Lattimore v. Brahmbhatt

District Court, W.D. Virginia·Decided January 10, 2023·No. 4:21-cv-00038·Unknown

Opinion

CLERKS OFFICE U.S. DIST. CO AT DANVILLE, VA IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PRED FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA JAN 10 2023 DANVILLE DIVISION LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK BY: s/H. MCDONALD PATRICK & SHIRLEY LATTIMORE, ) DEPUTY CLERK ) Plaintiffs, ) Case No. 4:21cvQ0038 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) SONAL BRAHMBHATT, e¢ a, ) By: | Hon. Thomas T. Cullen ) United States District Judge Defendants. )

This dispute—long gestating on the court’s docket—dates back to a business relationship that soured, ending in Plaintiffs Patrick & Shirley Lattimore’s termination from their positions at The Raceway Inn Motel in Martinsville, Virginia. Plaintiffs contend they were fired unjustly and otherwise discriminated against. They also allege that the new owner of the hotel filed false charges against Patrick Lattimore, and that BB&T and the new owner conspired to withhold pay and unlawfully withdraw money from Plaintiffs’ bank accounts. After several iterations of a complaint, the operative pleading is Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint (ECF No. 27). The case is presently before the court on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 47.) Because Plaintiffs have failed to meet the high bar to warrant summary judgment in their favor, their motion will be denied. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The court has recounted Plaintiffs’ allegations in this case in prior opinions (see, □□□□ ECF Nos. 38, 109), and they need not be repeated in great detail here. In sum, Plaintiffs allege that they were unlawfully terminated from their positions on the basis of their race and age, that Sonal and Kamlesh Brahmbhatt unlawfully evicted them from their apartment at the

hotel, that the Brahmbhatts withheld salary and bonus money that was rightfully due to them, that the Brahmbhatts falsified criminal charges against Patrick Lattimore, and that BB&T unlawfully transferred money out of their personal checking account at the Dhyanni

Corporation’s direction. (See generally Third Am. Compl. [ECF No. 27].) They also alleged that Wyndham Hotels and Resorts violated the terms of its franchise agreement with the Brahmbhatts by failing to oversee their management of The Raceway Inn Motel and to ensure proper training and inspections. (See id. ¶¶ 31–33.) Plaintiffs brought suit against the Brahmbhatts, the Dhyanni Corporation, and Wyndham Hotels & Resorts in state court, and the case was subsequently removed to this

court. The court granted Wyndham Hotels’ motion for summary judgment; shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed the present motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 47.) Although BB&T was named as a defendant in the third amended complaint, Plaintiffs had not served it prior to moving for summary judgment. (Compare ECF No. 47 [Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, filed on June 16, 2022], with ECF No. 64 [Plaintiffs’ motion for extension of time to serve BB&T, filed on August 3, 2022].) All told, Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint

at least four times (and at least twice after filing the present motion); two of those attempts were denied by the court because they violated this court’s prior rulings and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See ECF Nos. 85, 110). After Plaintiffs filed the present motion, the Brahmbhatts and the Dhyanni Corporation failed to respond.1 The court issued an order directing those defendants to show

1 The Brahmbhatts and the Dhyanni Corporation were the only parties to whom the present motion could be directed because Plaintiffs had note served BB&T at the time they filed the motion, and thus BB&T was not properly before the court. cause why summary judgment should not be entered against them, citing the court’s pretrial order establishing the requirements for opposing any motion. (ECF No. 75.) Those parties responded, and the court granted them the opportunity to file a response in opposition to

Plaintiffs’ motion. (ECF Nos. 76, 85.) Because the matter has been fully briefed, it is ripe for disposition.2 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the court must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986); Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013). When making this determination, the court should consider “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with . . . [any] affidavits” filed by the parties. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Whether a fact is material depends on the relevant substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. (citation omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets that burden, the nonmoving party must then come forward and establish the specific material facts

2 Because oral argument would not have benefitted the court in resolving the present motion, the court will decide the motion on the pleadings. in dispute to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court views the facts

and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Glynn, 710 F.3d at 213 (citing Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011)). Indeed, “[i]t is an ‘axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (per curiam)). Moreover, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing

of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The nonmoving party must, however, “set forth specific facts that go beyond the ‘mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.’” Glynn, 710 F.3d at 213 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). The nonmoving party must show that “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “In other words, to grant summary judgment the [c]ourt must

determine that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on the evidence before it.” Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

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