Lawrence v. Dawson

34 A.D. 211
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 1, 1898
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 34 A.D. 211 (Lawrence v. Dawson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lawrence v. Dawson, 34 A.D. 211 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1898).

Opinions

Willard Bartlett, J.:

This is a mechanic’s lien suit in which we are concerned only with a controversy between James V. Lawrence, as surviving partner of' the .firm of Lawrence ■ Bros, on the one hand, and John Dawson and William Archer, composing the firm of Dawson & Archer, on the other. The controversy grows out of the. construction of a schoolhousé in the city of Mount Vernon. Dawson & Archer were the contractors with the municipality for the erection of the building. They entered into a sub-contract with one John Burden under which he agreed to furnish all the materials required for the carpenter work, and to perform- the carpenter work required by the terms of the principal contract. The plaintiff sold and furnished building materials to Burden .in such quantity that on September 10, 1897, about $2,500 or $2,700 was due to him for such materials. In order to enforce his claim for this amount, the plaintiff at .that time contemplated filing a mechanic’s lien against the school property, but at an interview between his agent and Burden and the defendant Dawson, Burden and Dawson stated to the plaintiff’s agent, as was the fact, that the terms of Burden’s sub-contract provided for and required the retention by Dawson & Archer of fifteen per cent of the value of all work done under said sub-contract until final payment and completion, “ and that said moneys' had been and. would be retained and said provisions' and terms of said contract as to.payment kept and observed by the defendants Dawson & Archer.”

Relying upon these representations, the plaintiff refrained for the time being from filing any lien. On the very day of the interview, however, Dawson & Archer paid out $3,000 to materialmen (Hartmann Bros.), between whom and Dawson & Archer there appears to have been no relation except such as grew out of the fact that Hartmann Bros, had supplied material to Burden which he put into the school building. Dawsón & Archer also subsequently paid to Burden $2,274.30 in advance of the terms of their sub-contract with him; that amount, representing the fifteen per cent already mentioned, not being payable under the terms of the contract before January 1, 1898. After these payments had been made, and on' October 28, 1897, when a balance of $1,825.92 -remained.due from Burden to the plaintiff, the plaintiff duly filed his lien.

In .the statement of the facts thus far made, nothing has been [213]*213included which was not found by the learned trial judge; but, notwithstanding the representations which have been recited, and notwithstanding the.plaintiff’s reliance thereon which led him to withhold the filing of his lien for more than six weeks, the'learned, trial judge holds that the facts and circumstances are not sufficient to justify a finding that the advance payment of the fifteen per cent to the sub-contractor was made for the purpose of avoiding the provisions of the Mechanics’ Lien Law, and he does find in fact that such payment was not so made,-but was made in good faith.

I think this finding is clearly against the weight of evidence, and should not be sustained.

The existing Lien Law contains the following provision : Any payment by the owner to a contractor upon a contract for the improvement of real property, made prior to the time when, by the terms of the contract, such payment becomes due, for the purpose of avoiding the provisions of this article, shall be of no effect as against the lien of a sub-contractor, laborer or material man under such contract, created before such payment actually becomes due.” (Laws of 1897, chap. 418, § 7.)

The opinion and decision in the court below are evidently based upon the assumption that this provision applies as well to any payment by a contractor to a sub-contractor as to any payment'by the owner to the principal contractor. Upon the present appeal, however, the learned counsel for the respondents denies that this is the correct construction of the provision which has been quoted, and declares that there is no prohibition in the Mechanics’ Lien Law against a contractor paying his sub-contractor in advance of the terms prescribed by the contract between them..

The provision in question is contained in section 7 of the statute which is included in article 1, and the 22d section declares that that article is to be construed liberally to secure the beneficial interests aiid purposes thereof.

In view of the construction which we gave to the provision of the former Mechanics’ Lien Law (Laws of 1885, chap. 342), which was under consideration in Smack v. Cathedral of the Incarnation (31 App. Div. 559), I am of the opinion that section 7 of the present Lien Law should be held to embrace" payments by the principal contractor as well as payments by the owner. It is to be noted that the [214]*214contract in the present case between Dawson & Archer and Burden, itself refers to Dawson & Archer as the owner, for it. provides that should the contractor, meaning Burden, at any time during the progress of the work refuse or neglect to supply a sufficiency of materials or workmen, the owner (which must mean Dawson & Archer, and cannot possibly mean anybody else in this sub-contract between these parties) shall have the power to finish the work and deduct the expense from the amount of the contract. For the purposes of this-litigation, therefore, the parties have themselves voluntarily assumed the characters of owner and contractor respectively, and it is certainly not a forced construction of -this provision of 'the Lien Law, so far as they are concerned, to apply it to the advance payments which were made by Dawson & Archer to Burden.

The circumstances of the interview of September 10, 1897, must be considered somewhat in detail in order to throw light on the purpose which brought about the advance payment. There were present at that conversation Percy Yonng, the agent of the plaintiff, John Dawson, one of the contractors, and John Burden, the sub-contractor.. Mr. Young was desirous to procure a payment on account of the plaintiff’s claim of $2,500 or $2,700, but Mr. Dawson was unwilling then to pay more than $1,000 cash, whereupon, says Mr. Young in his testimony : “ I asked him if the terms of the contract with Mr. Burden were the same in regard to the payments as the terms of the contract with the board of education, and he said they were, and he stated that the 15 per cent, being held back would preclude his paying us the full amount in cash.” Burden, when examined in refeiv ence to the same conversation, denied that anything was said about the terms either of his contract with Dawson & Archer or their contract with the board of education, or that anything was said about fifteen per cent being retained under their contract. He did testify, however, that when Mr. Young expressed the opinion that the plaintiff ought to 'get more money, he, Burden, told Mr. Young'that he had no claim on Dawson & Archer for more cash at that time. Dawson, who was also called as a witness, corroborated Burden in the statement that nothing was said about the contracts or retaining fifteen per cent.

Now it is to be noted that the learned trial judge did not believe what Burden and Dawson said on this subject; for he found, in [215]*215the most distinct manner, that the representations alleged in the complaint in regard to the retention of the fifteen per cent were made by Burden and Dawson to the plaintiff’s agent on the 10th day of September, 1897.

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Bluebook (online)
34 A.D. 211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lawrence-v-dawson-nyappdiv-1898.