its legislation declared void, even though appropriate and proper as applied to the general subject upon which the law intended to operate.
796 N.E.2d at 240 (quoting Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80 (quoting Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Ry. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 561, 109 N.E. 206, 208 (1915))). Applying Dvorak, we find that granting a special privilege to residents of state licensed care facilities to vote at their residence without photo identification constitutes only a minor insubstantial variation that does not render sufficient disparate treatment to warrant judicial invalidation under Section 28.
Finally, in determining whether Section 28 is violated, we "must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion." Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80. Given the seope of the undertaking embraced in the Voter ID Law's efforts in enhancing the integrity of the electoral process and its attempt to tailor its operation to a significant variety of circumstances, we conclude that the possible absence of precise congruity in application to all voters represents a legitimate exercise of legislative discretion warranting our deference.
Conclusion
We conclude that it is clear on the face of the complaint that the plaintiffs, as a matter of law, are not entitled to the relief sought. It is within the power of the legislature to require voters to identify themselves at the polls using a photo ID.
This result may contrast with a somewhat analogous case in our sister state of Missouri, Weinschenk v. State, 2083 SW.3d 201 (Mo.2006). In that case, particular voters sued to block enforcement of a 2006 Missouri statute requiring registered voters to present certain types of photo ID to vote. Ms. Kathleen Weinschenk and the others claimed that the new law required them and other voters-particularly those who are low-income, disabled, or elderly, and who do not have driver's licenses-to spend money to obtain the necessary documents such as birth certificates in order to obtain the requisite photo ID in violation of the Missouri Constitution's provisions relating to equal protection and the right to vote. Id. at 204.13 The Missouri Su[773]*773preme Court held that while "there is a compelling state interest in preventing voter fraud, the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the Photo-ID Requirement is not narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose." Id. Accordingly, it found the statute unconstitutional. Id.
Not only do the constitutions of Indiana and Missouri vary, but also our statute differs from Missouri's-notably, a requisite photo ID can be obtained from the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles at no cost, Ind.Code § 9-24-16-10-and we do not mean to suggest that the facts present in the Missouri case would necessarily warrant declaring the Indiana Voter ID Law unconstitutional. But we do not foreclose such as-applied claims. Here the plaintiffs seek a declaration that it is unconstitutional to require voters to identify themselves at the polls using a photo ID. This is relief to which the plaintiffs are not entitled. But in affirming the trial court, we do so without prejudice to future particularized as-applied claims.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court granting the appellee's motion to dismiss and rejecting the plaintiffs' claims that the Indiana Voter ID Law contravenes Article 2, Section 2 or Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
BOEHM, J., dissents with separate opinion.