SCHWELB, Associate Judge:
Ezzard Charles Lawrence appeals from his conviction of possession of heroin, in violation of D.C.Code § 33-541(a) (1981 & 1989 Supp.). His sole contention is that the trial judge committed reversible error in denying his pretrial motion to suppress the heroin. Concluding that the judge correctly held that the contraband was recovered as a result of a contact between Lawrence and a police officer which did not constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we affirm Lawrence’s conviction.
I THE EVIDENCE
The only witnesses at the suppression hearing were Officer Ronald H. Ward of the Metropolitan Police Department and Appellant Lawrence. Officer Ward, a thirteen year police veteran, testified that on August 22, 1986, he was participating in a police operation designed to apprehend violators of the drug laws in the 1500 block of Alabama Avenue, S.E., an area known for narcotics activity. Ward and his partner drove their car off 15th Place, S.E., into an alley that parallels Alabama Avenue. The vehicle stopped in front of a paved passageway between the buildings facing Alabama Avenue, S.E. Ward observed a group of five to seven people on the sidewalk by the fence on Alabama Avenue. Lawrence was one of these individuals.
Officer Ward testified that, at approximately the same time, a police vice cruiser turned off Stanton Road, S.E. into the 1500 block of Alabama Avenue, S.E., and stopped near the individuals who had gathered on the sidewalk. The members of that group rapidly dispersed in different directions. Lawrence walked up the passageway directly towards Ward, who had begun to walk down the same passageway in the direction of Alabama Avenue. Noticing that Lawrence’s left hand was clenched, Officer Ward thought that he might be concealing drugs. Ward testified that he stopped directly in front of Lawrence and identified himself as a police officer. Using what he described as a conversational tone, Ward asked Lawrence what he had in his hand.
Officer Ward stated that although the passageway was narrow, Lawrence could have walked around him on the sidewalk, which was approximately three feet wide. According to Ward, however, Lawrence chose not to do so. Rather, he stopped and opened his hand, which contained one clear plastic packet of white powder. Officer Ward recognized, on the basis of the packaging, that the powder was probably heroin. He seized the packet and, after a field test of the contraband on the scene produced a positive reaction for opiates, he arrested Lawrence.1
Lawrence testified that he had come to the area from his home in Alexandria, Virginia in order to retrieve a tool set which he had lent to someone whom he knew from a drug treatment clinic. He explained that he had asked some people [59]*59where he could find his friend, but he was unable to locate the man. He then walked across the street, passing through a group of people on the sidewalk, and continued down the passageway. Seeing some money on the ground, he picked it up. At this point, he noticed Officer Ward and another man “shaking down” a third man against a fence in the walkway. Lawrence did not know who Ward was, but heard him say that he had seen the third man drop something on the ground.
According to Lawrence, Officer Ward then hollered, “Hey, big boy, come here.” After Lawrence turned to see who was calling, Ward approached him, inquired what he had in his hand, and “asked” him to open it. Believing that his hand contained nothing more than two tightly rolled bills, Lawrence opened it. Unfortunately for Lawrence, however, Officer Ward took the money from him, and the package of white powder fell out. Ward then returned the money to Lawrence and another officer apparently field-tested the substance. The officers discovered that he had failed to pay a fine for a traffic violation and placed him under arrest. They also told him that the powder had tested positive for heroin.
Lawrence did not claim that Officer Ward compelled him to open his hand. Indeed, he asserted that he had done so because he felt that he had done nothing wrong. He testified that he did not know that there were illegal drugs with the dollar bills which he had found. There was some confusion in his testimony as to whether he even knew, at the time that he was asked to open his hand, that Ward was a police officer. In response to the prosecutor’s inquiry whether the officer had physically restrained him in any way or had forced him to open his hand, Lawrence stated simply: “No, he didn’t.”
II THE TRIAL JUDGE’S RULING
The trial judge, Honorable Luke C. Moore, denied the motion to suppress. He found that the defendant was unsure that Ward was a police officer, and that he had “practically admitted or conceded that he was not restrained.” The judge stated that “it was the defendant’s belief that he had done nothing [wrong] and he had no reason not to open his hand.” He found that Lawrence could have remained “mum” and kept walking, but instead “elected” to open his hand. He concluded that, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed that he was required to respond to the officer's request.
Noting that there was some divergence in the accounts of the two witnesses, and explicitly crediting the testimony of the officer,2 Judge Moore found that “this was a police-citizen encounter no more intrusive than what was done in Gomez v. Turner,
Ill LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. The authorities
Lawrence claims that the trial judge erred in ruling that his encounter with Officer Ward did not amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure. In particular, he argues that it constituted an unlawful detention because, under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have concluded that he was not free to leave the scene or to refuse the officer’s request. Measuring Lawrence’s contentions against the record developed at the motions hearing and Judge Moore’s factual findings, however, we are constrained to disagree and affirm.
On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court’s scope of review is limited. Peoples v. United States, 395 A.2d 41, 43 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 2826, 61 L.Ed.2d 277 (1979). We give deference to the trial judge’s findings of fact, Giles v. United States, 400 A.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C.1979), and must accept his resolution of conflicting testimony. United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42, 49-50 (D.C.1981). Moreover, the judge’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, i.e., without substantial support in the record.
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SCHWELB, Associate Judge:
Ezzard Charles Lawrence appeals from his conviction of possession of heroin, in violation of D.C.Code § 33-541(a) (1981 & 1989 Supp.). His sole contention is that the trial judge committed reversible error in denying his pretrial motion to suppress the heroin. Concluding that the judge correctly held that the contraband was recovered as a result of a contact between Lawrence and a police officer which did not constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we affirm Lawrence’s conviction.
I THE EVIDENCE
The only witnesses at the suppression hearing were Officer Ronald H. Ward of the Metropolitan Police Department and Appellant Lawrence. Officer Ward, a thirteen year police veteran, testified that on August 22, 1986, he was participating in a police operation designed to apprehend violators of the drug laws in the 1500 block of Alabama Avenue, S.E., an area known for narcotics activity. Ward and his partner drove their car off 15th Place, S.E., into an alley that parallels Alabama Avenue. The vehicle stopped in front of a paved passageway between the buildings facing Alabama Avenue, S.E. Ward observed a group of five to seven people on the sidewalk by the fence on Alabama Avenue. Lawrence was one of these individuals.
Officer Ward testified that, at approximately the same time, a police vice cruiser turned off Stanton Road, S.E. into the 1500 block of Alabama Avenue, S.E., and stopped near the individuals who had gathered on the sidewalk. The members of that group rapidly dispersed in different directions. Lawrence walked up the passageway directly towards Ward, who had begun to walk down the same passageway in the direction of Alabama Avenue. Noticing that Lawrence’s left hand was clenched, Officer Ward thought that he might be concealing drugs. Ward testified that he stopped directly in front of Lawrence and identified himself as a police officer. Using what he described as a conversational tone, Ward asked Lawrence what he had in his hand.
Officer Ward stated that although the passageway was narrow, Lawrence could have walked around him on the sidewalk, which was approximately three feet wide. According to Ward, however, Lawrence chose not to do so. Rather, he stopped and opened his hand, which contained one clear plastic packet of white powder. Officer Ward recognized, on the basis of the packaging, that the powder was probably heroin. He seized the packet and, after a field test of the contraband on the scene produced a positive reaction for opiates, he arrested Lawrence.1
Lawrence testified that he had come to the area from his home in Alexandria, Virginia in order to retrieve a tool set which he had lent to someone whom he knew from a drug treatment clinic. He explained that he had asked some people [59]*59where he could find his friend, but he was unable to locate the man. He then walked across the street, passing through a group of people on the sidewalk, and continued down the passageway. Seeing some money on the ground, he picked it up. At this point, he noticed Officer Ward and another man “shaking down” a third man against a fence in the walkway. Lawrence did not know who Ward was, but heard him say that he had seen the third man drop something on the ground.
According to Lawrence, Officer Ward then hollered, “Hey, big boy, come here.” After Lawrence turned to see who was calling, Ward approached him, inquired what he had in his hand, and “asked” him to open it. Believing that his hand contained nothing more than two tightly rolled bills, Lawrence opened it. Unfortunately for Lawrence, however, Officer Ward took the money from him, and the package of white powder fell out. Ward then returned the money to Lawrence and another officer apparently field-tested the substance. The officers discovered that he had failed to pay a fine for a traffic violation and placed him under arrest. They also told him that the powder had tested positive for heroin.
Lawrence did not claim that Officer Ward compelled him to open his hand. Indeed, he asserted that he had done so because he felt that he had done nothing wrong. He testified that he did not know that there were illegal drugs with the dollar bills which he had found. There was some confusion in his testimony as to whether he even knew, at the time that he was asked to open his hand, that Ward was a police officer. In response to the prosecutor’s inquiry whether the officer had physically restrained him in any way or had forced him to open his hand, Lawrence stated simply: “No, he didn’t.”
II THE TRIAL JUDGE’S RULING
The trial judge, Honorable Luke C. Moore, denied the motion to suppress. He found that the defendant was unsure that Ward was a police officer, and that he had “practically admitted or conceded that he was not restrained.” The judge stated that “it was the defendant’s belief that he had done nothing [wrong] and he had no reason not to open his hand.” He found that Lawrence could have remained “mum” and kept walking, but instead “elected” to open his hand. He concluded that, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed that he was required to respond to the officer's request.
Noting that there was some divergence in the accounts of the two witnesses, and explicitly crediting the testimony of the officer,2 Judge Moore found that “this was a police-citizen encounter no more intrusive than what was done in Gomez v. Turner,
Ill LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. The authorities
Lawrence claims that the trial judge erred in ruling that his encounter with Officer Ward did not amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure. In particular, he argues that it constituted an unlawful detention because, under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have concluded that he was not free to leave the scene or to refuse the officer’s request. Measuring Lawrence’s contentions against the record developed at the motions hearing and Judge Moore’s factual findings, however, we are constrained to disagree and affirm.
On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court’s scope of review is limited. Peoples v. United States, 395 A.2d 41, 43 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 2826, 61 L.Ed.2d 277 (1979). We give deference to the trial judge’s findings of fact, Giles v. United States, 400 A.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C.1979), and must accept his resolution of conflicting testimony. United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42, 49-50 (D.C.1981). Moreover, the judge’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, i.e., without substantial support in the record. Id. Nevertheless, the ultimate determination as to whether a seizure occurred remains a question of law. Richardson v. United States, 520 A.2d 692, 696 (D.C.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917, 108 S.Ct. 267, 98 L.Ed.2d 224 (1987). As a result, “we must review independently the trial court’s conclusion, giving due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact concerning appellant’s encounter with the police.” Id.
In reviewing this ultimate question of law, we have recognized that “[t]he touchstone regarding whether a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.” Id.; Barnes, supra, 496 A.2d at 1044. See also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (White, J., plurality opinion); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877-78, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); Turner, supra, 217 U.S.App.D.C. at 288, 672 F.2d at 141. The test is an objective one, focusing on a reasonable person’s interpretation of the conduct in question, and thus allowing the police to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment. Chesternut, supra, 108 S.Ct. at 1980.
Under the applicable case law, however, the inquiry whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave when approached by a police officer under a variety of circumstances has become an increasingly sophisticated one. In Barnes, supra, 496 A.2d at 1044, this court noted that the Supreme Court, opting in favor of public safety in relation to such encounters between citizens and police officers, has raised the threshold of what constitutes a seizure. Indeed, the Court has concluded that reasonable persons would feel free to leave under circumstances in which many of us would discern the existence of considerable pressure not to do so. See, e.g., Mendenhall, supra.
In other areas of the law, the concept of freedom of choice is an expansive one. In racial discrimination cases, for example, courts have long held that freedom of choice can exist only if the choice is free in the practical context of its exercise. Coppedge v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 273 F.Supp. 289, 299 (E.D.N.C.1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 410 (4th Cir.1968). “If choice influencing factors are not eliminated, freedom of choice is a fantasy.” Lee v. Macon [61]*61County Bd. of Educ., 267 F.Supp. 458, 479 (M.D.Ala.1967) (three judge court), aff'd sub nom. Wallance v. United States, 389 U.S. 215, 88 S.Ct. 415, 19 L.Ed.2d 422 (1967). If these principles were transposed to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, suppression would surely be called for in a host of cases, including the present one. An officer’s request to Lawrence to stop and open his hand, under the circumstances of this case, must reasonably be deemed, at least, a significant “choice influencing factor.” As one empirical study has concluded,
In high-crime areas, particularly, persons who stop and answer police questions do so for a variety of reasons, including a willingness to cooperate with police, a fear of police, a belief that a refusal to cooperate will result in arrest, or a combination of all three.
L. Tiffany, D. McIntyRE & D. Totenberg, Detection Of CRIME 17 (1967), quoted in 3 W. LaFave, Search and SeizüRe § 9.2(h) at 408 (1987 and Supp.1989) (hereinafter La-Fave).
Although the “broad” view of freedom of choice might theoretically have been applied to street encounters between police officers and citizens, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 276-77, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2072-73, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (separate dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall), we can now say with some assurance that this has not occurred, and that no such development is around the corner. As Professor LaFave has explained, if the concept of “freedom to walk away”
is taken to mean that a pedestrian whose movements have been interrupted and who is questioned is likely to feel free to depart without responding, it is a highly questionable conclusion. As noted Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod:[6] “Implicit in the introduction of the [officer] and the initial questioning is a show of authority to which the average person encountered will feel obliged to stop and respond. Few will feel that they can walk away or refuse to answer.”[7] This, it is submitted, is an accurate characterization of the great majority of situations in which an officer approaches a pedestrian and seeks an explanation for his activities or even identification. Thus, if the ultimate issue is perceived as being whether the suspect “would feel free to walk away,” then virtually all police-citizen encounters must in fact be deemed to involve a Fourth Amendment seizure. The Mendenhall-Royer standard should not be given such a literal reading as to produce such a result.
LaFave, supra, at 410-11.
Professor LaFave suggests an approach which would permit police officers
to seek cooperation, even where this may involve inconvenience or embarrassment for the citizen, and even though many citizens will defer to this authority of the police because they believe — in some vague way — that they should.
Id. at 411, quoting Model Code Of Pre-Ar-raignment Procedure 258 (1975). In his view, the “moral and instinctive pressures to cooperate” are generally sound, and the police may quite properly rely on them. Accordingly,
a street encounter does not amount to a fourth amendment seizure merely because of those pressures — that is, merely because the other party to the encounter is known to be a policeman. Rather, the confrontation is a seizure only if the officer adds to those inherent pressures by engaging in conduct significantly beyond that accepted in social intercourse. The critical factor is whether the policeman, even if making inquiries a private citizen would not, has otherwise conducted himself in a manner which would be perceived as a nonoffensive contact if it occurred between two ordinary citizens.
Id. at 412.
Professor LaFave’s approach is consistent with the applicable case law. In Cheste[62]*62rnut, supra, the Supreme Court held that the police had not seized a defendant who had begun to run when he saw their vehicle, although the officers accelerated to catch up with him and drove alongside him for a period of time until he dropped some contraband. The Court acknowledged that “the very presence of a police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating,” 108 S.Ct. at 1980, but held that this kind of police presence “would not have communicated to a reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon [his] freedom of movement,” and did not constitute a seizure. Id.8 In Barnes, supra, this court ruled that no seizure had occurred where a police officer approached the defendant outside a store, asked him to remove his hands from his pockets, and inquired why he was there and whether he had an arrest record. The court held that this constituted a consensual encounter “absent intimidating circumstances beyond the natural sense of obligation almost anyone would feel when a police officer begins asking questions.” 496 A.2d at 1044. In United States v. Burrell, 286 A.2d 845, 846-47 (D.C.1972), this court likewise discerned no seizure when a police officer placed his hand on Burrell’s elbow and said: “Hold it, sir, could I speak to you a second?” Moreover,
the cases indicate that the officer may question [a moving pedestrian] without bringing about a seizure not only when the interrogation is carried on without interrupting the movement, but also when the officer overtakes the pedestrian and asks him to halt or summons him to where the officer is located.
LaFave, supra, at 409-10 and authorities cited at n. 232 and n. 233.
The kinds of circumstances which might indicate that there has been a seizure will vary widely, depending on the facts of the particular ease. In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart suggested that a seizure might be found, even where the person did not attempt to leave, upon a showing of
the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.9
446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877 (plurality opinion). Accord, Barnes, supra, 496 A.2d at 1043. In Chesternut, the Court reasoned that no seizure had occurred because, among other things,
[t]he record does not reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers; or that they commanded respondent to halt, or displayed any weapons; or that they operated the car in an aggressive manner to block respondent’s course or otherwise control the direction of speed of his movement.
108 S.Ct. at 1980. Obviously, these examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive, but they reflect a firm disposition on the part of the Court to require more than the reluctance to defy the police which almost any citizen would feel when approached by an officer in order to establish a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
B. The law applied
Applying these principles to the instant case, we must uphold the trial judge’s ruling that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred. Lawrence encountered Officer Ward on a public walkway in mid-afternoon. Ward was walking, not running, down the walkway, when he saw Lawrence disengage himself from the group upon the arrival of a vice operations police cruiser. The officer stopped in front of Lawrence, who was walking towards him with his fist clenched. Lawrence could have walked around Officer Ward on the approximately three-foot wide sidewalk, but chose not to do so. It was at this point that Ward identified himself as a police officer and [63]*63asked, in what Judge Moore found to be a calm, conversational tone of voice, what Lawrence had in his clenched hand.
In light of this record, we find no “intimidating circumstances” in this encounter. Officer Ward did not draw his gun. He ultimately testified that he did not order Lawrence to halt. Although Lawrence maintained that Officer Ward directed him to come over, Judge Moore explicitly credited Officer Ward’s version of the events, and thus implicitly rejected those portions of Lawrence’s testimony which contradicted the officer’s account.10 In any event, Lawrence did not claim to have been coerced into doing anything, and the judge found that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.
The case is not without its problems. From a common sense perspective, Officer Ward’s initial testimony that he “stopped” Lawrence certainly suggests a restriction on appellant’s freedom to go about his business. The officer’s lack of consistency as to whether Lawrence could have walked around him is troubling. The government’s basic theory, borne out by Lawrence’s ultimate conviction by the jury, that he knew that there was heroin in his hand, is hard to reconcile with the notion that Lawrence stopped and opened his hand of his own free will, thus voluntarily giving the police evidence with which to prosecute him.11 We have stated that courts should be “earthy” in assessing street encounters between citizens and police officers, Cooper v. United States, 368 A.2d 554, 557 (D.C.1977), and the notion that Lawrence accommodated the officer out of a public-spirited desire to cooperate may not be altogether compatible with hardnosed realism.
In light of the gloss placed by the Supreme Court on the concept of a reasonable person’s feeling free to leave, however, the foregoing observations cannot affect the result.12 The trial court’s findings are simply inconsistent with the existence of the kinds of inhibitions on Lawrence’s liberty, beyond the intrinsic pressures generated by any encounter with the police in a high crime area, which the Supreme Court has required in order to find a seizure on facts like these. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is hereby
Affirmed.
13
6. 398 F.Supp. 882 (N.D.Ill.1975), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.1976).