HAHN, District Judge.
The action in the court below was one at law by the receiver of the National Bank of Kentueky, an insolvent national bank, to recover statutory double liability duly assessed against the receiver of the Banco Kentucky Company, a Delaware corporation. A jury was waived, and the ease was tried to the court. Recovery was had for the full amount of the assessment. For convenience, the parties will be referred to in this opinion as Ban-co and as receiver.
The assessment of double liability was made against Banco upon the theory that, be-mg the holder of trustees’partmrpatmn cereaíe® 1Sf®i™der alrast ®nt dated APnl ^ 19f ’ * a£d beneficlaI owner of national bank stock. The purpose of that agreement was to merge and unify the control and management of the National Bank of Kentucky and the Louisville Trust Company, a state institution. See National Bank of Kentucky v. Louisville Trust Co. (C. C. A. 6) 67 F.(2d) 97, certiorari denied February 5, 1934, 54 S. Ct. 440, 78 L. Ed. -. Both of these institutions were located at, and did business in, Louisville, Ky.
To ef|eetUate the merger of interests between these two institutions, it was provided by the agreement that the stockholders of each institution should deposit their stock ™th six trustees named in the trust agreement, and pursuant to the agreement the trustees issued transferable trustees’ participation certificates. As ultimately issued, each certificate represented 69.79 per cent, of Na*ional Bank stock and 30.21 per cent, of Trust Company stock. At the time of the appointment of the receiver for said National Bank, Banco owned 540,484 shares, or 95 per eent. 0f the trustees’ participation certifigates which were issued under the agreement, gaid certificates representing 37,721.624 glares of the stock of the National Bank of Kentucky, and'recovery was had upon that basis. Banco never held stock in the National Bank of Kentucky, but several years aftf* thf d,ate °f. the agreement purchased f ® t;ustees participation certificates which had been issued under the agreement.
, ?he ^«mmnt of April 22, 1927, proyided *?r ^ advisory committee which was at all times to be composed ox the individuals who were then directors
of the Louisville Trust Company and of the National Bank of Kentucky, and certain powers of the trustees could be exercised only with the written consent of the advisory committee.
The trustees were vested with power to purchase all or part of the stock of any corporation engaged in a business similar to that of a bank or trust company; to raise the means for such purpose by the issuance of evidences of beneficial interests called par
ticipation certificates; to sell any stock so purchased and to use the proceeds of sueh , sale in several different ways by division among the certificate holders; and, when they received funds from the liquidation of any capital stoek so purchased, they were authorized to distribute the same in a lawful manner. They were empowered to take any legal action appropriate for the increase or decrease of the capital stoek of any corporation which might become a part of the trust estate. Likewise they were empowered to use any extra dividends in any lawful manner for the benefit of the trust estate. The above enumerated powers, however, were never exercised by the trustees, and m accord-anee with the terms of the agreement could not have been exercised, except with the written consent of the advisory committee, which was composed of the members of the board of directors of the National Bank of Kentucky and the Louisville Trust Company.
The only powers which were uncontrolled and unrestricted in the trustees were to receive and hold the stocks which came into their hands as one indivisible estate, to issue trustees’ participation certificates therefor, to change the par value of the certificates tore-cenm dividends and pay them to the holders of the trustees’ participation certificates,_ to sefi and assign absolutely shares belonging to the trust estate to persons desiring to become directors of the bank, m their discretion to fix the pnce and terms of such sale and to pay the expenses ox the trust out) ox any funds coming into their hands.
Perhaps the most comprehensive paragraphs vesting power in said trustees-were the following •
“(8), tshallahavte
I*»
and it shall be their duty subject only to the limitations herein prescribed, to exercise in the interest of tbe holders of Trustees’ Participation Certificates, all of tbe powers of management and control over any corporation in which they shall bold stock, incident to the ownership of stock held by them hereunder, and their power shall include all rights as stockholders, in connection with any corporate purposes or functions whatever and shall authqrize them to exercise all voting rights and rights of ownership over such stock M the election of directors or in tbe discharge of any other corporate functions.
“Provided, however, that the owner of record on the books of the Trustees of any Trustees’ Participation Certificate, shall have the right by written directions to the Trustees given at least 5 days before the vote is to be cast, to instruct them how they shall vote in the corporate meetings sueh proportionate number of shares therein owned by the Trustees as the number of shares represented by the Trustees’ Participation Certificate owned by such person giving sueh directions may bear to the total number of shares represented by outstanding Trustees’ Participation Certificates and the Trustees shall vote sueh proportion of stoek in accordance with such instructions.”
The limitations prescribed in the agreement were those which resulted from the powers 0f the advisory committee and the proviso of the agreement just quoted,
p. appears from a review of the pro-visions of t}le contraet that the absolute pow-erg vested in tlle trustees were very limited, and that; if certificate holders desired to act under the proviso of the contraet, they might hy direction to the trustees elect the direc-torg of t]le bailk and of the trust company, -^ho would in turn compose the advisory committee, upon whose written instructions alone the trustees could exercise important powers vested in them by the contract,
In tbe execiltion of tIle contract, however, tbe trustees voted the bank shares; exercised
m
control oyer tb and drew all divi_ dends feom tbe bank that were paid on the shares. Au dividends reeeived were paid over to tbe bolders of tbe trustees, partiei tion certificates. The trustees elected the directors of the ballk and did wbatever else was neces-to be done b bank sWbc>lders.
The directors of Banco were all directors °f íhe Louisville Trust Company and of the National Bank of Kentucky The trustees were “rectors either m the Louisville Trust Company or National Bank of Kentucky, or both, and were also directors of Banco,
The agreement provided that a bolder of Latees participation certificates should be subject to tbe same liability thereon as he have been subject to in ease be had ^een owner record of such proportion-a^e °T the shares held by the Trustees in ^ corporation as the number of shares call-e<^ -^or ^7 Ms Trustees’ Participation CertifieaM hears to the whole number of shares coveire^1 hy outstanding Trustees’ Participa^on. Certificates. * The measure of lability assumed hereunder shall be the same as Niat provided by law with reference to the Md“s of.
sueh! ^Jn ^
Partieular cor' P°ratl0n m wluch the Trustees may hold ?s 1S ProjMed by law with reference holders of sueh stock, and no more.”
The Louisville Trust Company was designated as transfer agent for the transfer of
trustees’ participation certificates, and the National Bank of Kentucky was designated as registrar. The agreement provided the form in which trustees’ participation certificates should be issued. Each certificate referred to the agreement of April 23, 1927, and carried on its face the following legend: “This certificate is issued under the terms of the aforesaid agreement, and the holder hereof, by accepting the same, consents to and accepts the terms as fully as if written in.’’
At all times the National Bank of Kentucky kept at its place of business a record giving the names of trustees’ participation certificate holders, and the amounts for which certificates were held by them. The bank list showed the number and amount of certificates held by Banco. Certificates of stock deposited with the trustees were transferred to and stood on the books of the bank in the name of “The Trustees Under Stockholders’ Agreement of April 22,1927.”
A receiver was also appointed for the Louisville Trust Company, and the statutory liability was assessed against its stockholders. The trust estate had no property or funds other than the stocks of the National Bank of Kentucky and the Louisville Trust Company.
The sole question for determination is whether Banco is liable to respond as a stockholder in the National Bank of Kentucky as the real and beneficial owner of the stock under title 12 USCA § 64,
or whether it is exempt from liability under title 12 USCA § 66.
Banco claimed that there was no liability against it, and that under section 66 only funds in the hands of the1 trustees were liable.
We may assume that in the case of a strict trust, in the absence of a statute or an express agreement to the contrary, the trustee, Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330, 334, 335, 4 S. Ct. 147, 28 L. Ed. 163; Heiden v. Cremin (C. C. A. 8) 66 F.(2d) 943, 944,
and not the beneficiary is liable for individual liability assessed against stockholders. Banco’s difficulty, we think, is that it contracted away any nonliability or exemption as a beneficiary. There is no merit in its claim that it assumed no liability because it did not sign the contract of April 23, 192(7. Contractual liability under a written agreement may be assumed without such formality.
In Cau v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 194 U. S. 427, 431, 24 S. Ct. 663, 43 L. Ed. 1053, it was held that a bill of lading limiting liability constitutes a contract between the carrier and the shipper, and knowledge of the contents by the shipper will be presumed. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Brothers & Co., 256 U. S. 566, 570, 41 S. Ct. 584, 65 L. Ed. 1094, it was held that the assent by the sender to a limitation of liability is ordinarily established if the telegraphic message is written upon one of the company’s blanks, and in American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584, 43 S. Ct. 206, 67 L. Ed. 414, it was held that the shipper, by receiving and acting upon the receipt of the express company, although, the same was signed only by the latter, assented, to the terms of the receipt, and the same became the written agreement of the parties.
In Jennings v. Bank of California, 79 Cal. 323, 21 P. 852, 5 L. R. A. 233, 12 Am. St. Rep. 145. it was held that the acceptance without objection of a certificate of stock of' a bank, which contained upon its face a condition, was an acceptance of such condition. To the same effect see New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432, 27 L. R. A. 271; Sellers v. Greer, 172 Ill. 549, 56 N. E. 246, 46 L. R. A. 589, and Fidelity
&
C. Co. v. Fresno Flume
&
I. Co., 161 Cal. 466, 119 P. 646, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.). 322. The general rule was recognized by the Court, of Appeals of Kentucky in Bowen v.
Chenoa-Hignite Coal Co., 168 Ky. 588, 592, 182 S. W. 635.
The assumption of liability here is clear; the certificates in express terms provided that, “by accepting the same,” the holder “consents to and adopts said terms” of the contract of April 22, 1927. The liability of a holder of a certificate was to be measured by the liability provided “by law with reference to the holders of stock in any particular corporation in which the trustee may hold stock as if provided by law with reference to the holders of sueh. stock.” The stockholder’s double liability is not contractual, but is imposed by statute as an incident of ownership. Christopher v. Norvell, 201 U. S. 216, 26 S. Ct. 502, 50 L. Ed. 732, 5 Ann. Cas. 740. Having thus assumed liability, Banco could not claim the immunity or exemDtion provided by title 12 USCA § 66, or of the law in the absence of the statute.
The agreement further provided that the trustees should certify to the National Bank of Kentucky a copy of the trustees’ register giving the names and addresses of the holders of trustees’ participation certificates and any change as to sueh holding. Presumably, such certification was to be made in compliance with title 12 USCA § 62, which provides that national banking associations shall at all times beep a full and correct list of the names and addresses of all shareholders and the number of shares held by each, and that such list shall at all times be subject to inspection of creditors of the association. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan in Pauly v. State Loan, etc., Co., 165 U. S. 606, 621, 17, S. Ct. 465, 471, 41 L. Ed. 844: “Manifestly, one, if not the principal, object of this requirement, was to give creditors of the association, * * * information as to the shareholders upon whom, if the association becomes insolvent, will rest the individual liability for its contracts, debts, and engagements.”
Casual inquiry would have disclosed to any creditor the terms of the contract of April 22, 1927, including the provision for the payment of double liability. The law presumes that creditors, in extending credit to national banks, take into consideration the double liability which may he assessed in case of insolvency, and they are treated for that purpose as if they had made an actual inspection of the records of the hank (compare Tourtelot v. Stolteben [C. C.] 101 F. 362), and as if they had extended credit in reliance on the solvency of the shareholders whose names appear upon the books of the hank. See Benedict v. Anderson, Receiver (C. C. A. 6) 70 F.(2d) 227, decided April 13, 1934.
Under this section, also, the officers of the bank are required upon the first Monday of July of each year to transmit a list of the shareholders of the bank, verified by oath, to the Comptroller of the Currenej. As we have seen, the bank list showed that the stock of the bank stood in the name of “The Trustees Under the Agreement of April 22,1927,” and that Baneo’s name appeared as holder of trustees’ participation certificates. We may assume that performance of this duty of the officers brought actual knowledge to the Comptroller of the Currency of the agreement to pay double liability.
Whether on principles of estoppel Banco would not be permitted to deny its liability, under the circumstances, even in the absence of direct assumption thereof, we need not inquire.
To determine liability under section 64, the courts must disregard the forms of transactions and ascertain who is the real and beneficial holder of the stock. It has long been settled that the real and beneficial holder of hank stock is primarily liable for the double liability.
The case of Pauly v. State Loan
&
Trust Co., 165 U. S. 606, 17 S. Ct. 465, 41 L. Ed. 844, establishes the rule. In that ease Mr. Justice Harlan reviewed all of the previous cases relating to the liability of shareholders, and one of the propositions announced was (page 619 of 165 U. S., 17 S. Ct. 465, 470): “The real owner of the shares of the capital stock of a national banking assoeia^ tion may, in every case, be treated as a shareholder within the meaning of section 5151 (now title 12, See. 63).” There never has been any departure from this rule. So lately as Early v. Richardson, 280 U. S. 496. 499, 50 S. Ct. 176, 177, 74 L. Ed. 575, 69 A. L. R. 658, it was said: “That the actual owner of the stock may be held for the assessment, although his name does not appear upon the transfer books of the hank, is well settled.” •
A trust [Corker v. Soper, 53 F.(2d) 190 (C. C. A. 5), certiorari denied Corker v. Howard, 285 U. S. 540, 52 S. Ct. 313, 76 L. Ed.
933] may not be employed to evade double liability. It was said in Lewin on Trusts (13th Ed.) p. 113: “The court will not permit the system of trusts to be directed to any object that contravenes the policy of the law. In a learned article in 8 Quarterly Law Review, 220, 225, the author reaches the con-elusion “If, on the other hand, the so-called trustee is a mere nominee or dummy, put forward for no other purpose but to screen the so-called cestui que trust from responsibility, the relation between them is that of principal and agent and the principal is lia-hie.” Quoted 1 Meebem on Agency (2d Ed.) p. 28, note 31.
And it was said in Pauly v. State Loan & Trust Co., supra, at page 623 of 165 U. S., 17 S. Ct. 465, 471: “The objeet of the statute is not to be defeated by the mere forms of transactions between shareholders and their creditors. The courts will look at the relations of parties as they actually are, or as, by reason of their eonduet, they must be assumed to be, for the protection of creditors.”
The evidence establishes that Banco was in every sense the true and beneficial owner of the national bank stock involved; the trustees holding only the bare legal title to the stock. Banco had a right to transfer the trustees’ participation certificates of which it was the owner, and such transfer carried with it a proportionate part of the stock of the National Bank of Kentucky. Banco, upon written direction to the trustees, had a right at all times to vote; such right being based upon its proportionate holding of stock in the National Bank of Kentucky. Because of the interrelationship of the corporations and personnel of the various boards of directors, it was not necessary for it at any time to exer-eise this right. Banco had a right to receive, and did receive, dividends. The trustees had a right in the first instance to receive such dividends, hut it was their duty to pay them over to the holders of the certificates. Banco had a right to subscribe for its proportionate part of the increase in the capital stock of any corporation whose stock was held in trust, and by its right to vote bad full power to control the trustees so far as its own stock was concerned,
The potion and especially the evidence sustain recovery against Banco as the real and beneficial owner under section 64 of the National Banking Act (12 USCA). It was
no¡.
necessaiy that the receiver rely upon Ban-co>s agreement to pay the double liability, allegations of the petition relating to sucb agreement were perhaps in the nature of antieipation of Banco’s defense. However, y. been necessary to recover upon the provision of the contract assuming -liability, the decisions of this court would permit such recovery. Maumee Valley Electric Co. v. City of Toledo (C. C. A. 6) 13 F.(2d) 98, certiorari denied 273 U. S. 717, 47 S. Ct. 109, 71 L. Ed. 856.
Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. (C. C. A. 6) 37 F.(2d) 279, 77 A. L. R. 4, relied upon by Banco, is not to the contrary. It was held in that case that the contract sued upon was not one for the benefit of a third party. Unless the agreement of April 22, 1927, was in part &r the protection of the creditors of the bank>:lt mere nullity winch is not m accord with the intention of the original parties.
The trust established by the agreement of April 22, 1927, was a business trust created by the settlors, to whose rights Banco sueceeded, for their own benefit. It was not the ordinary testamentary or living trust created for the benefit of third parties. We need not decide whether it was the kind or type of trust which was within the contemplation of Congress when it enacted section 66 of the National Banking Act. The point was not decided in Hubbell v. Houghton (C. C.) 86 F. 547, 552 (affirmed on other points, Houghton v. Hubbell [C. C. A. 1] 91 F. 453), the court observing: “Moreover, if we were cornpelled to consider the proposition, we should probably hold that the statute, so far as it relates to the status of stock held in trust, concerns only express and active trusts, where there is a probability of some estate to respond to the liability.”
We find no error in that the court entered a judgment which included interest on interest whieh had accrued to the date of the judgment. We assume that in, the final enforcement of the judgment interest will be computed on the amount of the original recovery with interest, to the date of payment of the judgment, without intervening rests. See, also, Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319, 335, 9 S. Ct. 739, 33 L. Ed. 184.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.