Latsis v. Arapahoe

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 24CA2031
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA2031 Latsis v Arapahoe 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2031 Board of Assessment Appeals No. 23BAA5069

George Latsis,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Arapahoe County Board of Equalization,

Respondent-Appellee,

and

Board of Assessment Appeals,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE LUM J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026

George Latsis, Pro Se

Ronald A. Carl, County Attorney, Benjamin Swartzendruber, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Littleton, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Stephen J. Woolsey, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 Petitioner, George Latsis, appeals the final agency order of the

Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) determining the value of his

property for the 2023 tax year. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Latsis owns a 2,629-square-foot residence on a 17,860-

square-foot lot. For the 2023 tax year, the Arapahoe County Board

of Equalization (BOE) valued the property at $1,043,100. Latsis

filed a petition with the BAA protesting the valuation, and a hearing

was held on September 18, 2024.

¶3 At the hearing, Latsis presented evidence in support of his

proposed $866,255 valuation. The BOE presented an expert

witness, Riva Cordova, who had appraised Latsis’s property and

recommended a reduction in value from $1,043,100 to $949,000.

The BAA agreed with Cordova’s estimated value and entered an

order reducing the value of Latsis’s property to $949,000. Latsis

appeals.

II. Standard of Review

¶4 Property owners may appeal a decision of the BAA to this

court. § 39-8-108(2), C.R.S. 2025; Gilpin Cnty. Bd. of Equalization

v. Russell, 941 P.2d 257, 263-64 (Colo. 1997). We review BAA

1 decisions under the State Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-

106(7), (11), C.R.S. 2025. See § 39-8-108(2); Bd. of Assessment

Appeals v. Sampson, 105 P.3d 198, 208 (Colo. 2005). “A decision of

the Board may be set aside only if it is unsupported by competent

evidence or if it reflects a failure to abide by the statutory scheme

for calculating property tax assessments.” Sampson, 105 P.3d at

208.

¶5 A taxpayer bears the burden to show by a preponderance of

the evidence that the assessor’s valuation is incorrect. Cantina

Grill, JV v. City & Cnty. of Denv. Bd. of Equalization, 2012 COA 154,

¶ 44, aff’d on other grounds, 2015 CO 15. “It is the function of the

BAA, not the reviewing court, to weigh the evidence and resolve any

conflicts.” Sampson, 105 P.3d at 208. “[T]he evaluation of the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight, probative value, and

sufficiency of all of the evidence are matters solely within the fact-

finding province of the BAA, whose decisions in such matters may

not be displaced on appeal by a reviewing court.” Gyurman v. Weld

Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 851 P.2d 307, 310 (Colo. App. 1993).

2 III. Procedural and Evidentiary Issues

¶6 Latsis contends that the BAA violated his due process rights

by increasing his evidentiary burden, improperly permitting the

BOE to reference prior tax appeals, curtailing testimony from his

witnesses, preventing him from cross-examining other witnesses,

and unevenly allocating hearing time. We discuss each contention

in turn.

A. Applicable Law

¶7 A party’s right to procedural due process is met if the party is

provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Pub. Utils.

Comm’n v. Colo. Motorway, Inc., 437 P.2d 44, 47 (Colo. 1968). The

essence of procedural due process is fundamental fairness. City &

County of Denver v. Eggert, 647 P.2d 216, 224 (Colo. 1982). If an

agency’s determination depends on the resolution of factual issues

in a hearing, procedural due process requires that the “parties be

apprised of all the evidence to be submitted and considered, and

that they be afforded a reasonable opportunity in which to confront

adverse witnesses and to present evidence and argument in support

of their position.” Hendricks v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 809 P.2d

1076, 1077 (Colo. App. 1990).

3 ¶8 Errors in administrative proceedings do not require reversal

unless the complaining party can show prejudice. Joseph v. Mieka

Corp., 2012 COA 84, ¶ 67.

B. Analysis

¶9 Latsis contends that the BAA made several procedural and

evidentiary errors that impacted his right to a fair hearing.

¶ 10 First, Latsis argues that the BAA erred by stating, “[W]ithout

additional interior photographs of the subject property, it is difficult

for the [BAA] to justify any change in how the subject property’s

quality grade was ascertained by the [BOE’s] appraiser.” This

statement, Latsis says, imposed a de facto requirement that he

provide interior photographs and unfairly heightened his burden of

proof. See § 39-5-122(5)(b), C.R.S. 2025 (“Any information

presented by the taxpayer regarding the value of his property shall

be considered by the assessor in determining whether an

adjustment in value is warranted.”). We disagree. The BAA’s

statement regarding photographs was simply an explanation for

why it didn’t credit Latsis’s description of the property’s interior

over Cordova’s appraisal. It is the BAA’s sole province to weigh the

evidence and determine its sufficiency. Gyurman, 851 P.2d at 310.

4 To the extent Latsis argues that the BOE’s references to the

photographs during closing argument were improper, that

argument isn’t preserved, and we decline to address it. See CTS

Invs., LLC v. Garfield Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 2013 COA 30, ¶ 14

(“A party generally must first raise an objection in the

administrative proceeding to preserve a contention for appeal.”);

Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App.

2010) (the court of appeals generally does not review unpreserved

issues in civil cases).

¶ 11 Next, Latsis contends that the BAA violated its duty to provide

de novo review of the underlying assessment decision by allowing

the BOE’s attorney to reference Latsis’s property tax appeals in

prior years during the hearing. However, of the six allegedly

improper comments he identifies, two don’t appear in the record,1

and his challenges to the remaining four are unpreserved because

1 Latsis also fails to provide record citations in connection with

these two statements, and we are not obligated to search the record to address his appellate contentions. See O’Quinn v. Baca, 250 P.3d 629, 631 (Colo. App. 2010); People v. Duran, 2015 COA 141, ¶ 20.

5 he didn’t object to the remarks at the hearing.2 See CTS Invs., LLC,

¶ 14. Accordingly, we do not address this argument.

¶ 12 We reject many of Latsis’s remaining contentions because he

doesn’t explain how the alleged errors prejudiced him. See Mieka

Corp., ¶ 67.

• Latsis argues that the BAA “improperly cut off” Kathryn

Latsis’s testimony about her sale of a comparable

property, which would have showed that “the [BOE]’s

valuation assumptions were overstated by at least

$175,000.” However, both Latsis’s opening brief and the

record reflect that Kathryn3 testified about her sale of the

purported comparable property, including that she sold it

for “$175,000 less.” Thus, she had already testified

about the information Latsis wanted to elicit. To the

extent Latsis raises other arguments about Kathryn’s

2 In response to the BOE counsel’s comment regarding Latsis’s

2017 appeal, Latsis said, “I don’t understand why anything prior is admissible in this instance.” However, Latsis didn’t object or seek any other relief when the BAA allowed counsel to continue his comment. 3 We use Kathryn Latsis’s first name because she and Latsis share

the same last name. We mean no disrespect by doing so.

6 testimony being interrupted or curtailed, he doesn’t

explain what other testimony he would have elicited or

how his inability to elicit such evidence prejudiced him.

• Latsis also contends that the BAA erred by improperly

curtailing his cross-examination of Cordova. But as with

Kathryn’s testimony, he doesn’t explain what further

information he planned to draw out or how the lack of

information affected the outcome of the proceeding.

• In a similar vein, Latsis argues that the BOE received

four more minutes of hearing time than he did. But

apart from a cursory allegation that this discrepancy

violated his right to a fair hearing, he doesn’t explain how

allocating him an additional four minutes would have

changed the result. See People v. Gingles, 2014 COA

163, ¶ 29 (an appellate court will decline to address

issues when they are presented in a “cursory[] and

undeveloped manner”).

¶ 13 Finally, Latsis argues that the hearing was “impaired” due to

the BAA members’ alleged lack of engagement. We decline to

address this argument because it is undeveloped. Id.

7 ¶ 14 For these reasons, we perceive no reversible procedural or

evidentiary errors.

IV. Latsis’s Property Valuation

¶ 15 Colorado law requires assessors to use the market approach

when determining the “[a]ctual value” of residential real property for

tax purposes. Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(8)(c) (“Actual value shall be

stated on all property tax bills and valuation notices and, for

residential real property, determined solely by the market approach

to appraisal.”); see also § 39-1-103(5)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (“The actual

value of residential real property shall be determined solely by

consideration of the market approach to appraisal.”).

¶ 16 “‘Actual value’ is synonymous with market value.” Sampson,

105 P.3d at 203. “Market value has been described as ‘what a

willing buyer would pay a willing seller under normal economic

conditions.’ Thus, the market approach involves analyzing sales of

comparable properties in the market.” Id. (quoting Bd. of

Assessment Appeals v. Colo. Arlberg Club, 762 P.2d 146, 151 (Colo.

1988)).

8 B. Analysis

¶ 17 In reaching her valuation of $949,000, Cordova used standard

appraisal methodology, and she complied with the statutory scheme

for calculating property taxes. As part of her market approach

evaluation, Cordova analyzed six comparable sales in proximity to

Latsis’s property. She testified that she accounted for Latsis’s

unfinished basement and the property’s location near a busy

highway and a church. Cordova additionally adjusted the sales

price of the comparable properties to reflect market value as of the

June 2022 appraisal date.

¶ 18 Latsis argues that the BAA erred by adopting Cordova’s value

for his property because (1) the BAA erroneously concluded that his

property had four bedrooms instead of three; (2) Cordova didn’t

consider the light pollution emitted by the nearby church; (3) four of

Cordova’s comparable sales were faulty because they were

dissimilar to Latsis’s residence — a single-story, ranch-style,

noncustom home; and (4) the “A” grade Cordova assigned to the

property didn’t accurately reflect the property’s actual quality.

¶ 19 First, while we agree that the BAA erred by stating that

Latsis’s property had four bedrooms, the error appears to have been

9 a typo and is harmless. See EchoStar Satellite, L.L.C. v. Arapahoe

Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 171 P.3d 633, 637-38 (Colo. App. 2007)

(the BAA’s error in excluding evidence was harmless because the

exclusion did not prejudice the taxpayer). The record shows that

Cordova’s appraised value was based on Latsis’s residence having

only three bedrooms.

¶ 20 Latsis’s three remaining arguments essentially ask us to

reweigh the evidence presented at the hearing or reassess Cordova’s

credibility. But determinations regarding witness credibility, the

weight of the evidence, and the resolution of evidentiary conflicts

are the BAA’s sole province. Sampson, 105 P.3d at 208; Gyurman,

851 P.2d at 310. And because the BAA’s valuation is amply

supported by Cordova’s testimony and her appraisal report, we

cannot disturb it. See Sampson, 105 P.3d at 208.

V. Disposition

¶ 21 The agency order is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.