Le Van Minh v. Department of Homeland Security

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedSeptember 10, 2025
Docket5:25-cv-02245
StatusUnknown

This text of Le Van Minh v. Department of Homeland Security (Le Van Minh v. Department of Homeland Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Le Van Minh v. Department of Homeland Security, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION 11 LE VAN MINH, ) No. 5:25-cv-02245-HDV-JDE ) 12 ) Petitioner, ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 13 ) ) THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE 14 v. ) DISMISSED )

15 ) DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND ) 16 SECURITY, et al., ) ) 17 ) Respondents. ) 18 19 On August 18, 2025, the Court received from Le Van Minh 20 (“Petitioner”), a federal detainee proceeding pro se and without paying the 21 filing fee or seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), a two-page 22 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. 1 23 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). Petitioner purports to challenge his “indefinite 24 detention” by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He alleges that 25 a final order of removal was issued on January 7, 2010, “but [ICE] has been 26 unable to remove” him. He was allegedly detained by ICE on June 8, 2025. 27 See Pet. at 1. Petitioner contends his detention violates the standard set forth 28 by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), as he has 1 been detained longer than six months and Petitioner’s home country “still 2 refuse[s] to accept him.” Id. at 1-2. 3 A habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is subject to the same 4 screening requirements that apply to habeas petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. 5 § 2254. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 6 Courts (“Habeas Rules”), Rule 1(b) (providing that district courts may apply 7 the Habeas Rules to habeas petitions that are not brought under 28 U.S.C. 8 § 2254); Lane v. Feather, 584 F. App’x 843 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district 9 court’s application of Habeas Rule 4 in dismissing a Section 2241 petition). 10 The Court has reviewed the Petition under Habeas Rule 4 and finds the 11 Petition appears subject to dismissal. 12 I. 13 DISCUSSION 14 Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules, a district court “must promptly 15 examine” the petition and, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition . . . that the 16 petitioner is not entitled to relief,” the “judge must dismiss the petition.” See 17 also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005). The Habeas Rules require a 18 statement of all grounds for relief and the facts supporting each ground, and 19 the petition should state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional 20 error and show the relationship of the facts to the claim. See Habeas Rule 2(c); 21 Habeas Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; Felix, 545 U.S. at 22 655; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (as amended). 23 Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, or 24 unsupported by a statement of specific facts, are insufficient to warrant relief, 25 and are subject to summary dismissal. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204- 26 05 (9th Cir. 1995); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994); Hendricks v. 27 Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 28 / / / 1 Here, the Petition falls far short of the minimal requirements to proceed 2 and fails to state facts that point to the real possibility of constitutional error. 3 As noted, Petitioner requests relief under Zadvydas. In Zadvydas, the Supreme 4 Court held that the “indefinite detention” of aliens subject to final orders of 5 removal raises “serious constitutional concerns.” 533 U.S. at 682. The 6 Supreme Court construed 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to contain an implicit 7 “reasonable time” limitation. Id. The Court held that “the statute, read in light 8 of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention 9 to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the 10 United States.” Id. at 689. “[F]or the sake of uniform administration in the 11 federal courts,” the Court held that six months was a presumptively reasonable 12 period of detention. Id. at 701. “After this 6-month period, once the alien 13 provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of 14 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond 15 with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. 16 “[A]n alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that 17 there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 18 future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. If released, an alien subject to a final order 19 of removal must comply with certain conditions of release. 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1231(a)(3), (6). The revocation of release is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), 21 which authorizes ICE to revoke an alien’s release for purposes of removal. 22 Specifically, an alien’s release may be revoked “if, on account of changed 23 circumstances,” it is determined that “there is a significant likelihood that the 24 alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. 25 § 241.13(i)(2). Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for 26 revocation of his release and an initial informal interview will be promptly 27 conducted to afford the alien an opportunity to respond. 8 C.F.R. 28 § 241.13(i)(3). “The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of 1 any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the 2 facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.” Id. 3 Here, Petitioner vaguely contends that he has been held longer than six 4 months and his “country still refuse[s] to accept him” (Pet. at 2), but he 5 provides no facts in support of these contentions. As pled, he has only been in 6 custody for approximately three months, and therefore his detention at the 7 time of filing was presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas, indicating that 8 the Petition is not ripe for federal review. See, e.g., Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 9 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (finding the six-month 10 presumptively reasonable period “must have expired at the time [the alien’s] 11 § 2241 petition was filed in order to state a claim under Zadvydas”). While 12 Petitioner otherwise alleges that the final order of removal was issued in 2010, 13 he alleges no facts regarding the intervening 15-year period, including whether 14 he was in custody during any portion of that time. Similarly, he has provided 15 no information regarding his home country, including the basis for his 16 contention that this country refuses to accept him.

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Le Van Minh v. Department of Homeland Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/le-van-minh-v-department-of-homeland-security-cacd-2025.