Laura Breeser v. the Menta Group

622 F. App'x 649
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 10, 2015
Docket13-16512
StatusUnpublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 622 F. App'x 649 (Laura Breeser v. the Menta Group) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Laura Breeser v. the Menta Group, 622 F. App'x 649 (9th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Laura Breeser appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants The Menta Group, Inc. NFP and Special Education Services dba Southwest Education Center, on Breeser’s claim for wrongful termination, brought under A.R.S. § 23-1501.3(c)(ii). We affirm.

In Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 932 P.2d 281 (App.1996), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that when a defendant advances a prima facie statute of limitations defense entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show available, competent evidence that would justify a trial. Id. at 284 (citation omitted). Defendant’s motion for summary judgment presented a sufficient pri-ma facie defense. Defendant produced evidence that Breeser was terminated on March 1, 2009, while Plaintiff did not initiate her lawsuit until March 15, 2010. The burden then shifted to Breeser to produce evidence showing why her cause of action did not accrue on March 1, 2009, the date of termination. See id.

Breeser is correct that under the discovery rule, a claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ conduct.” Mayer v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 14 Ariz.App. 248, 482 P.2d 497, 501 (1971). Breeser, however, had the burden of producing evidence showing the applicability of the discovery rule. See Logerquist, 932 P.2d at 284. Breeser failed to meet this burden. Breeser contended in her response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment that the wrongful termination claim could not have accrued until March 16, 2009, when she allegedly discovered that her name had been used erroneously on a form Defendants filed with the State of Arizona. She not only failed to provide evidentiary support for this claim, but also failed to explain why her cause of action could not have accrued until she had allegedly made this discovery. To the contrary, Breeser acknowledged that long before March 1, 2009, she had suspected that Defendants had filed applications with the state that contained incorrect information, and she had stated as much to Defendants. The information was enough for her claim to accrue by the date of her termination, March 1, 2009.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R, 36-3.

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Bluebook (online)
622 F. App'x 649, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/laura-breeser-v-the-menta-group-ca9-2015.