MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 13 2019, 10:19 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE R. Patrick Magrath Curtis T. Hill, Jr. RaeAne L. Pryor Attorney General of Indiana Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Jesse R. Drum Madison, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Laurin A. Smith, November 13, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-1287 v. Appeal from the Decatur Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Matthew D. Appellee-Plaintiff. Bailey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 16D01-1710-CM-1029
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 1 of 7 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, Laurin A. Smith (Smith), appeals her conviction and
sentence for battery resulting in bodily harm, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.
Code §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1); -(d)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES [3] Smith presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
(1) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt to convict Smith of battery resulting in bodily harm; and
(2) Whether Smith’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and her character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] Prior to divorcing, Smith and Robert Dean (Dean) had four children together.
On September 29, 2017, Dean, Dean’s girlfriend, Jessica Lindsey (Lindsey),
and the four children were spending the night at the Baymont Inn in
Greensburg, Indiana. Dean, who lived in Alabama, was exercising his
parenting time with the children that weekend. The following morning, Smith
arrived at the hotel, asking to see her children. She spoke with Dean, who
consented to let her see the children but requested that she remain in the lobby.
Smith waited, but the children did not come down.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 2 of 7 [5] When the children failed to appear, Smith went to Dean’s room on the second
floor. Peggy Glover (Glover), who works in housekeeping for the Baymont
Inn, was cleaning an adjacent room when Smith arrived on the second floor.
Smith “was upstairs waiting for her ex-husband to come out of the room or
something and she kept just sitting there and pretty much aggravating them.”
(Transcript p. 23). Glover heard Smith talk to the children through the door;
“all you heard in the room [] was [sic] her kids screaming and crying because
[Smith] was acting crazy the first time she beat on the door” (Tr. p. 19) Smith
yelled, “just let me have my kids.” (Tr. p. 19). At some point, Lindsey opened
the door wide enough for Smith to stick her foot in the opening and keep the
door open. While Smith forced the door open, “[o]ne of the kids got knocked
out of the way[.]” (Tr. p. 24). Glover heard the screaming, exited the room she
was cleaning and went down toward Dean’s room. Glover noticed that the
little girl “was laying there crying[.]” (Tr. p. 20). Smith “was in the room and
she had the girlfriend by the hair.” (Tr. p. 24). Glover “did see [Smith] pull
[Lindsey’s] hair.” (Tr. p. 25). Lindsey was “telling her to let go. She was
screaming a little” and appeared to be in pain. (Tr p. 26).
[6] On October 2, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Smith with battery
resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. On April 30, 2019, the trial
court conducted a bench trial, at the close of which Smith was found guilty as
charged. That same day, the trial court sentenced Smith to 360 days,
suspended to probation.
[7] Smith now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 3 of 7 DISCUSSION AND DECISION I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[8] Smith contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt to sustain her conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury.
Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well settled. In
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court does not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Clemons v. State, 987 N.E.2d
92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We consider only the evidence most favorable to
the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if
the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative
value to support the judgment. Id. Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient
to support a conviction. Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016).
Circumstantial evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. Clemons, 987 N.E.2d at 95. Reversal is appropriate only when
reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material
element of the offense. Id.
[9] To convict Smith of battery resulting in bodily injury as a Class A
misdemeanor, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that Smith knowingly or intentionally touched Lindsey in a rude, insolent, or
angry manner, resulting in pain. See I.C. §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1); -(d)(1). Bodily
injury, in turn, is defined by statute as “any impairment of physical condition,
including physical pain.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-29. “Any degree of physical pain
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 4 of 7 may constitute a bodily injury[.]” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 142 (Ind.
2012).
[10] The evidence presented reflects that Smith forced her way into the hotel room
by putting her foot in the door. Once inside, she grabbed Lindsey by the hair
until she screamed and yelled for Smith to let go of her hair. Glover testified
that Lindsey appeared to be in pain. The trial court could reasonably infer from
this evidence that Lindsey felt pain when Smith pulled her hair.
[11] Smith now attempts to place doubt on Glover’s testimony, as Lindsey did not
appear for trial and Glover’s testimony was the only evidence presented by the
State to establish the bodily injury prong of the statute. However, the trial court
explicitly “found the testimony of [Glover] to be credible. And [Glover
observed [Smith] pull the hair of [Lindsey], causing physical pain to Lindsey.”
(Tr. p. 54). As we cannot reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, we conclude
that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Smith’s conviction.
II. Sentence
[12] Next, Smith asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her to
an inappropriate sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Pursuant to
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if,
after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. “The 7(B) appropriateness inquiry is a discretionary exercise of the
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 13 2019, 10:19 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE R. Patrick Magrath Curtis T. Hill, Jr. RaeAne L. Pryor Attorney General of Indiana Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Jesse R. Drum Madison, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Laurin A. Smith, November 13, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-1287 v. Appeal from the Decatur Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Matthew D. Appellee-Plaintiff. Bailey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 16D01-1710-CM-1029
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 1 of 7 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, Laurin A. Smith (Smith), appeals her conviction and
sentence for battery resulting in bodily harm, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.
Code §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1); -(d)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES [3] Smith presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
(1) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt to convict Smith of battery resulting in bodily harm; and
(2) Whether Smith’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and her character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] Prior to divorcing, Smith and Robert Dean (Dean) had four children together.
On September 29, 2017, Dean, Dean’s girlfriend, Jessica Lindsey (Lindsey),
and the four children were spending the night at the Baymont Inn in
Greensburg, Indiana. Dean, who lived in Alabama, was exercising his
parenting time with the children that weekend. The following morning, Smith
arrived at the hotel, asking to see her children. She spoke with Dean, who
consented to let her see the children but requested that she remain in the lobby.
Smith waited, but the children did not come down.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 2 of 7 [5] When the children failed to appear, Smith went to Dean’s room on the second
floor. Peggy Glover (Glover), who works in housekeeping for the Baymont
Inn, was cleaning an adjacent room when Smith arrived on the second floor.
Smith “was upstairs waiting for her ex-husband to come out of the room or
something and she kept just sitting there and pretty much aggravating them.”
(Transcript p. 23). Glover heard Smith talk to the children through the door;
“all you heard in the room [] was [sic] her kids screaming and crying because
[Smith] was acting crazy the first time she beat on the door” (Tr. p. 19) Smith
yelled, “just let me have my kids.” (Tr. p. 19). At some point, Lindsey opened
the door wide enough for Smith to stick her foot in the opening and keep the
door open. While Smith forced the door open, “[o]ne of the kids got knocked
out of the way[.]” (Tr. p. 24). Glover heard the screaming, exited the room she
was cleaning and went down toward Dean’s room. Glover noticed that the
little girl “was laying there crying[.]” (Tr. p. 20). Smith “was in the room and
she had the girlfriend by the hair.” (Tr. p. 24). Glover “did see [Smith] pull
[Lindsey’s] hair.” (Tr. p. 25). Lindsey was “telling her to let go. She was
screaming a little” and appeared to be in pain. (Tr p. 26).
[6] On October 2, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Smith with battery
resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. On April 30, 2019, the trial
court conducted a bench trial, at the close of which Smith was found guilty as
charged. That same day, the trial court sentenced Smith to 360 days,
suspended to probation.
[7] Smith now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 3 of 7 DISCUSSION AND DECISION I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[8] Smith contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt to sustain her conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury.
Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well settled. In
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court does not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Clemons v. State, 987 N.E.2d
92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We consider only the evidence most favorable to
the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if
the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative
value to support the judgment. Id. Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient
to support a conviction. Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016).
Circumstantial evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. Clemons, 987 N.E.2d at 95. Reversal is appropriate only when
reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material
element of the offense. Id.
[9] To convict Smith of battery resulting in bodily injury as a Class A
misdemeanor, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that Smith knowingly or intentionally touched Lindsey in a rude, insolent, or
angry manner, resulting in pain. See I.C. §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1); -(d)(1). Bodily
injury, in turn, is defined by statute as “any impairment of physical condition,
including physical pain.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-29. “Any degree of physical pain
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 4 of 7 may constitute a bodily injury[.]” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 142 (Ind.
2012).
[10] The evidence presented reflects that Smith forced her way into the hotel room
by putting her foot in the door. Once inside, she grabbed Lindsey by the hair
until she screamed and yelled for Smith to let go of her hair. Glover testified
that Lindsey appeared to be in pain. The trial court could reasonably infer from
this evidence that Lindsey felt pain when Smith pulled her hair.
[11] Smith now attempts to place doubt on Glover’s testimony, as Lindsey did not
appear for trial and Glover’s testimony was the only evidence presented by the
State to establish the bodily injury prong of the statute. However, the trial court
explicitly “found the testimony of [Glover] to be credible. And [Glover
observed [Smith] pull the hair of [Lindsey], causing physical pain to Lindsey.”
(Tr. p. 54). As we cannot reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, we conclude
that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Smith’s conviction.
II. Sentence
[12] Next, Smith asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her to
an inappropriate sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Pursuant to
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if,
after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. “The 7(B) appropriateness inquiry is a discretionary exercise of the
appellate court’s judgment, not unlike the trial court’s discretionary sentencing
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 5 of 7 determination.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1291-92 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S.Ct. 978 (2015). “On appeal, though, we conduct that review with
substantial deference and give due consideration to the trial court’s decision—
since the principal role of our review is to attempt to leaven the outliers, and not
to achieve a perceived correct sentence.” Id. at 1292. Accordingly, the question
under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate;
rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Conley v.
State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). It is the defendant’s burden on appeal
to persuade the reviewing court that the sentence imposed by the trial court is
inappropriate. Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d 124, 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012),
trans. denied.
[13] Smith committed a Class A misdemeanor. “A person who commits a Class A
misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1)
year[.]” I.C. § 35-50-3-2. Here, the trial court sentenced Smith to 360 days
suspended to probation. While Smith complains that the trial court sentenced
her to the “maximum,” that statement is misleading as “[c]ommon sense
dictates that less executed time means less punishment.” Jenkins v. State, 909
N.E.2d 1080, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
[14] Regarding the nature of the crime, we note that Smith committed a battery on
another adult in the presence of her minor children, after forcing herself into the
hotel room. While entering the room, she pushed the door into her five-year-
old child, knocking her to the ground. Glover testified that the children were
“being shoved around . . . pretty good.” (Tr. p. 26).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 6 of 7 [15] Turning to her character, we note that Smith maintains employment and does
not have a criminal history. We agree with the State that maintaining
employment and not committing crimes are societal baselines, they are not
“substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character.”
Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Rather, Smith exhibited
some bad judgment by insisting on seeing the children during their father’s
parenting time and by escalating the situation into a physical altercation in front
of the children. At trial, she attempted to portray herself as a victim, such that
the trial court declared her “version of events to be implausible.” (Tr. p. 54). In
sum and based on the facts before us, we cannot conclude that Smith’s sentence
is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION [16] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
to support Smith’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, we hold
that Smith’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and her character.
[17] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C. J. and Bradford, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1287 | November 13, 2019 Page 7 of 7