Laster v. Laster

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: April 14, 1982
• Docket: 81-376
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 81-376 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RODNEY LASTER, Petitioner and Appellant, and JUNE M. LASTER, Respondent and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Boscher and Boschert, Billings, Montana Alan J. Lerner argued, Big Fork, Montana

- For Respondent: Berger, Sinclair and Nelson, Billings, Montana James J. Sinclair argued, Billings, Montana

Submitted: January 13, 1982 Decided : APR 15!!I ?$ iara $ 5 1992 Filed:

$ )&J',l- / Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

The h u s b a n d , Rodney Laster, a p p e a l s from a judgment

entered by the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial

D i s t r i c t , Y e l l o w s t o n e County, i n which t h e p a r t i e s ' m a r r i a g e

was dissolved, the marital estate divided, and the wife

a w a r d e d $ 3 5 0 p e r month i n maintenance, a s well a s attorney

f e e s and c o s t s .

The L a s t e r s w e r e m a r r i e d f o r t w e n t y - n i n e years. They

had t h r e e c h i l d r e n , two a r e now a d u l t s . The t h i r d c h i l d was

severely disabled, b o t h p h y s i c a l l y and m e n t a l l y , requiring

total care. The w i f e q u i t h e r s e c r e t a r i a l job i n 1956 t o

c a r e f o r h e r d i s a b l e d c h i l d , who l i v e d t o t h e a g e o f t e n .

The h u s b a n d and w i f e separated in April 1979. The

h u s b a n d moved to Montana i n December 1979 w h i l e the wife

stayed i n Pennsylvania.

After t h e i r separation the wife obtained a job a s a

f l o o r l a d y i n a garment shop. S h e i s now f i f t y - e i g h t years

o l d , and h e r g r o s s s a l a r y is $406.20 e v e r y two w e e k s .

The District Court determined that the wife's net

s a l a r y i s $ 3 0 8 e v e r y o t h e r week. In arriving a t t h i s figure

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s u b t r a c t e d from t h e g r o s s s a l a r y a l l o f

the itemized deductions (federal, state and local taxes,

s o c i a l s e c u r i t y and u n i o n d u e s ) t a k e n o u t o f t h e w i f e ' s b i -

weekly pay check. By m u l t i p l y i n g $ 3 8 8 t i m e s t w e n t y - s i x pay

periods, and dividing by twelve, t h e District Court found

t h a t t h e w i f e ' s a v e r a g e m o n t h l y s p e n d a b l e incorne i s $ 6 6 7 .

The District Court found that the wife's monthly

e x p e n s e s t o t a l $806. To s u p p l e m e n t h e r i n c o m e , t h e w i f e h a s

rented a mobile home owned by the parties for $165 per

month. The w i f e i s n o t e l i g i b l e f o r f u l l r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s

since s h e began her job a f t e r t h e age of fifty-f ive. She

will receive a small pension of $33.60 per month if she

works u n t i l s h e is s i x t y - s e v e n .

The h u s b a n d i s f i f t y - o n e years old. He has n ~ u l t i p l e

s c l e r o s i s b u t i t is i n r e m i s s i o n a n d t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e o n

t h e r e c o r d t h a t i t i m p a i r s h i s a b i l i t y t o work. The h u s b a n d

p r e s e n t l y works f o r t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t a s a n OSHA com-

p l i a n c e o f f i c e r i n B i l l i n g s , Montana.

The husband's gross income was $27,854 in 1981,

$25,608 i n 1980. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d t h a t i n 1 9 8 0 t h e

husband's spendable income was $1,865 per month. The

D i s t r i c t Court a r r i v e d a t t h i s f i g u r e by d e d u c t i n g o n l y t h e

federal taxes from t h e h u s b a n d ' s g r o s s income and d i v i d i n g

by twelve. Unlike its determination of t h e w i f e ' s monthly

spendable income, the District Court did not look to the

monthly d e d u c t i o n s t a k e n o u t of t h e h u s b a n d ' s paycheck. The

District Court also found that the husband's fiancee

c o n t r i b u t e s $100 p e r week a n d t h i s a d d i t i o n a l i n c o m e would

serve t o o f f s e t f u t u r e l i v i n g expenses.

In addition t o supporting himself, t h e husband sup-

p o r t s h i s f i a n c e e and h i s f i a n c e e ' s d a u g h t e r . H i s monthly

expenses were found to be $1,535 per month. Taking the

$1,865 spendable income and subtracting the $1,535 in

e x p e n s e s , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d was

a b l e t o p a y o v e r $300 i n m a i n t e n a n c e t o t h e w i f e .

The h u s b a n d h a s t h r e e r e t i r e m e n t p r o g r a m s , two v e s t e d

b u t n o t m a t u r e d and o n e n o t v e s t e d . A l l of t h e payments o f

t h e f i r s t two p l a n s were made d u r i n g t h e p a r t i e s ' marriage.

Under the first plan, the husband will receive $750 per inonth when he r e a c h e s t h e a g e o f sixty. Under the second

plan, the husband will receive $304 per month when he

reaches the age of fifty-nine. The husband is p r e s e n t l y

contributing to a third plan which will vest in approxi-

mately f i v e years.

Excluding the value of the husband's retirement

benefits, the District Court valued the marital assets a t

$73,580, l i a b i l i t i e s a t $18,359.27, and n e t m a r i t a l estate

a t $55,220.73. The m a j o r d i s p u t e d v a l u a t i o n s a r e t h e f a m i l y

home in Pennsylvania and the jewelry acquired during the

marriage. E v i d e n c e of t h e s e v a l u a t i o n s was i n d e f i n i t e s i n c e

a p p r a i s a l f i g u r e s were b a s e d m o s t l y on t h e p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s

of the parties, formed t h r o u g h informal inquiries or reli-

a n c e on amounts o f i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e .

Except for the retirement benefits, the District

C o u r t d i v i d e d t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y w i t h a p p r o x i m a t e l y 78% t o

t h e w i f e and 2 2 % t o t h e h u s b a n d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t l i s t e d

i t s r e a s o n s f o r s u c h a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e d i s t r i b u t i o n stat:.ng

that for the past three years the wife has been solely

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e m o r t g a g e p a y m e n t s o n t h e f a m i l y home and

ten-acre tract. This, coupled with t h e l e n g t h of t h e mar-

ridge, t h e d e v o t i o n of t h e w i f e t o t h e c a r e of h e r d i s a b l e d

c h i l d , t h e w i f e ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o u n d e r t a k e employment a t t h e

age of fifty-six y e a r s and t h e d i s p a r i t y of earning capa-

bilities, justified the distribution. To equalize this

disproportionate distribution, the District Court awarded

t h e wife a one-third s h a r e i n e a c h of t h e h u s b a n d ' s r e t i r e -

inent p l a n s r a t h e r t h a n t h e o n e - h a l f share she requested.

After considering the nature of the property

involved, i n t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y awarded t o t h e w i f e was n o t income produciny but incoiae reducing, the ~ i s t r i c tCourt

found there was not sufficient property in the marital

e s t a t e t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e r e d s o n a b l e n e e d s of t h e w i f e . The

District Court further found that the husband was finan-

c i a l l y a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t e $350 p e r month f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f

t h e w i f e and awarded h e r t h a t amount u n t i l h e r d e a t h , u n t i l

s h e remarries, o r u n t i l t h e husband r e t i r e s .

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f u r t h e r awarded t h e w i f e $541 f o r

h e r e x p e n s e s o f t r a v e l i n g t o Montana and s t a y i n g h e r e d u r i n g

the t r i a l . Finally, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t t h e w i f e

did not have sufficient funds to pay attorney fees and

ordered the husband to pay $1,050 in reasonable attorney

fees.

Four b a s i c i s s u e s h a v e b e e n p r e s e n t e d by t h e p a r t i e s :

1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n i t s e q u i t a b l e

apportionment of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e ?

2. Whether the District Court erred in awarding

maintenance t o t h e wife?

3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a w a r d i n g t h e

wife a p o r t i o n of t h e husband's r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s ?

4. Whether the District Court erred in awarding

a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s t o t h e w i f e ?

The husband r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e

basic four:

1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by c o n s i d e r i n g

the income o f the husband's f i a n c e e i n awarding maintenance

t o t h e wife.

2. Whether the husband's r i g h t t o equal protection

was v i o l a t e d by a w a r d i n g t h e w i f e a s h a r e o f h i s r e t i r e m e n t

benef its. 3. Whether the District Court's judgment is a

n u l l i t y s i n c e it d i d n o t s t a t e i n its f i n d i n g s of f a c t s t h a t

the m a r r i a g e was irretrievably broken or that one of the

p a r t i e s was d o m i c i l e d i n M o n t a n a .

The h u s b a n d c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a b u s e d

its discretion because a 78%-22% p r o p e r t y distribution is

p e r se i n e q u i t a b l e and b e c a u s e t h e v a l u e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

p l a c e d o n t h e m a i n m a r i t a l a s s e t s w e r e b a s e d on s p e c u l a t i v e

and incompetent e v i d e n c e . I t should be noted t h a t t h e 78%-

22% p r o p o r t i o n does not include consideration of the Dis-

t r i c t Court's division of the husband's retirement benefits

and is t h e r e f o r e m i s l e a d i n g .

In determining whether a trial court abused its

discretion, the standard for review is w h e t h e r the trial

c o u r t a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h o u t employment o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s

judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in

substantial injustice. I n re t h e Marriage o f Creon (1981),

- Mont . -, 6 3 5 P.2d 1308, 38 St.Rep. 1828; I n r e Mar-

r i a g e of Martens ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont. , 6 3 7 P.2d 523, 38

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d u t y u n d e r s e c t i o n 40-4-202(1),

MCA, is t o c o n s i d e r t h e f a c t o r s t h e r e i n a n d t h e n d i v i d e t h e

property equitably. An e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n d o e s n o t n e c e s -

s a r i l y mean a n e q u a l d i v i s i o n . A s h a s b e e n n o t e d many t i m e s

by t h i s C o u r t , and most r e c e n t l y i n M a r t e n s :

" ' A l t h o u g h - D i s t r i c t C o u r t -may e q u a l l y the --- divide the marital assets, such a distribu- t i o n i s n o t m a n d a t e d by s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA . . . ~-~ S e c t i o n 40-4-202 i s f l e x i b l e and i t v e s t s a good d e a l o f d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s - t r i c t Court ... W e h a v e s t a t e d , b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e adoption of the s t a t u t e , t h a t each c a s e must be looked a t i n d i v i d u a l l y , w i t h an eye t o its unique circumstances .. .' ( C i t a - t i o n s omitted.) I n R e M a r r i a g e o f Aanenson In Finding of F a c t No. 17, the District Court gave

extensive reasons for giving the wife 78% of the marital

property: t h e w i f e h a s been s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r mortgage

payments on t h e f a m i l y home s i n c e 1 9 7 9 , t h e l e n g t h o f the

marriage, t h e devotion of t h e wife t o her disabled c h i l d ,

and t h e g r e a t d i s p a r i t y i n e a r n i n g c a p a b i l i t y . The D i s t r i c t

Court recognized that the wife was receiving an unusually

l a r g e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y and t o e q u a l i z e t h e

s i t u a t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t award t h e w i f e a s much

of the retirement benefits as s h e had requested. If the

d i v i s i o n of retirement benefits is c o n s i d e r e d , t h e wife in

a c t u a l i t y i s r e c e i v i n g l e s s t h a n 78% o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e .

C l e a r l y , t h e D i s t r i c t Court considered t h e f a c t o r s l i s t e d i n

s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, and used v e r y c o n s c i e n t i o u s judgment

i n d i s t r i b u t i n g the property.

The husband n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d

n o t have s u f f i c i e n t c o m p e t e n t e v i d e n c e t o p r o p e r l y e v a l u a t e

the marital estate. While i t is t r u e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t

was n o t g i v e n t h e b e s t e v i d e n c e on which t o b a s e i t s v a l u a -

tions, the D i s t r i c t Court's determinations of values will

stand unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a),

M.H.Civ.P.; In re Marriage of Creon, supra. There is

nothing in the record to show that its valuations were

c l e a r l y erroneous.

A D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s award o f m a i n t e n a n c e must b e made

i n accordance with the factors set forth in s e c t i o n 40-4-

2 8 3 , MCA. I t is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether

a spouse seeking maintenance " l a c k s s u f f i c i e n t property" t o

provide for her need, "sufficient property" means income producing, not income consuming , property. See section

40-4-203(l)(a), MCA; In re the Marriage of Herron (1980),

- Mont. , 6 0 8 P.2d 97, 37 S t . R e p . 387; I n r e t h e Mar-

riage of Bowman (1981), - Mont. -, 6 3 3 P.2d 1198, 38 St.Rep. 1515.

Here, the District Court carefully considered the

n a t u r e of the property involved and the factors listed in

section 40-4-203, MCA. The District Court found that no

matter how favorable the property distribution was to the

wife, such a d i s t r i b u t i o n cannot substitute completely for

maintenance.

While we agree that the wife requires some main-

tenance, it must be noted t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court improperly

calculated the husband's monthly spendable income. The

District Court looked only to the federal taxes deducted

from t h e h u s b a n d ' s monthly paycheck. It failed to consider

other deductions, such a s s t a t e taxes, r e t i r e m e n t payments,

h e a l t h and l i f e i n s u r a n c e payments and u n i o n d u e s , i n d e t e r -

mining t h e husband's monthly spendable income. This error

is n o t c a u s e f o r remand, however, s i n c e t h e husband is s t i l l

a b l e t o p a y $350 p e r month i n m a i n t e n a n c e .

Under section 40-4-203(2)(f), MCA, the District

Court, in determining t h e arnount o f m a i n t e n a n c e , must con-

s i d e r t h e f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y o f t h e spouse paying maintenance

t o m e e t h i s own n e e d s w h i l e m e e t i n g t h e n e e d s o f h i s s p o u s e .

When the husband's monthly deductions are subtracted from

the figures used by the District Court, the husband's

rnonthly s p e n d a b l e incorne seems t o be $300 less per month

than originally calculated. Nevertheless, t h e husband h a s

incorne w h i c h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t u s e in determining his s p e n d a b l e ~ n o n t h l y income--namely, the c o n t r i b u t i o n s by

his fiancee, his tax rebate, and the rental fee for his

m o b i l e home. Taking into consideration t h e $401if p e r month

c o n t r i b u t e d by t h e h u s b a n d ' s f i a n c e e , t h e $1,286 t a x r e f u n d

r e c e i v e d by t h e h u s b a n d , and t h e $165 p e r month rental fee

for the mobile home, it is apparent that the husband is

s t i l l a b l e t o pay t h e $350 p e r month i n maintenance. The

District Court's miscalculation is, therefore, harmless

error.

The husband contends that under Duffey v. Duffey

(1981) - Mont . -, 631 P.2d 697, 38 St.Rep. 1105, t h e

income of the husband's fiancee cannot be used in deter-

m i n i n g t h e h u s b a n d ' s a b i l i t y t o pay.

Duffey is not on point here. It deals with the

c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a p r e s e n t w i f e ' s income i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e

a b i l i t y o f t h e husband t o p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t .

This Court has p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d and a p p r o v e d a

trial court's c a l c u l a t i o n of "family" net income based on

t h e e a r n i n g s of t h e husband and h i s f u t u r e w i f e . T h i s f i g u r e

was used t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f u t u r e a b i l i t y o f t h e husband to

pay m a i n t e n a n c e . See, I n t h e M a r r i a g e o f Cromwell (1979),

1 8 0 Mont. 40, 588 P.2d 1010. W s e e no r e a s o n n o t t o f o l l o w e

t h e Cromwell c a s e . The income o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s f i a n c e e may,

t i ~ e r e f o r e , be u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e h u s b a n d ' s future finan-

cial status.

The husband also contends that the District Court

e r r e d by a w a r d i n g t h e w i f e $ 1 , 0 5 0 i n a t t o r n e y f e e s and $541

in costs.

Under section 40-4-110, MCA, a District Court is

given discretion to award a reasonable amount in attorney fees and costs incurred prior to cornmencernent of a pro-

ceeding and after entry of judgment. In Wilson v . Bean

( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont. , 628 P.2d 287, 38 S t . R e p . 7 5 1 , we s e t

down t h e s t a n d a r d f o r r e v i e w i n g t h e award o f a t t o r n e y f e e s :

" I n o r d e r t o be awarded f e e s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 40-4-110, MCA, t h e p e t i t i o n i n g p a r t y nus st make a showing of n e c e s s i t y . . . The award m u s t be r e a s o n a b l e , and m u s t be b a s e d on c o m p e t e n t e v i d e n c e . .. Reasonableness is shown by means o f a h e a r i n g a l l o w i n g f o r o r a l t e s t i m o n y , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f e x h i b i t s , and t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o cross-examine. award w i l l n o t b e d i s t u r b e d by t h i s C o u r t i f . . The

i t is s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . . ." (Citations omitted.) 628 P.2d a t 289.

Here, t e s t i m o n y was p r e s e n t e d and n e c e s s i t y shown f o r

the award o f attorney fees. An uncontested a f f i d a v i t was

submitted showing the costs the wife incurred when she

traveled to Montana to contest this case. The District

Court's award of attorney fees and costs is, therefore,

s u p p o r t e d by t h e r e c o r d .

The husband contends next that the District Court

e r r e d by a w a r d i n g t o t h e w i f e o n e - t h i r d o f t h e b e n e f i t s from

each of t h e h u s b a n d ' s r e t i r e m e n t p l a n s . The husband c l a i m s

t h a t s u c h an award is an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n i n l i g h t o f t h e

large amount of property distributed to the wife and in

light of the amount of m a i n t e n a n c e awarded. The h u s b a n d

a l s o contends t h a t by awarding the wife a portion of his

retirement benefits, t h e D i s t r i c t Court v i o l a t e d his right

t o e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n under t h e laws.

The District Court's award of retirement benefits

c a n n o t i n i t s e l f be c o n s i d e r e d u n f a i r . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t

explicitly stated that maintenance would discontinue when

t h e nusband r e t i r e s . In l i g h t of t h e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence

s u p p o r t i n g an award o f m a i n t e n a n c e h e r e , the s u b s t i t u t i n g of a p o r t i o n of retirement benefits f o r n a i n t e n a n c e c a n n o t be

c o n s i d e r e d an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n .

The husband's equal protection argument lacks any

merit since i t was n o t raised at trial and s i n c e t h e r e is

no "plain error" in the distribution of the retirement

benefits. See, Easton v. E a s t o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 416, 574

P.2d 989, and Halldorson v. Halldorson (1977), 1 7 5 IJIont.

170, 573 P.2d 169. The husband's argument also fails

b e c a u s e no c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was c r e a t e d a s h e c o n t e n d s .

The husband claims that two recent Supreme Court

cases s e t up a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n "which d i s c r i m i n a t e s in its

application to divorce settlements against persons whose

retirements are not under the Federal Railroad Retirement

Act or from the Military." See, Hisquierdo v, Hisquierdo

( 1 9 7 9 ) , 439 U,S. 5 7 2 , 99 S . C t . 8 0 2 , 59 L.Ed.2d 1; McCarty v .

McCarty ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 49 U.S.L.W. 4850; f o r Montana's recognition

of McCarty see, In re t h e Marriage of McGill (1981), -

Mont . , 637 P.2d 1 1 8 2 , 38 St.Rep. 2105.

Quite simply, neither Hisquierdo nor McCarty gave

rise to such a classification. These cases were merely

construing federal statutes and discerning the intent of

Congress i n enacting those s p e c i f i c r e t i r e m e n t plans. These

c a s e s had no e f f e c t on a n y p r i v a t e o r o t h e r f e d e r a l r e t i r e -

ment p l a n s . The h u s b a n d is a r g u i n g a p p l e s and o r a n g e s .

It i s we11 established in this state and in most

other states that, a s a general rule, retirement benefits

a r e p a r t of the marital estate. For l i s t o f cases, s e e 94 /.) k A.L.R.3d4A3 e t seq.; I n r e t h e M a r r i a g e of Karr ( 1 9 8 1 ) , -

ivlont . , 628 P.2d 267, 38 S t . R e p . 506, and c a s e s c i t e d

therein. The reasoning behind this rule is that the ~ i s t r i c tC o u r t , in clpportioning the marital assets, inust

consider "the opportunity of each for the acquisition of

c d p i t a l a s s e t s and income." S e c t i o n 4Q-4-202 (1), MCA.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e x p l i c i t l y f o u n d t h a t m a i n t e n a n c e

would end when t h e husband retired. As a form o f marital

property and a s a substitute f o r maintenance, the District

Court granted the wife a one-third share in each of the

retirement plans. This well-reasoned s o l u t i o n is s u p p o r t e d

by evidence of the wife's f u t u r e needs and the husband's

future ability t o meet those needs. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s

dpportionment of r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s must therefore be

upheld.

The l a s t c o n t e n t i o n r a i s e d b y t h e h u s b a n d is whether

the District Court's failure to find t h a t t h e m a r r i a g e was

i r r e t r i e v a b l y broken and t o f i n d t h a t one o f t h e p a r t i e s h a s

b e e n d o m i c i l e d i n Montana f o r n i n e t y d a y s m a k e s t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t ' s judgment v o i d f o r l a c k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n .

The husband failed to make any exceptions to the

District Court's findings of f a c t s and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law.

Failure to make such exceptions is fatal when the issue

involved does not affect the substantial rights of the

parties. See, In re the Marriage of Barron (1978), 177

Mont. 1 6 1 , 580 P.2d 936; Turner v. Turner ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont.

262, 484 P.2d 1303; and H a l l d o r s o n , supra.

Here, the record supports the District Court's

jurisdiction both over t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r and the parties.

T h e f a i l u r e t o make t h e s e f i n d i n g s , in t h i s case, is merely

a technical oversight by the District Court and does not

a f f e c t the substantial r i g h t s of the parties. The h u s b a n d ' s

failure to except to the District Court's findings, t h e r e f o r e , p r e c l u d e s t h i s C o u r t from r e v i e w o f t h e m a t t e r .

F i n d i n g no a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,

i t s judyrnent is a f f i r m e d . Respondent's motion for reason-

a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s a n d c o s t s i s g r a n t e d a n d remanded t o t h e

District Court f o r proper determination.

W e concur :