Layman v. Doernte

175 A.2d 530, 405 Pa. 355, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 663
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 5, 1961
DocketAppeal, 225
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 175 A.2d 530 (Layman v. Doernte) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Layman v. Doernte, 175 A.2d 530, 405 Pa. 355, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 663 (Pa. 1961).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Musmanno,

On June 17, 1957, Clement P. Layman, the plaintiff in this case, was seriously injured when the bus in which he was riding was struck in the rear by another bus. In the ensuing trespass action which he brought against the Doernte Bus Lines, * owner of both buses, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000. The defendant seeks a new trial on the sole asserted ground that the verdict is excessive and should not be allowed to stand.

When bus No. 1, in which the plaintiff was a passenger, was struck by bus No. 2, the plaintiff was thrown with great force against the back of the seat which he occupied, his head coming into violent contact with the handrail above the seat. This whiplash blow fractured the plaintiff’s sixth and seventh vertebrae and, in consequence, he sustained disabilities and incurred ailments from which he had not recovered up to the time of the trial in October, 1960.

Immediately after the accident the plaintiff was treated by a chiropractor who later recommended him to Dr. Frank Pantalone, an orthopedic surgeon and physician.. Dr. Pantalone, who examined Clement Lay *358 man on July 20, 1957, testified: “. . . my first examination showed that he couldn’t turn his neck well from one side to the other or forward or backwards. Whenever I pressed in back of his neck, he would have a lot of pain and tenderness. The muscles in the back of his neck would be as hard as rocks. There would be expansion and rigidity. He had spasms in the region of his neck . . . When I would press on his neck, it would shoot the pain through his neck and between the shoulder blades. He had weakness of both of his shoulder regions and his arms. The pain went all the way down to the bottom of his chest in the back.”

The doctor found that the plaintiff had “two definite fractures or broken bones in two of the spinal processes.” He recommended physiotherapy, a cervical collar, a cervical pillow, a brace for his back, muscle stimu-' lation and home traction.

The plaintiff testified that he suffered from constant headaches. He described the symptoms: “You would swear your head was going to bust.” He said further that his head “gets full of knots.” When his wife was asked as to Layman’s sleeping habits after the accident she replied: “Twisting and turning and groaning.”

The doctor testified the plaintiff received physiotherapy 144 times; he saw him at his office about 175 times. Even after three years of medication and treatment, the plaintiff’s prognosis was not a bright one: “. .. I am of the opinion after having examined him and followed him not once or twice but for three (3) years, I am convinced in my opinion he will never get completely better. He will maintain the disability that he now has for the rest of his life. The x-rays show instead of getting better as a result of the accident they have gotten worse. I am definitely convinced he will maintain the permanent partial disability that he now has.”

*359 The plaintiff’s wife testified that her husband “seems to be getting what you call weaker.” Also that “his condition is becoming progressively worse.”

Dr. Pantalone said that the two fractures “have not hooked together”: “the two pieces that are broken off the two vertebrae are still there in the muscles of the neck. If he doesn’t get any better and tends to get worse, they will have to be removed because they are just like something there that doesn’t belong there . . . He has a lot of muscle turned into gristle ... No. 6 and No. 7 are split right in the middle . . . These can’t heal because they are in the part of the neck where there is always motion going on no matter how much you try to stop it.”

The doctor recommended an operation to “take out these two pieces” but he was not certain that the operation would accomplish a permanent cure because the plaintiff would still need physiotherapy.

The plaintiff’s total out-of-pocket expenses up to the date of the trial amounted to some $2100. If the operation is performed the surgical bill will amount to $500, plus hospital bills, and then there will be the further expense for the therapy treatments.

The appellant’s brief states: “Accepting these figures, it therefore seems that the jury awarded the plaintiff somewhere between $20,000 and $22,000 for his pain and suffering,” and that this amount shocks “a sense of justice.” The appellant’s principal argument in support of the asserted excessiveness of the verdict rests on the fact that the plaintiff lost no time from his occupation because of his injuries.

It is true that the plaintiff did not remain away from his job the day after the accident and that he continued to be gainfully employed when work was available, but this, ipso facto, is not proof that he was not physically disabled. There are many reasons why a *360 person would continue at liis employment and still be suffering from the effects of severe trauma.

The plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was 51 years of age. He is married and has four children, two of whom (a son 23 years of age and another 16) live with him at home. The 23-year old son is a permanent cripple, whose total helplessness is reflected in the fact that he must be spoon-fed. The younger son attends school. When the plaintiff was asked why he went to work after the accident he replied: “Because I couldn’t keep the family going not working.”

One who has been injured as the result of a tortious deed, and is legally entitled to recovery for his injuries, should not be penalized because he works in pain, and toils in agony, in order not to suffer the greater torment of seeing his family in want.

Moreover, continued employment after an accident, is no infallible criterion of physical strength, stamina or wholeness. Prior to the bus accident the plaintiff was employed as a “shot blaster” at the National Tube Company. The appellant describes this job as one entailing “the moving of large pipes, the rolling of them, the handling of a hose and distributing small steel pellets onto these pipes under heavy pressure. Following this, this shot must be shoveled up and these shovelfuls weigh approximately 75 pounds.”

The appellant argues that since this type of job obviously requires physical strength and muscular power, the plaintiff could not possibly have been as seriously disabled as he testified. But the appellant ignores the all-important fact that the plaintiff did not return to his shot blasting job. His foreman, being aware of his injuries, put him to work “pushing a broom or working on kneeling couplings or odd jobs like that.” A benevolent employer may make allowances for a faithful employee and assign him to comparatively easy jobs so that the pay envelopes may, like an unbroken *361 assembly line, continue to carry the necessities of life to the employee’s family. Thus, if Layman received the same rate of wages after the accident as before, this was due to the generous attitude of the employer, which benevolence does not lessen the responsibility of the tortfeasor.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
175 A.2d 530, 405 Pa. 355, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 663, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/layman-v-doernte-pa-1961.