Lashaway v. Lashaway

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 31, 2026
• Docket: WM-25-009, WM-25-010
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Lashaway v. Lashaway, 2026-Ohio-1168.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WILLIAMS COUNTY

Richard Lashaway, et al. Court of Appeals No. {86}WM-25-009 WM-25-010 Appellees Trial Court No. 20244001 v.

Margo K. Lashaway, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellants Decided: March 31, 2026

*****

Christopher B. Walker, Esq., and Jilene E. Richards, Esq., for appellees.

James F. Duranczyk, Esq., and Mark D. Hagans, Esq., for appellant, Margo K. Lashaway, Trustee.

Daniel R. Michel, Esq., for appellant, Jason D. Bailey.

***** DUHART, J.

{¶ 1} Appellants, Margo Lashaway and Jason Bailey, appeal the March 28, 2025

judgment of the Williams County Court of Common Pleas rescinding the sale of a farm property from Margo, as trustee of the Lashaway Family Trust, to Jason. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

I. Background and Facts

{¶ 2} This case arose from the sale of a farm property by Margo, as trustee of the

Lashaway Family Trust, to Jason. Following the sale, six of the trust beneficiaries—

appellees, Richard Lashaway, Perry Lashaway, Jeffrey Lashaway, Steve Lashaway,

Amanda Lennard, and Connie Salisbury—filed a complaint against Margo, as trustee,

Jason, and trust beneficiaries, Brandie Bailey and Brenda Haehl (a.k.a. Brenda Dick). In

their complaint, they alleged that Margo and her husband, Raymond Lashaway, created

the Lashaway Family Trust in May 2002. They were the settlors and trustees of the trust,

which had real property in Pioneer, Ohio, as its only asset. Before being transferred into

the trust, the property had belonged to Raymond’s parents, and the property was

transferred to Raymond following the death of his surviving parent, based on an

agreement with his siblings, Connie, Melvin Lashaway, and Lloyd Lashaway. Raymond,

Melvin, and Lloyd are all deceased. Following Raymond’s death, Margo became the sole

trustee of the trust.

{¶ 3} Raymond lived in the property until his death in December 2020. Margo

lived there until September 2023. After Margo moved out, the beneficiaries learned that

Margo sold the property to Jason for $80,000. Jason is Brandie’s husband and Margo’s

son-in-law. The beneficiaries believed that the property was worth at least $140,000 at

the time of the sale, and they believed that both Margo and Jason knew that the property

2. was worth more than $80,000 at the time of the sale. They also believed that Margo and

Jason had a copy of the trust and actual knowledge of the trust’s terms and that the sale

exceeded Margo’s authority as trustee or was an improper exercise of her powers as

trustee.

{¶ 4} Of the $80,000 Jason paid for the property, $5,313.75 went to Brandie as a

trust beneficiary, $33,823.85 was paid to the National Bank of Montpelier to pay off a

note in Margo’s name, individually, and $1,661.68 was used to pay property taxes,

despite a term in the trust requiring the occupants to pay property taxes.

{¶ 5} Based on these facts, the beneficiaries raised six claims.1 In count one, they

claimed breach of trust against Margo based on her “self-dealing and providing an unjust

benefit to a member of her family to the detriment of” the beneficiaries by selling the

property to her son-in-law for less than fair market value and paying her personal debts

from the proceeds.

{¶ 6} In count two, they claimed bad faith dealing against Jason based on him

purchasing the property for inadequate consideration. The beneficiaries alleged that

Margo was elderly and susceptible to being influenced by others; Jason “asserted

apparent authority or otherwise unduly influenced [Margo] by orchestrating the sale of

the Property to himself at a reduced purchase price and representing to [Margo] and

others that all Plaintiffs had consented to the sale”; and Jason had a copy of the trust,

1 The beneficiaries moved to withdraw, and the trial court dismissed, count four at the beginning of trial.

3. knew of the beneficiaries, and knew that the sale was a violation of Margo’s duty to sell

the property at fair market value.

{¶ 7} In count three, the beneficiaries alleged fraudulent conveyance against

Jason. They claimed that Margo was susceptible to undue influence based on her “age

and living circumstances,” Jason had the opportunity to exert undue influence on Margo

as she was leaving her home to reside in Jason’s home or the home of Jason’s adult child,

Jason exerted undue influence on Margo to sell the property to him for less than fair

market value for his sole benefit, and Jason falsely represented to Margo and her attorney

that the beneficiaries had consented to the sale to induce them to close the sale, and Jason

did so with the actual or constructive intent of defrauding the beneficiaries.

{¶ 8} In count five, the beneficiaries alleged unjust enrichment against Margo and

Jason. They claimed that Margo obtained repayment of her personal debt using trust

assets wrongfully withheld from the beneficiaries, and Jason, through fraud and undue

influence, received titled to the sole trust asset without payment of adequate

consideration.

{¶ 9} Finally, in count six, the beneficiaries requested the imposition of a

constructive trust on the property because Jason wrongfully obtained a legal interest in

the property, which he should not be allowed to retain.

{¶ 10} The beneficiaries asked the court to (1) void the transfer of the property to

Jason, (2) compel Margo, as trustee, and Jason and Brandie to return title of the property

to the trust, (3) impose a constructive trust on the property, (4) remove Margo as trustee,

4. (5) appoint a special fiduciary to take possession of the property and sell it at fair market

value, (6) distribute the proceeds of the sale to them, (7) award them attorney fees, and

(8) make Margo and Jason pay all costs. Alternatively, the beneficiaries asked that the

court award them a money judgment against Margo and Jason “in an amount equal to

what [their] distributable share of proceeds from the sale of the Property should have

been, but for the wrongful acts of” Margo and Jason.

{¶ 11} The Lashaway Family Trust, which the beneficiaries included as an exhibit

to their complaint, provides in Article 1 that

1. During the Settlors’ lives and as long as either Settlor lives in the house for ten months per year, pays all real estate taxes, maintains fire and wind-storm insurance coverage, and maintains the property in good condition, Settlors shall have the right to continued use and occupation of the property.

...

2, After the termination of the right of occupancy by reason of death or otherwise, the property will be sold at a fair market value and from the proceeds of the sale the trustees will pay to the Settlors, or their beneficiaries, an amount equal to the amounts expended by the Settlors to enhance or improve the real property subject to this trust. The balance shall be divided in four shares and distributed per stirpes to Melvin Lashaway, Lloyd Lashaway, Raymond Lashaway and Connie Fae Salisbury.

{¶ 12} The case was tried to the court. The beneficiaries presented the testimony

of attorney, Michael Shaffer; Connie; appraiser, Robin Hershberger; Perry; and Amanda.

Jason presented the testimony of appraiser, Elizabeth Sigg, and Brandie, and testified in

5. his own behalf. Margo testified in her own behalf. The following evidence was adduced

at trial.

{¶ 13} Shaffer testified that he reviewed the Lashaway Family Trust with Margo

in 2021, after Raymond’s death, and advised that her right of occupancy continued and

that she could remain in the home until her death or until she no longer desired to use it.

He also told her that she was the trustee and she was in control of the property. He

explained in general terms that the trust provided her with the right of occupancy and that

she was in control of the property. He recalled confusion in 2021 about who was in

charge, including a belief by some family members that Connie had authority, and he

alleviated Margo’s fears by explaining her authority as trustee. Shaffer remembered two

2021 meetings. The first was to identify estate needs and the second was after he pulled

the trust and estate records to explain Margo’s rights and responsibilities.

{¶ 14} Shaffer described a 2023 meeting, between July and September, at which

Margo stated she no longer wanted to reside at the property and intended to sell the farm

to Jason. He discussed with Margo her responsibilities under the trust, the sale process,

and the trust’s fair market value requirement. He told Margo that upon her death or

desire to leave the property, the trust required that the property be sold at fair market

value with the proceeds distributed to the beneficiaries or their children. He understood

that Margo and Jason had discussed and agreed to a purchase price of $80,000 before the

meeting. He addressed fair market value with Margo and Jason, and reviewed the county

auditor’s value online, noting that it exceeded the proposed purchase price. Jason told

6. him that the property was “in a state of disrepair and that there were a lot of things that

needed to be done and that that was the basis of why it was believed that the lesser value

was an appropriate fair market value.” Shaffer explicitly told Margo that she owed a duty

to all of the beneficiaries and warned her that she could be held responsible if the sale

was not at fair market value. He specifically testified that he would not have proceeded

with the sale if he knew that the family disagreed with the price. But “it was apparent

from that conversation that Connie was consulted with about that value, that there was an

indication that the family was acceptable with that value.” He concluded after the

discussion that the family believed $80,000 was fair and proceeded to prepare the

purchase agreement.

{¶ 15} Shaffer testified that his basis for believing that the beneficiaries were in

agreement came from speaking with Margo and Jason. “[A]fter that conversation which

was, you know, quite lengthy, it was concluded that eighty thousand (80,000) [sic] was a

number that everybody was okay with it and we should proceed to purchase based upon

that number. . . .” As far as who Jason had spoken to, Shaffer said,

I was certainly aware that there were ongoing conversations with Connie based upon that meeting. But as to each beneficiary, I did not have any representation that each of them had been contacted, but I was certainly aware that family discussions had been taking place and it was represented that eighty thousand dollars ($80,000.00) [sic] was a value that was acceptable to the family.

{¶ 16} Shaffer confirmed that he drafted the purchase agreement based on

information from Margo as trustee and Jason, and his office closed the transaction. He

explained the closing statement showing the $80,000 price and net cash to the trust of

7. $43,259.97, with deductions including closing costs, delinquent and prorated taxes of

$1,661.68, and a $33,823.85 mortgage payoff to State Bank. He said that the occupants

were responsible for property taxes during occupancy and confirmed that the taxes were

charged to the seller to the date of closing, as was customary. He identified the mortgage

payoff as a loan belonging to Margo Lashaway and Raymond Lashaway. Based on the

trust’s terms and available closing funds, he prepared and sent a final report and

distribution letter to each beneficiary.

{¶ 17} On cross-examination, Shaffer confirmed that he did not set up the trust

and first met Margo after Raymond’s death. Their initial meetings in 2021 focused on

who owned and controlled the property and on clarifying the trust. Shaffer would have

told Margo after reviewing the trust that she was the trustee and “in charge,” and he

believed that she left the second 2021 meeting understanding that she could stay on the

farm and that she was in charge. He believed that Margo was not sophisticated in real

estate or trust matters and said that Raymond had handled property issues and she stayed

out of them. Regarding Connie, Shaffer understood she was the last of Fay’s children

and had influence in the family, and that Connie gave her input before the $80,000

purchase price was determined.

{¶ 18} On fair market value, Shaffer said he did not know if $80,000 was fair

market value and that he did not provide fair market value opinions. He was concerned

that the value on the auditor’s website was more than the sale price, but he relied on the

condition issues Jason told him about and the representation that the family agreed to the

8. number. He confirmed having a meeting with Margo and Jason in July 2023 during

which they discussed the sale at $80,000 and said Connie had agreed to the terms.

Shaffer recalled discussing that the auditor’s value was higher, condition problems,

demolition costs for buildings, and the idea that fair market value can be a range. He

emphasized that he forcefully advised Margo about her responsibilities, that it was not

just her money, and that she was in charge as trustee. He prepared the purchase

agreement consistent with the trust and closed accordingly. While beneficiary signoffs

are not his office’s practice, obtaining them would have ensured that each beneficiary

was informed about and on board with the terms of the sale. He acknowledged being

concerned about Margo’s potential liability and said that getting the beneficiaries’

signatures would have provided some assurance that they were on board, despite not

being required by the trust.

{¶ 19} Addressing what Margo and Jason told him about the beneficiaries’

knowledge, he knew that Connie gave her input before the $80,000 price was reached and

remembered talking about “the family” agreeing with the price. He was unclear about

exactly who gave him the information. Further, he would have asked more questions had

he known a majority of beneficiaries did not know the sale was being discussed. He

reiterated that he would not have prepared the purchase agreement without knowing that

the family agreed the price was fair.

{¶ 20} Regarding what he told Jason and Margo about fair market value, Shaffer

testified that he discussed the trust’s fair market value requirement in Jason’s presence,

9. reviewed the auditor’s value, discussed the property’s condition, and warned Margo she

had a duty to beneficiaries and could be sued for breaching it. He told Margo that all

beneficiaries should agree that the price was a fair value if she proceeded with the

$80,000 sale to Jason. He confirmed that there was no appraisal before closing and that

he based fair value on a willing seller and buyer, knowledge of condition, and the

representation that the family believed the amount was fair.

{¶ 21} As to when Margo knew about her duties and that she had control of any

sale, Shaffer said that by the second 2021 meeting he believed Margo understood she

could stay, was in charge, and that the property would remain in trust. In 2023, he again

advised her that she had the power to sell, told her about her fiduciary duties and the

potential for a lawsuit, and proceeded to draft the purchase agreement after concluding

that she understood and the family agreed on price.

{¶ 22} Connie testified that she is the last surviving child of Fay and Louis

Lashaway, and is the sister of Melvin, Lloyd, and Raymond. The family farm, a 20-acre

property with several buildings, was appraised at $150,000 during Fay’s estate

proceedings. Fay’s will directed that the farm be sold, but the siblings agreed that

Raymond and Margo could remain living on the farm if they assumed the mortgage and

maintained the property. Connie, as executor, deeded the farm to them in April 2002,

allowing them to borrow $65,000 to settle estate debts, which included a mortgage note.

The Lashaway Family Trust was then established to allow Raymond and Margo to live

10. on the farm while also ensuring that the siblings would eventually receive their

inheritance from Fay.

{¶ 23} Connie believed that Margo, as trustee, would handle any future sale and

notify the beneficiaries. She consistently viewed herself as a beneficiary, not as a

decision-maker. After Raymond’s death in December 2020, Connie directed inquiries

about purchasing the farm to Margo.

{¶ 24} In July 2023, Jason approached her about buying the farm for $80,000.

Although she was surprised by the price, Connie was willing to consider it. She assumed

that Jason would contact the other beneficiaries and that Margo was aware of his plan.

She learned of the completed sale in September 2023. Her first post-sale communication

from Margo was a trustee’s final report and a check, which she did not cash.

{¶ 25} Connie understood that the trust was created so that Raymond and Margo

could live on the farm for as long as they wanted while maintaining and insuring it,

paying taxes, and keeping it in good condition. She believed that the trust would ensure

that she and her brothers would eventually inherit the farm’s value consistent with their

parents’ wishes. She testified that her role was only as a beneficiary and that Margo, as

trustee, was in charge of trust matters and responsible for keeping the beneficiaries

informed. The family expected to be notified when it came time to sell, though Connie

acknowledged that the trust does not require beneficiary notification.

{¶ 26} Connie testified that the trust followed a family plan devised after Fay’s

death to avoid selling the farm during probate proceedings. The family’s decision in

11. 2002 allowed Raymond and Margo to stay if they assumed the mortgage and paid Fay’s

debts, paid taxes, and maintained the farm. It also allowed them to keep any income

from the farm. Raymond and Margo borrowed approximately $65,000 to pay the estate’s

obligations, including the mortgage. Connie transferred the property to Raymond and

Margo in April 2002 so they could use it as collateral to obtain the loan and fund the

estate. She believed that Raymond and Margo, not the siblings, were responsible for that

debt, and she had no expectation that her share of the proceeds from the farm would

cover their loan. She further testified that the trust required a sale at fair market value

and allowed repayment of settlor “improvements,” not personal loans, from sale

proceeds.

{¶ 27} Connie said that Jason first approached her at her home in early July 2023

to tell her that he wanted to buy the farm for $80,000. He would use money he inherited

from his mother and wanted to build a house that would include living space for Margo.

Jason told her he was “coming to [her] first,” mentioned being buddies with Perry, told

her that land values were decreasing, and told her that he was going to the bank and

needed the price to be at $80,000. Connie did not tell him that she was the trustee or

authorized to bind the other beneficiaries. She assumed that Margo knew of the plan.

Jason did not tell her about any outstanding mortgage balance or delinquent taxes during

that conversation.

{¶ 28} Later, Jason sent Connie several text messages related to the sale. He sent

her a screenshot showing the auditor’s $126,500 appraisal and a message that he was

12. “talking to the bank” and needed to be “around 80,000,” to which she replied that she

thought the estimate would be more but did not want him strapped and said, “let’s move

forward.” Connie testified that she spoke only for herself, expected that the other

beneficiaries would weigh in, and believed that Margo, as trustee, had to handle notifying

and negotiating with the other beneficiaries.

{¶ 29} Connie learned of the completed sale while meeting with her attorney in

late September 2023. She had not discussed the sale with Margo beforehand. She later

received a trustee’s final report and a $10,627.50 check, which she gave to her attorney

without cashing. This was not what she believed she agreed to in July. After learning of

the sale, she texted Jason, expressing regret that she had not referred him to the other

beneficiaries and noting that the auditor showed him as owner as of September 6, 2023.

On cross-examination, Connie acknowledged that the trust document was the only

written record of the family’s agreement, despite some unwritten understandings. She

admitted not sending Jason to Margo in July 2023, unlike what she had done with earlier

purchase inquiries.

{¶ 30} Connie acknowledged that the trust does not require Margo to notify the

beneficiaries before a sale. She admitted that Margo was not present at the 2002 family

meeting, and she did not know what Margo understood about the trust at that time.

Connie received a draft of the trust in 2002 before Raymond and Margo signed it and was

told to pay particular attention to Article 1. She agreed that there were no trust terms

requiring that the mortgage be paid off before distribution, and that the trust text used

13. “proceeds” without differentiating net from gross. Regarding buyer inquiries, she

confirmed that after Raymond’s death, she told two separate third parties to contact

Margo, the trustee. She admitted she did not send Jason to Margo in July 2023 and did

not ask him to get an appraisal or consult all the beneficiaries. Regardless, she told him,

“let’s move forward,” despite her reservations. She agreed that there were no further

communications from her to Jason between that text message and September 2023.

{¶ 31} On re-direct, Connie reiterated that she relied on an attorney to incorporate

the family’s agreements into the trust, she understood that Margo was trustee, and she

believed that the trustee could repay improvements but not personal loans from sale

proceeds. She assumed that Jason had discussed the sale with Margo due to his statement

about her living in the new home. Connie emphasized that she did not think that she was

the last stop for approval, and she expected that others would take issue with the $80,000

price.

{¶ 32} Robin Hershberger, a state-certified real estate appraiser in Ohio with over

20 years of experience, testified about her appraisal of the farm property. She conducted

a land-only appraisal because she did not have access to the buildings. That is, the

appraisal hypothetically treated the property as if it were vacant land. To complete her

appraisal, she obtained the tax card from the Williams County auditor, visited the farm,

and chose comparable sales. Hershberger searched for comparables within 90 days to 12

months, prioritizing proximity and acreage similarity, and using MLS and auditor data.

She selected comps of 5.4, 31, and 35 acres. She ultimately concluded that the land had a

14. value of $7,000 per acre, so the total 20-acre farm was worth $140,000. Hershberger

explained that a livable residence generally adds value to the land, but that depends on an

inspection and its condition. She believed that public water and sewer availability

increases value, though she listed the availability of them to the farm as unknown in her

report. She saw demolition equipment on site but did not know if any demolition had

taken place. Additionally, the unique location of the farm could make the property more

valuable to certain buyers.

{¶ 33} Hershberger reviewed the appraisal done by Elizabeth Sigg, Jason’s

appraiser. She noted that Sigg included demolition costs in her appraisal, included value

for a barn, and used more distant comps. Hershberger emphasized that her comps were

closer in distance and time and were all in unzoned townships, like the farm was.

Hershberger said that appraisal involves subjectivity and maintained that her close and

recent sale comparables best indicated the farm’s fair market value.

{¶ 34} On cross-examination, Hershberger acknowledged she and counsel chose a

hypothetical vacant-land appraisal due to lack of access rather than seeking access to the

property. She agreed that this methodology affected the comparables that she chose. She

did not make any adjustments to her comps, despite the comps not being identical to the

farm. Instead, she used a dollar-per-acre approach, which required her to take the

average of the three sales’ price per acre to find her price-per-acre figure of $7,000. She

did not include tillable acreage percentages for the subject or comps in her report,

although buyers, especially farmers, consider tillable percentages and cleanup and

15. demolition costs in making purchase decisions. One of her comps was marked “invalid”

by the auditor. This did not mean that the sale was invalid for her purposes, however,

which she determined after verifying the transfer with the auditor and checking MLS

data. She did not note any of that verification in her report.

{¶ 35} Although Hershberger acknowledged that the size of a parcel influences its

value and that larger parcels tend to have more value, she still applied an unadjusted per-

acre average from her larger comps. She agreed that an “as-is” appraisal including

structures would require access and is ideally preferred for accuracy. She reiterated that a

livable structure typically adds value, and including structures would require a different

appraisal form and different comparables. Hershberger explained that she appraised the

farm as vacant ground and compared it to bare-ground sales, given the property’s

uniqueness and its location next to a factory.

{¶ 36} Perry testified that Jason first raised the idea of buying the farm to him on

September 9, 2023, at the Williams County fair. He remembered the conversation clearly

because he attended the fair with his wife and four grandchildren and recalled discussing

Jason’s idea on the ride home. During their conversation, Jason asked how he would feel

about Jason purchasing the farm, and Perry responded that keeping it in the family would

be good. Jason described plans to tear down the house and barn and build a new

residence with space for Margo and said that one of his sons would build a house farther

east on the property. He also made a joke about Perry being comfortable giving him a

“family discount.” Jason did not mention that he had already purchased the property

16. during their conversation. Perry told Jason to check with Connie because she was also a

beneficiary, and Jason replied he was not worried about Connie but was worried about

“the one up north,” whom he later identified as Amanda. Perry believed that Jason knew

there were other beneficiaries, but he did not know that Jason had already spoken with

Connie.

{¶ 37} Perry later learned Jason had closed on the purchase on September 6, 2023,

three days before their conversation at the fair. He learned about the sale in October

2023 when Amanda called to tell him about it. He was surprised to learn of the sale and

had no indication from Jason on September 9 that the purchase had already occurred. He

received a check for $5,313.75 with the trustee’s distribution packet and later received

another $2,000 check from Margo as trustee, which he did not cash and gave to counsel.

He did not receive any correspondence from Margo about selling the farm before

receiving the checks.

{¶ 38} Perry explained his understanding that he, Connie, and the other

beneficiaries were heirs, and that his role as an heir was to see the trust carried out as

written.

{¶ 39} On cross, Perry confirmed that he likely saw Jason at a Fourth of July

party, but the first time Jason shared the idea of buying the farm with him was September

9 at the Williams County Fair. He thought that their conversation lasted about five to ten

minutes and happened while he sat on a lawnmower, with his wife present and four

grandchildren nearby. Perry was initially happy about keeping the farm in the family.

17. He later told Jason to check with Connie. He expected Connie, as the eldest aunt and

family matriarch, to contact the rest of the beneficiaries because he thought that a group

decision was required. However, he was not intimately familiar with the trust terms

beyond recalling that fair market value was important. Jason did not say he had already

talked to Connie or that he had already bought the property during the fair conversation.

Perry denied that his account only made sense if the conversation occurred in July rather

than September and insisted that he knew when it happened.

{¶ 40} Perry learned of the sale in October, approximately four to six weeks after

the fair. Amanda contacted him with the news. He confirmed that he had not spoken

with Margo about the sale. He believed that the authority to sell rested with Raymond

and then Margo. He later learned that Connie had spoken with Jason about the sale in

July 2023 and that, at the time of the fair discussion, Jason had already purchased the

farm. Perry said this upset him because he believed Jason knew Connie was dealing with

personal difficulties and he could have spoken to others instead.

{¶ 41} After presenting this evidence, the beneficiaries rested.

{¶ 42} Next, Jason presented his case. He first called Sigg, a certified general real

estate appraiser and broker with over 35 years of experience in Northwest Ohio. She has

taught appraisal and real estate courses for 20 years, authored multiple textbooks, and

serves as chair of the Ohio State Appraisal Board. Jason hired her to appraise the farm’s

fair market value. She inspected the property in January 2024, which included touring

the house. Sigg called the assignment “complex” due to the property’s mix of a house, a

18. barn, and tillable acreage. She learned that two outbuildings had been demolished after

purchase. She concluded that the residence was a teardown because repair costs would

exceed the house’s value due to its severe settling, sloping floors, nonfunctioning

furnace, poor roof, peeling exterior, and structural problems. She assessed the land’s

highest and best use as agricultural because the house did not contribute to its value, the

site had significant tillable acreage, and the area’s market supported farm use over

residential. In her sales comparison approach, she searched Williams County sales within

one year, focusing on mixed-use parcels with tillable acreage and similar characteristics,

and relied on MLS, auctioneer, and auditor records. She selected three Williams County

comparables sized 39.92, 29.5, and 80 acres, and calculated each parcel’s percentage of

tillable acres because of its central importance to value. She adjusted for the percentage

of tillable acres because farmers pay more per acre for higher tillable ratios. She also

adjusted for property size because farmers pay more for larger farms. After adjustments,

the range was $4,235 to $5,361 per acre. From that range, Sigg chose $4,700 per acre as

the value for the farm. Thus, she valued land at $94,000 ($4,700 times 20 acres). Then,

she addressed existing improvements because they impact value. She determined that it

would cost $10,500 to tear down the house and that the barn added $12,000 in value to

the land. After deducting the cost of the teardown and adding the value of the barn, Sigg

concluded that the farm was worth $96,000 as of January 20, 2024.

{¶ 43} Sigg reviewed Hershberger’s appraisal. She noted that it used a

hypothetical condition of vacant land, did not include inspection of the house, used

19. comps with more than 90 percent tillable acreage while also saying that the farm was not

a working farm, and used one MLS-verified sale that the auditor had incorrectly flagged

as invalid. Sigg opined that two of Hershberger’s comps required downward adjustments

for the greater tillable acreage percentages and larger sizes and lacked explanations for

not having those adjustments. The third was a small site that was unlikely to be used for

agricultural purposes and was more likely to be used for residential purposes, so it was an

unlikely and unsuitable choice for farm-ground valuation. Sigg said that hypothetical

vacancy can inflate value because ignoring existing structures increases tillable acreage.

Additionally, appraising farm ground was outside of the scope of a certified residential

appraiser’s license.

{¶ 44} Sigg confirmed that her $96,000 value opinion remained unchanged and

said that her opinion was grounded in considerations of the property’s mixed-use features

and market trends favoring agricultural use. She also said that a public auction is not

necessary to determine fair market value and that finding mixed-use comparables is

challenging but routine in her practice.

{¶ 45} On cross, Sigg testified that auditor values are computer-generated and less

reliable than a boots-on-the-ground appraisal, which includes full on-site observation.

auditor models use large sales datasets and rarely involve recent individual inspections.

She confirmed her belief that lack of interior inspection was less accurate than an interior

inspection when the assignment requires valuing existing conditions, especially when

there is a need to assess repairability. Sigg acknowledged that appraisers sometimes lack

20. access to structures and that parts of appraisal—particularly comparable selection and

final reconciliation—are subjective, but decisions must align with professional standards

and peer reasonableness. She bases her adjustments on spreadsheets of market data that

she continually updates, which she uses because there is no standard industry database.

{¶ 46} Sigg knew that the farm abutted an industrial property to the south but was

unaware that it abutted an industrial project to the east. These industrial properties did

not change her view that the highest and best use of the farm was agricultural because the

parcel’s long, narrow shape would make it unattractive to industrial buyers. She

explained that fair market value reflects a typical buyer, not a unique adjacent buyer,

which would be a different assignment. She confirmed that the mixed-use nature and

lower percentage of tillable acres justify a lower price than highly tillable auctioned

farms and that the mixed-use nature made the assignment more difficult. She defended

her use of an “invalid” comp based on its MLS listing, a proper arm’s-length transaction,

and having the required documentation in her work file. She described her teardown

determination for the house as a reasonable judgment based on severe settling, interior

leakage, safety concerns preventing her from inspecting the basement, and the

deterioration she saw. Ultimately, the cost to cure the damage would exceed the home’s

value. She noted that the effect of the two demolished outbuildings was impossible to

determine without having inspected them. She confirmed that the property is unzoned

and that annexation into Pioneer could impose different requirements.

21. {¶ 47} Brandie is Raymond and Margo’s daughter, and she grew up on the

Lashaway farm property. She received a text in January 2021 from Connie telling her

that someone was interested in purchasing the farm. She was not surprised because

people had often approached the family over the years about buying the property.

Around this time, Melvin made two or three unplanned visits to Margo that turned

unpleasant, which concerned Brandie and her sister. As a result, Brandie and Brenda met

with Shaffer in January 2021 to learn about Margo’s rights, particularly whether Margo

could be forced to leave the farm or the property could be sold without her knowledge.

Shaffer told them that Margo had a life lease, could not be made to leave, and the

property could not be sold without her knowledge. He specifically told Margo, “the

ball’s in you[r] court[.]” Brandie took that to mean that Margo decided whether and

when to leave. They did not discuss whether Margo had a right to sell.

{¶ 48} Brandie understood from Raymond that when Margo no longer desired to

live on the farm after he died, the property would be sold. By 2023, Margo’s finances

became tight, due to Margo’s loss of benefits and expensive prescriptions, and the

farmhouse needed major repairs. In spring 2023, Brandie, Brenda, and Margo decided

that by fall or winter Margo would have to move, likely to Brenda’s home or an aunt’s

home. In early summer 2023, Jason casually said that he might buy the farm, but Brandie

initially dismissed the idea. She did not overhear Jason’s July 4 conversation with Perry

and did not know Jason would approach Connie about buying the farm. She learned

Jason had talked to Connie after their mid-July text exchange when Jason told her about

22. the conversation and she read the texts on his phone. Jason then shared his plan to buy

the farm and build a house with space for Margo. Jason did not discuss the price with

her; she saw the proposed purchase price only in the texts and did not know the auditor’s

value at the time. Jason arranged a meeting with Shaffer within days, which Brandie

attended with Margo. Margo reacted with relief because the plan let her stay on the

property and relieved her financial strain.

{¶ 49} At the meeting with Shaffer, Jason said that he and Connie agreed to an

$80,000 purchase price. Shaffer checked the auditor’s site showing that the value was

$126,000 and remarked Jason was getting a “[f]amily discount.” He also asked about the

need for an appraisal, which Jason denied. Shaffer then asked Margo if she agreed to the

purchase price. Margo claimed that she had no say in the matter, leading to several

back-and-forth exchanges between her and Shaffer in which Shaffer told her she did have

the say. Eventually, Margo said if Connie agreed she would not step on her toes and she

just wanted out. Shaffer warned that if the other beneficiaries were not consulted and not

satisfied with the purchase price, they could sue. Brandie believed, based on her earlier

understanding of the trust, that the four siblings controlled the trust and that as sole

survivor Connie was the final decision-maker. She conveyed that belief to Jason and told

Shaffer that the family respected Connie and would not go against her. Regardless,

Shaffer cautioned them that money can change people. Brandie did not recall discussion

of a fair market value requirement at that meeting. She believed Jason was not taking

advantage and was trying to help Margo, and that he did not know the trust terms.

23. {¶ 50} After closing, Brandie received an initial distribution check in October and

deposited it. She and Brenda declined any further money when Jason later paid an

additional amount after getting an appraisal.

{¶ 51} On cross, Brandie confirmed that the purpose of the January 2021 meeting

was to learn whether the siblings could sell the farm out from under Margo, and they

asked about that due to Melvin’s behavior. She did not believe at the time that Margo

had authority to sell and would have handled Melvin differently if they had known. She

did not recall “trustee” being mentioned at that meeting. She understood from Shaffer

only that Margo should see him if she decided to leave, and they did not ask about the

mechanics of any sale. By July 2023, she believed Connie had the authority to sell, but

Shaffer told Margo directly that Margo had the control, which surprised both Brandie and

Margo. Brandie still thought Connie’s agreement to the sale meant that it could proceed.

She did not think that Margo was acting in bad faith or trying to sell behind the family’s

back and believed that Margo had little understanding of the trust. Brandie had some

general knowledge from her father but her confusion about sale authority existed until the

July 2023 meeting. Margo maintained that as long as Connie agreed, she would not step

on Connie’s toes and she just wanted out. Brandie claimed that Margo stayed out of

family affairs involving the Lashaways. Raymond was the one who handled them.

{¶ 52} Brandie reiterated that the purpose of the January 2021 meeting was to

ensure that Margo could not be forced out of the farm, and Shaffer assured them that the

siblings lacked authority to sell the farm out from under her due to Margo’s life lease.

24. They did not take the 2021 statements to mean that Margo was in charge. Instead, they

interpreted “the ball’s in your court” to refer to Margo remaining in the home. In

responding to Connie’s January 2021 text message, Brandie told Connie that she was not

sure Margo was ready to make a decision yet. She was referring to deciding about

leaving the farm, not to selling the farm.

{¶ 53} Regarding the July 2023 meeting, Brandie recalled Shaffer remarking that

$80,000 seemed low and asking if it was a family discount but did not recall him making

further inquiry or him and Jason discussing the condition of the property. She did not

feel guilty about Jason getting a family discount because she believed that someone

would have voiced any objection they had. She understood Shaffer’s warning that the

beneficiaries could sue if they were dissatisfied with the price but believed that no one

would go against Connie. She did not feel an obligation to notify her cousins because she

believed only the siblings controlled the trust and that her generation had no power. She

confirmed that Shaffer made clear in 2023 that selling was Margo’s decision, while in

2021 he had only said that the farm could not be sold out from under Margo. After the

July 2023 meeting, they did not discuss Shaffer’s concerns.

{¶ 54} Brandie knew of outside offers, including hearing from her father that

someone offered $100,000 in 2020, but she did not discuss any offers with Margo beyond

confirming that Margo did not want to leave. Brandie was aware that Margo was paying

a loan tied to the farm but made no plan for the balance other than that sale proceeds

would pay the bank first, as she understood from her father.

25. {¶ 55} Jason testified that he pursued buying the Lashaway farm after his parents

died because he saw it as a chance to build a home for himself and Brandie. He decided

that he needed to speak with Connie because he believed she was the family leader and

the person in charge. He did not have a copy of the trust and was not part of prior family

discussions about the trust. He called Connie to arrange a meeting and did not arrive

unannounced. He told Connie he wanted to buy the farm, relieve his mother-in-law’s

daily stress, and build a home large enough for them and Margo. Connie loved the idea.

He mentioned a price of $80,000 and that the existing house would be torn down. He

explained that he arrived at $80,000 based on his own sense of the land’s value from

farming and what he wanted to spend. He sent Connie the auditor’s valuation screenshot

so she had an idea of its value. In mid-July 2023, he texted to confirm that $80,000 was

acceptable and said that he wanted to be around $80,000 if she was okay with that, to

which Connie replied, “let’s move forward.” He understood “let’s move forward” to

mean proceed with the sale, not to consult other beneficiaries, examine the trust, or get an

appraisal. He told his wife and Margo they would get a new house, and they were

excited. He then contacted Michael Shaffer to handle the paperwork.

{¶ 56} At the July 22, 2023, meeting with Shaffer, Jason relayed the price and that

Connie had approved, and heard Shaffer say the family could sue if they were unhappy.

He believed that he showed Shaffer the texts and recalled Shaffer saying it looked like

Jason was getting a deal. Shaffer said the price had to be within the range of fair market

value and $80,000 was on the low side of that range, but he did not define the range.

26. Jason told Shaffer that he planned to tear down the house and some buildings. Shaffer

explained to him that Margo, not Connie, had to sign the deed, which was the first time

Jason learned that information. He did not take this as an instruction to talk to anyone

else or get an appraisal.

{¶ 57} Jason closed on the farm on September 6, 2023. He paid cash from an

advance on his inheritance approved by his sister and stepbrother. After closing, when

Jason saw Perry at the Williams County fair, Perry was happy about Jason buying the

farm and said that he did not care about the money.

{¶ 58} In text messages that she sent after closing, Connie told Jason that she was

going to have to reconsider their deal because she did not have the authority to make the

decision, Melvin’s, Lloyd’s, and Raymond’s heirs were supposed to be involved, and

Connie did not contact anyone else but should have. Jason was unaware of those details,

which is why he talked to Connie before going to the lawyer to proceed with the sale.

During this text conversation, Jason also told Connie that his parents’ 40-acre farm had

recently sold for $150,000, which was significantly less than its actual sale price.

However, he claimed that the sale happened after closing and did not influence the

purchase of the farm in any way. If Connie had required an appraisal or higher purchase

price, Jason would have discussed with his wife whether to proceed.

{¶ 59} Jason obtained a value opinion of $105,000 from a real estate company and

later obtained a $96,000 appraisal from Sigg. His former counsel advised paying the

difference to align with the $96,000 appraisal, excluding Connie’s share because she

27. agreed to the $80,000 purchase price and Brandie’s and Brenda’s shares because they

disclaimed them. Jason deposited funds into a bank account that he arranged to be

opened for the trust so that Margo could disburse them. He confirmed that the account

still holds the funds.

{¶ 60} On cross, Jason agreed that he thought of Connie as family leader and did

not involve Margo in initial talks because he thought that Margo just lived on the farm.

He told Connie in July that the plan was to build a house and move Margo in, without

first confirming Margo’s wishes. He first spoke with Margo after Connie agreed and

before meeting with Shaffer in July. He learned at that meeting that Margo, not Connie,

had authority to sell the property, but it did not change his actions because he believed if

Connie approved, Margo would not care. He confirmed that he made extra

disbursements after receiving the $96,000 appraisal and put the money into a new bank

account for Margo to distribute. By the July meeting, Jason knew that Margo was the

trustee, which meant that she was the only one who needed to sign off on the deal, and

that $80,000 was on “[t]he low end of” fair market value. He proceeded with the

purchase believing that Margo’s and Connie’s approval of the sale was sufficient.

{¶ 61} Although he testified that he told Shaffer that Connie had approved the

purchase price, at his deposition, Jason said that he told Shaffer that the family was on

board “as far as [he] know[s].” He clarified that he only talked to Connie, did not know

that he needed to talk to anyone else, and did not know who else Connie might have

talked to about the sale. He denied that Shaffer advised him to consult the other

28. beneficiaries. Jason understood Shaffer’s warning that families can sue when money is

involved. He knew about the mortgage on the farm and acknowledged that it was paid

off at closing.

{¶ 62} Jason admitted that he did not research fair market value before offering

$80,000. Instead, he picked a number that he wanted to pay. He maintained that Connie

agreed to $80,000 and he viewed his role as making an offer that Connie accepted, not as

setting terms of the sale. He confirmed that the post-closing texts did not affect his

conduct before closing. He admitted that he “misquoted” the amount his family farm

sold for in the post-closing texts with Connie and said that he did not actually go to the

bank or pay interest on the money he used to buy the farm because he used an advance on

his inheritance from his parents. The declining real estate market he cited came from

information he learned from his realtor and what he saw with properties in his parents’

estates.

{¶ 63} Jason sought valuations of the farm after learning of the beneficiaries’

objections. After receiving the $96,000 appraisal from Sigg, Jason paid only $8,000 of

the $16,000 price difference into the trust’s bank account. That is because, on advice of

prior counsel, he excluded Connie’s share, and he received deferrals from Brandie and

Brenda. He did not pay the full $16,000 to the trustee to allow her to determine what to

do with it.

{¶ 64} Jason felt that the property was worth $80,000, which is why he wanted to

pay that much for it. He also said that if the sale were voided, he would expect

29. reimbursement of the mortgage payoff because that debt was not his. However, he did

not believe that he would be able to collect that debt from Margo.

{¶ 65} After he testified, Jason rested.

{¶ 66} Finally, Margo testified that she did not participate in creating the

Lashaway Family Trust, was not invited to meetings about the trust, and knew no details

of the trust at that time. Raymond referred to the trust only as “a paper” and told her if

something happened to him, she would go to the lawyer’s office to get the paper. She

first recalled seeing the trust document when she received paperwork related to this

lawsuit. She described a longstanding marital pattern where Raymond handled decisions,

told her to “just sign” documents, and she typically did so without asking questions.

After Raymond’s death in December 2020, Margo met with Shaffer in January 2021

primarily to make a will and medical decision documents, not to address the farm or trust

duties. At that meeting, she believed Connie was in charge and did not understand that

she had any authority under the trust. Shaffer told her that “the ball’s in your court,”

which she understood to mean that she would stand in for Raymond if the trustees had a

meeting. She did not believe at that time that she had authority to sell the farm.

In July 2023 Margo again met with Shaffer when she and Jason were planning to move

forward with the sale. Shaffer informed her that she, as the surviving spouse and trustee,

had to sign to convey the farm and that Connie was not in control. Even then, Margo did

not feel that she fully understood the trust or her role and repeatedly said that she would

not go against Connie. She believed that Connie had agreed to the sale based on her

30. discussions with Jason. Shaffer told her that a fair market price was required and said

that the proposed price was “low,” but she did not know what fair market value meant.

She relied on Shaffer’s guidance that the mortgage would “come off the top” of the sale

proceeds and that he would “handle all the rest.” She confirmed that she signed

numerous sale-related documents in Shaffer’s office, following his direction to sign them,

without reading them and without independently understanding them. Margo

acknowledged her signatures on the trust and related deeds from 2002 and admitted that

she did not read those at the time she signed them either.

{¶ 67} Margo explained that her understanding of “fair market value” came solely

from Shaffer telling her it was required; she did not know the concept before and did not

evaluate the sale price of the farm beyond deferring to Connie’s supposed agreement to

it. Regarding the decision to sell, Margo said that Jason came to her in late August or

early September 2023 after talking to Connie and asked her if she was ready to pack. She

agreed to proceed with the sale if Connie agreed to it because she believed that Jason had

negotiated with Connie. She also relied on Shaffer’s statement that she had to sign

documents for the sale. Margo struggled financially after Raymond’s death, and upkeep

of the farm was difficult, which contributed to her moving forward with the sale.

Prior counsel advised her to open an account and disburse additional funds to the

beneficiaries, using money that Jason provided, to bring them up to the amount of the

appraisal.

31. On cross, Margo confirmed that she had discussed with her daughters in spring and

summer of 2023 that finances were tight, and she had come to realize that she likely

would not stay through the winter. Jason did not pressure or force her regarding the sale

and presented the plan as a way for her to remain on the farm, which she viewed as “the

Lord’s answer to a prayer.” In her role as trustee, she relied on Shaffer to properly close

the sale in accordance with the terms of the trust.

{¶ 68} Margo reiterated that Shaffer made clear in July 2023 that Connie had no

authority and that the sale was Margo’s decision, though she initially found that hard to

believe and wanted to involve Connie. Margo returned to Shaffer’s office several days

later to sign the purchase agreement. She signed as trustee. Shaffer did not discuss fair

market value at that signing; he simply laid out papers and directed her to sign. Margo

did not understand in 2002 that the siblings were giving up their inheritance so that she

and Raymond could stay on the farm. Her understanding of their duties when she and

Raymond took the mortgage out on the farm included paying taxes and upkeep of the

farm. Margo paid taxes annually but sometimes late, and there were late charges and

force-placed insurance on the loan over the years. Shaffer told her that the mortgage

payoff would come “off the top,” and she did not know if that was fair to the

beneficiaries.

{¶ 69} Margo consistently believed that Connie was in charge until Shaffer told

her otherwise in July 2023, and much of what she believed about Connie’s role in

negotiations came from Jason. She left the farm because finances were tight. She

32. intended to speak to Connie about leaving the farm, but she did not end up speaking with

Connie before the sale. She acknowledged stating in an interrogatory that she believed

that she had to vacate the property after a sale arranged by Connie, but she testified in

court that she did not recall providing that specific answer. Margo did not regret how she

proceeded despite being warned by Shaffer about a possible lawsuit.

{¶ 70} After her testimony, Margo rested.

{¶ 71} Following the trial, the trial court issued a decision finding in favor of the

beneficiaries and against Jason and Margo. In its judgment entry, the trial court made the

following findings of fact. First, the parties stipulated to a number of facts. They agreed

that Raymond and Margo created the Lashaway Family Trust on May 29, 2002. They

were the settlors and trustees of the trust. Raymond died on December 3, 2020, leaving

Margo as the sole trustee of the trust. The only asset of the trust is property in Pioneer,

Ohio, which the court referred to as the Lashaway farm. The farm was the home of

Raymond’s parents, Louis Earl and Fay Lashaway.

{¶ 72} Louis and Fay had four children, Melvin Lashaway, Lloyd Lashaway,

Raymond, and Connie Salisbury. Melvin, Lloyd, and Raymond are deceased. Melvin is

survived by Richard Lashaway and Perry Lashaway. Lloyd is survived by Jeffrey

Lashaway, Steve Lashaway, and Amanda Lennard. Raymond is survived by Brandie

Bailey and Brenda Dick.

{¶ 73} Fay, the survivor of Fay and Louis, died in 2001. The farm was an asset of

Fay’s estate. On April 3, 2002, the estate’s fiduciary transferred the farm to Raymond

33. and Margo. On April 9, 2002, Raymond and Margo, using the farm as collateral, signed

a $65,000 note and mortgage in favor of the National Bank of Montpelier. On May 29,

2002, Raymond and Margo transferred the farm to the trust.

{¶ 74} On September 6, 2023, Margo transferred the farm to Jason. The State

Bank and Trust Company, successor to the National Bank of Montpelier, filed a

satisfaction of mortgage on September 11, 2023.

{¶ 75} Beyond the stipulated facts, the trial court found that all of the plaintiffs,

plus Brandie and Brenda, are beneficiaries of the trust. Jason is Brandie’s husband and

Margo’s son-in-law.

{¶ 76} The farm property is in a “‘unique’” location because it is the first property

north of the Pioneer village limits, it is bordered on the south by a plastic fabrication

business, and it is bordered on the east by a large development project. There have been

“multiple inquiries as to selling the property over the time that the Lashaways have

owned the Farm.”

{¶ 77} Fay intended to treat her children equally by distributing her estate to them

equally. The farm was appraised at $150,000 in Fay’s estate in 2002. Fay’s estate owed

several debts totaling approximately $55,000, and her will required the farm to be sold to

pay the debts. The children agreed not to follow the will, however. While the estate was

open, the children met with an estate attorney and reached an agreement under which

they would not sell the farm. Instead, they would allow Raymond and Margo to remain

34. living on the farm, which deferred their inheritance (except for a small payout they

received from Raymond’s loan proceeds).

{¶ 78} In order to remain on the farm, Raymond and Margo had to pay off the

estate’s debts. To do so, they took out the $65,000 note and mortgage. Raymond and

Margo signed the mortgage in their individual capacities.

{¶ 79} Before Raymond and Margo signed the trust, the attorney who drafted it

sent a copy of it to the siblings with a letter that told them to “‘[p]lease pay particular

attention to Article 1.’” This put the beneficiaries on notice and made them aware of the

trust’s terms.

{¶ 80} Raymond and Margo signed the trust and became the trustees on May 29,

2002. The trust allowed them to use and reside at the farm and required them to pay the

real estate taxes, maintain and pay for fire and wind-storm insurance, and maintain the

property in good condition. After the last of them died or they otherwise decided to leave

the property, the real estate would be sold “at a fair market value.” From the proceeds,

the trustees would pay the settlors or their heirs the amount the settlors expended to

enhance or improve the property. The rest would be divided equally among the

beneficiaries or their children, if they were deceased. The trust did not address other

farm expenses, farm income, or Raymond and Margo’s personal debt on the farm. There

was no requirement that the beneficiaries be given notice related to any terms of the trust.

The trial court found the trust unambiguous and “interpret[ed] the Trust terms in the plain

language stated in the document.”

35. {¶ 81} The testimony showed that the property was not maintained in “good”

condition, as required by the terms of the trust.

{¶ 82} Margo viewed and signed the mortgage documents, the deed conveying the

farm from her and Raymond individually to them as trustees, and the Lashaway Family

Trust. The court found that Margo “had an opportunity since inception of the Trust to

read, understand and inquire as to the meaning of these legal documents.”

{¶ 83} Raymond and Margo lived at the farm from 2002 to 2020. Both of them

contracted COVID in November 2020. Raymond died from COVID on December 3,

2020. Margo recovered but required new medications that were a monthly expense that

added to her financial strain.

{¶ 84} Margo became the sole trustee of the Lashaway Family Trust at the time of

Raymond’s death. She met with attorney Michael Shaffer twice after Raymond’s death

to discuss her right to remain on the farm. At these meetings, Shaffer told her about the

terms of the Lashaway Family Trust, that she was in charge, and that she could not be

forced to leave the farm. Brandie was present for at least one of these meetings.

After Raymond’s death, Connie was approached by two prospective buyers of the farm.

She directed them to Margo. She also sent Brandie a text message about one of the

potential buyers, which Brandie acknowledged.

{¶ 85} Following Raymond’s death, the farm deteriorated, the mortgage was not

timely paid, and it became financially unrealistic for Margo to maintain the farm. Margo

violated the terms of the trust by allowing the farm to deteriorate, failing to pay the

36. mortgage timely, and failing to pay property taxes. The payment history for the mortgage

showed that Margo made many late payments and failed to insure the farm over the

years. As a result, the balance of the loan at the time of the sale was “significantly

greater” than it should have been if she had adhered to the terms of the loan. At the time

of the sale, property taxes for the farm were delinquent by $1,008.49.

{¶ 86} Jason’s mother died in the spring of 2023 and left him more than $2

million. None of the beneficiaries, including Brandie, were aware of Jason’s inheritance.

Having this money allowed Jason to consider purchasing the farm. He planned to build a

new home for his wife there that would include a place for Margo to live. The first

person he talked to about this plan was Connie because he believed that he needed

Connie to consent to the purchase and the purchase price. He told her that he wanted to

pay $80,000 for the farm. Connie, “through all the documents that were provided to her

over the years and by her own actions, knew she was not the ‘decision maker’ for the sale

of the Farm.”

{¶ 87} Jason told Brandie and Margo about his plan to buy the farm and build a

new home in July 2023. After that, he contacted Shaffer, Margo’s attorney, to schedule a

meeting about proceeding with the sale of the farm.

{¶ 88} Margo, Jason, and Brandie met with Shaffer in July 2023. At the meeting,

Shaffer “advised them of the dangers of moving forward without a fair market value

determination of the Farm.” Despite that, Margo, as trustee, entered into a purchase

37. agreement with Jason, her son-in-law, on July 25, 2023, for $80,000. They did not have

the property appraised to obtain its fair market value.

{¶ 89} The sale of the farm closed on September 6, 2023. Of the $79,556.31 that

Jason brought the closing, $33,817.31 was used to pay off the note in Raymond and

Margo’s names, $1,661.68 was used to pay delinquent and prorated real estate taxes, $50

was used to pay a courier fee for the mortgage note, and $1,204.50 was used to pay

attorney fees and closing costs. The remaining $43,259.97 was paid to Margo as trustee.

Following the closing, Shaffer sent each beneficiary a final trustee’s report and a

distribution check. Only Raymond’s children cashed their checks.

{¶ 90} After purchasing the farm, Jason demolished three outbuildings on the

property. He did not present any evidence of whether he did this himself or

accomplished it through a third party or offer any evidence of the cost of demolition.

After the beneficiaries told Jason that they did not believe the farm was sold at fair

market value, Jason obtained two appraisals. He considered the appraisal from Elizabeth

Sigg (the appraisal with the lower value) as the fair market value of the farm. Based on

that, he increased the purchase price of the farm to $96,000. “However, the amount that

Jason has ‘paid’ to date is $88,000.00. He choose [sic] who was entitled to additional

funds and never paid the fair market value in accordance to his own appraisal.” The

additional $8,000 that Jason added to the purchase price is held in a bank account. The

beneficiaries who received additional checks have not accepted or cashed the checks.

38. Shaffer testified that he had three meetings with Margo between the time Raymond died

in the time she sold the farm. At the first meeting, in 2021, “there was concern as to

whether Margo’s occupancy at the Farm would terminate due to Raymond’s passing.”

After reviewing the trust, he advised Margo that she had the right to occupy the farm. He

testified that he would have reviewed the terms of the trust with her, told her that she was

the trustee, told her that she had rights under the trust, and told her that “she was ‘in

control’.”

{¶ 91} About two weeks later, they had another meeting to discuss the terms of the

trust. At this meeting, Shaffer had fully reviewed the trust and “clearly advised that

[Margo] was in charge under the Trust terms.”

{¶ 92} At the third meeting, in 2023, they discussed Margo no longer wanting to

live at the farm and wanting to sell the farm to Jason. Shaffer discussed Margo’s

responsibilities under the trust and the requirement that she sell the farm at fair market

value. Margo and Jason told him that they had agreed to a sale price of $80,000. Shaffer

looked up the property on the county auditor’s website and discovered that the sale price

was less than the auditor’s valuation. Jason explained that the property “was in ‘ill-

repair’.” He also told Shaffer that he had consulted with Connie, and Shaffer “believed

that the purchase price was ‘consented’ to by the beneficiaries.” Shaffer recalled telling

them that “if the purchase price is not consented to, Margo had liability and ‘they (the

beneficiaries) could bring a law suit’.” If Shaffer had been told or thought that the

beneficiaries were not in agreement with the sale, he would have “asked more questions

39. about the sale and would not have proceeded.” At the end of the meeting, Margo

instructed him to move forward with the sale, so Shaffer prepared the purchase

agreement, which Margo and Jason signed.

{¶ 93} Shaffer knew of a prior offer to buy the farm for approximately $100,000,

but he knew that the family did not want to sell to that buyer.

The trial court specifically found Shaffer’s testimony to be “creditable” and accepted his

testimony as true.

{¶ 94} Connie testified that the farm was to be sold as part of her mother’s estate

proceedings, but Raymond asked to continue living on the farm, which he could only do

by purchasing the property. Although Melvin was against the plan, she and Lloyd

convinced him and the estate attorney to let Raymond stay on the farm. In exchange,

Raymond and Margo would have to pay the estate’s debts, maintain the buildings on the

property, and pay property taxes and insurance. When they no longer lived on the farm,

it would be sold and each sibling would receive their share.

{¶ 95} After Raymond’s death, Connie was contacted by two prospective buyers.

She referred both of them to Margo because she knew that Margo was in charge under

the trust.

{¶ 96} In July 2023, Jason came to Connie to tell her that he wanted to purchase

the farm for $80,000 to build a home for him, Brandie, and Margo. Connie assumed that

Margo knew of and was in favor of Jason’s plan. She did not know of any delinquent

payments or remaining debt on the land. After their meeting, Jason followed up and told

40. Connie that land values were decreasing and that he was getting bank financing, which

would only allow for a purchase price of up to $80,000. The court found that Connie was

aware of the terms of the Lashaway Family Trust and knew that she could not decide to

sell the farm. It also found that there were “creditability” issues with Jason’s testimony,

while Connie was a “creditable” witness.

{¶ 97} Perry testified that Jason never told him that he had purchased the farm,

despite having the opportunity to do so at a Fourth of July party and at the Williams

County fair in September.

{¶ 98} Jason disputed Perry’s testimony and claimed that he did tell Perry about

his plan to buy the farm. He also claimed that he went to Connie believing that she had

to agree to the sale. Both Perry and Connie were happy for him. He did not hear back

from Connie right away after their meeting, but when she texted him back, she told him

she thought that the price would be more. Jason did not talk to Margo or Brandie about

buying the farm until he heard from Connie.

{¶ 99} Margo testified that she did not get involved in the household’s financial

affairs. She was aware that they took out a loan to pay Fay’s estate’s debts to stay on the

farm after Fay died. Around that time, Raymond told her to go to the lawyer to sign a

paper. If anything happened to him, she was to go to the lawyer to get the paper. The

court found it credible that Margo did not take an interest in the Lashaway Family Trust

or care about its terms while Raymond was alive. After his death, Margo and her family

members were advised multiple times that she had responsibilities as a trustee. Margo

41. said, “I don’t care to understand” the trust, and said, “I don’t understand and don’t want

to know” about the sale of the farm to Jason. She also said that she did not read any of

the legal documents. The court found this testimony “believable and significant.”

The court had before it three different valuations of the farm. First was a written opinion

of value from a real estate firm that valued the farm at $105,00. Second was

Hershberger’s appraisal that valued the farm at $140,000. And third was Sigg’s appraisal

that valued the farm at $96,000. Based on the evidence before it, the court determined

that “the disparity in the fair market values provided by the appraisers, the interest by

individuals over the years to purchase the Farm, and the unique location of the Farm does

not permit the Court to make a Finding of Fact as to the fair market value of the Farm

based on the evidence provided. The only fair way to determine fair market value is an

arm’s length transaction, without undue influence, with a willing buyer.”

{¶ 100} Regarding the claims against Margo, the court found that the beneficiaries

had proven breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, breach of duty of loyalty, and unjust

enrichment.

{¶ 101} Regarding breach of fiduciary duty, the court found that Margo owed a

duty to each of the beneficiaries when she became the trustee of the Lashaway Family

Trust. She signed documents that placed her in that position but did not read them. She

was advised by an attorney several times over multiple years about the trust, its terms,

and her role. The court found that “ignorance of her responsibilities is not a valid

defense, nor is her disinterest and blatant lack of regard to understand the role she

42. assumed when Raymond passed.” Despite being “articulate and able to understand the

issues presented[,]” Margo did not “care[] enough to fully understand the responsibilities

she had” or ask to be removed as trustee. The court found this to be “a gross and reckless

breach of her fiduciary duty, including a breach of her duty of loyalty.”

{¶ 102} Regarding the debts that were paid from the proceeds of the sale, the court

found that the terms of the trust unambiguously required Margo to pay the taxes on the

property. It also found that the mortgage was in Raymond and Margo’s individual

names, not in their names as trustee. The farm was used as security for the loan that

Raymond and Margo took out in 2002 to pay off Fay’s estate debts so that they could

remain on the farm. If the mortgage had not incurred late fees and forced insurance

payments over the years, the amount owed at the time of the sale would have been

significantly less. The court also found that it was Fay’s intent to treat each of her

children equally, and the siblings’ actions did not change that fact. Thus, Raymond “was

to be treated equally with the other siblings and receive his share of the sale proceeds . . .

.” The court concluded that

[t]he debt was Raymond and Margo’s individually and if it still existed at the time of final sale, would have been required to be paid by Raymond and Margo. There was no provision in the Trust requiring that debt in the individual names of the debtors, be paid and reduce the beneficiaries’ share of proceeds. The other siblings should not “contribute” to the original debt to pay the expenses of Fay’s estate as they received no benefit from the delay in the receipt of their inheritance. Further Raymond would have received his one-fourth (¼) share of the Farm’s sale proceeds. Fay’s intent was equal treatment. Requiring the siblings to now pay the debt of Raymond, is not equal treatment.

43. It found that Margo breached her fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries when she paid her

property taxes and the balance of the mortgage from the proceeds of the farm sale.

{¶ 103} Next, the court found that Margo breached her fiduciary duty to the

beneficiaries by failing to require Jason to pay the full $96,000 appraisal price that he had

relied on.

{¶ 104} Regarding the beneficiaries’ claims of undue influence and coercion

against Jason, the trial court found that “[s]o many of the facts of this case go into the

finding of undue influence and coercion[,]” including that all of the benefits of the sale

went to Margo, Jason, and Brandie; Jason “orchestrated the sale of the Farm in all ways”;

and Margo, Jason, and Brandie were all present when Shaffer told them that the farm had

to be sold for fair market value. The court found that Margo was a susceptible person

because of her inability to pay her debts and her complete disinterest in her

responsibilities as trustee. It also found that Jason had the opportunity to exert influence

over Margo as her son-in-law and through Brandie. Brandie knew of Margo’s financial

situation, helped her budget, and helped her pay bills. After Jason told Margo about his

plan, Margo “was secured in knowing she could continue to stay at the Farm in a ‘new

home’.” Critically, [d]ue to the Trustee’s disinterest in her role as Trustee, Jason was

able to assume that “role”, without authority, and did the following:

• Declared that Margo would be terminating her occupancy of the Farm, without first consulting Margo;

• Set the purchase price for the Farm at $80,000;

• Gave notice to Connie of his intent to purchase;

44. • Contacted Margo’s attorney for an appointment for the sale of the Farm, and went to the appointment with Margo;

• Obtained two appraisals of the real estate and decided on his own which appraisal to use when a dispute arose;

• Decided the amount of the additional funds that he would pay to the Trust and to whom (which beneficiaries) he would pay the funds;

• Arranged through his Bank to open a Trust checking account;

• Instructed Margo how to make the additional distributions to the chosen beneficiaries.

• To this date, Jason has not paid the Trust the purchase price represented by the appraisal that he relied upon. And the Trustee has made no demand for the full payment.

The court found that Jason took all of these actions for self-serving purposes, and the sale

went through after warnings issued by Margo’s attorney. It also found that the

beneficiaries suffered financial loss because of Jason’s and Margo’s actions.

{¶ 105} Regarding fraudulent conveyance, the court found that Shaffer would not

have moved forward with the sale if he had known that the beneficiaries did not consent.

However, “Jason led Attorney Shaffer to believe that there would not be a dispute, when

they [sic] had not taken any steps to ensure that was true.” This misrepresentation of

beneficiary consent caused the sale to occur. And throughout the discussions of the sale,

Margo chose to stay out of the conversations.

{¶ 106} The court also found that Margo, Jason, and Brandie were unjustly

enriched by the farm sale transaction. Margo was unjustly enriched by having her debts

paid from the sale proceeds. Jason and Brandie were unjustly enriched by retaining the

value of the farm above the price Jason paid for it.

45. {¶ 107} Finally, the court determined that Jason’s argument that Connie was not

entitled to any additional money for the farm because she consented to the $80,000 sale

price was without merit.

{¶ 108} The court voided and rescinded the sale of the farm, ordered Jason and

Brandie to convey the farm back to the Lashaway Family Trust, ordered the farm sold at

public auction, ordered Brandie and Brenda to return the distributions they had received

from the sale, ordered all of the distribution money returned to Jason, and granted Jason a

judgment against Margo totaling $35,528.99 for the real estate taxes, courier fee, and

mortgage note payoff that Jason paid at closing.

{¶ 109} Jason now appeals, raising four assignments of error.

Assignment of Error No. 1

The Trial Court’s Decision to Rescind the Deed is Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence and Contrary to Law.

Assignment of Error No. 2

The Trial Court erred in Failing to Restore Appellant Jason Bailey to his Original Position After Voiding the Fiduciary Deed.

Assignment of Error No. 3

The Trial Court erred in Concluding that the testimony of Beth Sigg should be disregarded.

Assignment of Error No. 4

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that Jason Bailey was Unjustly Enriched.

{¶ 110} Margo also appeals, raising four assignments of error.

46. 1. The Trial Court erred by rendering a judgment of fraud and undue influence that was against the manifest weight of the evidence and unsupported by the factual record presented at trial.

2. The Trial Court erred in determining that it possessed the authority to rescind a fiduciary deed, despite the trustee’s lawful execution of the conveyance pursuant to her authority under the Trust.

3. The Trial Court erred in its interpretation and application of the Trust instrument and relevant provisions of the Ohio Trust Code, resulting in a mischaracterization of the trustee’s duties and a failure to give effect to the settlor’s intent.

4. The Trial Court erred by holding that the trustee was obligated to convey Trust property free and clear of mortgage debt, despite the Trust’s acceptance of the property subject to an existing mortgage.

II. Law and Analysis

A. There is some competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s decisions on fraud and undue influence.

{¶ 111} In their first assignments of error, Jason and Margo each argue that the

trial court erred by finding against them on the beneficiaries’ fraud and undue influence

claims. Jason argues that there was not clear and convincing evidence of fraud because

the evidence showed that he told Shaffer that he had spoken to Connie about buying the

farm for $80,000, but he did not tell Shaffer that he had spoken to all of the beneficiaries

about the purchase price. He also claims that it was Margo—not him—who led Shaffer

to believe that there would not be a dispute about the purchase price. And he says that

his discussion of the purchase price with Connie did not involve any concealment or

misrepresentation. Regarding undue influence, he claims that there was not clear and

47. convincing evidence to support the beneficiaries’ claim because there is no evidence of

coercion or improper influence.

{¶ 112} Margo argues that the beneficiaries failed to show that she acted

fraudulently because she was outside of the business dealings for the sale of the farm and

none of the trial testimony showed her misleading or making false representations to the

beneficiaries. Regarding undue influence, she contends that the evidence fails to show

that she was pressured or mislead by Jason. She points to Shaffer’s testimony that he saw

no evidence of Jason trying to take advantage of her, and her testimony that she felt

confident in her decision after Shaffer explained the legal risks and duties to her. She

also contends that the trial court disregarded evidence that she acted in good faith and

executed her duties as trustee in a reasonable manner.

{¶ 113} The beneficiaries respond that there is ample evidence supporting the trial

court’s decision. They claim that Jason placed himself in a position of influence by

offering Margo a new place to live while keeping her on the farm, he decided on the

$80,000 purchase price without any basis, he did not tell Connie about Margo’s mortgage

balance or delinquent taxes, and he led Connie to believe that Margo was aware of his

plan, he intended to talk to the other beneficiaries, land values were decreasing, and he

could not afford to pay more than $80,000. Jason also made the appointment with

Margo’s attorney and led him to believe that all of the beneficiaries were on board with

the plan, and he would not have proceeded with the sale if he did not believe that.

48. {¶ 114} As to Margo, the beneficiaries point out she was careless regarding her

duties as trustee, not bothering to read the trust or to understand what was in it. When

Shaffer warned her that she was selling the farm for less than fair market value, she chose

to proceed with a sale that benefited her personally to the detriment of the beneficiaries.

{¶ 115} We review a judgment following a bench trial under a manifest weight of

the evidence standard. Terry v. Kellstone, Inc., 2013-Ohio-4419, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.). In

reviewing the judgment, we weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider

the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trial court clearly lost its way

in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice

that the trial court’s judgment must be reversed. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶

20. As part of this review, we presume that the trial court’s findings of fact are correct

because the trial court “is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor,

gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of

the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77,

80 (1984). We will not reverse a judgment supported by some competent, credible

evidence going to all the essential elements of the case as being against the manifest

weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978),

syllabus. Additionally, “‘[a] reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply

because it holds a different opinion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and

evidence submitted before the trial court. A finding of an error in law is a legitimate

49. ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses and evidence

is not.’” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24, quoting Seasons Coal at 81.

{¶ 116} The elements of fraud are:

(a) a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact, (b) which is material to the transaction at hand, (c) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred, (d) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it, (e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment, and (f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.

Burr v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs. of Stark Cty., 23 Ohio St.3d 69 (1986), paragraph two of the

syllabus.

{¶ 117} Here, there is some competent, credible evidence going to every element

of fraud, so the trial court’s decision is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

First, there is evidence that Jason represented to Shaffer that the family found $80,000 to

be an acceptable purchase price for the farm, and without that representation, Shaffer

would not have proceeded with drafting the documents for the sale. Jason knew that only

Connie had agreed to the $80,000 purchase price, as he had not discussed it with any

other beneficiaries. He also knew that the price was below fair market value based on his

knowledge of the county auditor’s value and Shaffer’s conversation with him and Margo

during which Shaffer looked at the auditor’s website and commented about Jason getting

a discounted price. Additionally, Connie testified that she agreed to the $80,000 price

because she thought that land values were decreasing based on information that Jason

gave her.

50. {¶ 118} Jason’s intent to mislead Shaffer can be inferred by his failure to disclose

or clarify that no one in the family except Connie had agreed to the purchase price. See

Kerbler v. Biltwell Contracting LLC, 2024-Ohio-5607, ¶ 79 (5th Dist.) (intent to defraud

can be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances). His intent to defraud

Connie can be inferred from him telling her that he planned to discuss the sale with Perry

and by telling her that land values were decreasing. It was reasonable for Shaffer to rely

on Jason’s representation in proceeding with the sale paperwork, and for Connie to

believe that Jason was going to discuss the sale with at least Perry before proceeding.

Finally, the beneficiaries were harmed by the resulting lower sales price.

{¶ 119} The trial court, as the finder of fact and the sole judge of the weight of the

evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, may believe or disbelieve all, part, or none

of a witness’s testimony. State v. Caudill, 2008-Ohio-1557, ¶ 62 (6th Dist.), citing State

v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964). A judgment is not against the manifest weight of

the evidence simply because the court finds some witnesses or evidence more believable

than others. Harding v. Harding, 2016-Ohio-7028, ¶ 24 (9th Dist.). The trial court chose

to believe the beneficiaries’ version of the evidence—which supports all of the elements

of fraud—and we cannot reverse the trial court’s decision on that basis.

{¶ 120} A party claiming undue influence must prove: “‘(1) a susceptible party;

(2) another’s opportunity to exert [influence]; (3) the fact of improper influence exerted

or attempted; and (4) the result showing the effect of such influence.’” (Brackets in

51. original.) In re Estate of Flowers, 2017-Ohio-1310, ¶ 87 (6th Dist.), quoting West v.

Henry, 173 Ohio St. 498, 510-511 (1962).

{¶ 121} The record also supports the trial court’s finding of undue influence.

First, Margo was a susceptible person. She was elderly, recently widowed, dealing with

health problems, struggling financially, and did not want to leave her home on the farm.

Jason had the opportunity to exert influence over Margo by virtue of being her son-in-law

and by purchasing the farm where she was living and wanted to remain living. He

exerted improper influence by offering to alleviate her financial difficulties by giving her

a place to live on the farm when he built his new house there. And the result of that

influence was Margo selling him the farm for less than fair market value. Because these

findings are supported by some competent, credible evidence in the record, the trial

court’s finding of undue influence is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 122} Jason’s and Margo’s first assignments of error are not well-taken.

B. There is some competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s decision on unjust enrichment.

{¶ 123} In his fourth assignment of error, Jason argues that the trial court erred by

finding that he was unjustly enriched. He claims that he has not been conferred and

retained a benefit at the beneficiaries’ expense because he paid the full, negotiated

purchase price at closing and then paid additional money to all of the beneficiaries except

Connie after he received Sigg’s appraisal. The beneficiaries respond that the farm is

worth some amount of money (albeit an undetermined amount) over the $88,000 that

Jason has paid for it and through his undue influence, the farm was fraudulently

52. conveyed to him, allowing him to retain the benefit of that additional value, while they

have been deprived of that part of their inheritance.

{¶ 124} Unjust enrichment occurs when (1) a plaintiff confers a benefit upon a

defendant, (2) the defendant has knowledge of the benefit, and (3) the defendant retains

the benefit under circumstances where it would be unjust to do so without payment.

Cuspide Props., Ltd. v. Earl Mechanical Servs., 2015-Ohio-5019, ¶ 60 (6th Dist.), citing

Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183 (1984). “An action in unjust

enrichment will lie ‘ . . . when a party retains money or benefits which in justice and

equity belong to another.’” (Ellipsis in original.) Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm.

of Ohio, 40 Ohio St.3d 109, 110-111 (1988), quoting Stan-Clean of Lexington, Inc. v.

Stanley Steemer Internatl., Inc., 2 Ohio App.3d 129, 131 (10th Dist. 1981).

{¶ 125} Here, there is some competent, credible evidence showing that Jason

retained value that belonged to the beneficiaries. Although the fair market value of the

farm is still up in the air, it has been appraised at $96,000, $105,000, $126,000, and

$140,000, and a potential purchaser had offered $100,000 for the property. Jason has

paid $87,556.31 for the farm. This is $8,400 less than even the lowest appraisal amount.

Jason was aware of at least three of the valuations because two of the appraisals were

obtained at his request and one came from the county auditor’s website, which he sent to

Connie. Jason unilaterally chose the lowest of those valuations as the appropriate

measure of the farm’s value and gave Melvin’s and Lloyd’s children additional money

but did not give Raymond’s children any additional money because he obtained waivers

53. from them and did not give Connie any additional money based on R.C. 5810.09. He

claims that this is sufficient to show that he has paid full value for the farm. However,

R.C. 5810.09 provides that, with certain exceptions, a trustee is not liable to a beneficiary

for breach of trust if the beneficiary consented to the conduct constituting the breach,

released the trustee from liability for the breach, or ratified the conduct. Id. By its very

terms, the statute applies only to trustees and beneficiaries; it does not extend to third

parties involved in business dealings with trustees and beneficiaries. Thus, Jason cannot

rely on the statute to support his position that Connie was not entitled to the additional

payment he made to Melvin’s and Lloyd’s children. So, assuming that the waivers from

Raymond’s children are valid, at the very least, Jason has retained approximately $4,200

in value to which he is not entitled. This is sufficient to show that Jason was unjustly

enriched. Therefore, Jason’s fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.

C. The trial court did not err in weighing Sigg’s testimony.

{¶ 126} In his third assignment of error, Jason argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by “disregarding Sigg’s appraisal as being too disparate to Hershberger’s.” He

contends that Hershberger did not possess the proper credentials to appraise farm ground

and did not follow appropriate appraisal methods, so the trial court should have

disregarded her appraisal and given Sigg’s appraisal more consideration than it did.

{¶ 127} “‘Failure to either object or move to strike evidence at trial on the basis of

hearsay, a witness’ qualifications, or purported foundational deficiencies, waives any

challenge on appeal, save plain error.’” Schmidt v. Crayne, 2024-Ohio-4726, ¶ 132 (6th

54. Dist.), quoting Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Christian, 2003-Ohio-2455, ¶ 32 (3d

Dist.); Hummel v. Suglia, 2003-Ohio-5226, ¶ 58 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Ritchie,

1997 WL 164323 (9th Dist. Apr. 2, 1997) (“It is well-established that a ‘failure to object

to the qualifications of an expert witness at trial waives that error on appeal.’”). Jason did

not object to Hershberger’s qualifications or methodology at trial, so he has waived all

but plain error review of these issues on appeal.

{¶ 128} The application of plain error in civil cases

is sharply limited to the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where the error, left unobjected to at the trial court, rises to the level of challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself. . . . The plain error doctrine should never be applied to reverse a civil judgment simply because a reviewing court disagrees with the result obtained in the trial court . . . .

(Emphasis in original.) Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122 (1997). This is not

such an extremely rare and exceptional case. Thus, we find no plain error related to

Hershberger’s qualifications or methodology.

{¶ 129} Regarding the weight that the trial court gave to Sigg’s appraisal, “[t]he

weight to be given an expert’s testimony is to be determined by the trier of fact.”

Donithan v. Donithan, 1990 WL 134310, *2 (12th Dist. Sept. 17, 1990). The court can

accept all, part, or none of the expert’s testimony and give the testimony “whatever

weight it deem[s] appropriate.” Id. Because the trial court had the discretion to accept

all, part, or none of Sigg’s testimony and give her testimony the weight it deemed

appropriate, we cannot say that the court’s refusal to wholly accept Sigg’s appraisal was

error. Jason’s third assignment of error is not well-taken.

55. D. The trial court properly rescinded the deed.

{¶ 130} In her second assignment of error, Margo argues that the trial court lacked

the authority to rescind the fiduciary deed used to transfer the farm from her, as trustee, to

Jason. She contends that the trial court could intervene only if a breach of trust occurred,

but the evidence presented at trial did not establish that Margo breached her duties as

trustee. Rather, the evidence showed that she acted in good faith, consulted an attorney

who did not tell her that the sale was unauthorized or the price was improper, and relied

on Connie’s apparent authority and consent. The beneficiaries respond that the evidence

shows that Margo was “careless” regarding the trust; she never read the trust, did not

understand the trust, and did not care to understand the trust. Shaffer also warned Margo

that the purchase price Jason proposed was less than fair market value and that the

beneficiaries could sue her if she went through with the sale, but she did it anyway and

personally benefited by having her personal mortgage debt paid from the proceeds of the

sale.

{¶ 131} Under R.C. 5808.01, “[u]pon acceptance of a trusteeship, the trustee shall

administer the trust in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the

interests of the beneficiaries, and in accordance with Chapters 5801. to 5811. of the

Revised Code.” A trustee who commits breach of trust is liable to the trust beneficiaries.

R.C. 5810.02(A). If the trial court finds a breach of trust, the court is authorized to,

among other things, void an act of the trustee. R.C. 5810.01(B)(9).

56. {¶ 132} “‘It is well settled that every violation by a trustee of a duty which equity

lays upon him, whether wilful [sic] and fraudulent, or done through negligence, or arising

through mere oversight or forgetfulness, is a breach of trust.’” Keybank N.A. v. Thalman,

2016-Ohio-2832, ¶ 15, quoting Shuster v. N. Am. Mtge. Loan Co., 139 Ohio St. 315, 343

(1942). To prove breach of trust, the plaintiff must show that (1) the trustee owes a duty

to a beneficiary, and (2) the trustee breached that duty. Bryan v. Chytil, 2021-Ohio-4082,

¶ 88 (4th Dist.). Some of the duties a trustee owes to the trust beneficiaries include

the duty to “administer the trust in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries, and in accordance with Chapters 5801. to 5811. of the Revised Code,” . . . the duty of loyalty and to avoid conflicts of interest, . . . the duty to “administer the trust as a prudent person would” and to “exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution,” . . . [and] the duty to “take reasonable steps to take control of and protect the trust property” . . . .

Id., quoting R.C. 5808.01; R.C. 5808.04; and R.C. 5808.09; and citing R.C. 5808.02. We

review the trial court’s breach of trust findings under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence

standard.

{¶ 133} The evidence presented at trial showed that Margo breached several of her

duties as trustee of the Lashaway Family Trust. First, Margo did not attempt to

administer the trust in accordance with its terms and in the interests of its beneficiaries or

attempt to administer it as a prudent person would and to exercise reasonable care, skill,

and caution. She did not read the trust to learn its terms and what being trustee required

of her and did not take any reasonable steps to determine the farm’s fair market value

before selling it to Jason. Instead, Margo chose to remain ignorant of her duties under the

57. trust and chose to proceed with the sale to Jason even after being warned that $80,000

was below fair market value and could result in the beneficiaries suing her. Second,

Margo entered into a transaction that is statutorily presumed to be a conflict of interest by

selling the farm to her son-in-law. R.C. 5808.02(C)(2) (“A sale . . . involving the

investment or management of trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict

between personal and fiduciary interests if it is entered into by the trustee with . . . the

spouse of a trustee’s descendant . . . .”). Finally, she failed to take reasonable steps to

protect the trust property by failing to pay the income taxes, maintain the required

insurance coverage, and allowing the property to fall into disrepair. All of these findings

are supported by some competent, credible evidence in the record, so they are not against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 134} Because Margo committed breach of trust, the trial court was authorized

under R.C. 5810.01(B)(9) to void her act of selling the farm to Jason. Therefore,

Margo’s second assignment of error is not well-taken.

E. The trial court’s interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the trust.

{¶ 135} In her fourth assignment of error, Margo argues that the trial court

imposed a duty to transfer the farm property free of encumbrances that is not in the terms

of the trust. She claims that she reasonably relied on the terms of the trust and

administered the trust in good faith, which is sufficient to protect her from liability under

R.C. 5810.09. She points out that the property was encumbered with a mortgage taken

out to pay Fay’s debts when it was transferred into the trust, and she was effectively

58. using the sale proceeds to satisfy Fay’s obligations, so using trust funds to pay off the

mortgage was not inconsistent with her fiduciary duties.

{¶ 136} “‘A court’s purpose in interpreting a trust is to effectuate, within the legal

parameters established by a court or by statute, the settlor’s intent.’” Arnott v. Arnott,

2012-Ohio-3208, ¶ 14, quoting Domo v. McCarthy, 66 Ohio St.3d 312 (1993), paragraph

one of the syllabus; Wyper v. DuFour, 2019-Ohio-1035, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). In general,

when the language of the trust is unambiguous, the settlor’s intent can be ascertained

from the express terms of the trust itself. Natl. City Bank v. de Laville, 2006-Ohio-5909,

¶ 28, citing Domo at 314. Any words used in the trust are presumed to be used according

to their common, ordinary meaning. In re Trust of Brooke, 82 Ohio St.3d 553, 557

(1998). But when ambiguity exists or the settlor’s intent is unclear, a court may consider

extrinsic evidence to determine the settlor’s intent. de Laville at ¶ 28, citing McDonald &

Co. Secs., Inc., Gradison Div. v. Alzheimer’s Disease & Related Disorders Assn., Inc.,

140 Ohio App.3d 358, 363 (1st Dist. 2000). “Ambiguity exists only when a provision at

issue is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” Lager v. Miller-

Gonzalez, 2008-Ohio-4838, ¶ 16. The construction of a written trust is a matter of law

that is reviewed de novo. Arnott at ¶ 14.

{¶ 137} The key terms of the Lashaway Family Trust are in Article 1, which

states:

The Gift Trust shall be administered and disposed of as follows:

59. 1. During the Settlors’ lives and as long as either Settlor lives in the house for ten months per year, pays all real estate taxes, maintains fire and wind-storm insurance coverage, and maintains the property in good condition, Settlors shall have the right to continued use and occupation of the property.

2, After the termination of the right of occupancy by reason of death or otherwise, the property will be sold at a fair market value and from the proceeds of the sale the trustees will pay to the Settlors, or their beneficiaries, an amount equal to the amounts expended by the Settlors to enhance or improve the real property subject to this trust. The balance shall be divided in four shares and distributed per stirpes to Melvin Lashaway, Lloyd Lashaway, Raymond Lashaway and Connie Fae Salisbury.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 131} The terms of the trust are clear and unambiguous. First, “proceeds” are

“the amount of money received from a sale[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 2014);

see also Merriam-Webster Online, https://www. merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/proceeds (accessed Feb. 12, 2026) (“the total amount brought

in”). They differ from “net proceeds,” which are “[t]he amount received in a transaction

minus the costs of the transaction[.]” Id.; see also Merriam-Webster Online,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/proceeds (accessed Feb. 12, 2026) (“the

net amount received . . . after deduction of any discount or charges”). The trust does not

indicate that any payments are to be made from the net proceeds of the sale; it clearly

refers only to the “proceeds,” which indicates all of the money realized from the sale.

60. {¶ 132} Second, the only expense that the trust authorizes to be paid from the

proceeds of the sale of the farm is “an amount equal to the amounts expended by the

Settlors to enhance or improve the real property subject to [the] trust.” That is, the trust

authorizes payment only for any money that Raymond or Margo spent to enhance or

improve the farm. There is no evidence that Raymond or Margo in fact spent money to

enhance or improve the farm, so Margo was not entitled to any payments from the

proceeds of the sale. Although Margo argues that “[t]he trust contained no directive

precluding her from paying off the mortgage or to otherwise convey the property subject

to liens . . .[,]” this ignores the fact that there is nothing in the express terms of the trust

that authorized payment of the mortgage existing on the property—or any other expense

beyond costs of enhancement or improvements—before the balance of the proceeds was

divided among the trust’s beneficiaries. By paying her personal debt out of the sale

proceeds, Margo violated the terms of the trust. Margo’s fourth assignment of error is

not well-taken.

F. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when fashioning its remedy.

{¶ 133} In his second assignment of error, Jason argues that the trial court erred by

awarding him a judgment against Margo in the amount equivalent to the mortgage that he

paid off with the funds he brought to closing. He contends that the court awarded him a

judgment that he never sought and, in doing so, failed to return him to the position he was

in before the sale and awarded the trust monetary damages for the benefit of the

61. {¶ 134} The beneficiaries respond that the trial court was not required to restore

Jason to the position he was in before the sale because he came to the transaction with

unclean hands. Regardless, the trial court’s remedy attempted to restore Jason to the

position he was in before the sale without transferring Margo’s personal debt to the trust

or the beneficiaries.

{¶ 135} In her third assignment of error, Margo argues that the trial court

erroneously required her to convey the farm free of encumbrances and to obtain fair

market value as a condition of a valid transfer, despite those terms not appearing in the

trust. Because those terms are not in the trust, and Margo exercised her discretionary

powers under the trust in good faith, she claims that the court did not have the authority

to override her actions.

{¶ 136} All of Margo’s arguments under this assignment of error presuppose that

she was acting in good faith and did not breach her duties as trustee. But, as we have

already discussed, the record supports the trial court’s findings that Margo breached the

trust and did not act in good faith. A trial court has discretion under R.C. 5810.01(B)(3)

and (10) to “[c]ompel the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying money . . .” or

“[o]rder any other appropriate relief” for a trustee’s breach of trust. Bryan, 2021-Ohio-

4082, at ¶ 97 (4th Dist.) (“[T]he Ohio Trust Code gives trial courts discretion to choose

among various remedies when a court finds that a trustee committed a breach of trust.”).

Thus, we will review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Abuse of

62. discretion means that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. State ex rel. Askew v. Goldhart, 75 Ohio St.3d 608, 610 (1996).

{¶ 137} The trial court in this case used its powers under the trust code to fashion

a remedy that attempted to make both the trust and Jason whole, while also making

Margo responsible for the debt that she, personally, incurred when she and Raymond

purchased the farm. By the time the trial court entered its judgment, the money that

Jason brought to closing and used to pay the balance of Margo’s mortgage note was no

longer available to be returned to Jason; it had been given to the bank for Margo’s

benefit. The court’s solution was to award Jason a judgment against Margo—the person

who retained the benefit of the money Jason paid. We cannot say that this was an abuse

of discretion.

{¶ 138} Moreover, as the beneficiaries point out, Jason, as the wrongdoer, came to

this transaction with unclean hands, so the court was not required to use its equity powers

to restore him to his presale position. See Prokos v. Hines, 2014-Ohio-1415, ¶ 117 (4th

Dist.), quoting Bradford v. Reid, 126 Ohio App.3d 448, 454 (1st Dist. 1998) (“[I]t has

long been the rule in Ohio that one seeking equity must come to the court with clean

hands. . . . This maxim denies all relief to one, no matter how well-founded his claim

may otherwise be, if, ‘in granting the relief which he seeks, the court would be required,

by implication even, to . . . give its approval to the inequitable conduct on his part.’”).

{¶ 139} Because the court attempted to restore Jason to his presale position and

used its discretionary powers under R.C. 5810.01(B) to remedy Margo’s breach of trust,

63. Jason’s second assignment of error and Margo’s third assignment of error are not well-

taken.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 140} For the foregoing reasons, the March 28, 2025 judgment of the Williams

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Jason and Margo are ordered to divide the

costs of this appeal equally under App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. [[Applied Signature]] JUDGE

Christine E. Mayle, J. [[Applied Signature 2]] JUDGE

Myron C. Duhart, J. [[Applied Signature 3]] CONCUR. JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

64.