Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock

CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedFebruary 3, 2025
Docket1:22-cv-01143
StatusUnknown

This text of Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock (Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock, (D. Colo. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Judge William J. Martínez

Civil Action No. 22-cv-1143-WJM-KAS

MICHAEL LAWRENCE,

Plaintiff,

v.

BONAVENTURE OF CASTLE ROCK,

Defendant.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S VARIOUS MOTIONS SEEKING POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF

Before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Michael Lawrence’s (“Plaintiff”) three post- judgment motions—namely, his Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 33), Motion for Disqualification of Judge (ECF No. 34), and Motion for Relief from Court’s Order Dated July 10, 2024 (ECF No. 38). Defendant Bonaventure of Castle Rock (“Bonaventure”) responded to each of the motions (ECF Nos. 39–41), and Plaintiff replied only in support of his first motion seeking relief from judgment. (ECF Nos. 42– 43.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motions are all denied. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On October 23, 2023, the Court adopted the Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix (“Recommendation”) (ECF No. 18) and, in accordance therewith, dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 30.) The Court entered final judgment in favor of Bonaventure on the same date. (ECF No. 31.) In June 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 33) and a Motion for Disqualification of Judge (ECF No. 34). Both motions lacked the certificate of conferral required by D.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a). After 21 days had passed with no response from Bonaventure, Plaintiff filed notices with the Court stating that the motions were “now at issue and unopposed by the defendant.” (ECF Nos. 35, 36.) The Court

set a briefing schedule for Bonaventure’s response and Plaintiff’s reply to the pending motions (ECF No. 37), prompting Plaintiff to file a Motion for Relief from Court’s Order Dated July 10, 20241 (ECF No. 38) in opposition to the Court permitting Bonaventure to respond to the motions. Despite the Court’s Order, Plaintiff filed a reply only in support of his initial Motion for Relief from Judgment. (ECF Nos. 42, 43.) However, as Plaintiff’s reply deadline long ago passed on August 16, 2024, the Court considers the motions ripe for review and considers them in turn below. II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Relief from Court’s July 10, 2024 Order (ECF No. 38) The Court first takes up Plaintiff’s motion asking the Court, “pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) or (4),” to vacate its order setting response and reply deadlines on Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment and Motion for Disqualification of Judge. (ECF No. 38 at 1.) Plaintiff asserts that the Court “apparently inadvertently” “overstepped its authority” by ordering Bonaventure to file a response to his pending motions after the default 21-day response deadline under the Local Rules had passed. (Id.) Although

1 Although Plaintiff consistently refers to a July 10, 2024 Order, the Court assumes Plaintiff’s motion is directed to its July 9, 2024 Order (ECF No. 37). No order was entered in this action on July 10, 2024. acknowledging the Court retains discretion to set a response deadline of “such lesser or greater time as the court may allow” under D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d), Plaintiff contends that “[o]bviously, for the sake of fairness and foreseeability, if there is to be a change to the presumptive 21-day deadline, the Court must specify this before the deadline has passed.” (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff provides no authority to support this strained reading of the Local Rules. Cf. Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2010) (“District courts generally are afforded great discretion regarding . . . control of the docket and parties[], and their decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion.”). Moreover, the Court notes that its Order setting forth a briefing schedule for Bonaventure’s responses and Plaintiff’s replies served to remedy Plaintiff’s failure to confer with Bonaventure before filing the motions2—which is in itself a violation of the Local Rules for which the Court could have rightfully struck Plaintiff’s filings or denied them out of hand. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a); Builder MT LLC v. Zybertech Const. Software Servs., Ltd., 2008 WL 5246166, at

*2 (D. Colo. Dec. 16, 2008) (finding the “failure to confer alone is sufficient grounds to warrant denial” of plaintiff’s motion to vacate judgment). For at least these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Court’s Order Dated July 10, 2024 is denied, and the Court will consider Bonaventure’s responses in resolving Plaintiff’s post-judgment motions on the merits below. B. Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 33) Plaintiff moves for relief from the Court’s final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

2 In the Court’s view, Plaintiff’s failure to confer is exacerbated by the fact that his motions seeking post-judgment relief and the disqualification of the undersigned were filed almost eight months after final judgment was entered. (See ECF Nos. 31, 33, 34.) of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), which provides that “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” if “the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is available “only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party

of notice or the opportunity to be heard.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010); see also Bartch v. Barch, 2024 WL 3560748, at *5 (10th Cir. July 29, 2024) (same). To show that a court’s judgment is void on jurisdictional grounds, a party must show there is “no arguable basis on which [the court] could have rested a finding that it had jurisdiction.” Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 232 F.3d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citation omitted). Plaintiff introduces his motion as one seeking relief because “[t]he judgment . . . exceeds the court’s jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 33 at 1.) However, Plaintiff’s purported jurisdictional argument is that the Court was limited to reviewing whether the EEOC’s

issuance of a Notice of Right to Sue was “arbitrary and capricious.” (ECF No. 42 at 1.) Of course, the “arbitrary and capricious” standard Plaintiff recites is not a jurisdictional rule but instead the appropriate standard of review district courts apply when reviewing agency action pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Agr., 183 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1141–46 (D. Colo. May 2, 2016) (explaining that federal courts can exercise federal question jurisdiction to review administrative action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and apply an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review when considering the merits).

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Related

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa
559 U.S. 260 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Liteky v. United States
510 U.S. 540 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
232 F.3d 1342 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
United States v. Buck
281 F.3d 1336 (Tenth Circuit, 2002)
Garza v. Davis
596 F.3d 1198 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc.
787 F.3d 1297 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)
Hinman v. Rogers
831 F.2d 937 (Tenth Circuit, 1987)

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Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lawrence-v-bonaventure-of-castle-rock-cod-2025.