Le v. Saul

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedFebruary 8, 2021
Docket7:19-cv-00708
StatusUnknown

This text of Le v. Saul (Le v. Saul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Le v. Saul, (W.D. Va. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKEDIVISION THAI L.1, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No.7:19-CV-708 ) ANDREW SAUL, ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Thai L.(“Thai”) filed this action challenging thefinal decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) finding him not disabled and therefore ineligible for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (“Act”).2 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433. Thai alleges that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by failing to properlyperform a function-by-function analysis of his limitations arising from his hand, wrist and shoulder impairments, and failing to properlyweigh his subjective allegations. I conclude that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision in all respects. Accordingly, I DENYThai’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 14) and GRANTthe Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 18). STANDARD OF REVIEW This court limits its review to a determination of whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s conclusion that Thaifailed to demonstrate that he was disabled 1Due to privacy concerns, I use only the first name and last initial of the claimant in social security opinions. 2This case is before me by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). under the Act.3 Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001).This standard of review requires the Court to “look[] to an existing administrative record and ask[] whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the [ALJ’s] factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). “The threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high,” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154, and the final decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed where substantial evidence supports the decision. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). CLAIM HISTORY Thai filed for DIB in March 2016, claiming that his disability began on February 28, 2007, due topain in his right shoulder, hand and wrist, depression, high blood pressure and gout. R.16,200, 226.Thai’sdate last insured was December 31, 2012; thus,he must show that his

disability began on or before this date and existed for twelve continuous months to receive DIB. R. 22, 24; 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B), (d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.101(a), 404.131(a). The state agency denied Thai’s applications at the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review. R. 83–112. On March 13, 2018, ALJ Michael Dennard held a hearing to consider Thai’s claims for DIB. R. 60–82.Counsel represented Thai at the hearing, which

3The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Disability under the Act requires showing more than the fact that the claimant suffers from an impairment which affects his ability to perform daily activities or certain forms of work.Rather, a claimant must show that hisimpairments prevent himfrom engaging in all forms of substantial gainful employmentgiven his age, education, and work experience. See42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(2),1382c(a)(3)(B). includeda Vietnamese interpreter and testimony from vocational expert GeraldWells. On August 20, 2018, the ALJ entered his decision analyzing Thai’s claims under the familiar five- step process4 and denying his claim for benefits. R. 16–34. The ALJ found that Thaiwas insured at the time of the alleged disability onset and that he suffered from the severe impairments of right wrist fracture, carpal tunnel syndrome,

degenerative changes and right shoulder tear. R. 19.The ALJ determined that these impairments, either individually or in combination did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment.Id. The ALJ concluded that Thai retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, except that he can occasionally operate hand controls with the right hand; occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally crawl; frequently reach overhead to the right and perform all other reaching to the right; frequently handle items with the right hand and frequently finger with the right hand; frequently climb ramps and stairs; frequently work at unprotected heights; and frequently operate a motor vehicle. R. 20. The ALJ determined that Thai would be unable to perform his past relevant work as a

sheet rock installer, wooden frame builder, and cabinet maker, but that he could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, such as cleaner, hand presser, and folder/sorter. R. 32–34.Thus, the ALJ determined that Thai was not disabled. R. 34.Thai

4The five-step process to evaluate a disability claimrequires theCommissioner to ask, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) is working; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) can return to his past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether he can perform other work. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005)(per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R.§404.1520); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460–62 (1983). The inquiry ceases if the Commissioner finds the claimant disabled at any step of the process. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four to establish a prima facie case for disability. Atthe fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant maintains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”), considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform available alternative work in the local and national economies. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); Taylor v.

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Bluebook (online)
Le v. Saul, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/le-v-saul-vawd-2021.