IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0310 Filed December 17, 2025
LATOYIA TOWNS, Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
SILVER OAKS NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Patrick D. Smith,
Judge.
Latoyia Towns appeals from a district court order that determined the court
lacked jurisdiction to review the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner’s
decision following remand. AFFIRMED.
Dennis Currell of Currell Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Tyler C. Block of Kuper Block & Paumer, PC, LLO, Omaha, Nebraska, for
appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and
Ahlers, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
This appeal centers on the jurisdiction of the district court following a
remand after hearing on a petition for judicial review. Latoyia Towns sustained a
work-related injury to her right shoulder during her employment at Silver Oaks
Nursing and Rehabilitation, LLC. Dissatisfied with her employer’s stance on
recommendations from her primary care physician, Towns filed a petition for
alternate medical care. Following the denial of her request for alternate medical
care by the deputy workers’ compensation commissioner, Towns filed a petition
for judicial review in the Polk County District Court challenging the decision. There
is no dispute that Towns’s initial timely petition for judicial review was procedurally
correct.
Following hearing on Towns’s petition for judicial review, the district court
determined that “given the record before the Court, it cannot determine whether
the Commissioner’s decision was irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” The
district court remanded the case to the agency for “more specific findings” and
“further analysis” “as to the issues of Towns’[s] notice [of dissatisfaction] to Silver
Oaks, Silver Oaks’[s] notice to Towns, and whether [Towns’s primary care provider
(PCP)] was deemed an authorized provider by Silver Oaks.”
After entry of the order, both parties filed motions pursuant to Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.904. The court denied Silver Oaks’s motion and denied Towns’s
motion in part and granted such in part, determining: “This Court feels that the
previously entered order implicitly required the agency to undertake the requested
actions, but this ruling will make that request explicit. Additional hearing and
supporting documents are necessary for a decision by the agency.” 3
Following remand and hearing, the deputy entered a decision denying
Towns’s petition for alternate medical care. The deputy’s order further stated it
was “delegat[ed] authority” “to issue final agency decisions on applications for
alternate care”; “[c]onsequently, this decision constitutes final agency action, and
there is no appeal to the commissioner. Judicial review in a district court pursuant
to Iowa Code chapter 17A is the avenue for an appeal.”
It is at this point where the jurisdictional dispute arises. Towns did not file
a petition for judicial review following the commissioner’s decision but instead filed
a document captioned “presentment of agency response to remand order for
additional factual findings and request for order for hearing transcript and
scheduling orders.” Towns challenged the deputy’s decision and requested, in
part, that the district court “direct the agency to enter an award of alternate medical
care entitling Ms. Towns to proceed with the care recommendations from her
PCP.”
The district court scheduled a hearing. At the hearing, Silver Oaks disputed
the court’s jurisdiction. Silver Oaks maintained that Towns was required to file a
petition for judicial review to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to review the remand
decision. But Towns argued the district court retained jurisdiction because it had
ordered remand for the limited purpose of receiving additional factual findings on
the specific issues requested by the court. The district court agreed with Silver
Oaks and ordered: “[T]he court does not have jurisdiction to review the
Commissioner’s Remand Decision. The court takes no further action, and the
Remand Decision stands as the final decision.” 4
Towns appeals, claiming the district court erred in finding it was without
jurisdiction as the court previously ordered a “limited remand,” which did not result
in final agency action reviewable only by a petition for judicial review.1
We begin our analysis with the following. A limited remand contemplated
by the section of the administrative procedure act which allows a court to order the
taking of additional evidence is unlike the remand envisioned in the section
providing for a remand for further proceedings. The limited remand is meant to
expand the record available to the district court for judicial review and to permit the
agency to modify its decision on the basis of additional evidence, while a complete
remand contemplates review on the merits and is appropriate where an erroneous
rule of law is applied by the agency or where the record is inadequate for the court
to determine effectively the merits of appeal. Iowa Code § 17A.19(7), (10) (2023);
Reiter v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 327 N.W.2d 763, 766–67 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
In a limited remand, the reviewing court retains its jurisdiction; while in a
remand for further proceedings, the reviewing court loses jurisdiction. See Reiter,
327 N.W.2d at 766–67 (distinguishing between a limited remand and remand for
further proceedings).
There may be instances where the district court is authorized to make an
interlocutory order remanding the case to the agency for further proceedings. See
Iowa Code § 17A.19(7); see also W. Side Transp., Inc. v. Fishel, No. 02-0092,
2003 WL 21542498, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 2003). If this is done, “it is
1 Towns also maintains the deputy’s “remand decision is null and void” because
the “agency exceeded the limits of the remand order.” But because this issue was not decided by the district court, it is not preserved for review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). 5
incumbent upon the court to note that the remand is of a limited nature and that
the court is retaining jurisdiction.” Cont’l Tel. Co. v. Colton, 348 N.W.2d 623, 625
(Iowa 1984). Here, the district court did not indicate the remand was limited, nor
did the court indicate it was retaining jurisdiction.
Towns highlights Iowa Code section 17A.19(7), referenced above, which
provides in part:
Before the date set for hearing a petition for judicial review of agency action in a contested case, application may be made to the court for leave to present evidence in addition to that found in the record of the case.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0310 Filed December 17, 2025
LATOYIA TOWNS, Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
SILVER OAKS NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Patrick D. Smith,
Judge.
Latoyia Towns appeals from a district court order that determined the court
lacked jurisdiction to review the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner’s
decision following remand. AFFIRMED.
Dennis Currell of Currell Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Tyler C. Block of Kuper Block & Paumer, PC, LLO, Omaha, Nebraska, for
appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and
Ahlers, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
This appeal centers on the jurisdiction of the district court following a
remand after hearing on a petition for judicial review. Latoyia Towns sustained a
work-related injury to her right shoulder during her employment at Silver Oaks
Nursing and Rehabilitation, LLC. Dissatisfied with her employer’s stance on
recommendations from her primary care physician, Towns filed a petition for
alternate medical care. Following the denial of her request for alternate medical
care by the deputy workers’ compensation commissioner, Towns filed a petition
for judicial review in the Polk County District Court challenging the decision. There
is no dispute that Towns’s initial timely petition for judicial review was procedurally
correct.
Following hearing on Towns’s petition for judicial review, the district court
determined that “given the record before the Court, it cannot determine whether
the Commissioner’s decision was irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” The
district court remanded the case to the agency for “more specific findings” and
“further analysis” “as to the issues of Towns’[s] notice [of dissatisfaction] to Silver
Oaks, Silver Oaks’[s] notice to Towns, and whether [Towns’s primary care provider
(PCP)] was deemed an authorized provider by Silver Oaks.”
After entry of the order, both parties filed motions pursuant to Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.904. The court denied Silver Oaks’s motion and denied Towns’s
motion in part and granted such in part, determining: “This Court feels that the
previously entered order implicitly required the agency to undertake the requested
actions, but this ruling will make that request explicit. Additional hearing and
supporting documents are necessary for a decision by the agency.” 3
Following remand and hearing, the deputy entered a decision denying
Towns’s petition for alternate medical care. The deputy’s order further stated it
was “delegat[ed] authority” “to issue final agency decisions on applications for
alternate care”; “[c]onsequently, this decision constitutes final agency action, and
there is no appeal to the commissioner. Judicial review in a district court pursuant
to Iowa Code chapter 17A is the avenue for an appeal.”
It is at this point where the jurisdictional dispute arises. Towns did not file
a petition for judicial review following the commissioner’s decision but instead filed
a document captioned “presentment of agency response to remand order for
additional factual findings and request for order for hearing transcript and
scheduling orders.” Towns challenged the deputy’s decision and requested, in
part, that the district court “direct the agency to enter an award of alternate medical
care entitling Ms. Towns to proceed with the care recommendations from her
PCP.”
The district court scheduled a hearing. At the hearing, Silver Oaks disputed
the court’s jurisdiction. Silver Oaks maintained that Towns was required to file a
petition for judicial review to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to review the remand
decision. But Towns argued the district court retained jurisdiction because it had
ordered remand for the limited purpose of receiving additional factual findings on
the specific issues requested by the court. The district court agreed with Silver
Oaks and ordered: “[T]he court does not have jurisdiction to review the
Commissioner’s Remand Decision. The court takes no further action, and the
Remand Decision stands as the final decision.” 4
Towns appeals, claiming the district court erred in finding it was without
jurisdiction as the court previously ordered a “limited remand,” which did not result
in final agency action reviewable only by a petition for judicial review.1
We begin our analysis with the following. A limited remand contemplated
by the section of the administrative procedure act which allows a court to order the
taking of additional evidence is unlike the remand envisioned in the section
providing for a remand for further proceedings. The limited remand is meant to
expand the record available to the district court for judicial review and to permit the
agency to modify its decision on the basis of additional evidence, while a complete
remand contemplates review on the merits and is appropriate where an erroneous
rule of law is applied by the agency or where the record is inadequate for the court
to determine effectively the merits of appeal. Iowa Code § 17A.19(7), (10) (2023);
Reiter v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 327 N.W.2d 763, 766–67 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
In a limited remand, the reviewing court retains its jurisdiction; while in a
remand for further proceedings, the reviewing court loses jurisdiction. See Reiter,
327 N.W.2d at 766–67 (distinguishing between a limited remand and remand for
further proceedings).
There may be instances where the district court is authorized to make an
interlocutory order remanding the case to the agency for further proceedings. See
Iowa Code § 17A.19(7); see also W. Side Transp., Inc. v. Fishel, No. 02-0092,
2003 WL 21542498, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 2003). If this is done, “it is
1 Towns also maintains the deputy’s “remand decision is null and void” because
the “agency exceeded the limits of the remand order.” But because this issue was not decided by the district court, it is not preserved for review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). 5
incumbent upon the court to note that the remand is of a limited nature and that
the court is retaining jurisdiction.” Cont’l Tel. Co. v. Colton, 348 N.W.2d 623, 625
(Iowa 1984). Here, the district court did not indicate the remand was limited, nor
did the court indicate it was retaining jurisdiction.
Towns highlights Iowa Code section 17A.19(7), referenced above, which
provides in part:
Before the date set for hearing a petition for judicial review of agency action in a contested case, application may be made to the court for leave to present evidence in addition to that found in the record of the case. If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the contested case proceeding before the agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken before the agency upon conditions determined by the court.
Our courts have held remanding for further proceedings is sound and in
accordance with the underlying reasons for the exhaustion requirement. Bugely
v. State, 464 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1991). These reasons include “aiding judicial
review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert
forum,” conserving the court’s time due to “the possibility that the relief applied for
may be granted at the administrative level,” and allowing the agency below a
chance to correct errors which occurred during administrative proceedings. Id.
at 881 (cleaned up).
We find Towns’s argument that the district court’s prior order was for a
limited remand to be unpersuasive. Neither party made application to the court to
present additional evidence to the district court before the remand as contemplated
in section 17A.19(7). We concur with the district court that its ruling on judicial
review in this case “is missing the essential elements of a limited remand.” See, 6
e.g., Reiter, 327 N.W.2d at 766. The district court explained the remand order as
follows:
The court held a review on the merits, but found the record was inadequate to effectively determine the merits without further fact finding and analysis by the Commissioner. The court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further findings and analysis, but did not expressly state or otherwise make clear the remand was limited, nor that the court was retaining jurisdiction pending the Commissioner’s taking of additional evidence. . . . . The court found remand was necessary not just because more evidence was needed, but because the Commissioner on one issue applied the law incorrectly, and also failed to properly analyze the evidence already in the record. Importantly, there was nothing in the court’s Judicial Review Ruling indicating it was a limited remand under section 17A.19(7) or that the court was retaining jurisdiction.
On remand, the deputy entered a remand decision that, as here, specified
it was the agency’s final agency action. “A timely petition for judicial review from
an administrative decision is a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Askvig v. Snap-On
Logistics Co., 967 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Iowa 2021); Cooper v. Kirkwood Cmty. Coll.,
782 N.W.2d 160, 164 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (stating “a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived”). And here, there was a lack of a judicial-review
petition from the agency’s final action. Accordingly, we agree that the district court
was without jurisdiction to consider Towns’s claims.
AFFIRMED.