Lawrence v. Commissioner
This text of 44 B.T.A. 128 (Lawrence v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION.
The Commissioner determined a deficiency of $1,-609.88 in war excess profits tax for 1917. Petitioner contends (1) that he is not taxable on his distributive share of income of Philippine partnerships derived from practicing law in the Philippine Islands; and (2) that, if he is taxable, the deficiency is barred by the statute of limitations. The facts are stipulated.
Petitioner, a citizen of the United States, now residing in San Francisco, California, was, during the years 1902 to 1918, engaged in the practice of law in Manila, Philippine Islands, as a member of successive partnerships. The income of the partnerships was derived exclusively from professional services performed in the Islands. Petitioner and the partnerships kept their accounts on the cash basis.
Petitioner’s net income in 1917 was:
Salaries, wages and commissions---⅜1,220.00
Share of profits of law partnership of 1917_ 44, 888. 56
Share of profits of law partnerships prior to 1917_ 6,137.11
1*52,245.67 .
This was equivalent to $26,122.84. He duly filed an income tax return for 1917 with the collector of internal revenue of the Philippine Islands. Data necessary and sufficient for the preparation of a war excess profits tax return appeared on the income tax return. Petitioner filed no war excess profits tax return. The Commissioner pre[129]*129pared such, a return and so advised the taxpayer in the deficiency notice of July 21,1939. This return showed net income of $26,122.67, and a deficiency was determined of $1,609.83.
The determination rests upon.the statement in the deficiency notice:
During the taxable year 1917 you were a citizen oí the United States residing in the Philippine Islands engaged in the practice of law. Tour net income from that source is held to be subject to the war excess-profits tax imposed by Title II of the Revenue Act of 1917.
There is no determination or suggestion of fraud.
Partnerships were subject to excess profits tax upon their net income, Revenue Act of 1917, sec. 201. By the same section, individuals were also subject to such tax, but members of partnerships, although subject generally to the excess profits tax, were not individually subject to such tax upon their distributive shares of the partnership income, Regulations 41, art. 41.1 So far as they were applicable, the regulations touched lawyers in the Philippine Islands no less than those practicing within continental United States. The Revenue Act of 1917, section 200, treated Philippine partnerships as foreign partnerships, and imposed the excess profits tax upon only the partnership net income derived from sources within the United States. The petitioner’s partnerships had no net income from sources within the United States and therefore there was no basis for an excess profits tax. The respondent is not claiming a tax upon the partnership.
The respondent claims the right to subject the individual partner to a 1917 war excess profits tax upon his share of partnership income from sources in the Philippine Islands. This would be contrary to the regulations in force at the time and consistently recognized ever since. If the regulations are to be ignored and the statute strictly applied under a revised interpretation to members of foreign partnerships, this must also be done as to members of domestic partnerships. Article 41 is equally applicable to both. Thus the tax would now be retrospectively said to apply to the distributive shares of all members of partnerships, such individual income being held now to be from trade or business, whether derived from sources in the Philippines, Porto Rico, foreign countries, or from the main part of the United States. Nothing indicates that article 41 was intended to cover only members of partnerships which had actually paid excess profits taxes, and then only to the extent of such payment. There is no foundation either [130]*130in tbe statute or tbe regulations for sucb a limitation of tbe article. This new interpretation more than twenty years after the statute has been superseded would be unconscionable. The 1917 excess profits tax was the first of its kind in this country and was difficult of interpretation and application in many respects.2 The regulations were drawn to facilitate administration of a novel statute. Many of the administrative rulings were expressly made to adjust the statute to practical conceptions.3 Eegulations 41 was the vade, mecwrn of both the taxpayers and the Government. It is now too late to say that it goes beyond the administrative power. Preeminently it should be recognized as having the force of law. The Commissioner’s determination is reversed.
[131]*131Since the Commissioner’s determination is reversed on the substantive ground, it is unnecessary to consider the petitioner’s contention that the statute of limitations precludes the deficiency.
Decision will he entered for the petitioner.
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44 B.T.A. 128, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1375, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lawrence-v-commissioner-bta-1941.