Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.

692 F. Supp. 2d 425, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21100, 2010 WL 809848
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedMarch 9, 2010
DocketCivil Action 08-862-JJF
StatusPublished

This text of 692 F. Supp. 2d 425 (Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 425, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21100, 2010 WL 809848 (D. Del. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Leader Technologies, Inc. (“Leader”) filed this action against Defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) alleging infringement of United States Patent No. 7,139,761 (the “'761 patent” or the “patent-in-suit”). The parties briefed their respective positions on claim construction, and the Court conducted a Markmcm hearing on the disputed terms. This Memorandum Opinion provides constructions of the disputed terms.

I. Background

The patent-in-suit is entitled “Dynamic Association of Electronically Stored Information With Iterative Workflow Changes.” It relates to the “management and storage of electronic information,” and specifically relates to “new structures and methods for creating relationships between users, applications, files and folders.” '761 patent, col. 1:20-24. At the core of their dispute, the parties have very divergent understandings of the technology covered by the '761 patent. Leader maintains that the '761 patent discloses a system which automatically captures environmental and tracking information on a document uploaded by a user, so that other users can search for the information associated with the document, and access the document from a central repository without having to know the document’s exact location. (D.I. 179, at 3-4; D.I. 196, at 3.) In contrast, Facebook contends that the '761 patent discloses a system in which data created by a user is automatically tethered to the user, so that when the user moves to a new location, the change in user context is captured dynamically, and the data is auto *428 matically available to the user in the new location. (D.I. 191, at 3-4.)

II. Legal Principles of Claim Construction

Claim construction is a question of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-78 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 388-90, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). When construing the claims of a patent, a court considers the literal language of the claim, the patent specification and the prosecution history. Id. at 979. Of these sources, the specification is “always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2005)(citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)). However, “[e]ven when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’ ” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.Cir.2004)(citing Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2002)).

A court may consider extrinsic evidence, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises, in order to assist it in understanding the underlying technology, the meaning of terms to one skilled in the art and how the invention works. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19; Markman, 52 F.3d at 979-80 (citations omitted). However, extrinsic evidence is considered less reliable and less useful in claim construction than the patent and its prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19 (discussing “flaws” inherent in extrinsic evidence, and noting that extrinsic evidence “is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of a patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence”).

In addition to these fundamental claim construction principles, a court should also interpret the language in a claim by applying the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words in the claim. Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759 (Fed.Cir.1984). The ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms denotes the meaning that a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art would ascribe to the terms in the context of the entire patent, including its specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. If the inventor clearly supplies a different meaning, however, then the claim should be interpreted according to the meaning supplied by the inventor. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (noting that patentee is free to be his own lexicographer, but emphasizing that any special definitions given to words must be clearly set forth in patent). If possible, claims should be construed to uphold validity. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1984) (citations omitted).

III. Term Construction

Leader alleges that Facebook infringes 27 of the 35 claims of the '761 patent. The parties were unable to agree on a set of representative claims for claim construction. (See D.I. 176, 177.) Leader contends that most claims of the '761 patent do not require construction, and accordingly asks the Court to construe five terms from the asserted claims. (D.I. 179, at 1.) Facebook initially sought construction of 31 additional terms, and argued that Leader’s failure to identify the “plain and ordinary meaning” of terms which Leader contends do not require construction “virtually ensure[d] that the parties [would] attempt to present claim construction evidence at trial.” (D.I. 191, at 8.) At the Markman hearing, the Court advised *429 the parties that “claim construction evidence” would not be presented at trial, and the Court would entertain a party’s motion to strike if experts disagreed on the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms. (See D.I. 269, Tr. at 60:8-63:7; 101:18-104:14.) Thereafter, by letter dated January 22, 2010, Facebook narrowed its proposed list of claim terms requiring construction to three terms. (D.I. 219.) By letter dated January 29, 2010, Leader contends that the three terms identified by Facebook do not require construction, as they are understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. (D.I. 224.)

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