Laura Kohrs v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 21, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02244
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4

5 LAURA KOHRS, Case No. 2:24-cv-02244-JAD-NJK 6 Plaintiff, Order 7 v. [Docket No. 39] 8 SMITH’S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, INC., 9 Defendant. 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel. Docket No. 39. Defendant filed 11 a response. Docket No. 40. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 42. The motion is properly resolved 12 without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. 13 I. BACKGROUND 14 Plaintiff’s suit alleges that she fell as a result of a negligently maintained pothole in the 15 parking lot of Defendant’s store on June 5, 2023, and suffered injuries as a result. See Docket No. 16 1-1 (complaint). 17 On October 15, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s initial motion to compel without 18 prejudice and ordered the parties to reengage in conferral efforts to resolve their discovery 19 disputes. Docket No. 36 at 5. Further, the Court ordered that any renewed motion practice on 20 these disputes must be brought by October 29, 2025, and any renewed briefing must be supported 21 by legal authority as to each argument being presented for resolution. Id. The parties conducted 22 a meet-and-confer on October 21, 2025, during which they resolved the majority of their disputes. 23 See Docket No. 39 at 1-7. Plaintiff moves the Court to compel Defendant to provide responses to 24 requests for production nos. 17, 40, and 41, as well as interrogatories nos. 11 and 12. 25 II. STANDARDS 26 “[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery.” Hallett v. 27 Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 28 (1998). When a party fails to provide discovery and the parties’ attempts to resolve the dispute 1 without Court intervention are unsuccessful, the opposing party may seek an order compelling that 2 discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The party seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of showing 3 why it should not be permitted. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). 4 Arguments against discovery must be supported by “specific examples and articulated reasoning.” 5 U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Ent., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006). 6 Parties are permitted to seek discovery of any nonprivileged matter that is relevant and 7 proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). District courts enjoy wide discretion 8 in deciding relevancy for discovery purposes.1 E.g., Shaw v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 306 9 F.R.D. 293, 296 (S.D. Cal. 2015). To be permissible, discovery must be “relevant to any party’s 10 claim or defense.” In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 563-64 (D. Ariz. 11 2016) (discussing impact of 2015 amendments to definition of relevance for discovery purposes). 12 Relevance for the purposes of discovery is defined broadly. See, e.g., V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 13 334 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D. Nev. 2019). 14 “Proportionality focuses on the marginal utility of the discovery being sought.” Guerrero 15 v. Wharton, No. 216CV01667GMNNJK, 2017 WL 7314240, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2017) (citing 16 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 180 F. Supp. 3d 273, 280 n.43 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)). Proportionality is judged based on: (1) the importance of the issues at stake in 18 the action; (2) the amount in controversy; (3) the parties’ relative access to relevant information; 19 (4) the parties’ resources; (5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues; and (6) 20 whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Fed. R. Civ. 21 P. 26(b)(1). “At bottom, proportionality is a ‘common-sense concept’ that should be applied to 22 establish reasonable limits on discovery.” Guerrero v. Wharton, No. 216CV01667GMNNJK, 23 2017 WL 7314240, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2017) (quoting Sprint Comm's Co. v. Crow Creek 24 Sioux Tribal Court, 316 F.R.D. 254, 263 (D.S.D. 2016)). 25 26

27 1 Material may be discoverable even if not admissible at trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), and relevance for discovery purposes is broader than relevance for trial purposes, see, e.g., F.T.C. v. 28 AMG Services, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 544, 552 (D. Nev. 2013). 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Plaintiff moves the Court to compel Defendant to provide responses to requests for 3 production nos. 17, 40, and 41, as well as interrogatories nos. 11 and 12. Docket No. 39. The 4 remaining discovery requests present three issues: 1) whether Defendant must produce documents 5 with customer names for five years’ worth of prior incidents in the subject parking lot; 2) whether 6 interrogatory no. 11 is properly limited in geographic scope to incidents at Defendant’s stores 7 where Defendant owns the parking lot in Clark County, Nevada; and 3) whether Defendant must 8 produce discovery as to previous sanctions for spoliation or destruction of evidence. 9 A. Request for Production No. 17 10 Plaintiff seeks documents relating to prior incidents involving potholes or other hazardous 11 conditions in the subject parking lot for five years prior to the incident. Defendant’s supplemental 12 response provided information for incidents that occurred in the subject parking lot for almost 13 three years prior to the incident. See Docket Nos. 39 at 11, 40 at 4-5. The parties previously 14 disputed the proper temporal scope of this request; however, Defendant agreed to produce five 15 years’ worth of prior incidents limited to the subject pothole. See Docket No. 40 at 5. Defendant 16 contends that any information regarding prior incidents beyond five years as to the subject pothole 17 is not proportional to the needs of the case. See id. at 13. In her reply, Plaintiff submits that the 18 temporal objections are now moot, but requests that the Court compel Defendant to produce 19 incident report documents with claimant names, rather than provide summaries. See Docket No. 20 42 at 3-4. 21 First, while the dispute over the temporal scope is now moot, there appears to remain a 22 dispute over whether these prior incidents are limited to the subject pothole or the subject parking 23 lot. Defendant submits that this discovery request should be limited to the subject pothole because 24 it is the specific location and instrumentality that allegedly caused Plaintiff’s fall. See Docket No. 25 40 at 13. In her reply, Plaintiff appears to gloss over Defendant’s insistence that the five-year 26 limitation apply only to the subject pothole, rather than the entire subject parking lot. See Docket 27 No. 42 at 3. Given the circumstances here, the Court finds that five years’ worth of prior incidents 28 limited to the subject pothole is reasonable and proportional to the needs of the case. 1 Second, Plaintiff requests that the Court compel Defendant to produce incident report 2 documents with claimant names, rather than provide summaries. See id. at 4; see also Docket No. 3 39 at 14-15. Plaintiff contends that request for production no. 17 is a request for documents and 4 thus requires Defendant to provide incident reports rather than brief descriptions of prior incidents. 5 See Docket No. 42 at 4. In its response, Defendant fails to address this issue with meaningfully 6 developed argument, beyond asserting that any additional discovery greater than that already 7 produced is overly burdensome. See Docket No. 40. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 34(a)(1), a party must produce or permit the inspection of documents responsive to a request for 9 production of documents when such documents are in the “party’s possession, custody, or control.” 10 Although Defendant previously produced summaries of prior incidents in the subject parking lot 11 for almost three years prior to the alleged incident, Defendant failed to produce the documents 12 relating to these incidents. See Docket No. 40 at 3-4. 13 Therefore, the motion to compel is GRANTED in part as to request for production no. 14 17. Docket No. 39. Defendant is ORDERED to produce all documents relating to the previously 15 disclosed prior incidents in Defendant’s supplemental response to request for production no. 17 16 and any prior incidents concerning the subject pothole for five years prior to the subject incident. 17 B. Interrogatory No. 11 18 Plaintiff originally requested information identifying similar incidents involving parking 19 lot injuries at any of Defendant’s stores in Nevada within ten years preceding the subject incident 20 to the present. See Docket No. 39 at 9. Plaintiff has since limited this request to five years 21 preceding the subject incident at Defendant’s stores in Clark County, Nevada, where Defendant 22 owns the parking lot. See Docket No. 39 at 15. Defendant submits that it is willing to produce 23 five years’ worth of prior incident information limited to the subject pothole at the subject location, 24 but that Plaintiff’s limited request is still too far outside the scope of discovery. See Docket No. 25 40 at 9. 26 This Court has held that, “[e]vidence concerning prior slip-and-fall incidents is generally 27 relevant to establish notice.” Daccache v. Sprouts Farmers Mkt., No. 2:24-CV-00423-GMN-NJK, 28 2024 WL 5109385, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 11, 2024) (citing Shakespear v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 LLC, No. 2:12-CV-01064-MMD-PAL, 2012 WL 13055159, at *5 (D. Nev. Nov. 5, 2012)). In 2 Daccache, the Court compelled the production of prior slip-and-fall incidents at the defendant’s 3 grocery stores within Clark County during the five years prior to the subject incident. Daccache, 4 2024 WL 5109385, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 11, 2024). This included all incidents involving the store’s 5 shopping cart area generally, even though the incident at issue occurred during a rare rainy day. 6 See id. 7 Although the subject incident is not a slip-and-fall, Daccache is applicable here because 8 Defendant’s notice of prior incidents at other stores is relevant to establishing notice of the alleged 9 parking lot hazard in this case. See id. (citing Chu v. Smith’s Food & Drug Cntrs., Inc., 2021 WL 10 2667683, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 25, 2021)) (“testimony being sought regarding prior incidents is 11 ‘probative of whether [Plaintiff’s] fall was caused by a temporary condition as Defendant claims 12 or a recurring problem that Defendant had a duty to address.’”). Further, even though the prior 13 parking lot incidents at the subject store did not involve a pothole, the broader inquiry into parking 14 lot hazards remains relevant to the issue of notice. See Shakespear v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., LLC, 15 No. 2:12-CV-01064-MMD-PAL, 2012 WL 13055159, at *6 (D. Nev. Nov. 5, 2012) (“evidence 16 regarding prior slip-and-falls is relevant to how Wal-Mart maintained the store and whether it 17 knew or should have known about the alleged foreign substance that caused Plaintiff’s fall, and 18 whether it took appropriate measures to protect its customers.”). 19 As to the proportionality analysis, a restricted timeframe of two years and a geographic 20 scope of Defendant’s stores in Clark County, Nevada, where Defendant owns the parking lot is 21 appropriate given the factors outlined in Rule 26(b)(1) and the circumstances of this case. See 22 Daccache, 2024 WL 5109385, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 11, 2024); see also Carreon v. Smith’s Food 23 & Drug Stores, No. 2:18-CV-01933-APG-NJK, 2019 WL 13210889, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 26, 2019) 24 (ordering the production of any slip-and-fall incident reports in defendant’s stores in Clark County 25 for two years prior to the subject incident); see also Schroeder v. Smiths Food & Drug Centers, 26 Inc., No. 2:12-CV-02024-LRH, 2013 WL 5493153, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 2, 2013) (ordering the 27 production of information about slip and falls that occurred on wet polished concrete outside of 28 defendant’s stores in Las Vegas during the three years prior to the subject incident). Although 1 parking lots may vary across Defendant’s stores, information about parking lot incidents at other 2 stores “would tend to suggest that Defendant either was aware or should have been aware” that its 3 failure to maintain the parking lot was creating unsafe conditions in front of its stores, or that these 4 unsafe conditions were “reasonably foreseeably in light of how often [they] had occurred in the 5 past.” Schroeder, 2013 WL 5493153, at *3. 6 Accordingly, the motion to compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as to 7 interrogatory no. 11. Docket No. 39. Defendant is ORDERED to provide responsive information 8 limited to a timeframe of two years preceding the incident and a geographic scope of Defendant’s 9 stores in Clark County, Nevada, where Defendant owns the parking lot. 10 C. Discovery Related to Prior Instances of Defendant’s Receiving Discovery 11 Sanctions 12 Through requests for production nos. 40 and 41 and interrogatory no. 12, Plaintiff seeks 13 discovery into whether Defendant has previously been sanctioned for spoliation or destruction of 14 evidence in cases involving personal injury claims in Nevada. Plaintiff submits that this discovery 15 is relevant because Defendant disclosed surveillance footage of the subject incident in which the 16 screen “goes black and the clock for the camera continues to run, including the exact moment 17 when Plaintiff falls and stands back up.” Docket No. 39 at 18. Plaintiff contends that the screen 18 going black when Plaintiff’s fall occurs provides reason to suspect spoliation. See id. Further, 19 Plaintiff asserts that this discovery is proportional because: 1) it goes to the issue of whether 20 Defendant willfully destroyed evidence; 2) the amount at issue is over $2 million; 3) Defendant 21 has direct access to its prior cases and would be aware of these instances; 4) Defendant is a large 22 company with a lot of resources while Plaintiff is represented by a relatively small firm; 5) this 23 discovery is relevant to Plaintiff’s negligence and punitive damages claims; and 6) Defendant has 24 not shown a demonstrable burden in searching for this discovery. See id. at 19-20. Additionally, 25 Plaintiff submits that she “is aware that the requests as phrased may be too broad in temporal 26 scope, and is amenable to limiting the temporal scope of the requests.” See id. at 20. 27 Defendant submits that information from the entirety of Nevada does not provide insight 28 into spoliation in this case, which involves a single store. See Docket No. 40 at 14. Further, 1 Defendant contends that its counsel does not possess a database of spoliation allegations or 2 determinations; therefore, any information that it would be able to gather would be derived from 3 the same source as Plaintiff. See id. Additionally, Defendant asserts that the surveillance footage 4 contains other portions of blacked-out video, not just the instant where Plaintiff falls. See id. 5 In her reply, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s designated witness testified that “she had 6 never seen this blackout effect before despite reviewing surveillance footage as part of her role.” 7 Docket No. 42 at 8. Further, Plaintiff submits that the footage provided from all other cameras 8 does not include “blacked out” moments. See id. at 9. 9 Defendant has the better argument. First, as Plaintiff admits, these requests are too broad. 10 See Docket No. 39 at 20. Requests for production nos. 40 and 41 have no temporal limit and the 11 geographical scope is the entire state of Nevada. Interrogatory no. 12 is temporally limited to ten 12 years preceding the subject incident through present, yet does not provide any geographical scope. 13 The Court declines to rule on the temporal and geographic limitations offered in Plaintiff’s reply— 14 which have not been fully briefed by the parties. See Docket No. 42 at 11. “It is Plaintiff’s 15 responsibility to seek discovery that is appropriately tailored; the Court will not endeavor to redraft 16 overbroad discovery to discern the outermost border of discoverable information for Plaintiff.” 17 D.S. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:22-CV-00246-JCM-NJK, 2023 WL 3584256, at *2 (D. Nev. 18 May 22, 2023). 19 Second, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant to produce previous Court orders in which it 20 was sanctioned for spoliation in an effort to create a record from which she can argue spoliation 21 or establish a discovery violation by Defendant. See Docket No. 39 at 18. But “[d]iscovery into 22 another party’s discovery process is disfavored,” and such requests are closely scrutinized. 23 PlayUp, Inc. v. Mintas, 344 F.R.D. 429, 437 (D. Nev. 2023) (first quoting Jensen v. BMW of N. 24 Am., LLC, 328 F.R.D. 557, 566 (S.D. Cal. 2019); then citing Ashcraft v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 25 No. 2:16-cv-02978-JAD-NJK, 2018 WL 6171772, at *2 n.2 (D. Nev. Nov. 26, 2018)). Plaintiff 26 submits that this discovery is relevant to her negligence and punitive damages claims; however, 27 those claims are specific to Defendant’s inspection and maintenance of the subject parking lot and 28 not the surveillance camera system. Plaintiff’s assertions regarding the relevance of prior 1}, sanctions are too far attenuated from the claims at bar, especially where Plaintiff has not 2|| demonstrated that spoliation occurred in this case. 3 Third, given that the discovery sought is previous Court orders, the proportionality analysis 4| skews in favor of Defendant. Both parties are represented by counsel who are capable of 5], conducting legal research; therefore, both parties have relatively equal access to the information 6] sought. 7 Accordingly, the motion to compel is DENIED as to requests for production nos. 40 and 8|| 41 and interrogatory no. 12. Docket No. 39. CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED in part and 11] DENIED in part. Docket No. 39. The ordered discovery must be provided no later than February 12} 4, 2026. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: January 21, 2026. et Fen Nancy J. Koppe * 16 United Sia lagistrate Judge

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