Lawrence Pickett v. CTA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: July 17, 2019
• Docket: 18-2785
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18-2785 LAWRENCE L. PICKETT, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 16 C 4337 — Charles P. Kocoras, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED JULY 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 17, 2019 ____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2015 a passenger on a bus operated by the Chicago Transit Authority screamed at and threatened Lawrence Picke[, the driver. He took six months off from work while recovering. After his physician conclud- ed that he could return to work (though not as a driver), Picke[ appeared one morning and requested a light-duty job. He was given one by the personnel on duty, but four 2 No. 18-2785

days later he was told that the CTA was not ready to permit his return to work. Picke[ previously had been told that before returning to work he needed to complete a form (which was enclosed with the le[er) and report to CTA’s Leave Management Ser- vices office, which would administer some tests (including a drug screen). He ignored those directions and simply showed up at his former workplace, where a supervisor gave him work pending advice from management. The ad- vice, when received, turned out to be a direction that Picke[ go home until he had done as instructed—fill out the form and report to Leave Management Services. Picke[ did not follow those directions until 2017. He was then approved for work and retired five days later. Before visiting Leave Management Services in 2017 he had filed with the EEOC a charge of age discrimination. Picke[ says that during 2015 he saw three or four persons younger than himself doing light-duty tasks. The CTA re- moved him, the eldest of the group, and he believes that it left the others at work. After receiving his right-to-sue le[er, Picke[ began litigation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34. The district court granted summary judgment to the CTA. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119454 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2018). (That opinion, and one earlier order, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66873 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2017), ad- dress several theories in addition to the age-discrimination claim, but all of those other theories have been abandoned.) Picke[’s principal contention on appeal is that the district court should have recruited counsel to represent him. He filed one motion for counsel, to which the judge replied: “Picke[s [sic] Motion for A[orney representation is denied No. 18-2785 3

at this time.” That was it. No explanation. Pro bono counsel representing Picke[ on appeal accurately observes that we have told district judges that explanations are essential. Prui8 v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 660 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc); McCaa v. Hamilton, 893 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir. 2018). How else would an unrepresented litigant know what more must be done to obtain judicial assistance? Prui8 and later cases set out considerations that bear on the proper exercise of dis- cretion, but without an explanation how can this court de- termine whether the district judge has abused that discre- tion? A few words might have sufficed, but the judge left both Picke[ and this court in the dark. It is not hard to imagine what those few words might have been. The judge might have pointed out that Picke[ had not provided a complete financial disclosure, so the rec- ord did not show inability to afford counsel. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(1). Picke[ doubtless has retirement income from Social Security as well as his former employers. He paid the filing fee in the district court. Or the judge might have observed that Picke[ did not describe why he had been unable to hire counsel. A litigant’s good faith but unsuccessful effort to obtain counsel is a nec- essary condition to the provision of judicial assistance to re- cruit a lawyer. See Prui8, 503 F.3d at 654. Picke[ told the dis- trict judge that he had approached four lawyers without success, but he did not say why they declined to represent him. Was it his unwillingness or inability to pay a retainer? Unwillingness and inability have different implications for the propriety of judicial aid. Was it that the four lawyers lacked the time to take new clients, given other commit- ments? Was it that the lawyers he approached were unfamil- 4 No. 18-2785

iar with age-discrimination law? Specialization in the bar contributes to good legal representation, and someone seek- ing to litigate an age-discrimination case needs to consult lawyers who practice this specialty—of which Chicago has many. Was it perhaps that they deemed Picke[’s claim too weak to justify litigation? If lawyers misunderstood Picke[’s contentions because he is inarticulate, then a judge might have a useful role to play in recruiting counsel, but if Picke[ conveyed his situation well and counsel deemed the claim feeble, then it would be inappropriate for a court to inter- vene. Why should a judge ask lawyers to devote less of their time to people with strong cases and more to people with weak ones? That would injure other litigants. Or the judge might have observed that Picke[ filed his motion so early in the case that it was impossible to tell whether he could represent himself adequately. A litigant’s competence to present his claim without a lawyer’s aid is another of the considerations that ma[er under Prui8. See 503 F.3d at 654. Perhaps this is what the judge meant when he said that he would not help Picke[ “at this time.” Picke[ did not file a second motion for judicial assistance in obtain- ing counsel. Finally, the judge might have thought it significant that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act has a fee-shifting clause. 29 U.S.C. §626(b), incorporating 29 U.S.C. §216(b). A[orneys who represent successful plaintiffs can anticipate full compensation from the employer, whether or not the cli- ent can afford to pay. Prui8 concerned a prisoner’s suit un- der 42 U.S.C. §1983, and although 42 U.S.C. §1988 provides for fee-shifting in §1983 suits, the fees that can be awarded in prisoner litigation are limited by 42 U.S.C. §1997e(d). See No. 18-2785 5

Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Be- cause of that cap, we did not consider in Prui8 how statutes that provide for a prevailing plaintiff to collect a fully com- pensatory fee affect the circumstances under which judges should try to recruit lawyers for indigent plaintiffs. Nor need we consider the subject here, given the other considerations already mentioned. But it deserves a[ention in cases where it may make a difference. The district judge should have said one or more of these things. Denying the motion without explanation was an er- ror, but a harmless error. See Pennewell v. Parish, 923 F.3d 486, 490–92 (7th Cir. 2019). It is enough for us to say that, even with the assistance of counsel on appeal, Picke[ has not shown how a lawyer could have helped him overcome his biggest obstacle: he never took the steps that the CTA told him were essential. The CTA told Picke[ to fill out a form and report to Leave Management Services for a drug test and other evaluation. He did not do so. Even after being re- moved from the position to which he had been assigned while a supervisor checked on his eligibility, Picke[ failed to follow these instructions for more than a year. Proof that the younger workers Picke[ saw in light-duty positions had been allowed to bypass those administrative steps would support an age-discrimination claim. But Picke[ has not alleged this. This means that he does not have any route to success, for he could not show that his age caused an adverse effect. The absence of counsel was harmless, and the claim on the merits was properly rejected by the district judge. AFFIRMED