LaVoult.com, LLC v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 4, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-06724
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LAVOULT.COM, LLC, Case No. 24-cv-06724-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS v. 9 Re: Dkt. No. 21 10 META PLATFORMS, INC., et al., Defendants. 11

12 13 LaVoult.com, LLC filed this action for patent infringement against Meta Platforms, Inc. 14 f/k/a/Facebook Inc., Instagram LLC, and WhatsApp, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”). Now 15 pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. Having carefully 16 considered the parties’ submissions, and with the benefit of oral argument on April 3, 2025, the 17 Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. As a matter of law, the ‘594 18 patent is ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Patent No. 8,751,594 (“594 patent”) was issued in June 2014. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 31.)1 21 “LaVoult is the legal owner by assignment of the ‘594 patent.” (Id. ¶ 8.) As alleged in the 22 complaint, the ‘594 patent “describes a groundbreaking, first-of-its-kind ‘disappearing’ message 23 technology where electronic messages sent by a user are automatically deleted after being read 24 when sent in ‘confidential mode’.” (Id. ¶ 1.) The specification explains the patent “involves using 25 a single software application to switch between a first mode of electronic messaging and a second 26 mode of electronic messaging.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 9.) In the first “regular” mode, messages are 27 1 “saved in a memory, e.g., a permanent memory.” (Id.) In the second “confidential” mode, 2 messages are sent “in data transmitted through the server and not permanently saved in any type of 3 memory, history or database.” (Id.) As a result, in confidential mode, “the data is irretrievable at 4 a later time.” (Id.) When a user exits the confidential mode of messaging, the confidential 5 messages are automatically deleted. (Id. at 13.) 6 Plaintiff filed suit in September 2024, alleging “Meta and its subsidiaries . . . have 7 provided disappearing messaging since at least as early as 2016” and “[e]ach disappearing 8 messaging feature infringes one or more claims of the ‘594 patent.” (Dkt. No. 21 ¶ 74.) 9 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Instagram’s “vanish mode” and WhatsApp’s “disappearing 10 messages” feature infringe Claim 1 of the ‘594 patent. (Id. ¶¶ 77, 98.) 11 MOTION TO DISMISS 12 Defendants move to dismiss on the ground the ‘594 patent is ineligible for patent 13 protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Patent eligibility “is a question of law, based on underlying 14 facts” that “may be, and frequently has been, resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) . . . motion.” SAP Am., 15 Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Dismissal is appropriate “where the 16 undisputed facts, considered under the standards required by [Rule 12(b)(6)], require a holding of 17 ineligibility under the substantive standards of law.” Id. 18 Section 101 “defines the subject matter that may be patented.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 19 593, 601 (2010). Under § 101, patentable subject matter includes “any new and useful process, 20 machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 21 35 U.S.C. § 101. “These categories are broad, but they are not limitless.” Twilio, Inc. v. Telesign 22 Corp., 249 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2017). “Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 23 abstract ideas are not patentable,” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014), 24 because “they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work,” which are “free to all . . . 25 and reserved exclusively to none.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 26 66, 70 (2012) (cleaned up). Allowing patent claims for such purported inventions “might tend to 27 impede innovation more than it would promote it.” Id. 1 of patent law.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. “At some level, all inventions embody, use, reflect, 2 rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Id. (cleaned up). So, “in 3 applying the § 101 exception, [the Court] must distinguish between patents that claim the 4 ‘building blocks’ of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something 5 more, thereby ‘transforming’ them into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. (cleaned up). 6 To draw this distinction, the Court engages in a two-step “Alice” analysis. First, the Court 7 “determine[s] whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Id. at 218. 8 If so, the Court then assesses “whether the elements of each claim, both individually and as an 9 ordered combination[,] . . . transform the nature of the claim into a patent eligible application.” Id. 10 at 217 (cleaned up). This second step of the analysis is “a search for an inventive concept—i.e., an 11 element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts 12 to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.” Id. at 217-18 (cleaned up). 13 I. ALICE STEP ONE 14 At Alice Step One, the Court decides whether the ‘594 patent’s claims are directed to an 15 “abstract idea.” This inquiry has two parts. First, the Court identifies precisely what the claims 16 are directed to accomplish. Second, the Court determines whether that “focus” is an abstract idea. 17 A. The “directed to” inquiry 18 The Court need not individually analyze every claim under the Alice rubric when certain 19 claims are “representative.” Twilio, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 1141 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 224). As 20 Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ contention that Claim 1 is representative, the Court limits its 21 analysis to Claim 1. See AI Visualize, Inc. v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 97 F.4th 1371, 1375 (Fed. 22 Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted) (“[C]laims may be treated as representative in a § 101 23 inquiry if a patentee makes no meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of any claim 24 limitations not found in the representative claim”). 25 Claim 1 recites:

26 A communication method between two or more users, comprising the steps of: 27 application, both the first mode of electronic messaging and the 1 second mode of electronic messaging being between a first electronic device associated with a first user and a second electronic 2 device associated with a second user;

3 receiving inputs from the first user for composing a regular message while in the first mode of messaging; 4 sending the regular message to the second user while in the first 5 mode of messaging;

6 receiving inputs from the first user for composing a confidential message while in the second mode of messaging; 7 sending the confidential message to the second user while in the 8 second mode of messaging; and

9 automatically and without user intervention, deleting a history of the confidential message on the first electronic device and on the second 10 electronic device based on at least one of the first user and second user exiting the second mode of messaging, 11 wherein the confidential message is only displayable before the 12 history of the confidential message is deleted;

13 wherein while in the first mode of messaging, a regular message is sent to the second user in data transmitted through a server and 14 saved in a memory; and

15 wherein while in the second mode of messaging, the confidential message is sent to the second user in data transmitted through the 16 server, the data being displayed until at least one of the first user and the second user exits the second mode of messaging. 17 18 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 12-13.) 19 In evaluating Claim 1, the Court examines “the focus of the claimed advance over the prior 20 art to determine if the character of the claim as a whole, considered in light of the specification, is 21 directed to [an abstract idea].” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1092 (Fed. 22 Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Finding a claim’s “focus” requires a delicate balancing act. While the 23 process necessarily requires some high-level description, the Court must articulate “what the 24 claims are directed to” with “enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful.” 25 Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Enfish, LLC 26 v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[D]escribing the claims at such a high 27 level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures that the 1 On one hand, Defendants contend the patent is “directed to the abstract idea of 2 automatically deleting confidential messages when exiting confidential mode.” (Dkt. No. 21 at 3 14.) In support of this assertion, Defendants point to the patent’s prosecution history.2 In an 4 amendment after a non-final rejection, the applicant stated: “Automatic deleting of messages is a 5 significant aspect of the current invention. . . . A user doesn’t have to remember to delete 6 confidential messages.” (Dkt. No. 21-2 at 9.) On the other hand, Plaintiff contends the patent is 7 “generally directed to a telecommunications method and apparatus in which two users can switch 8 between two modes of messaging, one being ‘regular’ or non-confidential and the other being 9 ‘confidential’ . . . and ‘irretrievable.’” (Dkt. No. 29 at 6.) 10 While the applicant’s comments in the prosecution history inform the “directed to inquiry,” 11 Mortg. Application Techs., LLC v. MeridianLink, Inc., 839 F. App’x 520, 525 (Fed. Cir. 2021), the 12 focus is the claim language. Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc., 72 F.4th 1355, 1363 (Fed. 13 Cir. 2023) (“Our focus is on the claims, as informed by the specification.”). Considering Claim 14 1’s language—as informed by the prosecution history and specification—the Court finds Claim 1 15 directed to a communication system to switch between two modes of electronic messaging: in 16 regular mode, messages sent are saved in a memory, while in confidential mode, messages are 17 stored temporarily and automatically deleted if either user exits confidential mode. 18 B. The “abstract idea” inquiry 19 Next, the Court determines whether this focus is an abstract idea. “Neither the U.S. 20 Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has set forth a bright line test separating abstract ideas from 21 concepts that are sufficiently concrete so as to require no further inquiry under the first step of the 22 Alice framework.” Twilio, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 221). That a claim is 23 directed to “mental processes that can be performed in the human mind or using a pencil and 24 paper” is a sign of abstraction. PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 8 F.4th 1310, 1316 (Fed. 25

26 2 At the parties’ request, (Dkt. No. 21 at 9 n.1; Dkt. No. 29 at 10), the Court judicially notices the ‘594 patent’s prosecution history at Docket Nos. 21-2, 21-3, and 29-4. See Lexos Media IP, LLC 27 v. eBay Inc., 722 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“Courts may . . . take judicial notice of 1 Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Likewise, “[a] claimed method’s similarity to fundamental . . . practices 2 long prevalent is yet another clue that the claims may be abstract and unpatentable.” Beteiro, LLC 3 v. DraftKings Inc., 104 F.4th 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). To determine whether a 4 claim’s focus is an abstract idea, courts also “compare claims at issue to those claims already 5 found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1334. 6 In this case, viewing the relevant facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Claim 1 is 7 directed to a process that could be performed by humans. As one illustration, an individual 8 exchanging handwritten messages with a recipient seated next to them could designate certain 9 messages private and shred those messages after the recipient reads them. Likewise, two 10 individuals recording their conversation could turn off the recorder, thereby designating that 11 portion of the conversation confidential and rendering the words they exchange irretrievable. 12 “[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps”—in this case, the automated 13 deletion of messages when one user exits the application—“there is nothing in the claim[] [itself] 14 that foreclose [it] from being performed by a human.” See Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Symantec 15 Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 16 Defendants analogize the case to RingCentral, Inc. v. Dialpad, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 3d 988 17 (N.D. Cal. 2019). In RingCentral, the patent described “a synchronization application which 18 synchronizes the client messages with the server messages associated with the client.” Id. at 1001. 19 The application, after comparing the messages on the server with the messages on the client, 20 “identifie[d] a set of actions that need to be performed to synchronize the messages . . . 21 “includ[ing] adding messages, deleting messages, or changing the status of a message to read or 22 unread.” Id. At Alice Step One, the court concluded the claims were directed to patent-ineligible 23 abstract ideas because “[t]he functions described in the claims could all be performed by humans.” 24 Id. at 1004. That is, a person could compare folders on the desktop with folders on a mobile 25 device, note the discrepancies, and make changes as required to “synchronize the desktop copy 26 with the copy on the first mobile device”—including by deleting messages. Id. at 1004. 27 So too here, a human can perform the steps of the ‘594 patent by exchanging “regular” 1 after showing them to the recipient. Claim 1 “do[es] this in a computer environment, but that 2 doesn’t transfigure an idea out of the realm of abstraction.” See PersonalWeb, 8 F.4th at 1316 3 (concluding the claimed data-management functions, including “marking copies of data items for 4 deletion,” were abstract because humans could perform them). 5 Plaintiff does not address RingCentral or other cases Defendants cite where the claimed 6 invention involved automated deletion. Instead, Plaintiff cites cases where the claim was directed 7 to “a specific improvement to the way computers operate.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. For 8 example, Enfish involved “several patents related to a ‘self-referential database’” that had two 9 features not found in traditional databases. Id. at 1329, 1332. “[F]irst the self-referential model 10 can store all entity types in a single table, and second the self-referential model can define the 11 table’s columns by rows in that same table.” Id. at 1332. “The patents [taught] that multiple 12 benefits flow from this design” including “faster searching,” “more effective storage of data,” and 13 “more flexibility in configuring the database.” Id. Because “the self-referential table recited in 14 the claims on appeal [was] a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a 15 computer stores and retrieves data in memory,” the Federal Circuit concluded the claims at issue 16 were not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1339. In doing so, the Federal Circuit distinguished 17 claims “directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer”—like the one before it— 18 from claims that “simply add[] conventional computer components to well-known business 19 practices.” Id. at 1338. 20 In this case, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Claim 1 falls into the 21 latter category. The toggling between two modes of communication and the automatic deletion of 22 messages described in Claim 1 do not improve the functioning of a computer. Whereas in Enfish, 23 the claimed invention provided benefits such as faster searching and better storage, the benefits 24 described in the ‘594 patent’s specification stem from the abstract idea itself. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 12 25 (explaining the dual messaging mode “may be useful when for example, communicating 26 restricted, secret or private content such as medical conditions, financial information, business 27 plans, sensitive corporate data or legal issues”).) 1 (Dkt. No. 29 at 19.) At oral argument, Plaintiff conceded this storage space benefit is nowhere 2 disclosed in the prosecution history, specification, or claim. Plaintiff nonetheless insisted the 3 Court can consider this benefit because it is an “inherent” and “obvious” advantage. But Plaintiff 4 could not provide any support for the proposition that the Court can or should consider “inherent” 5 benefits in deciding whether a claim is abstract. Moreover, that the benefit is “obvious” is another 6 way of saying the benefit inures from the use of generic computer components. And 7 “improvements in speed, cost, and accuracy are benefits of using computers for automation 8 generally and do not result from some other inventive concept.” People.ai, Inc. v. Clari Inc., No. 9 2022-1364, 2023 WL 2820794, at *12 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2023). 10 Similarly, Plaintiff insists Claim 1 “simplifies and reduces time to segregate normal 11 messages from confidential messages, and avoids the extra steps of coordinating deletion by 12 people at both ends of a communication.” (Dkt. No. 29 at 19.) But this is precisely what makes 13 the focus of Claim 1 abstract. While Claim 1 may make the process of deleting messages more 14 efficient, it remains the case that Claim 1’s steps can be performed by humans. See Credit 15 Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[A]utomation of 16 manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in 17 computer technology.”). 18 Plaintiff’s other citations are likewise inapposite. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 19 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting “the method of claim 1 employ[ed] a new kind of 20 file that enables a computer security system to do things it could not do before”); Core Wireless 21 Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting the claim 22 “disclos[ed] a specific manner of displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather than 23 using conventional user interface methods to display a generic index on a computer . . . resulting 24 in an improved user interface for electronic devices”). Whereas the claimed inventions in Finjan 25 and Core Wireless—like that in Enfish—recited a specific improvement in computer functionality, 26 in this case, “computers are invoked merely as a tool” to implement the abstract process of 27 switching between two modes of communication and automatically deleting messages in one of 1 So, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Claim 1 fails Alice Step 1 as a 2 matter of law because it is directed to an abstract idea. 3 II. ALICE STEP TWO 4 Patent claims directed to an abstract idea may be patentable if the claims contain an 5 “inventive concept,” either individually or taken together. Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. The inventive 6 concept must add “significantly more” to the abstract idea, Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73, enough to 7 “transform” it into a “patent-eligible application” of the abstract idea, Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. 8 Here, there is no inventive concept transforming Claim 1’s abstract idea into a patent- 9 eligible application. Just as the Court determined the claim fails to elaborate on specific 10 improvements to computer capabilities at Alice Step One, the claim fails at Alice Step Two as a 11 matter of law for the same reason. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339 (explaining the Step One and Step 12 Two inquiries can blend together when software patents are at issue). 13 Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Plaintiff contends “the ordered 14 combination of the claim limitations of claim 1 constitutes an inventive concept.” (Dkt. No. 29 at 15 21.) But Claim 1 describes the necessary order of steps to carry out the abstract idea of a dual- 16 mode communication system wherein confidential messages are deleted. The steps are to: (1) 17 receive and send inputs in the regular mode of messaging, (2) switch from the regular mode of 18 messaging to confidential mode, (3) receive and send inputs in the confidential mode of 19 messaging, and (4) upon a user exiting confidential mode, automatically delete the confidential 20 messages. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 12-13.) Figure 3 in the specification reinforces this sequence: 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 1 210 fo ai STAT MESSAGE IS 2 STORED TEMPORARILY 22 3 USER] LOGS INTO = suse IS 239 DELIVEREDTO. | =| essagi 4 zi || Meaty 5 says cn | | "ac USER? YES 6 i6 | nse wer Gis "L TF AND SENDS MESSAGE TO USER? NO g _ 9 218 HAS US 10 MODE? 1] 220 ~ ua = MESSAGE MAY BE MESSAGE IS = 2 uSET Ok USR2 YES 22 m4 726 MESSAGE IS MESSAGE IS USER ENDS SESSION v 14 Meee DISPLAYED ; mS . FG. 3 16

= 17

18 || Ud. at 6.) This “ordered combination of steps, which matches the ordered combination of steps 19 traditionally practiced by people manually, are themselves part of the abstract idea and cannot 20 || supply the inventive concept.” See People.ai, 2023 WL 2820794, at *12 (quotation marks 21 omitted). While the ‘594 patent “goes into detail about how the receiving and sending is 22 || accomplished” as Plaintiff observes, (Dkt. No. 29 at 23), such detail does not transform the 23 abstract idea into an inventive concept. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82 (“[S]limply appending 24 || conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to .. . abstract ideas cannot make those . 25 . . ideas patentable.”). 6 Nor does Claim 1’s invocation of a server to send the messages render Claim 1 patent- 27 eligible. In opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff describes the benefits of using a 28 “specialty, private server,” (Dkt. No. 29 at 7), but as Plaintiff conceded, this language is not in the

1 claim or specification. Rather, Claim 1 describes messages sent “in data transmitted through a 2 server.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13.) And elsewhere, the specification says “[s]erver . . . is any server 3 capable of processing and storing data.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 10.) Further, Plaintiff fails to explain 4 how data transmission through a server is anything but a generic computer component being used 5 to apply the abstract idea. See Realtime Data LLC v. Array Networks Inc., No. 2021-2251, 2023 6 WL 4924814, at *12 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2, 2023) (listing “data server” among other “generic 7 computer components” does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea). Put 8 another way, “[s]tating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’” is not 9 enough for patent eligibility. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223. 10 At oral argument, Plaintiff raised a new Step Two argument, asserting the “something 11 more” transforming the idea into a patent-eligible invention is the utilization of two different kinds 12 of memory: permanent memory for messages exchanged in regular mode, and temporary memory 13 for the messages exchanged in confidential mode. But this argument is not grounded in the 14 language of the claim or the specification. Claim 1 says “while in the first mode of messaging, a 15 regular message is sent to the second user in data transmitted through a server saved in a memory.” 16 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13) (emphasis added).) The specification is likewise unspecific about the type of 17 memory the claimed invention uses: “The memory may be, for example, a random access memory 18 (RAM), or a type of read only memory (ROM) such as erasable programmable ROM (EPROM) or 19 Flash ROM, hard drive or any such storage system typically used for storing computer related 20 data.” (Id. at 10.) 21 Moreover, memory is among the “generic computing terms . . . that provide a generic 22 technical environment for performing the abstract idea.” Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, 23 Inc., 72 F.4th 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2023); see also In re Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior 24 Univ., 991 F.3d 1245, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (at Step Two, concluding a claim describing the 25 “conventional steps of receiving and storing data in a computer memory” remained abstract); 26 Realtime Data, 2023 WL 4924814, at *12) (at Step Two, concluding the claim remained abstract 27 when the plaintiff “fail[ed] to explain how a . . . ‘memory system’ [was] anything but [a] generic 1 does not transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. 2 The same is true for Claim 1’s description of temporarily storing then automatically 3 deleting messages. In discussing prior art, the ‘594 patent specification describes a “currently 4 available messaging App” where users can specify a time for messages to expire, and when that 5 “time limit is reached, the message automatically deletes from the sender’s device, recipient’s 6 device and server.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 9.) On that app, which was available prior to the ‘594 7 patent’s issuance, users could also select “the ‘delete on read’ mode of operation which causes the 8 message to delete itself 60 seconds after the recipient has opened the message.” (Id.) So, contrary 9 to Plaintiff’s assertion, “automatic deletion of the history of the message ‘without human 10 intervention’” does not render Claim 1 patent-eligible. (Dkt. No. 29 at 23.) Moreover, automatic 11 deletion cannot be the inventive concept. See ClearDoc, Inc. v. RiversideFM, Inc., No. CV 21- 12 1422-RGA, 2022 WL 3355960, at *5 (D. Del. Aug. 15, 2022) (“To the extent [the plaintiff] is 13 arguing that the automatic deletion of media content supplies the inventive concept, I have already 14 decided that automatic deletion is an abstract idea.”). 15 Plaintiff’s citations in support of its Alice Step Two analysis are also inapposite. In 16 Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 17 the patent “claim[ed] a technology-based solution . . . to filter content on the Internet that 18 overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering systems” and “improve[d] the 19 performance of the computer system itself.” The Federal Circuit distinguished that patent from 20 patents like Plaintiff’s claiming “an abstract idea implemented on generic computer components, 21 without providing a specific technical solution beyond simply using generic computer concepts in 22 a conventional way.” Id. at 1352. Likewise, in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 23 F.3d 1288, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2016), “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily require[d] that 24 these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in 25 computer functionality.” 26 Here, in contrast, there is nothing in the complaint or specification to support a plausible 27 inference the ‘594 patent improves computer functionality. Plaintiff does not argue “that whether 1 issue.” See WhitServe LLC v. Dropbox, Inc., 854 F. App’x 367, 373 (Fed. Cir. 2021). And even 2 had Plaintiff made this argument, “purported factual questions” do not necessarily “preclude 3 dismissal . . . at the pleadings stage.” See id. Here, viewing the relevant facts in the light most 4 favorable to Plaintiff, there is no plausible case that the patent satisfies the eligibility requirement. 5 III. FUTILILTY OF AMENDMENT 6 Because Claim 1 recites an invention that is merely a routine and conventional use of 7 technology, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend. 8 “Although leave to amend should be given freely, a district court may dismiss without leave where 9 a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment 10 would be futile.” Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc., 65 F.4th 698, 705 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned 11 up) (quoting Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)). 12 “A patentee must do more than invoke a generic need for claim construction or discovery to avoid 13 grant of a motion to dismiss under § 101.” Trinity Info Media, 72 F.4th at 1360–61. “Instead, the 14 patentee must propose a specific claim construction or identify specific facts that need 15 development and explain why those circumstances must be resolved before the scope of the claims 16 can be understood for § 101 purposes.” Id. 17 At oral argument, Plaintiff did not identify a proposed claim construction or additional 18 factual allegations that warrant leave to amend or a claim construction hearing. As to claim 19 construction, Plaintiff stated the only construction needed—if at all—involves Claim 1’s language 20 stating messages in regular mode are sent “in data transmitted through a server and saved in a 21 memory.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13.) Plaintiff argued “memory” should be defined to include a 22 temporary memory and a permanent memory. But, as described above, the use of two types of 23 memory does not constitute an improvement in technology, so even if the Court adopted 24 Plaintiff’s construction, the patent would still fail the Alice test. Likewise, as to the proposed 25 amendment, Plaintiff represented it would amend the complaint to clarify the patent involves 26 permanent memory and temporary memory. But once again, the invocation of memory—a 27 generic computer component—is insufficient to render the ‘594 patent’s abstract idea patent- 1 Because amendment would be futile, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. 4 This Order disposes of Docket No. 21. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: April 4, 2025 7 8 ne AQQUELINE SCOTT CORLE, 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12

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